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Thesis Abstract 
 
Based on 18 months of fieldwork in southwest Mali (October 2008 - April 2010), this study of 
everyday Islam focuses on ‘ordinary’ Muslim migrants of rural origin who have moved to build 
better lives in the fast-growing town of Bougouni, the crossroads of southwest Mali. The thesis 
explores the importance to them of being both successful and good Muslims in contemporary 
Mali and stresses the triple Mande-Islamic-French legacy shaping local life in southwest Mali. 
 Moral evaluation of success takes place within contexts that range from the 
globalisation of commercial circuits, via sub-Saharan regional factors, to local social ethics, 
status and traditions. Its public character is facilitated by the openness of street life found in 
urban Mali. Against the background of a liberal and democratic shift (associated with a new 
freedom of the press and association, and the reinforcement of laïcité brought about by the 
coup d’état of 26 March 1991), forms of public life in the Third Republic of Mali are 
characterised by outward signs of the practice of a generic Islam which express both piety and 
mundane success. Wealth and consumption are understood as indexes of social status and of 
blessing. While the logics of the market have reinforced the links between prosperity and 
religion, the values of the Mande world are still embodied locally in the exemplary figures of 
the noble Muslim and the blessed child, and in the tensions between display and intention, as 
well as in contrasts between daytime activities and night life that connect morality to issues of 
power, secrecy and occult in Bougouni. For many Malians, this notorious centre of Bamanaya 
religion remains a marginal place, its inhabitants uncivilised, bad Muslims and expert in occult 
manipulation.  
 This study of everyday Islam demonstrates that meanings of Muslims life in Bougouni 
stem from complex interplay between modern forms of distinction and prestige, older 
processes of identity and sociality, and Mande ideas of ‘humanism’ (hadamadenya) that occur 
in southwest Mali. 
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Glossary of Bamanan, French and Arabic words used in text 
 
 
Orthographic conventions, 
 
ŋ = [ng] 
ɲ = [ny] 
ɛ = [è] 
ͻ = [ò] 
c = [ch] 
aa, ee, ii (...) = long vowels 
an, en, in (...) = nasalised vowels 
 
Words in plural are written with a ‘w’ at the end. For instance denw means children. The 
structure of compound words may be stressed by ‘.’ For instance Bamanankan becomes 
Bamanan.kan so as to indicate that its structure is composed of Bamanan (group identity) and 
kan (language). 
 
 
Bamanan 
 
arijɛnɛ   heaven 
baara    work 
baarakalo den  monthly worker 
Bamanankan  bambara language 
Bamanaya   to be bamanan, bamanan religious practices 
balani   itinerant discotheque 
balimaya   brotherhood 
banji   palm wine  
baraji   religious award 
barika   physical strength, blessing 
baya   sermon 
bogolan   traditional cotton cloth dyed with natural vegetal/muddy  
    techniques 
boli    object-power 
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furunafolo   dowry 
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gingin   nocturne raptors 
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kabako   surprising 
kafo   political unit (canton) 
kamalen   young unmarried man 
kamalenba   philanderer, womanizer 
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Introduction 
 ‘Mon père avait raison. La vie est un combat. Ma mère avait raison. Il ne faut jamais jamais 
baisser les bras’ (Madou, 37 years old, electrian).
1
 
In Mali, every day people arrive in middle-sized towns such as Bougouni (or Banimonitie2) so as 
to build their lives. Aïcha comes from a village near Bankass in the Dogon country of northern 
Mali.3 When I met her in 2009 she had lived away from her husband for a year. She left the 
village soon after their marriage and moved to Bougouni where she worked as housemaid to a 
better-off family; her little savings contributed to pay back her wedding costs. Madou grew up 
in a village near the Ivorian border. He moved to Bougouni several years ago to seek money in 
town. As he told me: ‘Ni jama bԑ, wari dͻͻni bԑ’ (Money is where the crowd is). After years of 
hardship, he eventually managed to learn the trade of an electrician; he got married and 
settled down with a family. Urban migrants in Mali struggle to make a livelihood and to move 
forward in life. They often raise ‘the issue of money’ (wariko) as the main hurdle as well as the 
principal door leading them towards a successful life.4 
 Since 2000 I have embarked on several sojourns in the majority-Muslim (90%) country 
of Mali for a total of 27 months.5 During my stays I came to recognise the importance of 
worldly success in people’s lives, their aspiration to be successful, moral Muslims. This 
observation constitutes the main theme of this ethnography based on 18 months of fieldwork 
(December 2008 – April 2010) in the town of Bougouni in the savannah of southern Mali. It 
analyses how the meanings of Muslim life are shaped in the struggles of everyday life and at 
the meeting places between pious concerns, mundane schemes, and ideas of a successful life 
in Mali. By recognising the constitutive importance of earthly success and religiosity in building 
people’s lives in Mali, my intellectual curiosity resonates with The protestant ethic and the 
spirit of Capitalism in which Max Weber pioneered the study of the ‘relation between practical 
life and a religious motivation’ ([1905]2002, 45-46). 
 In line with the analytical scope of Weber’s seminal book, recent studies of Muslim life 
stress the linkages between neoliberalism and religion. By referring to ‘l’Islam de marché’, the 
political scientist Patrick Haenni explores the emergence of a new religiosity, based on recent 
processes of urban distinction and media-visibility found into the Muslim world, which is 
                                                          
1 ‘My Dad was right. Life is a struggle. My Mum was right. One should never give up’. 
This quotation of Madou is a famous tune of a song called Mon père avait raison written by Alpha Blondy and released in 1994. 
2 Banimonotié means between the rivers Ba and Mono in Bamanankan.  
3 To maintain the privacy of my informants, I have changed their names (except for public figures, such as artists, politicians and 
historical figures) and the names of their neighbourhoods. 
4 All amount of money in francs of fcfa refer to the West African CFA franc or XOF (ISO 4217 code); £1 was worth roughly 800 West 
African CFA francs in 2010. 
5 On further statistical details about the religious composition of the inhabitants of Mali, see Leiniger (2009). 
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promoted by new religious entrepreneurs who insert neoliberal values in Islamic discourses 
(Haenni 2005). Following Sloane’s findings about Malay business life (1999), the 
anthropologists Caroline Osella and Filippo Osella (2009), through an investigation of activities 
of Muslim entrepreneurs between India and the Gulf, illustrate the meshing between religious 
orientations and economic principles found in contemporary Muslims’ subjectivities. Focusing 
on the spiritual reform movements that are active in state-owned companies in Indonesia, the 
anthropologist Daromir Rudnyckyj explains how their training programmes aimed to produce 
better Muslims as well as better workers (2010), an assemblage he labels ‘market Islam’ 
(2009a) or ‘spiritual economies’ (2009b). All these scholars stress the appropriation of religious 
values for economic ends in the contemporary Muslim world.  As Osella and Osella write, the 
combination of ‘material success with moral connectedness is coming to be seen as the 
exemplary contemporary way of being a modern, moral, Muslim’ (2009, 204). Their emphasis 
on neoliberal forces in the shaping of contemporary Muslim life highlights a conception of 
worldly success which is, above all, defined in terms of market success. 
 While recognising the impact of transnational neoliberal forces upon Muslim life, this 
dissertation does not explore worldly success in its economic dimension only. Although Aïcha 
and Madou conceive of money as the portal to success, the unfolding of their lives shows that 
success in Mali is a complex social reality which is not defined only by neoliberal ends. In a 
study of economic change among the Giriama of Kenya (1972), the anthropologist David J. 
Parkin investigated the consequences of economic development for social relations, 
particularly people’ s ideas about them. Similarly, this dissertation contributes to 
understanding the importance of being both successful and Muslim in Mali as a subjective 
experience that is social in nature. It explores how the morality of success is simultaneously 
articulated with modern forms of globalisation, sub-Saharan regional and Malian contexts, and 
local social ethics, status and traditions. It also offers the first analysis of urban life in the 
administrative Région of Sikasso and contributes to an ethnographic understanding of 
southwest Mali in general.  
 After explaining my ethnographic approach, in this introduction I will position my 
research initially within the main debates which have shaped the anthropology of Islam in 
West Africa and outline the necessary analytical backdrop for understanding the coming 
chapters of this dissertation. 
 
The study of Bamanankan as ethnographic vector 
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One of the main goals of my fieldwork was to study in depth the lingua franca of Mali, 
Bamanankan (literally, ‘the Bamanan language’). When I arrived in Mali in September 2008, I 
first lived two months in Bamako where I attended intensive Bamanan classes given by an 
excellent teacher, the linguist Mohamed Larabi Diallo of the University of Bamako. In the 
meantime I also prepared for my return to south Mali for my PhD fieldwork, an area with 
which I was already familiar and where I had developed a network of local contacts from my 
previous stay (see Chappatte 2005). Thanks to a local friend who had relatives living in 
Bougouni, I also opted for this urban locality as my main ethnographic site because the town 
was located in the Bamanan zone of the administrative Région of Sikasso. 
 My friend’s family welcomed me with open arms on my arrival in Bougouni on 12 
December 2008; they housed me within the ‘familial compound’ (carré) in a room of a cement 
wing of the main building. Feeling at home in this family, I was able to focus all my energy and 
my time on the research project for the rest of my sojourn in Mali. Within days following my 
arrival I bought a Chinese-made bicycle on which I explored the town and its surrounding 
villages, and met their inhabitants throughout my stay. 
 It is, above all, my commitment to the study of Bamanankan that influenced the 
contacts I made in the field. This linguistic enthusiasm substantially determined the main 
actors of this PhD dissertation: the rural-urban migrants, labourers, craftsmen and small 
traders of Bougouni. Wishing to go beyond the limits of French language imposed by its elitist 
status in Mali, the former settlement of French Sudan, I did not focus especially on the lives of 
the members of the intellectual elite in this research. On the contrary, I privileged making 
contact with Malians who did not speak French. Always equipped with the Bamanankan-
French dictionary written by Reverend Charles Bailleul (1996),6 a diary and a pen, I consistently 
learnt Bamanankan in the field by taking linguistic as well as ethnographic notes while talking 
with Bamanan speakers. Month after month, this linguistic enthusiasm for the main local 
language shaped the social network through which this ethnography of everyday Islam is 
conceived. People like Salif the tailor, Fousseini the carter, and Boubacar the seller of 
yuguyuguw7 (cheap clothes) became my closest friends and informants. Most ethnographic 
materials I present in this PhD dissertation are informal observations and conversations 
emerging in the course of the everyday life I shared with the inhabitants of Bougouni. 
However, this ethnography contains few gendered studies because, except for women of my 
host family, all friendships I developed beyond my housing situation were with men. 
                                                          
6 For an older edition, see Bailleul (1981). 
7 Literally, ‘yuguyugu’ is a Bamanan verb which means ‘to shake’. Yuguyuguw (Fr. friperies) are clothes of various Western origins 
(second-hand/unsold stock) or of Asian manufacturing sold at cheap prices in numerous West African markets. The seller 
commonly spreads yuguyuguw in piles; therefore clients had to rifle through them so as to find what they want. 
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 Language is a privileged vehicle for local culture and historic imprint. In similar way to 
what Paul Riesman undertook in Freedom in Fulani social life (1977), my method consisted of 
apprehending a social life from words to values, and from these values to people’s attitudes. 
The conversational materials I collected during the anthropology of street life I undertook by 
hanging around Bougouni, speak of a vibrant Mande legacy. The daily exploration of districts, 
public life and spaces of sociality on my bicycle connected me with social plots that did not 
originate from the wider world; they rather connoted the presence of expectations, social 
ethics, schemes and threats which are widely interpreted to be of Mande origin. 
 In parallel with recent liberal, economic and political changes brought by the coup 
d’état of the 26 March 1991, the meanings of Muslim life I explore in this dissertation result 
also from the resurgence and the reformulation of longstanding local processes of 
identification, belonging and sociality. I want to stress that contemporary religious phenomena 
are also produced by an older ‘historical process that un-folds over the longue durée’ (Marsden 
and Retsikas, forthcoming) represented by the triple Mande-Islamic-French legacy present in 
contemporary Mali. In order to balance the anthropological trend towards the study of 
‘modern forms of globalisation’ (ibid.), Marsden and Retsikas invite the analyst to recognise 
what Guyer phrases as ‘the long term sedimentation of experience’ in contemporary forms of 
Islam and Muslim life (2004, 172).8 Whereas the anthropologists Benjamin Soares  (2005a) and 
Dorothea Schulz (2012) focus on the study of the impact of modern forms of globalisation such 
as neoliberalism and new media in Muslim life in Mali, I want to examine to what extent older 
processes of sedimentation are constitutive of local conceptions of Muslim life (and vice 
versa). I do so mostly by exploring the legacy of the Mande world found in contemporary 
forms of religious life in Bougouni. 
 
 
 
 
 
Positioning the PhD thesis within the anthropology of Islam in West Africa 
 
                                                          
8 Such processes of sedimentation are well illustrated in two contemporary anthropological studies about Sierra Leone. In a book 
called The Underneath of Things, violence, history and everyday in Sierra Leone  Mariane C. Ferme argues that ‘the politics of 
ambiguity’ and ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ found in Mende daily life are partly the product of a violent history of warfare and 
slavery which has been sedimented and reappropriated in ‘material objects, language, and social relations’(see 2001, 
introduction). In a similar vein, Rosalind Shaw explores how ‘the predatory nature of modernity’, such as lived through the 
violence of Sierra Leone’ s rebel war (1991-2001), has been associated with memories of the Atlantic slave trade among the 
Temne diviners (see 2002, introduction). 
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Most anthropological analyses of Islam in West Africa have focused on religious elites (Muslim 
scholars, marabouts, saints) as the main actors in the Islamic sphere (Cruise O’Brien 2003; 
Otayek 1993; Soares and Launay 1999). Their aim has been to study the relations of 
domination that have shaped Islamic orthodoxy, itself seen as plural, as represented by the 
classic dichotomy between ‘traditional African Islam’ or Sufi orders, on the one hand, and 
‘Reformists’ or ‘Islamists’, on the other, through an historical approach. In this regard, the 
impact of the colonial period on the religious elite has encouraged a historical approach to the 
question of the Islamic orthodoxy in Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF) (Launay 1992; 
Mamdani 1996; Soares 2005a). 
 Consider, for instance, the French creation of la politique musulmane from the fear of 
pan-Islamism. The anthropologist Benjamin Soares stipulates that this latter policy was part of 
a broader politique des races mostly invented by the Governor-General of AOF William Ponty 
(1908-1915). This politique des races ‘promulgated the idea that each “race”, recognised as 
having its own “particular mentality”, should be freed from “the religious and political 
influence of neighbouring groups”’ (Soares 2005a, 53). This political approach of Islam 
emanating from a colonial imagination was turned into the notion of Islam noire (Black Islam) 
by French scholar-administrators such as Maurice Delafosse and Paul Marty. For them, West 
African Islam was different from Maghrebian and Middle-Eastern Islam, and had to be 
protected from their influences. In this way, the French intervention within the religious 
authorities was, in fact, an attempt to define what ‘true’ or legitimate Islam was. This is why, 
according to numerous scholars, it has been difficult to understand shifts of Islamic authority 
in AOF without relating those shifts to the actions of the French colonial authorities. Therefore, 
most anthropological analyses of Islam in West Africa have followed what I call a ‘top-down’ 
research perspective. 
 However, this historical focus on the elites and the state tended to sideline 
consideration of the most common contemporary forms of religious practice and belonging. 
Most Muslims in Africa are neither members of Sufi orders, nor reformists or Islamists (Otayek 
and Soares 2007).9 Despite a notably increasing politicisation of Islam in West Africa and 
beyond, multiple forms of sociability, of thinking and living Islam, are present, and occur in 
differing socio-political contexts (see Gomez-Perez 2005).10 Their main actors are the ‘ordinary 
Muslims’ (a category explored in detail in chapter 2) whom I emphasise in this PhD 
dissertation. 
                                                          
9 This observation was already made in the 1980s about the Muslims of Bamako (see Triaud 1988). 
10 On ‘Political Islam’ see Hirschkind (1997); on ‘Islamic Revival’ see Mahmood (2005). 
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 The relevance of a focus on ordinary Muslims is that it allows me to position this 
research vis-à-vis current anthropological debates on Islam in which scholars are attempting to 
transcend the misleading dichotomy between ‘traditional African Islam’ and ‘Reformists’ 
(Osella and Osella 2008a; Otayek and Soares 2007). In similar vein, already in the early 1980s 
the anthropologist Michael  Gilsenan critiqued the preoccupation of Western politics and 
media with the idea of ‘Muslim mind’ as the key to understanding the essence of the people of 
the Islamic world (1982). Following the events of September 11th 2001, Western public 
discourses have tended to essentialise Islam as the sign of a dangerous ‘other’. Translated into 
academic, political and journalistic discourses, this tendency often takes the form of an over 
simplistic dichotomy between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam (Mamdani 2004) and of the fear of pan-
Islamism (Miles 2004a; Miles 2004b).11 My research on everyday Islam eschews the idea of a 
Muslim essence, as well as the traditional African Islam/Reformists and good/bad dichotomies, 
and the belief in the unity of the Islamic world, to show how such reductions impoverish our 
understanding of the multiplicity and complexity of Islamic discourses, identities, and religious 
experiences. 
 
 
 
Which anthropological approach to Islam? 
 
In the first chapter of his book Muslim Society, Ernest Gellner (1981) ambitiously attempts to 
build a macro model for understanding the working of Muslim society in the arid zone of the 
Maghreb and Middle-East. His approach to Islam as an institutionalized culture is very similar 
to Geertz when defining the scriptural style of Moroccan Islam and the illuminationist style of 
Indonesian Islam in Islam Observed (1968). These two scholars were mainly interested in how 
Islam shapes the contours of a society. Both scholars rightly focus on the fact that Islam - as a 
‘blueprint of social order’12 - is imbricated within the structure of power of Muslim societies. 
Their macro-analysis, however, supports other scientific aims than those I wish to bring 
forward in this work. Their researches refer more to a sociology of Islamic institutions than to 
an anthropology of Muslim life. To do so, below I discuss the notion of piety and the realm of 
religious experiences in relation to a selection of some of the main works on Islam found in 
contemporary anthropology. 
                                                          
11 This tendency is sometimes strengthened by the power of allodoxia, which is the superimposition to the dominant discourse of 
the appearance of reason  and the authority of science (Bourdieu 2004; Bourdieu and Wacquant 2000). 
12 Gellner’s expression (1981). 
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 Talal Asad defined Islam as a discursive tradition (or an objectified form)13 that 
includes the founding texts of the Qur’an and oral traditions relating to the words and deeds of 
the Prophet Muhammad (Hadith) (1986). What does the concept of discursive tradition mean 
in terms of an anthropological approach? Firstly, the Islamic tradition refers to all 
institutionalized conceptions of the past (Qur’an and Hadith) related to present practices (Ibid, 
15). Secondly, the tradition as a discursive phenomenon is linked to power. Therefore, Islam is 
primarily defined as an orthodoxy, itself stemming from relationships of power. In this regard, 
Asad argues that the anthropologist must study the social and historical modalities of the 
relationships of power which frame the enactment of traditions and the resistances they 
encounter (Ibid, 16). In this way, the realm of religious experience is foremost theorised as the 
practice of Islamic precepts based on the interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith.  
 This approach is well illustrated by the feminist Saba Mahmood (2005) in her book 
Politics of Piety, the Islamic revival and the feminist subject in which she explores the 
grassroots women’s piety movement in the mosques of Cairo. Based on Foucault’s notions of 
power and subject, her analysis is seductive because it explains the subordination of women to 
Muslim norms of piety of reformist character. For Mahmood, the practice of the veil is neither 
the outcome of women’s oppression, nor the outcome of women’s free choice, but ‘a 
disciplinary practice that constitutes pious subjectivities’ (Ibid, 195). 
 However, her account of Muslim practice is limited because of the Asadian scope she 
takes that reduces Islam to a ‘Religion of the Book’, and hence piety to the practice of Islamic 
precepts. As Schielke noted, by stressing the concept of discursive tradition, the analyst can 
only study the continuity of Islamic traditions (2006), and this mostly through its intellectual 
debates. In this way of thinking, piety can be easily and wrongly generalised. According to 
Osella and Osella (2008a), by stressing the uniqueness of Muslim experience, the 
anthropologist over-privileges the coherence and disciplinary power of contemporary piety 
movements. Focusing on the personal as well as the social nature of pious practice, Haniffa 
rightly argues that Mahmood forgets simply to analyse ‘the larger context in which such a self 
is desired or the social consequences of choosing such a self’ (2008, 11). If the anthropologist 
would like to grasp how a Muslim life is shaped by worldly matters, another approach is 
needed. 
Furthermore, theorising Islam exclusively as a ‘Religion of the Book’ may lead to overlaps 
between anthropology and theology. Robert Launay shows how the problem of interpretation 
of the Qur’an is primarily a theological one linked to discussion of the purity of Islam and not 
                                                          
13 On the process of objectification of religion, see Eickelmann and Piscatorri (1996). 
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an anthropological one (1992). For a Muslim scholar, all the Islamic sacred texts contain 
perfectly straightforward rules. The problem is not to know which interpretation is the best, 
but to know who knows most when there is disagreement over a given rule. For a Muslim 
scholar, there is no alternative to the interpretation but only ignorance. The same logic applies 
to Islamic rituals. 
 Islam as an anthropological subject should not be reduced to what Durkheim calls its 
prénotions (allegedly self-evident representations) which tend to enclose the nature of the 
study of Islam within its orthodoxy and its purity.14 The strength of anthropology is to open 
new ways of investigating Muslim life (see Alles 2008); recent anthropological studies have 
rightly demonstrated the multiplicity of ways of being Muslim, and the contested area of 
norms of piety (Marsden 2005; Masquelier 2007; Philippon 2006; Soares 2005a). Starting from 
their findings, I can assert only that piety, as lived experience, is heterogeneous. It covers 
different religious orientations implemented in different cultural contexts and shaped by 
different living conditions. 
 When the analyst goes beyond the concept of discursive tradition the very field of the 
anthropology of Islam is questioned.15 There is no such thing as an anthropological essence of 
Islam that deserves a separate field of study. On the contrary, as Triaud argues, ‘Muslims live 
in concrete societies and in concrete situations’ which need to be investigated (2009, 23); the 
ethnographic study of Muslim life refers foremost to an anthropology of religion in which piety 
is primarily defined and assessed in term of religious experience. 
 Framing the argument in a more provocative manner, I agree that ‘there is too much 
Islam in the anthropology of Islam in the sense of a lack of balance between the emphasis on 
religious commitment and a not always sufficient account of the lives of which it is a part’ 
(Schielke 2010, 2). However, Schielke, like Asad (1993), does not consider the study of Muslim 
life as part of an anthropology of religion due to the fact that the Muslim notion of religion 
(dîn) includes only Islam, Christianity and Judaism as genuine religions. But what makes the 
three ‘Religions of the Book’ so special that, as lived experience, they fundamentally differ 
from other religious phenomena? 
 In this work, the term religion refers rather to its Latin etymology ‘religare’ which 
signifies to link, to connect or to join (to the divine, the religious). Arguing for a shared ‘space 
of discussion’ instead of a separate ‘disciplinary subfield’ (Lambek 2000, 310), I hence conceive 
the anthropology of religion as the study of the relationship between the human being, his/her 
                                                          
14 On prénotions, see Durkheim (1894, chapter 2). 
15 In a recent article about the encounter between lay Jains and environmental activists in the Animal Liberations Movements, the 
anthropologist James Laidlaw questions the idea of ethical traditions as immutable by showing how ethical choices are embedded 
in ‘the contingency of the situation’ (2010). 
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living conditions and the religious phenomena, which, as illustrated below, can be articulated 
in people’s worlds in many different ways. 
 
 
 
Walking an earthly path 
  
In the introduction to a recent edited book, Islam and Muslim politics in Africa, Otayek and 
Soares express the current reformulations of Islam in Africa as the emergence of an islam 
mondain or ‘Islam in the present world’ (2007). The notion of islam mondain opens the 
possibility of exploration of Muslim life in relation to contemporary worldly matters (such as 
modernity, social success and globalization) instead of in confrontation with them. The 
religious phenomena of islam mondain become not alternatives to the mundane world but 
inserted into it. Put differently, the study of ‘islam mondain does not privilege Islam over 
anything else, emphasizing instead the actual world in which Muslims find themselves’(Osella 
and Soares 2009, 12). Going one step further in the unpacking of the ‘religious’ dimension of 
the religious phenomenon as an anthropological category, in the introduction to a forthcoming 
book called Articulating Islam, Marsden and Retsikas, through the concept of ‘articulation’, 
invite the analyst to study how the religious phenomenon is constantly ‘produced, reproduced 
and transformed in particular social and historical contexts’ and this happens in mutually 
constitutive dynamics and unpredictable ways (forthcoming).16 
 In line with the concepts of ‘islam mondain’ and ‘articulation’, the way I explore 
everyday Islam among ordinary Muslims living in Bougouni and southwest Mali is inspired by 
the local saying: ‘Tomorrow is in God’s hands’ (Sini bɛ Ala bolo). Analytically I presuppose that 
ordinary Muslims I met strive to live a proper Muslim life for two fundamental religious 
rewards; they do it motivated by the classic ‘access to Heaven’ betterment of doctrinal 
orthodoxy; but they also do it so as to achieve worldly ambitions which make a successful life 
on earth. Referring to the proverb above, my Muslim friend stated God rewards and punishes 
Muslims on earth already. In this way - moving forward in life - (the earthly path) is as 
important as - the gates of Paradise - (the afterlife) for ordinary Muslims I met in Bougouni and 
beyond. 
                                                          
16 Schielke invites analysts to study religion as ‘a grand scheme’ that is ‘external and superior to everyday experience, a higher and 
reliable measure and guideline of life’ (2010, 14). However, by postulating the existence of “grand” schemes by contrast to “small” 
schemes the analyst risks essentialising human activities through a rigid hierarchy. I instead wonder under what specific 
circumstances the human being can turn a grand scheme into a small scheme (and vice-versa). 
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 However, one can argue that concerns about the earthly path and the afterlife are 
interconnected in Muslim life; therefore, they cannot be apprehended separately. For 
instance, once during a bus journey I overheard a conversation between two young adult 
Muslims concerning the recent death of an elder and reflecting upon his funeral by making 
links with people’s earthly achievements and Muslim identity. For them, the fact that his 
funeral was attended by an immense crowd signified two linked things: the local community, 
by paying tribute en masse to their elder, acknowledged his successful life on earth; therefore, 
he surely went to Paradise. By contrast, locals say a poorly attended funeral might be a 
harbinger that Hell was the fate of the deceased. The earthly path and the afterlife are so 
closely related because people think the judgement of God does not diverge far from 
communal appraisal. Although the earthly path and the afterlife cannot be dissociated, I 
analytically emphasise the former because it is ethnographically richer and more concrete than 
the belief in the afterlife and the consequences of God’s judgement. 
 
 
 
The events of 1991 
 
The historical conjuncture framing the religious momentum explored in this ethnography 
stems mostly from changes brought about by the events of 1991 in Mali. Following successive 
droughts, economic difficulties and austerity measures imposed by IMF injunctions in the 
1980s (among other factors), the military dictatorship of Moussa Traoré, who had ruled the 
country since the overthrow of the socialist regime of Modiba Keita in 1968, faced growing 
popular dissatisfaction. The population demonstrated several times on the streets of Bamako 
between January and March 1991; they demanded the end of the single party regime and the 
setting up of multiparty elections;17 state repression led to 200 deaths between 22 and 25 
March. However, on 26 March 1991, a group of officers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou 
Toumani Touré arrested Moussa Traoré and the principle leaders of his regime and suspended 
the constitution. Within days following the coup d’état the new elites (officers and civilians) 
created the CTSP (Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple) which appointed a civilian-led 
government. A transitional period of 14 months paved the road to multi-partyism and 
democracy through the organisation of a national conference, a gathering of several weeks 
including representatives from the transitional government, all opposition and political groups, 
                                                          
17 Anti-governments demonstrations and riots occurred in most regional towns of Mali as well. The administration of Bougouni 
hosted an important set of colonial archives which were burnt during the uprising of March 1991.  
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and the major trade unions as well as some members of the leading international aid and 
finance agencies. Its outcome was embedded in the voting for a new constitution and a series 
of elections (for municipalities, national assembly, and presidency). On 27 April 1992, Alpha 
Oumar Konaré became the first elected President of the Third Republic of Mali.18 The post-
Cold War era in Africa opened up to the decade of ‘second independence’19 in many West 
African countries (see Clark 2000). This new democratic era brought changes that still shape 
the broader contexts in which this ethnography is situated. 
 
 
 
The French legacy of laïcité  
 
Similarly to most former French settlements of West Africa, the laïcité of the Malian state was 
inscribed in its constitution at independence in 1960.20 Nonetheless, its enforcement has 
differed depending on the successive regimes of the postcolonial period. Inspired by both, the 
French colonial legacy of laicïté and a socialist ideology, the socialist regime of Modiba Keita 
(1960-1968) ‘rhetorically integrated Islam’ in its discourses while prohibiting any religious 
associations (such as the UCM21 of reformist allegiance) in order to avoid the influence of 
religious actors on political affairs (Leiniger 2009). The military dictatorship of Moussa Traoré 
(1968-1991) softened its religious policy, but still acted in an ambiguous manner.  The 
government launched the country’s sole officially authorised Islamic association called AMUPI 
(Association Malienne pour l’Unité et le Progrès de l’Islam) in 1981. This latter organization 
was, above all, used as an instance of regulation of conflicts between reformist Muslims and 
Sufi orders and as an instrument of coordination of the ‘petrodollars’ coming from Arabic 
countries in the 1980s (Brenner 1993b; Soares 2005b, 82).22 By creating the AMUPI, the state 
set a closer control on Muslim actors in the country. At the same time, however, by banning 
the opening of bars and night-clubs during the holy month of Ramadan, the state showed its 
sympathy for Islam.  
                                                          
18 Alpha Oumar Konaré won the second presidential election of the Third Republic of Mali in 1997. In 2002, he became the first 
President of Mali who had not ended his term of office in prison. The second elected President of Mali, Amadou Toumani Touré 
(nicknamed ATT), the hero of 26 March 1991, was overthrown after my departure by a coup d’état on 22 March 2012. Further 
links with the 2012 Malian crisis will be developed in the conclusion of my PhD dissertation. 
19 Other political shifts happened in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Togo.  
20 The French colonial state enacted the law about laïcité (the separation between religion and state) in 1905 (Soares 2005a). 
21 L’Union Culturelle Musulmane (UCM) was founded in 1953. It united all reformist movements. The regime of Moussa Traoré 
authorised the reconstitution of the UCM in 1970. One year later, the UCM was accused of public disorder and was abolished for 
good (see Amselle 1985, 346; 352).  
22 After the Second World War, Mali saw the emergence of reformist influences brought by pilgrims and Islamic students who 
returned from the Middle East. The early postcolonial period was characterised by tensions between traditional African Islam and 
new reformist movements in urban Mali (see Amselle 1985). 
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 The Third Republic of Mali reinforced the French legacy of laïcité. ‘After the 1991 coup, 
the new Malian constitution reaffirmed the principle of secularism and religiously based 
political parties were not permitted’ (Soares 2005b, 85). The Malian state did not endorse the 
Traoré regime’s sympathy for Islam; it permitted the opening of bars and night-clubs during 
Ramadan out of respect for its secular principle. Being an overwhelmingly majority-Muslim 
country (90% +) with a commitment to laïcité, Mali has been praised on the international stage 
as a model of religious toleration.23 For instance, in the course of my investigation of the 
variety of religious programmes broadcast on the four local radios of Bougouni, each radio 
director explained to me the diversity of Islamic as well as non-Islamic programmes their radio 
broadcasted by asserting that ‘Mali is a secular country’ (Le Mali est un pays laïc). One added: 
‘As long as they pay the requested fees for broadcasting, I cannot forbid these religious 
programmes.’ More importantly, the presence of three private radios in Bougouni highlighted 
that, besides the reinforcement of its French legacy of laïcité, the Third Republic of Mali also 
brought new civil liberties which have had a considerable impact on religious expression in 
public life. 
 
 
 
Islam through the new civil liberties  
 
During the period of single-party rule (1960-1991), only state medias, such as Radio Nationale 
(the state radio of ORTM (Office de Radiodiffusion et Télévision du Mali) and L’Essor (the 
official state newspaper), officially existed; these state medias strictly represented what 
Sangaré called ‘la voix de son maître’ (2001).24 However, since 1991, the democratic shifts in 
Mali have been characterised by an increasingly lively public sphere, abetted by the new 
freedom of the press and association; both civil liberties have allowed Malians to develop and 
espouse a great variety of opinions, identities and claims in public through social events, 
associations and private media (see Perret 2005). With regard to religious expression, these 
civil liberties, helped by the multiplication of innovative media of religious communication (TV 
and radio, recorded sermons, pamphlets…),25 have further disjointed the Malian ‘Islamic 
                                                          
23 ‘Mali received praise on the international stage as a model of toleration and for its commitment to laïcité or secularism and after 
11 September 2001 was held up as “the sole exemplar of freedom in a majority-Muslim” in the world’ (Soares 2005b, 78). 
24 The voice of his master (e.g. the Malian state). 
25 On the impact of ‘small media’ in the Muslim world, see Eickelmann and Anderson (2003). 
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sphere’,26 and opened new ways of being Muslim.  These civil liberties have also increased the 
visibility of Islam in public in Mali.  
 In her book Muslims and new media in West Africa: pathways to God (2012), Schulz 
focuses on the female face of this religious renewal in the urban localities of San and Bamako; 
through the decision of ‘taking the veil’ as an act of ‘public self-expression’, she illustrates how 
the public practice of piety has become an important element of religious identity among 
female participants in the Islamic renewal movements (Ibid, 9-10). Ordinary Muslims of 
Bougouni have also commonly adopted outward signs of piety (such as the Islamic dress code 
and the communal prayer), however, they not only appreciate them as pious expressions, but 
also assess them as shaping the broader politics of mundane success. Tensions arise from the 
fact that markers of Muslim identity simultaneously convey pious expression and mundane 
status in Mali.  
 
 
 
Institutional and liberal reforms in Mali: the case of Bougouni  
 
The most ambitious institutional reform of the Third Republic of Mali has been the Malian 
decentralisation. From the Jacobin27 and paternalistic Malian states of Modibo Keita and 
Moussa Traoré, the current Malian state triggered in 1993 a complex bottom-up process called 
la Décentralisation. It attempted to involve, through the GREM/GLEM (Groupes 
Régionaux/Locaux d’Etudes et de Mobilisation), the participation of each level of the society in 
the constitution and goals of new territorial collectivities which would receive delegated 
powers  (see Kassibo et al. 1997). The outcome of this reform has been the creation of three 
new levels of territorial collectivities I mention here in ascending order: 701 Communes, 46 
Cercles, and 8 Régions. As of 2012, Malian decentralisation is being achieved through the third 
mandate of locally elected representatives (communal councillors, mayors, representatives of 
Cercle and Région, the Haut Conseil des Collectivités Territoriales). With this reform the town 
of Bougouni, already a Commune Urbaine since 1982,28 was elevated to the administrative 
centre (chef-lieux) of Le Cercle de Bougouni, a vast area of 20,082 km2 which is composed of 26 
                                                          
26 According to Soares and Launay (1999, 504–506), the Islamic sphere in West Africa emerged during the colonial period. They 
argued, with the ‘the free circulation of persons and commodities throughout the colony’, the political economy of French West 
Africa accelerated the ‘Islamisation’ of large parts of the colony and  led to the formation of an ‘Islamic sphere’ separated from the 
state and from the traditional social structures (ethnicity, kinship and castes). 
27 Highly centralised state (French style). 
28 Before the Malian decentralisation, only 19 localities were recognised as having the status of Commune Urbaine, among them, 
13 became Commune Urbaine during the colonial period (in 1955) (see Kassibo et al. 1997); the Commune Urbaine de Bougouni is 
composed of 7 districts and 21 villages. 
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Communes spread over 482 localities (see USAID-Mali and CSA-PROMISAM 2007); roughly 
450,000 people live in this populous Cercle of Mali. Regional Malian towns, such as Bougouni, 
by becoming administrative centres of one of the 46 Cercles of Mali, have benefited from the 
implementation of numerous state services which have boosted their growth. With the arrival 
of new civil servants (such as teachers, doctors, nurses, and various white-collar workers and 
administrators), Malian decentralisation has supported the development of the local 
intellectual elite of Bougouni.  
 Officially cutting the link with a socialist conception of the state and its control of 
economic institutions, the 1991 Malian constitution also sanctions the right to property and 
freedom of enterprise (see Rawson 2000). Besides its liberal reforms, the Malian state ‘has 
tended to meet International Monetary Fund and World Bank targets and timetables for 
structural adjustment programmes, privatization schemes and reductions in state budgets 
deficit’ (Soares 2005b, 77). The implementation of a new liberal economy, intertwined with 
current political stability, has facilitated the flow of aid and loans, foreign investments and 
foreigners in Mali as well as the reinforcement of a spirit of entrepreneurship among Malians 
through the development of local trade.29 With a 6-percent GDP growth rate during the late 
1990s and early 2000s, Mali was regarded as an ‘economic example’ in the West African sub-
region (see Laloupo 2004, 252). In parallel, previously rare goods, such as TV sets, mobile 
phones and DVD players (among other electrical items), internet access, motorbikes and cars, 
have become more common in urban Mali.30 Before 1991, the economy of Bougouni rested 
mainly on the two ageing factories of the CMDT (Compagnie Malienne de Dévelopment du 
textile) and farming (cereals, cotton, and cattle). After 1991, even though most of the families 
of Bougouni remain involved in farming, the secondary and tertiary domains have increased in 
the town with the development of local trade, the arrival of foreign investors, and various 
NGOs and bilateral governmental projects (13 in total).31 
 The post-Cold War era in Mali has been characterised not only by North-South aid, but 
also by the increasing business between Africa and the East. New opportunities for 
consumption in Bougouni have been enlarged by the rise of new Asian producers and 
especially by China. Rapid urbanization in Mali during the 1990s coincided with an influx of 
cheap and mostly Asian-made items termed ‘produits chinois’ (Chinese product) by Malians 
                                                          
29 Since the new democratic and liberal era initiated by the 1991 coup d’état, the ‘United States, European donor countries and 
multilateral lending agencies have all regularly praised Mali as a model for the transition to democracy, the implementation of 
economic reforms and liberalization’ (Soares 2005a, 77). 
30 With regard to material conditions, the Future of Mud documentary (Vogel, Marchand, and Musée National du Mali 2007) 
illustrates how the town of Djenne has changed since 1996 in ways similar to those I observed in Bougouni. 
31 On NGOs and bilateral governement projects in Bougouni, see Plan quinquennal de développement économique, social et 
culturel (2006-2010) de la Commune Urbaine de Bougouni (PAAD/Helvetas and Ministère de l’administration territorial et des 
collectivités locales (DNCT) 2005). 
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themselves. Sale of these goods boosted the uptake of small trade as a complement or 
alternative to farming for many Malians moving to urban areas. Thanks to their being both 
affordable and available, cheap goods have become ubiquitous in urban households. Although 
not long-lasting, they have made what were formerly prestige goods available for purposes of 
self-fashioning by ordinary Malians. 
 Another aspect in the recent urbanisation of Bougouni has been the Ivorian crisis 
which began in late 1990s. The plantation economy (mostly cocoa) supporting the postcolonial 
‘Ivorian Miracle’32 had attracted cheap labourers predominantly from northern Ivory Coast, 
Mali and Burkina Faso since the late colonial period. Most elders of Bougouni worked 
seasonally in these plantations during their youth; others settled there. However, when this 
‘mining’33 economy entered into crisis in the 1990s, ethnic tensions between indigenous 
people of the forest zone and northerners (labelled ‘Duyla’) arose. The stigmatisation of 
northerners in south Ivory Coast caused a partial return of migrants to their home region. This 
civil war particularly hit southern Mali where all families had at least one of their members 
working in the former Ivorian El-Dorado (see Gary-Tounkara 2008). Many migrants from 
southwest Mali settled back in their localities of origin and invested in neighbouring towns 
such as Bougouni.34 An important minority among them managed to build cement houses and 
to be involved in local trade with what they earned over the years in Côte d’Ivoire. The flux of 
migrants returning from Ivory Coast, coupled with their remittances, supported the recent 
urbanisation of Bougouni.   
 Boosted by these dynamics, Bougouni has tripled its population since the events of 
1991. The formerly large village has been transformed in two decades into an important 
regional town of more than 60,000 inhabitants, the third biggest town of the Région of Sikasso. 
As a growing crossroad of the West African savannah, Bougouni has become an important 
centre of migration to which foreigners and adventurers come in order to build a better life. 
The legacy of the Mande world 
 
                                                          
32 Numerous experts and scholars attributed the Ivorian Miracle to its plantation economy. In 1990, Côte d’Ivoire accounted for 40 
percent of French West African regional income, http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/dossiers/cotedivoire/ (retrieved 
10.02.2012). 
33 The Ivorian Miracle ran out of steam due to the inherent ‘cycle of cocoa’. Indeed, histories of cocoa in Brazil, Ecuador, Ghana… 
and Côte d’Ivoire have all followed the same ‘Boom – Crisis’ cycle.  Basically, the economy of plantation is a ‘mining’ economy in 
which the principal resource is the forest zone (Ruf 1995a; Ruf 1995b). This economy is based on a system of a ‘pioneer front’ (the 
sporadic development of unexploited tropical forest lands to plant cocoa trees) and the conquest of the forest zone by migration 
(see Woods 2003, 643) . As soon as the forest zone disappears, the cocoa boom ends and an economic recession begins. 
34 After my departure, the presidential election of 2010 in Côte d’Ivoire ended up in a political crisis between the southerner 
Laurent Gbagbo and the northerner Alassane Ouattara. After months of conflict, the pro-Ouattara forces, helped by UN and 
French forces, captured and arrested Laurent Gbabgo. The investiture of Alassane Ouattara as President of Côte d’Ivoire happened 
on 21 May 2011. Since then, the situation has defused in Côte d’Ivoire, but tensions remain. 
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Nowadays the cultural influence of the Mande world crosses several West African countries, 
but its heartland was southwest Mali and eastern Guinea, the birthplace of the great Mali 
Empire established by Sundiata Keita in the thirteenth century.35 The Mandinka, the people of 
the Mande world, were classified in the colonial period into numerous ethnic groups.36 I am 
particularly interested in the relation between Islam and one of the founding and largest 
ethnic groups of the Mande people, the Bamanan (or Bamana, Bambara), because the town of 
Bougouni is located in their historic zone.  
 The presence of Islam was accepted in the Mande world for centuries. The first 
contacts between Mande people and Muslims happened in the seventh and eight centuries 
with Arab travellers who explored the Sahara desert from southern Morocco. Then, Muslim 
traders and Islamic scholars, known under the name of marabouts, gradually and progressively 
spread southward down to the hearth of the Mande world, the forest zones and, to a lesser 
extent, the coastal countries of West Africa. The kafo of Bougouni was a vassal of the powerful 
Bamanan kingdom of Ségou (from the seventeenth century to 1861). At that time, the tiny 
minority of Muslim traders and marabouts coexisted peacefully with the overwhelming 
majority of the population (farmers and craftsmen), notables, and the royal family who 
practised what anthropologists now call ‘the bamanaya religion’ (see Bravmann 2001, 35–
43).37 These cohabitations illustrated the centuries-old processes of accommodation between 
Islam and local religious practices which preceded the mass-Islamisation of the entire Mande 
world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
  However, the Bamanan have been known to remain attached to their traditional 
religion. Historically, Islam achieved relatively slow progress among them compared to other 
Mandinka people (see Conrad 2001, 27). As a consequence, Bamanan has covered somewhat 
heterogeneous signifiers, but one of them has been ‘pagans of the south’ (see Bazin 1985, 101; 
113). Bamanan as a populous ethnic group lately Islamised tended to stand for what was not 
Muslim in the past. Nowadays the wording ‘bamanaya’ is still associated with un-Islamic 
religious practices of Mande origin whether Bamanan or not. Therefore, in an introductory 
chapter of an edited book called Bamana: the art of existence in Mali, the anthropologist Jean-
Paul Colleyn wrote: ‘According to all the sources, the people who were (and still are) 
eventually claiming to be Bamana refer to the fact that they don’t perform prayers to Allah, 
the Muslim God, but remain faithful to the religion of their ancestors’ (Colleyn 2001a, 20). 
Furthermore, unlike north Mali, north Ivory Coast and eastern Guinea, south Mali underwent a 
                                                          
35 On the epic of Sundiata Keita, see Niane (1960), Jonhson (1986) and Sisoko and Johnson (1992); on the Mande creation myth, 
see Dieterlen (1957); on the problem of the Mande creation myth, see Austen (2008). 
36 On an illustration of such colonial classification, see Delafosse (1912); on the inventive and coercive nature of such colonial 
process, see Dozon (1985). 
37 On the notion of Bamanaya religion, see Dieterlen (1951). 
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late Islamisation (1900 – currently). Many of my Muslim friends from central and northern 
Mali did not understand why I wanted to study Muslim life in Bougouni (rather than in Djenné, 
Timbuktu or other historic towns); one of them significantly told me ‘the Cercle of Bougouni is 
a land of fragile faith’. As a newly Islamic land, southwest Mali has been stigmatised as 
backward by northern Muslims in general. Indeed, numerous are the Malians who suspect the 
autochthons of Bougouni of being uncivilised, bad Muslims and expert in occult manipulations. 
However, by 2008-2010, the overwhelming majority of inhabitants of southwest Mali I met 
considered themselves as ‘Bamanan-Muslim’, a linguistic juxtaposition which would have 
seemed contradictory 40 years earlier according to Colleyn. 
 Today, Bamanan as a way of life is mostly perceived by scholars as a past reality 
preserved in museum collections. Changes brought by ‘colonialism, Islam, capitalism, and the 
establishment of Western educational system‘(Frank 2001, 51) accelerated the collapse of the 
traditional Bamanan culture. But Frank concludes by writing that ‘the resurgence of bͻgͻlan 
and the continued vitality of such institutions as Ci-wara and Sogow attest the resilience and 
dynamism of Bamana social and aesthetic traditions’ (2001, 51). In line with Frank’s concluding 
remark, I do not mean to enclose the Bamanan way of life in museum. Arguing against the 
predominance of the new neoliberal order as analytical framework (see Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2000) and the sharp historical line implied in ‘post-theories’  (see Kipnis 2008 
preface) I explore how local conceptions of Muslim life in postcolonial Mali are also shaped by 
processes of recurrence and reproduction of Bamanan identity in different domains of local 
social life. 
 
 
 
The Chapters 
 
Chapter 1 first provides a portrait of the town of Bougouni with a focus on religious changes; it 
shows how the town of Bougouni has been shaped by wider transformations, although it 
continues to suffer from a bad reputation in Mali. The conclusion to this chapter, explains the 
centrality of street life to people’s lives in urban Mali. Chapter 2 argues that the increasingly 
public expressions of piety observed in post-1991 Mali, in addition to being supported by the 
new civic liberties, result from a longstanding cultivation of ostentatious identities promoted 
by the visual dimension of street life in Mali. Chapter 3 examines how complex interactions 
between local understandings of Islam and being Muslim are informed by the reformulations 
of a set of sacred and ordinary virtues and local norms and practices of ‘social ethics’ 
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(hadamadenya), which are widely interpreted to be of Mande origin. Chapter 4 focuses on a 
peculiar field of migratory experiences: rural Malians who respond to the challenge of earthly 
ambitions through undertaking ‘adventures’ (tunga) to urban area. However consumerism in 
town has increased and made more visible the material distinctions in wealth between Malians 
which, in turn, has fostered ‘jealousy’ (kɛlɛya) and made ‘egoism’ (ɲɛgoya) a source of public 
concern to the inhabitants of Bougouni. When moral evaluation of someone’s success or 
failure in life brings forth divisive sentiments, the bad reputation of Bougouni resurfaces in the 
shape of accusations of witchcraft and sorcery that I examine in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 explores 
generational issues over Islam in contemporary Mali through the resurgence of a local 
tradition of music (guitars and local drums) in the so called ‘zikiriw’ promoted by the powerful 
Ansar Dine Muslim association. Chapter 7 completes the exploration of urban street life and its 
metaphor of sight through an anthropology of the night in Bougouni. It demonstrates how the 
interplay between day life and night life is an important component of morality in Mali. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Bougouni, a crossroads in southwest Mali 
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Bougouni is located in the savannah of southwest Mali; a peripheral zone that never played a 
prominent role in West African history. According to the historian Brian Peterson this region 
‘was something of a zone of refuge that had absorbed waves of population over the centuries’  
who fled ‘state control and enslavement’ during the pre-colonial period (2011, 37–38). At that 
time the region, relatively low in population density, was divided into multiple chiefdoms 
called kafo each composed of grouping of villages dominated by powerful lineage. Villager 
livelihoods depended on an extensive mode of agricultural production (hoe farming) practised 
in abundant but relatively poor soils. Such small kin-based organisations did not control long-
trade exchange (which was in the hands of Muslim traders), and would probably be termed 
‘acephalous’ or ‘chiefless societies’ by Jack Goody (1971). As a ‘buffer zone’38 or borderland 
between the pre-colonial Empire of Wassoulou and the Kingdom of Kenedougou, southwest 
Mali suffered unevenly from the widespread predations that occurred during the wars of 
Samory in the late nineteenth century. Samory Touré, the founder of the Empire of 
Wassoulou, enslaved numerous inhabitants there so as to finance his fierce resistance to the 
colonisation.39 The French conquest stabilised the region in the 1880s, but it continued to be a 
marginal zone. Southwest Mali was on the fringe of colonial policy in terms of investments 
compared to forest and coastal West Africa. It remained an area characterised by remoteness, 
poverty and lack of economic opportunities (see Meker 1980) in which labour migration to 
coastal countries became an important economic strategy. Ever since the implementation of a 
colonial ‘head tax’ (nisͻngͻ)40 in 1895, southwest Mali has further been marked by migratory 
processes of an economic nature. Many of its inhabitants moved to coastal countries as 
seasonal workers in the cash crop economy; a minority among them permanently settled in 
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire (mostly).  As one of the last zones of Bamanan country to become 
predominantly Muslim (see introduction), southwest Mali has also been specifically 
stigmatised as backward by Northern Muslims in general. This marginal past still casts its 
shadow over Bougouni which does not enjoy a good reputation among Malians who suspect 
its autochthons of being uncivilised, bad Muslims and expert in occult manipulations.  
 Bougouni’s bad reputation endured because of its relative underdevelopment in the 
early postcolonial period compared to other Malian towns with similar colonial pasts. In the 
1980s, ‘when we told a civil servant that he was posted to Bougouni this latter became very 
scared’.41 When a transfer to Kidal (extreme Northeast of Mali) was interpreted as sort of 
punishment due to its extreme geographical remoteness, a transfer to Bougouni was also 
                                                          
38 Peterson’s expression (2008, 263). 
39 On the wars of Samory in south Mali, see Peterson (2011, 24–57). 
40 On colonial head tax (nisͻngͻ) see Peterson (2011, 66–67). 
41 Nouhoum Doumbia, Bougouni, 17 Nov. 2009. 
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understood as kind of career regression because of its backwardness and the occult threat of 
its inhabitants. Although electricity arrived in town during Second World War and a tarred road 
in 1962, Bougouni remained a big village until recently. The town started its growth in the 
1970s with the construction of one cotton factory that developed the cash crop economy in its 
hinterland and employed hundreds of locals.42 Nonetheless, during the 1980s, cement houses 
and motor vehicles were rare and streets all unsurfaced. At that time not a single house had 
more than one floor. Hearsay was that better-off families did not dare to build houses with 
multiple storeys because they feared falling victim to ‘mauvaises personnes’ (bad persons).43 
Although elevated to the status of 18th Commune Urbaine of Mali in 1982, Bougouni had fewer 
than 20,000 inhabitants in 1991. 
 In the last two decades, however, Bougouni expanded considerably and became an 
important regional town. Its growth has followed general tendencies shaping urbanisation 
within Africa, such as the increasing phenomena of migration and mobility enabled by the 
development of modern transport and road networks in much of the continent (De Bruijn, Van 
Dijk, and Foeken 2001; Hanna and Hanna 2009; Gugler 2002). In addition, smaller and 
medium-sized administrative towns have since the 1980s grown more quickly than the largest 
cities due to a combination of factors such as ‘the generally more difficult economic conditions 
facing urban dwellers in the last two decades, the on-going deterioration44 of infrastructure 
and public services, and since the 1990s, the spatial decentralisation of investment and 
planning decision’ (Tacoli 2001: 143).45 Regional factors also explain the growth of Bougouni. 
 The vast savannah of southwest Mali, a transition zone between the Sahelian zone of 
northern Mali and the coastal forests of Côte d’Ivoire, became an important zone of migration 
within Mali due to the increasing demographic pressure affecting northern Mali, by contrast, 
with the availability of land resources in southern Mali, considered as ‘le grenier du Mali’ (the 
granary of Mali). In parallel, the wild oscillation in food production caused by the desiccation of 
the Sahel has increased a general ‘southbound migration’ within Mali (see De Bruijn and Van 
Dijk 2003). In this regard, southwest Mali has witnessed significant rural-rural migration since 
the late 1980s as illustrated by the arrival of Dogon farmers (see Konaté 2003). Although low in 
fertility and sensitive to erosion compared to the coastal forests of Côte d’Ivoire, southern Mali 
benefits from a longer and heavier rainy season than northern Mali. Migrants from northern 
Mali stressed that ‘the issue of water’ (ji.ko) is much less pressing than in their native Sahel. As 
a relatively small town, Bougouni still offers complementary farming opportunities; ‘In these 
                                                          
42 A second cotton factory was built in the 1980s. 
43 On the occult, see chapter 5. 
44 The development of modern transport has been undermined by a lack of maintenance of road networks. 
45 On similar analysis, see Bertrand and Dubression (1997). 
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less densely populated centres, urban and peri-urban agriculture could more easily be 
combined with other urban occupations as a livelihood strategy’ (Tacoli 2001, 145).46 Indeed, 
most families in Bougouni complement their urban activities with small breeding and a 
garden47 within their courtyard, and the cultivation of a plot of land in the vicinity of the town. 
Bougouni has also attracted an important rural-urban migration of people from the 
surrounding rural hinterland and beyond who go on an adventure to the town (see chapter 5). 
Other countryside men hide in town in order to avoid taxes back in their villages. They become 
what Malians name ‘populations flottantes’ (fleeting population).48 Strategically located next 
to Ivorian and Guinean boundaries and along the international tarred road Bamako – Abidjan 
(the only tarred road crossing the boundary between Mali and Côte d’Ivoire), Bougouni has 
also drew international traders and smugglers as well. Due to the weakness of the Guinean 
franc compared to the CFA franc, smuggled cigarettes, motorbikes and weapons (among other 
products) from Guinea arrive and pass through the town. The town witnesses also an 
important ‘gradual migration’ (see Van Dijk, Foeken, and Van Til, Kiky 2001); migrants who 
temporarily settle in small towns first, before continuing to larger towns such as Bamako 
where opportunities are supposed to be more profitable but risks bigger.49 Finally, the 
emergence of the Ivorian crisis in late 1990s with its ethnic tension caused a partial return of 
migrants to their home region. This civil war has particularly hit southern Mali where all 
families had one and more of their members working in the former Ivorian El-Dorado (see 
Gary-Tounkara 2008). 
 This rapid growth of Bougouni has nurtured alternative views which nuance its bad 
reputation. Boosted by these dynamics, Bougouni has tripled its population since the events of 
1991. It has become by far the biggest locality within a savannah of roughly 40,000 km2 
(composed of the administrative Cercles of Kolondiéba, Yanfolila and Bougouni). Its weekly 
market on Thursday attracts merchants from as far as Bamako, Sikasso and Guinea. Its ‘forains’ 
(stallholders) supply a network of weekly rural markets within southwest Mali down to 
Manankoro. What was formerly a large village has been transformed in two decades into an 
important regional town of more than 60,000 inhabitants, the third biggest town of the Région 
de Sikasso. 
                                                          
46 On similar analysis, see Girault  (1997). 
47 Families in Bougouni are known to cultivate lady’s fingers (dagan) for the market of Bamako. 
48 Nouhoum Doumbia, Bougouni, 17 Nov. 2009. 
49 With its 2,000,000 inhabitants, Bamako exceeds by far the 250,000 inhabitants of the second biggest town of Mali (Sikasso). It is 
the political and economic centre of Mali where most Malians wish to live. It is ‘the destination of desire and promise, especially 
for Mali’s young people’ (Arnoldi 2007, 19). Most inhabitants of Bamako have a tendency to reduce Mali to its capital and an 
immense homogeneous space they name ‘la brousse’ (bush), a discourse which resonates with the Paris - province simplification 
made by the inhabitants of the French capital. 
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  This chapter documents my field-site of Bougouni as a shifting place because this 
increasingly urban area is still marked and “haunted” by a history of marginality.  Living in 
Bougouni means experiencing, a modern town, set up with electricity, tarred road, mobile 
network (…) and cement houses while, at the same time, being connected to an ambivalent 
past through its old districts, colonial buildings and bad reputation.50 The somewhat 
contradictory identities of Bougouni are first addressed through a song which reflects the past 
reputation and present transformations of what its composer, the famous local artist Nahawa 
Doumbia, called the ‘crossroads’ of southwest. Thereafter, I give a short history of the late-
Islamisation of Bougouni in order to understand better the origins of its notoriety, the 
formation of public Islam in Mali as well as the presence of a Mande legacy in local life as I 
observed it during my 18 months fieldwork there. Then, a tour of the old districts of the town 
will connect Bougouni to its foundation, its local history and places of memory, and its 
powerful chieftainship which still shapes local politics. In similar perspective I continue by 
investigating the colonial imprint found in town. Both periods still inform contemporary 
dynamics of power. They also stress elements of continuity with the past. The second part of 
the chapter will explore the recent growth of Bougouni; I illustrate how post-1991 waves of 
migrants widened the four postcolonial districts of the town, undermined the demographic 
position of autochthons, and supported alternative views of Bougouni which challenge its bad 
reputation. Finally, I introduce the three spaces of sociality (carré, street and grin) in which 
people spend most of their time in Bougouni. The focus on these open spaces involves an 
anthropology of street life that is crucial to my analysis of Muslim life in this dissertation. 
 
 
 
Past reputation and present transformations 
 
Nahawa Doumbia, a famous singer born in the village of Mafélé in southwest Mali in 1959, 
grew up and has lived most of her life in Bougouni.51 According to local recollection, her 
mother, who died shortly after her birth, predicted that Nahawa, although the daughter of a 
blacksmith (numu), would perform songs, a profession which is traditionally the realm of griot 
(praise singer and bard, jɛli).52 Defying her father, she started to perform locally in the 1970s. 
Spotted by agents of the Ministry of Culture, she took part in and won La Biénnale de la 
                                                          
50 This analysis of Bougouni is inspired by De Boeck’s mirroring approach to the urban world (2008). 
51 For a documentary of Nahawa Doumbia, see Lecomte (1997). 
52 For further information on Mande statuses, see chapter 3. 
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Jeunesse53 in Bamako in 1980. Her career then took on a national and even international 
dimension. She has, however, mostly performed in Mali where she is often called the ‘Queen 
of Didadi’, a rhythm of the Wassoulou54 region of southwest Mali on which young people 
challenge each other during ceremonies and festive evenings. Nahawa is nicknamed ‘child of 
djinns’ (jinɛ den), which she references often in her repertoire; this connection with occult 
forces makes her an awe-inspiring artist in Mali.  Part of her success in Mali is also due to 
Nahawa’s empathic lyrics which are related to the difficulties of everyday life. Although a star 
in Mali, she has remained close to ordinary Malians by living in Bougouni (instead of moving to 
Bamako and the Western world) and by working for twelve years as a nurse in the hospital of 
Bougouni until recently. She lately wrote a praise song called ‘Bougouni’55 for her eleventh 
album which invites the listener to appreciate Bougouni for what it is instead of what people 
have heard about it (2009).  I comment below on a selection of its lyrics in order to discuss the 
suspicion with which Bougouni is perceived in Mali. 
 
The country of Banimonité is good; the country of Banimonotié is good [twice].  
Bougouni is within Bamanomitié; Bougouni is good. I greet Bougouni [twice]. 
If your bad reputation precedes your good reputation, this latter remains unknown.  
 
In the lyric above, Nahawa neither refutes nor accepts the bad reputation of Bougouni, but she 
invites people to look at it nowadays as a place where life is good. Indeed, for the first time in 
two centuries, the town of Bougouni has become an important centre of migration where 
Malians from all the country and foreigners are coming in order to build a better life. 
 
I greet Coulibaly of Bougouni. If a stone falls on someone, he is injured. If someone falls on stone, he is 
injured. Coulibaly are good people. 
 
According to Nahawa Doumbia, however, the current expansion of Bougouni also relies on 
respecting the value of its autochthons. The Bamanan Coulibaly were among the first 
autochthons of Banimonitié. Nahawa praises them with a play on words: Couli or Coulou 
means stone (kulu) in Bamanankan; Coulibaly are as one, and solid as stone; therefore one 
should respect them instead of fighting them. 
 
                                                          
53 For an extended study of such youth festivals, see Arnoldi (2006). 
54 Wassoulou region is well known for its music.   
55 See original lyrics in Bamanankan in Appendix 1. 
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There are four kinds of Fula. If a Fula puts on weight, he is not a Fula. If Fula is thin, he is a true Fula. [
56
] I 
thank Fula of Banimonitié for their hospitality. Fula are good people. 
 
Nahawa moves on by jokingly praising the four Fula families (Diallo, Diakité, Sangaré and 
Sidibé) who are the second autochthons of Banimonité. According to local discourses, the Fula 
arrived in southwest Mali slowly in pre-colonial waves of migration from Northeast Mali (the 
current Région of Mopti). They progressively settled in southwest Mali and took political 
power due to their military strength. Step-by-step, they abandoned their language and 
adopted that of their first hosts: the Bamanankan. Present-day inhabitants of southwest Mali 
make jokes with these ‘fake Fula’ who settled in their villages and married their sisters. They 
tease them, saying that their Bamanan sisters, in turn, taught Bamanankan to their Fula 
children instead of Fula language. Progressively these Fula became farmers and adopted the 
local life style. Only their patronym remains of Fula origin. Their former hosts say ‘they have 
been “Bamanised”’. Bamanan locals express a sort of ‘joking relationship’57 which certifies the 
alliance between Fula and Bamanan there, but question Fula authority by reminding them of 
the disappearance of a Fula ethos and the longstanding cultural domination of Bamanan 
society characterising southwest Mali.    
 
Some said it has become l’examen de Bougouni [twice]. Some said there are many mad people in 
Bougouni, but it is not true. 
 
Here Nahawa questions the bad reputation of Bougouni within Mali that is expressed in the 
popular saying about ‘l’examen de Bougouni’ (the examination of Bougouni); it is a tale, 
allegedly based on a true event that happened in the early postcolonial period, which stresses 
that egoism and jealousy are particularly present in Bougouni. It narrates that an 
autochthonous sorcerer used his occult power to cause all children to fail in an exam because 
he did not want his son to fail alone. 
 Before moving to Bougouni I often heard this popular saying from Malian friends who 
wanted to warn me about the nastiness of the inhabitants of Bougouni and the high 
proportion of witches and sorcerers among them. Similarly, Malians frequently pointed to the 
backward character of Bougouni by mentioning a famous reprimand voiced by the former 
President Moussa Traoré following the murder of the young Secrétaire Général of the Cercle de 
                                                          
56 The Fula are usually reckoned thin. 
57 For early writing on joking relationships as reciprocal bonds between two groups in West Africa, see Labouret (1929); for a 
functionalist analysis of joking relationships see Radcliff-Brown (1940; 1949); on joking relationships as strategic means for 
‘wedging two groups apart while keeping them together’ in Djenné (Mali), see Marchand (2003, 60). 
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Bougouni of the single party UDPM58 in 1987 whose corpse was found a couple of kilometres 
from Bougouni on the road to Manankoro. This tragic event hit the national headline news and 
caused the President to come to Bougouni. Moussa Traoré assembled the townspeople in the 
Sakoro Mery Diakité soccer stadium. Angry, he shouted at the population the following play on 
words that became a famous saying in Mali: ‘Bougouni tɛ kɛ Bougouba yé!’ (The small hut 
(Bougouni) is not a big hut (Bougouba)). His meaning, based on a contrast between suffixes ni 
(small) and ba (big), is that Bougouni was not a big town and will never be one. Originally, this 
play on words conveyed the idea that Bougouni cannot be developed because its inhabitants 
are not civilised; some of them are even murderers. Indeed, when Moussa Traoré delivered his 
famous reprimand in 1987, the town was still small and looked rather like a big village of mud 
houses. In 2008-2010, except for autochthonous adults, most youngsters and foreigners I met 
did not know about the original context of this play on words. They just associated it with the 
general backward character Bougouni has in Mali.59  
 Both ‘L’examen de Bougouni’ and this saying remind to Malians of the bad reputation 
of Bougouni. Foreigners also think there are many mad men in Bougouni due to immoral 
schemes of its inhabitants. I heard many others such stories that, I argue, were initially due to 
the peripherality of southwest Mali, its late-Islamisation, and more recently, to the relative 
underdevelopment of Bougouni before 1991. But Nahawa sings that things have changed in 
the last two decades. Development is coming to Bougouni. ‘Maisons à étages’ (houses with 
floors) are now numerous in Bougouni. Its centre was recently tarred and the town hosts 
numerous NGOs now. 
 
Bougouni is a crossroads. 
If you want to find Bougouni, it is located between Côte d’Ivoire and Mali.  
It is between Guinea and Mali. It is between Sikasso and Bamako. 
I thank the protective djinn of Bougouni. Bougouni and Banimonité are good. 
 
At the end of the song, Nahawa invites listeners to look at Bougouni as a flourishing town 
which is now a crossroads connected to the wider world.60 In the predominantly Muslim 
society of Mali, Nahawa overtly praises the protective djinn of Bougouni who has sustained its 
recent development by guarding the town against misfortune and curse. Indeed, foreigners 
said that, although Muslims, the inhabitants of southwest Mali remain attached to a near 
                                                          
58 Union Démocratique Populaire du Mali. 
59 Others mentioned that Moussa Traoré voiced this reprimand when, on his way to Bougouni from Yanfolila, his convoy passed by 
bushfires.    
60 Put differently, local modalities of cohesion, sociality and development  are conversing with more regional and global 
frameworks; outcomes of such conversations are shaping what AbdoulMaliq calls the ‘worlding’ of African cities (2001). 
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‘legacy’ (facɛ) of un-Islamic origins upon which their nastiness is built. Such statements cannot 
be fully grasped without outlining the late-Islamisation of south Mali, a historic specificity 
which largely accounts for the bad reputation of Bougouni. 
 
 
 
A short history of religious changes in Bougouni 
 
According to Peterson, Islamisation in this part of rural West Africa was a long-term, gradual 
and ‘drifting’ process that took place from below (see 2011). The wars of Samory with their 
conversion ‘at the point of the sword’ achieved very little success (Ibid, 49). Islamisation has 
been rather the progressive outcome of mobile social groups (freed slaves from 1910, colonial 
soldiers, migrant workers from 1920) who returned to their homeland and introduced prayer 
into their villages. His findings are mostly right, but nuances need to be added with regard to 
the peculiar case of Bougouni, the only colonial post in southwest Mali until 1951. Islam in 
Bougouni was originally brought by Muslim foreigners who settled there during the colonial 
period. These migrants were mainly composed of civil servants who worked in the colonial 
administration, and merchants who set up businesses in this roadside trade town. In this way, 
Bougouni attracted a Muslim elite that induced an Islamisation from above. Within the town, 
Islam became quickly associated with wealth, power and status. Until the mid-colonial period, 
Islam was substantially present (in the form of a grouping of Muslims composed of few 
families) and freely practised within southwest Mali only in the colonial post of Bougouni and 
several old Muslim trade settlements such as Garalo. These ‘Muslim islands’ (Ibid, 35) also 
sheltered newly converted Muslims against the segregation they underwent in their villages. 
As a colonial centre and roadside town, Bougouni underwent a faster process of Islamisation 
than its hinterland. 
 During the colonial period, Bamanaya practitioners and Muslims lived together in 
Bougouni. Islam was not a regulator of public life as it is nowadays. For instance, the town 
hosted a place called korokoji (water of peddlers) where people met around small taprooms 
and drank local millet beer (dͻlͻ) in public.61 The two religious practices were less distinct than 
now. Muslims had very little knowledge of Islam; ‘shifting’ or ‘dual’ practices were common 
among newly converted Muslims as well as among practitioners of Bamanaya. According to 
local elders, some Muslims went to see performances of the kͻmͻ initiation society of the 
                                                          
61 Nouhoum Doumbia, Bougouni, 17 Nov. 2009. 
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village of Kola, participated in public Bamanan sacrifices asking for rain, and performed Islamic 
prayers as well.62 At that time, each practice borrowed elements from the other. Following 
Peterson ‘even as people began praying and embracing Muslim forms of religious life, the 
generative cultural grammar, as it were, remained rooted in bamanaya’ (Ibid, 13). Within the 
emerging context of an ‘Islamic sphere’ promoted by colonial peace and the development of a 
road network (see Soares and Launay 1999), Muslim identity progressively came to be 
associated with a body of standardised Islamic practices. As elders said ‘those who pray’ (mͻgͻ 
min bɛ sɛli) became distinct from ‘those who possess fetish’ (jͻtigi). In Bougouni, Muslim 
identity sharpened with the arrival of foreign ‘Muslim scholars’ (karamͻgͻw)63 who preached 
in public (wajuli) and instructed in traditional Islamic schools (duguma kalan)64 in the second 
half of the colonial period.  
 At the same time the remoteness, poverty and lack of economic opportunities of 
southwest Mali has promoted mobility among its inhabitants that accelerated their 
Islamisation. Owing to the introduction of colonial taxes, many inhabitants of Bougouni moved 
to work in the cash crop economy of the forest and coastal Muslim zones (current Senegal, 
Guinea and part of Ivory Coast) during the colonial period.65 Some of these mobile workers 
returned to their homeland and introduced prayer to their families. Such migratory processes 
continued in the postcolonial period and reinforced mass-Islamisation in Bougouni. The first 
médersa (Ar. madrasah) in Bougouni was opened in 1961.66 The establishment of such modern 
Muslim schools, which teach Islamic studies alongside secular subjects with the same 
pedagogical principles employed in the state schools, undermined traditional Islamic school 
(see Brenner 2001, introduction). Moreover, such form of schooling opened up Bougouni to 
wider Islamic influences because it was primarily developed in Mali by local Muslim scholars 
trained in the Middle East. Although difficult to assess, local elders say that the town became 
predominantly Muslim during the early postcolonial period; mosques mushroomed during the 
last two decades. By 2010 more than 30 mosques had been erected in Bougouni. Muslims 
prayed in 5 different mosques on Friday.67  
                                                          
62 Mamadou Traoré, Bakary Diawarra, Ablaye Diarra, Youssouf Coulibaly, Bougouni, 6 June 2009. 
63 For instance, Lallama Sylla of Bamako who settled in Bougouni in early 1950s. 
64 From the noun ‘dugu.ma’ (soil) and the verb ‘ka kalan’ (to study); basically, in these traditional Islamic schools (or Qur’anic 
schools) students (Ar ‘talibe’; Bam. ‘garibu’) sit directly on the ground and ‘learn’ the Koran ‘by heart’(ka durusi kɛ).  
65 Economic migration was more important in hinterland of Bougouni where cash economy was much less developed (almost nil). 
66 7 médersas were operating in Bougouni in 2010. 
67 Bougouni also hosted a minority of Christians (one Catholic parish and one Protestant seminary). Other religious movements 
were present in Bougouni such as the Baha’i. The public presence of the non-Muslim community illustrated the laïcité of the 
Malian state (see introduction); however, this non-Muslim community was nevertheless incidental and did not turn out to be a 
major actor in my fieldwork.   
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In the hinterland of Bougouni, the region of Cɛmala-Banimonitié suffered ‘very little’ from the 
wars of Samory; this is partly due to the fact that this area sheltered the Dyula68 of Garalo who 
collaborated with Samori and protected their kafo (see Peterson 2011, 61). Most of its 
inhabitants did not undergo a period of enslavement in Muslim areas. Hence, the ending of 
legal slavery in 1905 did not encourage Islam through the exodus of former slaves there who 
had become Muslim during their enslavement, as it is the case of villages along the river Bagoé 
which crosses the centre of south Mali (Ibid, 24-57). My enquiries in the hinterland of Cɛmala-
Banimonitié suggest that it was, above all, migrant workers involved in the cash crop 
economies of Senegal (1920-1950) and Côte d’Ivoire (from 1950) who progressively brought 
Islam there by introducing prayer into their village.69 First mobile workers moved to seek 
money in order to be able to pay colonial taxes (ni.sͻngͻ which literally means ‘soul price’), 
bridewealth and new items of consumption (e.g. bicycles, hats, sun glasses); subsequent 
generations of migrant workers moved, not only for economic reasons, but also to see the 
civilised world which was mostly represented by the Côte d’Ivoire (see chapter 4). According to 
a local elder who migrated to Côte d’Ivoire during his youth, ‘it is yaala (tour, stroll, circular 
movement) that brought Islam to Cɛmala-Banimonitié’. Phenomena of mobility have caused 
religious change and economic development in colonial and postcolonial southwest Mali. In 
line with recent researches in human geography (Blunt 2007; Bailey 2010), the nature of the 
relationship between mobility and dwelling in peripheral zones such as southwest Mali 
demonstrates that remoteness promoted ‘ideologies of mobility’ that ‘reveal the centrality of 
mobility in shaping what it is to be modern’ (Blunt 2007, 685) there. Islam, like new items of 
consumption, became a powerful marker of the civilised world. By contrast, the markers of 
Bamanaya turned to be increasingly characterised as backward things of un-Islamic origin. 
 With religious changes ‘bamanaya, or indigenous religious practices, became 
something shameful’ (Peterson 2011, 3). Peterson’s sentence is right when related to his 
period of study (1880-1960), but it does not represent an exact picture of the nature of the 
contemporary relationship between Bamanaya and Islam I observed during my fieldwork in 
southwest Mali. Although practically all people define themselves as Muslim, Bamanaya is still 
present in southwest Mali as practice70 and as a cultural backdrop. Here, Bamana.ya does not 
only mean the Bamanan religion; its suffix -ya- evokes also a broad Bamanan ‘condition’ or 
‘way of life’.  Whereas the latter subtly informs the morality of Muslim life (see chapter 3), the 
former, in addition to representing a shameful past, has been subjected to process of 
                                                          
68 At that time, being Dyula (or Jula) meant being a Muslim trader (see Amselle 1977). 
69 For a similar but more extensive account of ‘the dialectics of conversion’ through migration in south Mali, see chapter 6 of 
Peterson’s book (2011). 
70 Nevertheless Bamanaya practices diminished. As these practices are now mostly hidden, it is difficult to assess their presence. 
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demonization which has nurtured the bad reputation of Bougouni. Muslim scholars who 
accompanied the Islamisation of southwest Mali constantly and severely criticised local 
religious practices as backward and evil. They aimed at the annihilation of such practices. The 
public burning of fetishes happened widely in southwest Mali and echoed other African forms 
of iconoclasm which, in the name of a monotheistic creed, symbolically aimed at creating new 
social, religious and political orders (see Sarró 2009, 2–6). In this regard, the local religious 
figure of El-Hajj Ladji Blen (about 1900 -1989) who built with his acolytes the second Friday 
Mosque of Bougouni epitomises harsh proselytism. Local recollection of his life recounts the 
victory of the worshippers of God over the Bamanaya forces of ‘Satan’ (sitanɛ). According to 
his biographer (Sissoko 2007),71 Ladji Blen was born in a village near Bougouni within an 
‘animist’ family. He converted to Islam in 1942 during a journey around Senegal and 
performed the Hajj in 1948. He came back to Bougouni in 1952 and started his fight against 
animist practices, a religious commitment achieved through the destruction of numerous 
fetishes, idols and power-objects which he pursued until his death.72 Sissoko explains the life of 
El-Hajj Ladji Blen as ‘croisades aux pays des idoles’ (crusades in idol countries), a sort of holy 
war against evilness. All Muslim scholars warned people against the un-Islamic nature of 
Bamanaya practices. For them, the worshipping of local djinns was diabolic and led to Hell. In 
their view, only God must be worshipped. Many newly converted Muslims, however, did not 
totally abandon their ‘old ways’ (ko kͻrͻ) because as ’legacy’ (facɛ) they were part of their 
origin, their identity. 
 With the advent of Muslim society in Mali, Islam became an important moral authority 
and a regulatory force that shaped public attitudes in contemporary Mali (see chapter 2). Thus, 
Bamanaya practices have been segregated and are now hidden. As a local old Imam said ‘all 
the mouths are Muslim’73 which implied that, for many locals, Islam is just a public identity.74 
Another elder added ‘although you washed your mouth very well, the smell of what you have 
eaten is still here’.75 Such thoughts express the fact that most inhabitants of southwest Mali 
say they are Muslim; indeed Islamisation as process of avowed conversion is nearly completed 
in southwest Mali. But their Bamanan practices still act, nonetheless, out of public sight, such 
as during a nightly visit to a soma (Bamanan sorcerer) and in a power-object concealed 
underneath someone’s cloths. In parallel, the late-Islamisation of southwest Mali is still 
                                                          
71 At the back of this biography I bought directly from the hands of the Imam of the Ladji Blen Friday Mosque in Bougouni, it is 
stated that El-Hajj Ladji Blen entrusted Mamadou Sissoko with the ‘mission sacrée’ of writing this book. Whether Mamadou 
Sissoko (born in 1944) was El-Hajj Ladji Blen’s mere friend or close acolyte remains obscure. 
72 This commitment brought him to southwest Mali, the Région of Kaye, Senegal and back to Bougouni where he is buried. 
73 Mͻgͻ bɛɛ donna silamɛya da a la. 
74 The declaration of religious identity in front of fellow villagers during the colonial census already paved the way to the 
profession of a public Muslim identity so as to avoid mockery, shame and other negative connotations associated with Bamanan 
identity (Peterson 2002; 2011, 207-210). 
75 Hali ni ɛ bɛ ɛ da ko kosɛbɛ, ɛ bɛ min dun, kasa bɛ a la. 
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remembered by foreigners and informs ideas about the bad reputation of Bougouni, the high 
proportion of ‘mauvaises personnes ’ and the sentiments of egoism and jealousy among its 
inhabitants which I explore in chapter 5.  
 
 
 
The old districts  
 
In 2010, the town was composed of 8 districts, of which Dougounina, Niébala and Faraba are 
the three oldest. They are mainly populated by descendants of the founders of Bougouni and 
descendants of Muslim traders who settled in town during the colonial period. These three 
small districts are now enclosed in the centre of Bougouni (see plan of Bougouni below). They 
originated in the pre-colonial period and are related to the foundation of Bougouni. 
 
 According to local history, Bougouni was initially a lazaretto for smallpox.76 It is 
narrated that, in pre-colonial times, a Fula Diakité of Kita77 moved to southwest Mali and 
                                                          
76 Small variations exist between versions but they do not affect the main plot exposed in this chapter. 
77 Region of Kayes (Northwest Mali). 
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became the shepherd of the Bamanan Coulibaly of the village of Kola. The Coulibaly hosted 
him (jatigiya)78 and gave him one of their daughters in marriage. Later, the Fula had to build a 
lazaretto composed of a small hut (bugu [hut]; ni [small]) away from the village because 
members of his family were infected by smallpox. When they recovered, the Fula decided to 
stay in the small hut where the current district of Dougounina stands. The couple gave birth to 
children. When they grew up, two sons settled next to their parents and founded the district of 
Nièbala. A third one similarly established what would be the district of Faraba. The hamlet 
started to grow slowly and attracted local hunters as well, but it still belonged to the first 
settlers of the area, the Coulibaly of Kola. The small hut that marked the foundation of 
Bougouni has inspired the only monument of present-day Bougouni: a small hut made of 
stones, cement and thatched roof fenced with wire netting that stands in front of the Conseil 
de Cercle of Bougouni at the centre of the town (see photograph 1 below).79 
 
 
 
 Soon after the colonial conquest, the French moved their local administration from 
Faragouaran to Bougouni in 1894 due to water shortage. Boosted by the opening of the French 
post and the colonial policy of repopulating villages along the main road from Bamako after 
the wars of Samori (see Peterson 2011, 62), the village of Bougouni was progressively 
transformed into a roadside trade town. Its growth was further supported by French decrees 
prohibiting the slave trade in 1894 throughout the colony that caused runaway slaves to 
congregate in the ‘so-called liberty villages’ (French posts) (Ibid, 64). This shift of power 
encouraged the Diakité families to sever their links of submission to their hosts, the first 
                                                          
78 Host-foreigner relationship. 
79 All photographs of this PhD dissertation by author, unless credited to others. 
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autochthons and landlords of the area. They took control of land surrounding Bougouni and 
created their own chieftainship. 
 In the present-day, the village of Kola stands inconspicuously in the vicinity of 
Bougouni. The Diakité still hold the chieftainship of Bougouni, and their renowned ancestors 
inhabit places of memories in town. The Diakité families occupy most of the three oldest 
districts of the town that constitute the centre of Bougouni. The house of their patriarch 
(dugutigi, chief of village) is strategically located in Dougounina next to the oldest Friday 
Mosque of the town and its big market.  At a short distance from their main house is the tomb 
of Diakassan Moussa Diakité, a great warrior who, according to the Diakité’s oral tradition, 
converted to Islam and fought for the King of Ségou during the pre-colonial period.80 The first 
football stadium of Bougouni situated in Medine district bears the name of his descendant 
Sakoro Mery Diakité who was chef de canton during the colonial period. 
 The rivalry between the Coulibaly of Kola and the Diakité of Bougouni still shapes 
contemporary politics. Although the village of Kola and the town of Bougouni are separated by 
only a five minute ride by motorbike on a tarred road, they do not belong to the same 
Commune. The process of decentralisation in Mali (see introduction) promoted public 
consultation about the regional subdivision of Communes during the 1990s (see Kassibo et al. 
1997). These grassroot debates often highlighted local history and resulted in the formation of 
Communes according to ancient affinities and old rivalries (see Toé 1997; Coulibaly and 
Hilhorst 2004). The village of Kola did not want to join the same decentralised unit as Bougouni 
and therefore created the Commune Rurale of Kola with 8 other villages. But tensions still 
exist. A land dispute between the chieftainships of the village of Kola and the town of 
Bougouni ended in dramatic events. Early in the Sunday morning of the 7 June 2009 members 
and allies of the Diakité families burnt and destroyed several houses constructed in disputed 
lands. They chased off their occupants arguing that they had not asked permission of the 
Diakité chieftainship to settle there. According to the sole local newspaper, Le Relais,81 the 
rampage was led by Diakaridja Diakité, son of the traditional district chief of Dougounina and a 
former political candidate of the RPM82 for the National Assembly of Mali. Although under 
Malian law land belongs to the state, traditional custom is still pervasive. The Diakité family 
continue to see themselves as the owners of the land. Moreover the Préfet and the police did 
not intervene. 
                                                          
80 For further information about the tomb of Diakassan Moussa Diakité, see chapter 4. 
81 See, press article ‘Litige foncier. Douze familles saccagées par des Diakité de Bougouni. Le laxisme du Préfet Sankou Touré en 
cause’, in the Bougouni newspaper Le Relais, 29 June 2009, 13, Coopérative Jamana, Bamako, 2-3. Le Relais was created in early 
2000. 
82 Rassemblement Pour le Mali. 
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The Malian law on Decentralisation promoted what Mbembe called ‘the re-enchantment of 
tradition’ and ‘the rehabilitation of origins and of belonging’ (2000, 37) by giving traditional 
chieftainship the right of consultation and the task of tax collecting.83 Here the law legitimises 
traditional power by including it as part of the decision-making process of the Commune; it 
also enforces it with new fields of financing by granting the traditional chieftainship a share of 
taxes they collect. The Malian decentralisation in Bougouni, as well as in many other 
Communes, illustrates also how traditional decision-making processes interfere with elected 
and administrative channels of power. For instance, it is not rare to see in Mali kin of the 
traditional chieftainship holding Communal political offices when their elders hold the 
traditional chieftainship (see Chappatte 2005). The system of traditional chieftainship belongs 
to a broad Mande legacy that still pervades local power as well as religious life, as I explore in 
chapter 3.  
 
 
 
The colonial town 
 
The fourth oldest district of Bougouni is Medine. This enlargement of the town was planned in 
the colonial period and its division into plots was ordered by Maurice Meker the French 
commandant of the Cercle of Bougouni (1947 - 1952) who wrote a memoir containing 
references to Bougouni (see 1980). Méker also drew up the first urban plan of Bougouni that 
provided the framework for the postcolonial extension of the town. During the colonial period 
Medine was called Mékerbougou. On the independence of Mali in 1960 the district changed its 
name and became Medine. With the expansion of the town this district is now surrounded by 
new settlements. Part of it also forms the current centre of the town where the hospital of 
Bougouni stands. Medine also contains colonial cement buildings. Their current use illustrates 
that in Mali ‘most colonial buildings (...) became the residence or the workplaces of the Malian 
bureaucracy, thus providing continuity in the geography of power after independence’ (De 
Jorio 2006, 85). 
 Medine district ends westwards at the bottom of a hill that reminds locals of ‘la colline 
de Koulouba’84 in Bamako. This hill, nicknamed ‘la colline du pouvoir’85 by inhabitants of the 
capital, hosts various ministries and the Palais de Koulouba, the former residence of the 
                                                          
83 See Lois et Décrets de la Décentralisation, Mars 1999, Mission de Décentralisation et des Réformes Institutionnelles, Présidence 
de la République, République du Mali, Nouvelle Imprimerie Bamakoise, Bamako. 
84 Kuluba means ‘big hill’ in Bamanankan. 
85 The hill of power. 
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Governor of French Sudan erected in 1907 which is now the Presidential Palace of Mali. In 
similar vein, the French commandant of Bougouni lived in a big house built in the Sudanese 
style at the top of the ‘hill of power’ of Bougouni. This colonial residence overlooking Bougouni 
is now the house of the Préfet of the Cercle de Bougouni, the highest representative of the 
Malian State in town. Other smaller colonial houses stand on the hill. They host families of 
important state officers such as the sous-préfet, the judge, the chief of police as well as various 
decentralised state services. At the top of the hill other non-colonial buildings extend the 
concentration of power found there.  At the entrance to the tarred road leading to the colonial 
buildings stands Radio Kafokan (the voice of people). This is the local radio of the Conseil de 
Cercle which broadcasts state information and appointments to rural state agents and 
inhabitants of hinterland of the Cercle de Bougouni. In front of the radio stands the antenna of 
the powerful Orange Mali company that brought mobile phone services to most Malians in 
2007 with the introduction of popular credits named ‘watermelon’ (zɛrɛ) (see chapter 5). 
Around the ‘hill of power’ of Bougouni the Malian state recuperates the geography of power of 
the colonial state. Even fifty years after independence inhabitants of Bougouni still use the 
colonial title to refer to the Préfet of Bougouni in informal discourses as the commandant of 
Bougouni. 
 At the foot of the same hill towards the tarred road to Yanfolila the Malian state still 
imprisons its trouble makers in the same place where the colonial jail stood. Next to the prison 
lie traces of what was the ‘cimetière français’ (French cemetery). But Muslims of Bougouni 
bury their kin in the central cemetery of Bougouni that borders Medine and the postcolonial 
district of Heremakono. 
 Apart from Medine, the ‘hill of power’ and the urban plan of Bougouni that reflects the 
colonial past of Bougouni, the colonial imprint in southwest Mali in general is felt through its 
colonial road network which mostly corresponds to the contemporary one. At the exit from 
Bougouni towards Sikasso, trucks, cars, bicycles, carts and pedestrians still cross the river Ba 
over the colonial bridge which is the biggest colonial structure of southwest Mali. The recent 
decentralisation reforms in Mali that raised the town of Bougouni to be the chef-lieu 
(administrative centre) of the Cercle de Bougouni also broke down Malian territory into Cercles 
that bear the same names and often follow the same territorial demarcation of those of the 
colonial period. 
 Bougouni became a roadside town and is now an important regional hub as a result of 
colonial policy in 1894 that transformed this formerly ordinary village into the only colonial 
post of southwest Mali, which it remained until 1951 (when the subdivision of Yanfolila was 
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created). Its current importance is based on its colonial momentum that was incorporated into 
the structure of Malian state in many ways. 
 
 
 
The postcolonial districts and the recent growth of the town  
 
When I arrived to Bougouni in 2009 what I discovered looked more like a growing middle-sized 
town than the big village of mud houses visited by Moussa Traoré in 1987. I travelled to 
Bougouni by coach from Bamako on the 12 December 2008. After an easy 3 hour trip on the 
newly repaired 170km tarred road from Bamako to Bougouni (financed by EU) I arrived in 
Bougouni coach station in the evening around 10.30pm. The place was still full of street 
peddlers, travellers, coxers (local brokers) and gargotes.86 I had to make my way through the 
crowd. My host waved and welcomed me. He then drove me home on the back of his old 
Yamaha 100. The tarred streets of the town centre, street lights, coaches, taxis and night life 
(shops, TV, video games) gave me the impression of a dynamic urban locality. 
 After customary salutations with my host family, I had a walk in the vicinity 
accompanied by Malik, a fostered teenager who grew up in Côte d’Ivoire but was sent to 
Bougouni on account of the Ivorian crisis. We headed towards loud coupé-décalé87 music 
coming from the neighbourhood. A civil wedding party was still going on in an open courtyard. 
The sandy dance floor was light by a strip lamp fixed at the top of a post next to the DJ. His 
electronic materials were connected to two car batteries. Children were raising dust by 
dancing energetically. A bunch of youths wearing elegant western outfits were chatting and 
smoking cigarettes. In darker spots, others were flirting. Midnight passed. I decided to go to 
bed. 
 In the morning, I did my first day tour of the town on the back of a Jakarta; an 
affordable Chinese-made motorbike that became the new sign of success in urban Mali (see 
chapter 5). My driver Alou, a student of the Institut de Formation des Maîtres (IFM)88 of 
Bougouni, brought me to what he thought would be the best spots to show a newcomer in 
Bougouni. We crossed the centre without stopping, passing by the Siraba Togola Auditorium, 
the Conseil de Cercle and the big market. On the way he pointed out to me the new three-floor 
cement building of the local police. Passing by some opulent houses, we took the exit toward 
                                                          
86 Small restaurants composed of a table, a bench and cooking pots. 
87 Popular dance music associated with youth culture, consumption and success which originates from Côte d’Ivoire and the 
Ivorian Diaspora in Paris in early 2000s, see Kohlhagen (2006). 
88 IFM is a professional state school that attracts more than 1,000 students from all over Mali. 
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Yanfolila, a tarred road section of 82km built by a Chinese company and inaugurated in 
October 2008.89 After one kilometre, Alou stopped in front of a massive football stadium 
including athletics lanes and VIP boxes. This stadium, which can host international games, was 
inaugurated in December 2008 by the Malian President and the Ambassador of China in Mali. 
Next Alou took the exit towards Bamako and pointed out to me an Indian-owned cotton seed 
oil factory Alcoma where more than two hundred locals have worked since 2007. After my first 
24 hours in Bougouni, I realised the town was expanding towards spaces and with dynamics 
that went beyond its traditional mud houses and its notoriety.  
 Bougouni was raised to a chef-lieu of the Cercle de Bougouni in 2000 as part of the 
Malian decentralisation reform. As a result, Bougouni hosts many administrative services and 
provides health (3 CSCOM90 and 1 Centre de Référence91) and school services (1 high school, 5 
professional schools) that bring qualified workers, civil servants and students to town. As an 
important regional town, Bougouni offers jobs for intellectuals and qualified workers who 
work in the NGOs, radios,92 hotels (...) found there. With the presence of a growing local elite, 
Bougouni also offers prestigious services such as one bank with a cash machine,93 3 modern 
petrol stations,94 3 internet cafés, various private schools (including 2 high schools) and 3 
private clinics and 6 hotels. Bougouni also contains two modern bakeries and series of big 
shops (clothing and food). Canal + Group (TV channels) and Orange Mali (telecommunication) 
also set up in town recently with the opening of official outlets. 
 My host family belongs to the category of intellectual elite that moved here because of 
the growing services sector in Bougouni. The head of the family, a retired professor of 
mathematics and physics, comes from Kita. He moved to Bougouni 30 years ago and had a 
distinguished career teaching in Bougouni. He died in April 2009. His wife, also from Kita, 
worked in the Bougouni Post Office. She retired following the death of her husband, a humble 
man who had welcomed me with open arms. During their career they managed to build a 
cement house in Bougouni where they decided to settle for good. Their children grew up in 
Bougouni, but are now spread all over Mali. In fact, my host’s family represent second 
generation migrants in a town most of the inhabitants of which are first generation migrants 
who settled there after 1991. During my stay in Bougouni I met many people; however few 
among them were born in Bougouni. In three decades the demographic structure and size of 
                                                          
89 This section was financed by Chinese and Malian states. 
90 Centre de Santé Communautaire. 
91 Small hospital. 
92 4 radios were operating in 2010. 2 other radios were planned. 
93 BNDA (Banque Nationale de Dévelopement Agricole). Inhabitants started to complain about the lack of banking services. Other 
banks are prospecting the town.  
94 Total recently built what is the biggest petrol station of Bougouni which stands near the two cotton factories of the CMDT 
(Compagnie Malienne de Dévelopement du Textile). 
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Bougouni changed radically from a big village dominated by its autochthons to a middle-sized 
town where migrants are in majority. 
 During the postcolonial period Bougouni extended into four new districts: 
Massablacoura (where I lived), Heremakono, Torakabougou and Dialanikoro. They are large 
areas mostly inhabited by migrants. Due to its distance from the centre of the town, 
Torakabougou possesses its own food market and Massablacoura a chicken market. 
Demographic growth has been accompanied by inflation in land prices in the centre of the 
town. Hence people are now buying building plots in these new districts, the edge of which are 
now more than 30 minutes walk from the centre. Some such as Amidou, a teacher in the 
village of Kèlèya, bought a building plot for his future retirement and his children. Others 
invested in housing to provide a reliable rental income. The four new districts of Bougouni 
illustrate the emergence of an economic elite who invest their wealth in the building of 
opulent houses. They also depict how most Malian households struggle over the construction 
of their cement houses, the sign par excellence of success in life in Mali at the beginning of this 
century. The purchase of a building plot is usually directly followed by the construction of a 
well, without which, the plot can be threatened with sale to someone else. The informal rule 
stipulates that a plot without concrete investment belongs to nobody in particular in Mali. 
Then the buyer starts to build his cement house step by step. The first stage is to construct the 
groundwork, thereafter the wall and eventually the roof with optional iron structure for the 
second floor. This building process can take years. It is a life-time project for most Malian 
households. The rapid expansion of the town is also accompanied by corruption and illegal 
housing schemes. Real estate business involves powerful actors, big money and all sorts of 
negotiations. It is not rare to hear stories of building plots sold to more than one owner. Land 
disputes between the traditional chieftainship and communal authorities have punctuated the 
urbanisation of Bougouni.  Entrepreneurs in construction are among the richest people in 
Bougouni. 
 For others Bougouni is definitively urban because of its night life, a perspective I 
explore in chapter 7. As they said ‘Bougouni is a town because of the presence of night 
activities’. Thanks to electricity, many small shops, workshops and gargotes are open until late 
in the night. By contrast village life stops soon after the night appears. A grocery, sewing shop, 
gargote, essencitigi95and a table football stood next to my home at the crossroad between two 
streets. This bunch of shops enlivened the neighbourhood until midnight every day. Tailors 
completed clothes in their workshop. Children played table football. Motor vehicles stopped to 
                                                          
95 Small petrol station. 
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buy petrol, and those who felt peckish ordered something in the gargote.  But the most 
crowded shop was the grocery. Its owner brought a TV out each evening where a sort of night 
grin96 gathered and chatted. Many small shops (grocery, dibiterie (butcher shop), gargote, 
shɛfantigi (tea-coffee-omelette shops), cigarettitigi (seller of cigarettes), video games spots 
and night grins were situated along main streets which had street lighting. The coach station 
and its vicinity stayed open for night coaches from Sikasso that stopped in Bougouni after 
midnight every day. I quickly located a couple of spots where food, cigarettes and beverages 
could be found round-the-clock. Bougouni also witnessed numerous balani events in the 
evening (7pm - 12pm); a sort of noisy mobile discotheque set on the street for various reasons 
(joyful events, youth association). The town also had the Siraba Togola auditorium and a youth 
centre that organised artistic events (concert, theatre, and dance) in Bougouni from time to 
time and during Muslim celebrations. But the peak of night life for the trendy youth and party-
men of Bougouni remained the Saturday night dancing parties in Alcatraz, the only modern 
discotheque in southwest Mali. Otherwise, the town of Bougouni also hosted a hidden 
network of maquis (local pubs) and brothels that offered beers, whisky and sex away from 
public scrutiny.  
 
 
 
Spaces of sociality: carré, rue, grin 
 
Since the 1990s urban studies have tended to associate towns with processes of globalisation 
and modernity (see Appadurai 1996; Robertson 1995; Sassen 2002). Following this insight, 
numerous scholars have explored the logics of flow that shape big towns, such as those 
illustrated in the study of the ‘social life’ of Sebago shoes which are distributed by Senegalese 
traders settled in Dakar and New York (Scheld 2003). However, the anthropologist Mathieu 
Hilgers, who wrote an ethnography of the middle-sized town of Koudougou in Burkina Faso, 
rightly reminds us that urbanites still live in places (see 2009, 46–57). Put differently, while the 
urban is the locus of global flows par excellence, urbanites are still involved in and shaped by 
local life. This is especially the case for small and middle-sized towns because they are less 
connected to global flows than big towns.  
 The fact that Bougouni is perceived as a crossroads does not cut its inhabitants off 
from local life. On the contrary, in the course of my fieldwork I realised the centrality of street 
                                                          
96 On grin, see next section.  
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life to people’s lives. An anthropology of street life will be crucial to understanding Muslim life 
in this dissertation. I opted for an ‘anthropology of street life’, instead of an ‘anthropology of 
the street’ or ‘street anthropology’, because I do not set out to question the mechanisms of 
capitalism by studying those who live on the fringes of the street, such as homeless, unstable 
poor people and street dwellers (see Margaretten 2009; Sekine 2011). What I want to highlight 
is that people in Bougouni do not spend the day indoors in their house, car and office. Their 
daily life is mostly based on outdoor activities in courtyards, neighbourhoods and in town. 
People spend most of their time in three spaces of sociality (carré, street and grin) which 
shape a sort of ‘outdoor living room’97 and, at the same time, a working place as I explain 
below. My aim is to demonstrate that these open spaces contribute to the ordering of social 
relations and practices by making quotidian activities observable (see plan of urban street life 
below). Nonetheless, the surveillance of movement and the body in space does not reduce my 
analysis to simply noting strategies of social control; people also use ‘tactics’ (Low and 
Lawrence-Zúniga 2003, 32) so as to take advantage of life’s visuality through ostentatious 
practices (see chapter 2 and 5), and to bypass its constraints through nighttime activities (see 
chapter 7). As these spaces of sociality are common to all Malian towns, such findings go 
beyond Bougouni. 
 
 
                                                          
97 In his analysis of Brazíla as a city without street, Holston compares common Brazilian street corners to outdoor living rooms 
(1989). 
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Le carré  
 
Traditionally the Malian family (gwa) follows patrilocal and patrilineal rules. It is composed of 
the head of family, his wife (or wives), their children, the wife (or wives) of their sons, and their 
grandchildren who all share the same courtyard. The gwa, what Malians call ‘the extended 
family’, is widespread in villages. Malians in town still stick to the above custom (laada), but 
they tend to constitute smaller versions of gwa, because mobile practices and urban processes 
have undermined the authority of the head of family and the unity of the traditional family. 
Thus the urban district is divided into households (du) that vary between the traditional 
extended family and smaller units such as the nuclear family. Each household inhabits a space 
enclosed by a wall (of mud, brick) that gives a sense of intimacy to its members. This space, 
commonly named after its shape (le carré),98 is composed of building(s) and a vast courtyard.99 
During the day people do not spend much time in buildings which are mostly used as 
dormitory and shelter for the night. With the heat of the sun the air inside the house tends to 
be stifling during the day. Malians are also abandoning their traditional thatched roofs for 
sheet metal ones which bake the inside of the house. Social life happens within the courtyard 
where people spend most of their time when they are at home. The courtyard is usually split 
into zones (kitchen, laundry, corral and playground) and the washroom stands in one of its 
corners. Everyday life in le carré unfolds around meals, chats, naps, comings and goings, and 
prayer. It is also structured by gender. Women usually stay home where they do all household 
chores and take care of children, only going outside to market, to attend a wedding, or a 
baptism, or to greet someone.100 Men eat at home, and take a nap, but otherwise spend their 
time on various activities in town. Family members often gather together in the shade of a big 
tree101 after lunch for chats and in front of TV after dinner (see photographs 2 and 3 below). 
 
                                                          
98 The square. 
99 With demographic growth, the price of a building plot is increasing and its size decreasing. 
100 Women can also be involved in the local economy (see Chapter 7). 
101 Mango tree are well known to have thick leaves that produce fresh shade.  
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Although le carré represents what is the Malian private space, it is still framed by shared 
activities and subjected to collective sight.102 Moreover the main entrance is open to comings 
and goings of many kinds. People come to greet the family, to ask for someone in particular. 
These meetings occur without invitation. As is customary, the foreigner is always welcomed 
with a seat and a glass of water. What was planned as a short visit often extends to the next 
meal for the person who does not know how to say ‘no’. Although enclosed by a wall, le carré 
is an open space during the day because people freely move in and out of it. As such le carré is 
a porous space where the private and the public are always merging. At the end of the day 
when the head of family and his wife (or wives) go to bed, lights are switched off and doors 
shut. But cunning teenagers, students and young unmarried adults still find a way to join the 
night life in Bougouni and to be involved in illicit practices out of the public gaze of the day (see 
chapter 7). 
 
 
 
 
La rue (the street) 
 
Each cluster of carré is separated by a grid of streets. Except for main streets, most of them are 
unsurfaced and do not have street lights. Urban streets are important places of sociality in 
many ways. The street façades (the walls of carrés alongside the street) are usually punctuated 
by commercial units in which locals set small retail stores and workshops. At the sides of the 
street, some run shops ‘par terre’ (street-vendors, stallholders) while others come together in 
grin spots where groups scrutinise and comment on the comings and goings of other people. 
The street façades and the sides of the street shape an economy of the pavement (see chapter 
4) where leisure and business intermingle. Some hail street peddlers to come closer. Others 
wink at young women (sungurunw) on their way to school. A shopkeeper greets an elder on his 
way home with respect. The donkey cart driven by a farmer, the Jakarta of a student, and the 
4x4 of a patron (among other vehicles) circulate on the streets. Traffic moves slowly because 
of the uneven surface and holes of sandy streets. All these comings and goings animate street 
life and dynamise social life between families in the neighbourhood; they also nurture gossip 
among its inhabitants. Life on urban streets is articulated around prestigious ostentation and 
moral evaluation of the behaviour and dress of passers-by; it constitutes the foreground of 
public morality. When stepping out of the carré someone enters into public space where 
                                                          
102 Better-off families might have big houses, but it is still very rare that a room is occupied by one person only. 
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his/her manner and clothing cannot avoid public scrutiny and moral evaluation; these are part 
of the social life of street and shapes someone’s reputation (danbé) in the neighbourhood and 
beyond.  People say that what happens outside the carré mirrors what happens inside the 
carré. Therefore someone’s behaviour affects the honour (danbé) of his elders and his 
household as well. The street is also space of celebration where families welcome parents, 
friends and the neighbourhood under a big tent with music and foods during baptisms and 
weddings (see photographs 4 and 5 below). Finally from the street, pedestrians observe and 
envy the new cement and multiple storey buildings of the new-rich families. 
  
 
 
 
Le grin  
 
The grin is an important element of urban social life.103 According to Schulz, it is an informal 
male group based on friendship and neighbourhood connections which ‘cuts across divides of 
socio-economic background, age, occupation and educational background’ (2002, 811).104 The 
men meet on a daily basis at home or at the working place of the leader of their grin, usually 
the one who can afford to provide sugar and tea for the group. The grin is the place where 
men can address concerns to people outside the control of their parents and their household. 
There they drink tea, play cards, listen to music and, more importantly, they talk (baro). 
Women can spend some time in the grin on their way to the market, but they usually do not 
linger there. Men wave to them and they sit for a couple of minutes. Then they move on.105 As 
analysed by Schultz, the dimension of baro - ‘talk-as-action’- is the cornerstone of the grin that 
bring men together and forges their sociality (Ibid, 812). Overall, Schulz’s definition of grin 
                                                          
103 On grin as element of rural social life, see Jonsson (2007). 
104 While grins are heterogeneous in composition, their members generally share a common marital status (see Schulz 2002, 811). 
105 For a debate about women’s grin in Mali, see Chapter 7.   
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resonates with what I observed in Bougouni. However, nuances need to be made when 
considering the pluralisation of activities, identities and the formation of an urban elite found 
in Mali. Although the grin gathers members beyond social divisions, this aspect is diminishing 
in town. People tend to meet in grin according to their age, their activities, their marital status 
and economic power. For instance, during my early period in Bougouni I spent time with a grin 
of youths who were renowned for their night life. Next to them, a group of teachers had their 
grin as well. Others became friends and set up a kind of grin consisting of regular sitting in 
front of the TV of the local shopkeeper. In this way, membership in a grin can vary greatly, 
from a group bound by a common criterion to a loose group sharing time in front of the same 
TV. Moreover grins are not stable spaces of sociality; they do and undo over time, because 
people move from one grin to another one during the same day, and because one can be a 
member of several grins at the same time. In addition, some grins meet in day time, others are 
night grins. Grins are shaped by heterogeneous causes, but all are important spaces of sociality 
where people talk, exchange and debate.106 
 Talking is punctuated by the drinking of tea which is a daily ritual for many Malians.107 
The tea maker puts 25gr. of green tea in a teapot and boils it for a long time (10 - 40 minutes). 
Then he adds lots of sugar, and serves it in small cups. The ritual is started again with the same 
tea leaves a second time and a third time. In this way, the first tea service is strong and bitter. 
It is the tea of men and guests which wakes them up and gives them strength. The second 
infusion is mild and slightly bitter. The third one is light and sweet. It is the lady’s tea. If you sit 
and wait here until the third tea is served, more than one hour will have gone by. Between tea 
services, people kill the time.108 They, not only socialise, but also watch and comment on 
movements of pedestrians, and vehicles on the street. 
 Given that most people struggle to find full-time livelihoods, they spend time in grins 
along the streets where life flows ‘dͻͻni-dͻͻni’ (step by step, slowly). These grins are good 
spots to have fun and to scrutinise and gossip about the comings and goings on the street. 
Meeting, joking and gossiping are dimensions of grin stressed in a popular Malian TV series 
called Le Grin, which shows life in a grin: ordinary Malians sit by the side of a street, drink tea, 
exchange, chitchat in Bamanankan about daily life matters and interact with passers-by in 
humorous manner.109 Social activities in grins nurture comments and moral evaluations of 
                                                          
106 As representing both a culture of chatting and an open place, the grin is an important element of Malian social life which 
resonates with the tea shop adda of central Calcutta (see Chakrabarty 2000, 180–213). 
107 Many Malians are tea addicts. If they cannot drink it they have a headache. Usually the first tea round is made after breakfast 
and the second one after lunch. Some add a third round (up to a fourth round) in late afternoon and during the evening. 
108 Elders sometimes criticise the grins of youth. They say the youth are lazy because they prefer to sit, talk and drink tea instead of 
working (see chapter 2 and 7). 
109 See le grin in YouTube. 
60 
 
street life in Bougouni. Such grins are the eyes and ears of Radio Trottoir that convey street 
happenings to households (see photographs 6 and 7 below). 
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2. Public Islam, street life and ordinary Muslim in southwest Mali 
 
One evening in May 2009 I was sitting in a grin by the side of the tarred road that runs 
between Medine and Dialanikoro Districts. This main road has street lamps and passers-by 
frequent its several shops and grins that stay open late into the night. As usual, I was spending 
my evening drinking tea, chatting with friends, and observing the night life around me. Around 
10.30pm we noticed a well-groomed man wearing a clean white robe and sunglasses, with 
Islamic prayer beads around his neck, walking along the street. He was coming towards us 
while chanting in bamanankan, ‘God is protection. God is help. God is cover.’110 Arriving at the 
grin, he stopped, looked around, then stared at a group of young women (sunguruw) sitting in 
the shadow of a big mango tree on the other side of the road.  He spoke vociferously, ‘Women 
put newborn in toilets.111 Mothers are sleeping when their daughters are outside during the 
night. Women whiten their skin. I do not understand!’ Reactions within the grin were mixed. 
Some shrugged; some smiled and responded ‘this is true’;112 others just listened carefully. 
Afterwards, this odd person started to dance to hip-hop and reggae music coming from 
someone’s mobile phone. A couple of youths gathered around him. They encouraged his 
performance by clapping their hands together. Suddenly he stopped, pointed skywards, and 
said, ‘Obama and the White House fear me because I can trigger the Third World War by 
planting something in the soil.’ Everybody around started to laugh out loud! One person 
thanked him and bought him an ice cream from the neighbouring shop, after which he 
continued his night walk along the streets of Bougouni, repeating ‘God is protection. God is 
help. God is cover’. 
This strange character is well-known in Bougouni and reminds people that Islam means 
more than prayer and fasting. According to local recollection, he was a promising and even 
gifted student of Islamic studies who had attained a good level of competence in Arabic 
language and knew about some esoteric aspects of Islam. When asking a favour of God during 
long, lonely and demanding sessions of prayer, running the prayer beads between his fingers 
(ka wurudi kɛ), he lost control of himself and fell into madness (fatͻya) from which he has 
never recovered fully. Many interpreted his madness to be the result of occult forces which 
unsettled his mind during his prayers to God, so that he lost his way. He had asked God for 
powerful forces that only pious, ‘old men’ (cɛkͻrͻbaw) can handle. Haste and immoderate 
ambition had led him onto the path of madness, but his insanity gives him the ability to catch 
                                                          
110 Ala yé sutara yé. 
111 On infanticide accusation in Bougouni, see newspapers Le Relais, August 2008, 3 ; and 30 Octobre 2008, 5, Coopérative Jamana, 
Bamako. 
112 O yé cɛn yé. 
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glimpses of an invisible world that ordinary Muslims do not see. Therefore, people also fear 
and listen to him because, as a member the grin said this very evening, ‘even if he is mad he 
can sometimes tell the truth.’113 
This anecdote shows that Islam is conceived as a multi-dimensional phenomenon in 
Mali. Certainly, it involves a set of rituals, public signs and moral discourses that shape social 
life; but it also involves an inner force that informs someone’s personality, maturity and 
blessedness (barika).114 Most Muslims conceive of piety as both the practice of Islamic 
precepts, and as self-discipline (virtuous ethos). This twofold nature of piety as a thread 
running through Muslim life in Bougouni and southwest Mali provides the theme to the 
analysis I develop in this chapter. 
This anecdote also illustrates that the interplay between practice and its virtue is, 
however, not straightforward and is subjected to criticism. 
  
  
 
The problem of intentionality in the practice of public piety 
 
The debate over the sincerity of the seere in Mali illuminates the ambivalence intrinsic to the 
twofold nature of piety. The seere is ‘the dark, sometimes circular, spot or mark on some 
Muslims’ foreheads (...), the mark indexes regular prayer beyond the obligatory five ritual daily 
prayers and presumably appears on the forehead from touching the ground during prayer’ 
(Soares 2004, 206). Thus the seere indexes piety. Nonetheless it is frequent that Muslims 
question the ‘moral character’ of its bearers when they are accused of ‘charges of corruption, 
embezzlement, or illicit sexual activities’ (Ibid, 222). I also met Muslims who accused some 
bearers of seere to have intentionally created it in order to make people think they are 
pious.115 Then what can we learn from the questioning of the validity of seere as a norm of 
piety? Soares states ‘it is perhaps unwise for the anthropologist to speculate about the 
intentionality of actors’ (Ibid, 222) and concludes by asserting the existence of publicly 
recognised signs of piety. Soares is right in stating that public signs of piety exist in Mali, but I 
would like to go one step further. Whatever the intentionality of actors the debate over the 
sincerity of the seere as an index of piety and its duplicity in Mali demonstrates the 
                                                          
113 Madness in Mali is often understood as incoherent and shameless behaviour punctuated by special gifts such as telling the 
truth and foretelling the future. Mad persons do not live in separate institutions. The mad live freely within Malian society, either 
with their families, or on the street. 
114 From Baraka (Arabic language). 
115 ‘Some even speculate that many Malians will rub something on the forehead – even a stone – until such a mark appears’ 
(Soares 2004, 221). 
63 
 
ambivalence intrinsic to the twofold nature of piety. The seere means - proof - in Bamanankan 
(see Bailleul 1996). As proof the seere is notwithstanding one that can be “falsified” for 
mundane purposes. Whereas the outwards signs of Islam indicated the presence of a Muslim 
identity, they do not automatically certify piety because they can be duplicated by insincere 
intentions for mundane purposes. The intention is by nature inward and, as Muslims say, only 
known by God; therefore its content through outwards signs of Islam is subjected to criticism 
and moral evaluation. 
 As the motives for practising Islam are numerous, the analyst needs to explore ‘the 
larger context in which such an [intention] is desired or the social consequences of choosing 
such an [intention]116’ (Haniffa 2008, 11). A focus on the notion of intention allows the analyst 
to explore the relation between outward signs of piety (appearance) and inward states of mind 
(moral world). Instead of analysing how religion subordinates subjects to its precepts, a focus 
on intention explores ‘the formation of subjectivities’ so as to ‘understand how people (try to) 
act on the world as they are acted upon’ (Ortner 2005, 41). The debate around the problem of 
intentionality in the practice of public signs of piety in Mali involves an anthropology of ethics 
and freedom for two main reasons: to widen the potential motives supporting the practice of 
allegedly outward signs of piety; to explore how the complexities of personal subjectivities give 
rise to the practice and display of public signs of piety for mundane purposes. I do not say 
Muslims can stand “outside Islam”, but the fact that people’s attitude towards public norms of 
piety can be ambivalent show how Muslims engage with rituals, public signs and moral 
discourses in complex and reflexive manners which deserve to be explored.  
 The debate around the problem of intentionality in the practice of public signs of piety 
links the study of piety with the intricacies of everyday life. This living approach to Muslim life 
goes beyond the idealism of the Islamic dogma. When we investigate the making of virtuous 
life, the challenge is not to abolish the ambivalence of everyday life. On the contrary, the task 
is to take into consideration ‘the complex and often contradictory nature of everyday 
experience’ (Schielke 2009a, 26). Paraphrasing Ewing in Schielke’s work I assert that the 
analyst should not fall into the ‘illusion of wholeness’ that tends to over-emphasis of 
coherence and perfection of religious experience (ibid).117 Taking a Platonic perspective, only 
the idea of piety as an intelligible reality is absolutely pure and eternal. However, social 
anthropology does not explore the world of ideas in itself, but its daily negotiation framed by 
moral choices and self-interested aims. As Marsden observed, the Qazi, pretended living 
                                                          
116 I replaced ‘self’ by [intention] because of the encompassing character of the notion of self I find difficult to pinpoint 
ethnographically. 
117 The ability to shift between contradictory sets of views without being troubled by them:  on illusion of wholeness, see Ewing 
(1990). 
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symbol of pure piety, expresses also ‘inconsistencies’ by making sexy jokes during public 
sermons in the mosque, and by showing his ‘playful’ appearance (smart clothes, slick haircuts, 
and expensive perfumes) in public (Marsden 2007a, 5–6). How then do Muslims reflect upon 
discrepancies between the twofold nature of piety in Mali?  
 Bamanan language does not have a word for ‘good Muslim’, or an adjective for ‘pious’. 
When I asked my fieldwork assistant to translate ‘vrai musulman’ (true Muslim) into the 
vernacular, he replied by saying ‘silamɛ yɛrɛ yɛrɛ’. The term ‘yɛrɛ’ is a particle of insistence 
that expresses the idea of absolute and legitimate (see Bailleul 1996). It can stress any word. 
For instance, true friend becomes terikɛ yɛrɛ yɛrɛ. Most people simply say of a bad Muslim 
that ‘he is not Muslim’ (silamɛ118 tɛ) and of a good Muslim, ‘he is Muslim’ (silamɛ don). The 
intonation of their voice completes the intensity of their moral evaluation. 
 Local conceptions of the Islamic path, however, illustrate how most Muslims recognise 
the struggle for the making of a proper Muslim life. According to local discourses, being 
Muslim is synonymous with respect and virtue, but this does not mean that the Muslim is 
perfect. As my friend Alou the teacher explained: 
 
 ‘The Muslim is the one who sins and asks for forgiveness. The true Muslim is the one who never 
sins. According to the Qur’an, the true Muslim is called mu’min.
119
 This latter is extremely rare among 
Muslims.’ 
 
 Alou’s saying resonates with most local discourses I heard about Muslim life in 
Bougouni. For many, the figure of mu’min is more an ideal-type than a reality, and the reality 
they observe around them differs from this ideal-type. Reflecting upon Muslim life, 
Abdramane the street peddler stated: ‘We are like a scales. On one side we collect barajiw 
(divine awards). On the other side we amass jurumuw (sins)’. In this way, Muslims recognise 
human weakness and earthly challenge as inherent to the making of a proper Muslim life. 
Their view of the Muslim path is realistic and pragmatic and takes into consideration the 
roughness of everyday life. For them, all Muslims debate about piety. Some understand it 
more through the practice of precepts; others put more emphasis on Islamic virtues; but 
eventually Muslims agree to assert that only few among them live it. It is in this somewhat 
elusive religious scope than someone’s religious experience is constantly assessed. 
 Most anthropologists who have studied the practice of piety in Islam have investigated 
specific piety reformist movements such as the grassroots women’s piety movement in the 
                                                          
118 Silamɛ signifies Muslim. Mori means Muslim too, but this latter also refers to marabout. 
119 The believer (Arabic language). 
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mosques of Cairo (Mahmood 2005), the Muslim women’s da’wa preaching group – Al 
Muslimaat in Sri Lanka (Haniffa 2008), and the Minhajul Quran organisation in Pakistan 
(Philippon 2006). Other anthropologists have focused instead on the existence of numerous 
ways of being Muslim by demonstrating how Muslims are active and creative in an intellectual 
and sensual way (Hirschkind 2006; Marsden 2005); others have also focused on phenomena of 
“new Muslims” (or “postcolonial Muslims”) as the outcome of a process whereby the growth 
of secular education, the expansion of a public sphere and new mediums of communication 
have resulted in a change in the sociology of Islamic knowledge which reduced the 
dependence of Muslims towards religious leaders in term of religious authority (Eickelmann 
and Anderson 2003; Schulz 2003; Soares 2005a). Following this increasing objectification of 
Islam in the private and public domain, two recent works explore the increasing engagement 
of Muslim women in religious debates and experiences in Niger (Masquelier 2009) and in Mali 
(Schulz 2012). Overall, anthropological researches on Islam nevertheless conceive the notion 
of piety as being the domain of reformist piety movements, Islamic revival groups and religious 
leaders. However, what might piety involve for the overwhelming majority of Muslims in their 
everyday lives? Ordinary Muslims I met in Mali too face pious concerns in their life. As I will 
explore later in this chapter, in Mali, piety is discussed by people from a wide variety of 
backgrounds; it is an open and complex notion which is not only captured by focusing on 
discourses of reformist movements, Islamic revival groups and religious leaders. The problem 
of piety is not a binary one related to specific religious affiliations; the Western analyst should 
not contrast secular goals with pious ones. On the contrary, my aim is to study the interplay 
between Muslim identity, pious concern and mundane interests. Finally, in the study of piety 
as religious experience I argue for ‘democratisation’ of piety to Muslims in general because 
pious concerns are not exclusive to religious elites and Islamic revival movements.  
 
 
 
The pluralisation of Islam in Bougouni 
 
Mostly based on Brenner’s approach to identity as ‘a process of naming: naming of self, 
naming of others, naming by others’, I explore ‘the process of Muslim identity-building in the 
broader political context of contemporary [Bougouni and beyond120]’ (1993b, 59). In this way 
each category is identified in relation to other categories. It also refers to changing religious 
                                                          
120 I replaced ‘Mali’ by ‘Bougouni and beyond’. 
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orientations and modes and markers of piety instead of fixed criteria. Therefore the reader 
should bear in mind that the process of naming intentionally involves fluid and incomplete 
categories, and their definite meanings are situational. In line with Brenner (1993b), I argue 
that the process of naming reflects more social representations shaped through interactions 
rather than notions of essence. 
 Certain historical religious centres of Mali are still characterised by the presence of 
prominent religious leaders and their network of followers who have managed to keep at bay 
other more recent Islamic currents. For instance, the two Sufi orders (Hamawiyya and 
Tijaniyya) of Nioro-du-Sahel dominate the Islamic sphere there and prevent other Islamic 
influences taking root in town (see Soares 2005a). However, Bougouni is not an historical 
religious centre of Mali; there is no religious monopoly that restricts its Islamic sphere. 
Following the new civic liberties brought by the events of 1991 in Mali, Bougouni, like many 
Malian towns, has undergone a process of religious pluralisation. The town has become the 
religious crossroads of southwest Mali where many Islamic currents are present. 
 At the beginning of my stay in Bougouni, my host father once recounted me an 
anecdote about events witnessed recently in the mosque:  
 
  ‘The other day the pieds-nus (barefoots) visited the mosque. They are a grouping of 
fundamentalists who wear traditional cotton cloths. They proclaimed that there are 73 Islamic religious 
paths, but only one, theirs, leads to God. I disagree because Islam cannot be reduced to one path’. 
 
 This anecdote about Islamic path(s) points to the numerous discrepancies and tensions 
separating Muslims in Bougouni. Muslims debate the legitimacy of religious authority and the 
nature of its legitimacy. Piety, as an important element (among others) of religious legitimacy, 
is therefore contested among Muslims. Disagreements over its meaning have resulted in 
several ways of being Muslim. With regards to Bougouni, Muslims tend to divide its Islamic 
landscape into five different categories I describe below. The first four categories concern 
Islamic currents that refer to distinct affiliation and religious leaders. The fifth one is related to 
the broad category of ordinary Muslim. 
 The above anecdote refers to the ‘barefoots’. It is a Muslim movement that was 
founded by Cheick Ibrahim Kalil Kanouté in the 1980s in Mali. According to its founder, the 
true Muslim should live the same way the Prophet Muhammad did; thus his followers must 
refuse any technology subsequent to the life of Muhammad. As a consequence, they do not 
drive any motorised vehicles and do not wear modern shoes. It is why they have been 
nicknamed ‘barefoots’. Sometimes barefoots are also called ‘sirawo’ (the path of hole) because 
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it is commonly said that the founder of this movement developed this peculiar Islamic path 
during years he lived in the hole of a big tree. His followers also wear traditional hand woven 
cotton cloths and refuse modern medicines (among other common traits). Women are 
confined to the house (chores and child rearing) and men mostly farm. Their strict discipline of 
life has prompted clashes with civil servants who consider them as rebellious citizens because 
of their rejection of modern services (e.g. vaccinations). A few conflicts even ended in 
tragedy.121 Considered as rebellious citizens by the Malian state, the barefoots only muster 
several thousands of adherents in the entire country. 
 In Bougouni barefoots are composed of a few families settled at the vicinity of 
Heremakono district. They built their own mosque; the only one not registered in AMUPI’s 
record of mosques. The barefoots are not part of the AMUPI because of their religious views, 
which are mainly rooted in their refusal of modernity of present time; they are deemed 
‘extremist’.122 Wherever they go, barefoots attract public scrutiny. Their specific outfits are 
easily recognisable. Barefoots walking on the streets of Bougouni often provoke mocking 
remarks from passers-by. Most Muslims consider them as crazy people and Muslim extremists. 
Their small number of followers however causes more laughter than suspicion among Muslims 
there. 
 Bougouni also hosts the so-called ‘Wahhabis’123 who name themselves ‘Sunnis’; but 
following colonial terminology they have been labelled ‘Wahhabis’ by those who are not 
affiliated to their doctrines. Although they cover a heterogeneous group of Muslims, they all 
refer to reformist movements of Arabic influences for two main reasons. Many members of 
their religious elite have studied Islam in Middle-East; they vehemently criticise the 
superimposition of local social structure on religious offices, the maraboutage practices and 
the cult of saints adopted by most local Muslims.124  
 The so-called ‘Wahhabis’ were established first in Bamako, Bouaké and Sikasso.125 The 
town of Bougouni located half way between Bamako and Sikasso hosts an important minority 
of Wahhabis who gather in four mosques (one Friday mosque) and two médersas of reformist 
allegiance (out of the 33 mosques and 7 médersas of the town of Bougouni). The expansion of 
reformist movements has stagnated since the 1990s; nonetheless their presence is very visible 
due to their display of outwards signs of religious affiliation. 
                                                          
121http://www.sectes-infos.net/repression-39.htm;http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012306503-l-islam-au-mali-loin-d-aqmi; 
http://www.ccmm.asso.fr/spip.php?article828  (retrieved the 20.07.2011). 
122 Although AMUPI is not a state association anymore, it is still considered as such. Except for the barefoots, all the main Malian 
Muslims tendencies are represented in the AMUPI. On AMUPI, see introduction. 
123 On detailed definition of Wahhabis in Mali, see Soares (2005a, 180-209) and Brenner (2001). 
124 ‘Reformists wrote and spoke forcefully about the need to combat bid’a (Ar. Innovation), which means unlawful innovation in 
Islam’ (Soares 2005a, 183). 
125 On Wahhabis in Bamako, see Amselle (1985); on Wahhabis traders in Sikasso, see Warms (1992). 
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They are noticeable by what people call their ‘Arabic dress code’. Women are mostly confined 
at home, but when they go outside they wear integral black veils over ordinary cloths. Men 
wear white robes and trousers. Their pants are shorter than ordinary ones. They are cut in the 
calf region so as to avoid picking up dirt from the soil that can invalidate the prayer. Men let 
their beards grow. Wahhabis also pray with arms crossed by contrast with arms hanging by 
sides (adopted by all other local Muslims) and have promoted modern and rational Islamic 
education (médersa) in Mali by contrast to the traditional Islamic education (dugumakalan)126, 
or Western-style public school (see Brenner 2001).127 
 Wahhabis have been received with mixed feelings in Mali. Most Muslims I met share 
the opinion of Sidy the builder who said ‘Wahhabis are knowledgeable about Islam, but they 
exaggerate’. One of his promotionaires (schoolmates) became a Wahhabi. Despite their 
religious divergences, they stayed friends over the years. Sidy respects his friend’s knowledge 
of the Islamic sacred texts, but he thinks his friend sometimes goes too far when he struggles 
to find an Islamic explanation for everything and to restrict his conduct to religious guidelines 
only. 
 
 ‘The Wahhabis are walking on a thin red line. They think life is within religion. For me however 
it is the opposite. Religion is within life. It is tough for them. They sometimes drop it’. 
 
Sidy’s comment - walking on the thin red line - depicts the wahhabi path as a tightrope walk-
like because its religious rigour makes life complicated.128 Many educated Muslims who read 
Islamic sacred texts by themselves also criticise the Wahhabis for their ‘islam littéraliste’129 
(Holder 2009a, 241) that consistently seeks to encapsulate Muslim life into a set of norms. As 
the world-as-it-is (the real) cannot be fully grasped by textual knowledge, so this kind of 
intellectual process is often blamed for its speculative tendency. For Bakary the engineer, 
when the nature of Islamic authority is enclosed in intellectual interpretation and textual 
knowledge, one risks reducing the conception of proper Muslim life to ‘all that is not written is 
condemned’ to the detriment of ‘all that is not condemned is allowed’. Put differently, Bakary 
associated the Islamic sacred texts as a finger which points at God: the Qur’an and Hadiths 
indicate the direction of the religious path. However, the Wahhabis study the finger instead of 
                                                          
126 On the traditional Islamic education, see chapter 1. 
127 Many Muslims who are not affiliated with reformist movements send their children to médersa as well.  However, médersa do 
not differ from public schools in term of school dropout and absenteeism. Many students leave school after only a couple of years. 
Most former médersa students therefore know rudimentary Arab.  
128 In similar vein, people adopting Salafi piety in Egypt face ‘practical problem’ and may suffer from ‘backlash’ due to the 
difficulties of living according to Salafi piety in contemporary Egypt (Schielke 2009b, 176–177). 
129 Literal Islam. 
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the direction it reveals because their textual approach to Islam keeps them from seeing the 
wider world into which religious life is inserted. 
 Many Muslims also blame Wahhabis for undermining the local tradition of ‘social 
ethics’ (hadamadenya) because they tend to socialise among themselves only and do not 
attend the life-cycle rituals of other Muslims. In similar vein Wahhabis are depicted as those 
who weaken social harmony and community life because they do things differently: their 
public codes, their way of praying, and the praying times in their mosques differ from the rest 
of Muslims in Mali. Wahhabis are also the only Muslims in Mali who do not celebrate the 
national celebration of the Maouloud (the birth of the Prophet) (Holder 2009a). Other 
Muslims, referring to their ‘Arabic dress code’, criticise Wahhabis for confounding Islam with 
Arabic culture. These Muslims argue the long tradition of Islam in Mali certify local Islam as 
valid as Islamic tendencies coming from the Arabic world. 
 The third category is ‘Sufi’; it covers the ‘phenomenon of new Sufis’ found in Bougouni 
(see Soares 2007). These recent movements are articulated around ‘new Muslim public 
figures’ that have emerged thanks to recent liberalisation, freedom of association and new 
media of communication in the 1990s (Ibid, 80). Among these movements, one is present in 
Bougouni; the Sufi branch of Cheick Soufi Bilal. This new Sufi movement has attracted public 
attention because of the media coverage of its spiritual leader. Bilal is a prolific writer and 
famous preacher with a growing saintly reputation in Mali. Overall, his charisma and 
‘bricolage’ of various Sufi orders (Ibid, 85), his youthful appearance and dreadlocks indexing 
‘youth urban culture’ (Ibid, 83) have supported his reputation of open-mindedness among 
ordinary Muslims of the younger generation in Bougouni. The followers of Cheick Soufi Bilal 
opened a zawiya in Dialanikoro district in the late 1990s. They organise regular public 
preaching (wajuli) in the evening that always draws a crowd.130 Many young Muslims I met 
appreciate the new Sufis because of their tolerance and their acceptance of dance and music 
within their conception of a proper Muslim life. By contrast, elders are more suspicious 
towards such movements which they depict as rebel and lacking of good manners. 
 The fourth category is ‘Ansar’; the diminutive for members of the Ansar Dine131 Islamic 
association. Founded in 1983 in Bamako by Cherif Ousmane Madani Häidara’s, Ansar Dine in 
less than 30 years has become the most powerful Muslim association in present-day Mali.132 
The success of this association is mostly due to the oratorical skills and outspokenness of their 
‘guide spirituel’ Ousmane Cherif Haïdara who defied Moussa Traoré’s dictatorial regime and 
                                                          
130 On detailed analysis of Cheick Soufi Bilal, see Soares (2007, 80-86). 
131 Ansar Dine is a Arabo-bamanan expression which means ‘the gardians/helpers of religion [Islam]’; Holder translates it into ‘les 
Partisans de la Religion’ (the Followers of Religion) (2009a, 277). 
132 On Ansar Dine and Cherif Ousmane Madani Häidara, see Schulz (2003; 2006a; 2006b; 2007) and Soares (2005a). 
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harshly criticised reformist movements in Mali. Haïdara’s popularity is also due to his 
promotion of local ‘social ethics’ (hadamadenya) in the shaping of Muslim faith such as his 
emphasis on jogo ɲuman (correct attitude) and hͻrͻnya (nobleness) in parallel with traditional 
Islamic precepts. Membership of this association is growing, and members are very active in 
Bougouni where they organise weekly public preaching. These events often end with public 
swearing of allegiance of new members to Ansar Dine and his spiritual guide.133 For Ansar, the 
profession of the Islamic creed (Shahada)134 does not completely certify adherence to Muslim 
faith; someone adheres fully to Islam only through making the six Islamic promises (Ar. 
baya)135 during the public swearing of allegiance. 
 Members of Ansar Dine do not aim to pray in a specific mosque. Nevertheless they 
recently built a local head office where they organise various Islamic events. Men do not wear 
recognisable symbols of allegiance, but women known as ‘Ansar musow’ wear partial veils that 
cover their hair. Their practice of partial veiling makes them easily recognisable within a crowd 
because most Muslim women (except wahhabi women) do not cover their hair in Mali. 
 Ansars also provokes criticism from ordinary Muslims and especially from Muslim 
scholars and elders. Most elders dislike the straightforward rhetoric of Haïdara and denounce 
him as a vulgar man. One of Haïdara’s interventions over sexuality has been the subject of 
many controversies among Muslims in Bougouni. As response to someone’s question about 
sex acts tolerated by Islam, Haidara simply stated that how to make love is up to the married 
couple. Then he specified that a married man can even ‘put his wife on top’ if he desires to do 
so. What he added shocked many Muslims who thought such a statement is unworthy of a 
religious leader. Many Muslims criticise those who join the Ansar Dine association as Muslims 
who just want to be trendy; their adherence is based more on fashion than on Islamic faith. 
Many also regret the fact that success has softened Haïdara’s positions to the point of 
reneging on his earlier criticism of ostentatious religious leaders and corrupted elites. Muslims 
who have followed his trajectory since 1980s criticise Haïdara for becoming a kind of Muslim 
entrepreneur, who now possesses big, luxury cars (Hummers and 4x4s) and runs a successful 
travel company specialised in the organisation of the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. They point to 
the ‘embourgeoisment’ of Haïdara who even joined the HCIM136 in 2006 (see Holder 2009a, 
279), an Islamic association created by the government in early 2000s so as to balance the 
power of the AMUPI in the national level.137 This structure, gathering members of the Muslim 
                                                          
133 On public swearing of allegiance, see http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200908060904.html (retrieved the 03.02.2012). 
134 The Muslim declaration of belief in the oneness of God and acceptance of Muhammad as his Prophet. 
135 I do not associate anything to God, I do not steal, I do not commit adultery, I do not kill my children, I do not slander, I do not 
disobey to the Prophet’ (Qur’an LX,12). 
136 Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali. 
137 On HCIM, see Holder (2009a, 274–275),  Schulz (2012, 177–178) , and Soares (2005b, 83). 
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establishment, is conceived as the official interface between the Malian state and the Muslim 
community concerning religious affairs in the country.  
 The popularity of Haïdara among Muslims, the circulation of his preaching on local 
radio, and via DVDs shown in grins and courtyards, the presence of his picture on trucks, cars 
and shops make him an unavoidable religious figure in Bougouni and the sole ‘media star’ of 
the Islamic sphere of contemporary Mali (see Soares 2007). Above all, I argue, the success of 
Haïdara stems from his criticism of Arabic Islam and his focus on social ethics that remind 
Muslims of the twofold nature of piety. The success of Haïdara in present-day Mali deserves 
further examination; the reasons Haïdara’s views are sympathetically received by many 
ordinary Muslims (and especially the youth) will be explored in chapter 6. 
 
 
 
The ordinary Muslim 
 
‘There are many paths within Islam; the Ansar, Sufi, Wahhabi, Barefoots and those who walk on 
Muhammad’s path. I am among those who follow Muhammad only. We do not have a chief except God 
himself’. (Boubacar, 38 years old, seller of yuguyuguw in Bougouni) 
 
 The fifth category ‘silamɛ’ (Muslim) accounts for the vast majority of Muslims found in 
Bougouni. I intentionally translate silamԑ as “ordinary Muslim”. The category of ordinary 
Muslims was first developed by Peletz in his study of Islamic resurgence in the Malay Peninsula 
(1997). He wanted to understand how the vast majority of Malays perceive discourses of 
Malay Muslim reformers so as to ‘examine the production and consumption of contrasting 
discourses on Islam and Malay cultural identity in contemporary Malaysia’ (Ibid, 232). 
Although its heterogeneity is problematic, Peletz argued that ‘ordinary Muslims’ is employed 
in order to focus on ‘contrast’ with ‘Muslim resurgents’ rather than on religious orientations 
per se (Ibid, 233). In similar work, Mckenna studied everyday political relations between 
Muslim rulers and rebels, and ordinary Muslims in the context of Muslim national struggle in 
the Cotabato region of the southern Philippines (1998). In his work, Mckenna defined ordinary 
Muslims as lower class Muslims (peasants, low-skilled wage workers) who were not members 
of political elite and who did not possess strong ethnoreligious consciousness (Ibid, 292n3). 
Inspired by both authors, I would like to adapt the category of ordinary Muslims for my study 
of everyday Islam in Bougouni and southwest Mali.   
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Mainstream Islam in Bougouni is rooted in broader traditional African Islam, itself originating 
from Sufi orders (mostly Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya) which dominated Islam during the colonial 
period there. However locals do not speak of Sufi affiliation because most of them have never 
been related to any Sufi leaders (muqaddam). They just received their religious education from 
Muslims who were somehow influenced by dominant Sufi orders of the Islamic sphere of their 
epoch. Only a few elders I met in the field remembered the Sufi origins of their religious 
background. Otherwise, the overwhelming majority of Muslims just say ‘I am Muslim’ (nɛ yé 
silamɛ yé). 
 Following Boubacar’s statement, I start to define ordinary Muslims as Muslims who 
perceive themselves neither as members of a religious elite, nor as members of specific 
religious movements. While ordinary Muslims might sympathise with some aspects of Islamic 
currents introduced in the previous section, nonetheless, they are affiliated to none of them. 
In similar vein, Osella and Osella mention the existence of ‘just Muslims’ in Kerala; although 
these Muslims declare themselves in private not to be aligned with particular groups, they take 
a clearer religious affiliation in public due to an over-determination of identity by political 
events (2008b). Such a situation of political pressure over the choice of a specific Muslim 
identity does not exist in Mali. How then do ordinary Muslims position themselves within the 
religious pluralisation of contemporary Mali? 
 I first explore the category of ordinary Muslim in relation to contemporary changes in 
religious authority and Islamic knowledge in Mali.  
 As demonstrated in recent anthropological works about Islam in Mali (Schulz 2006a; 
2007), Muslims do not need to rely exclusively on religious leaders for religious authority.  
According to Schulz (2007, 146), the diffusion of religious knowledge on broadcast media has 
contributed ‘to a process of objectification in the course of which “religion” becomes the 
object of individual scrutiny and identity construction’. To illustrate, one day I entered a 
clothing store in the market of Bougouni. The merchant welcomed me and asked what I was 
looking for. After the usual commercial exchange we opened up the conversation. He wanted 
to know what I was doing in Bougouni. Knowing that the figure of the anthropologist would 
not make any sense to my interlocutor, I simply replied with what Muslim friends used to say 
to express the fact of someone being interested in Islam: ‘I am curious about Islam’ (Nɛ bɛ 
ɲԑɲini silamԑya kan). He then smiled and replied ‘it is easy!’ (a ka ɲͻgon!). After having 
explained to me a few things about Islam, he told me: ‘I’ve got books [on Islam]’. He put his 
hand behind a shelf, pulled a small book out of the dust and lent it to me. This sort of 
notebook had no named author; it was illustrated with drawings and Bamanan writings that 
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explained how to make ablution, how to pray and basic moral guidelines. At its back a couple 
of sentences attracted my attention, 
 
 ‘Put this small book in your pocket. Take it with you when you go working to the fields. Then 
study it very much. Learn it entirely by heart’.
138
 
 
This couple of instructions indicated three points: Islam is accessible to all; one should learn 
about Islam by oneself; one can study Islam whenever and wherever one wants. They 
correspond to what I observed in Bougouni. Ordinary Muslims belong to what Lambek calls 
‘people from the path’ because ‘everyone strives also, to one degree or another, to become 
and act as a well-informed [Muslim]’.139 The verb ‘Ka ɲԑɲini fԑn kan’ means ‘to search for the 
cause of something’ in the above anecdote (see Bailleul 1996). My Muslim friends just 
translated ‘nɛ bɛ ɲԑɲini silamԑya kan’ into ‘J’ai la curiosité de l’Islam’ (I am curious about 
Islam).140 They too are curious about Islam, but they do not investigate Islam in the same way 
than members of religious elite do because Islam is not their main activity. By contrast an 
Islamic student would rather say ‘I study Islam’ (nԑ bԑ silamԑya kalan).141 My friends’ nuanced 
translation is meaningful because it signifies that ordinary Muslims want to learn about Islam, 
but they are invested in other interests and activities of a mundane and earthly nature as well; 
being a good Muslim is one domain among others which constitute a successful life in 
Bougouni.142 It is worth noting that the term ɲԑɲini is composed of two words: ɲԑ (eye) and 
ɲini (search); both together express the fact of being curious. The one who is curious tends to 
gaze at what surrounds him; at some point he will pay attention to Islam because religiosity is 
part of the society he belongs to. Then he will learn a bit about Islam because it informs local 
social life and moral life. Moving forward in life might involve also religious ambitions. Here 
Islam is not an end in itself but is inserted in broader mundane projects, such as getting 
married, having children, possessing motorbikes and a car, and building a cement house 
among other factors defining what constitute a successful life in Bougouni. 
 Ordinary Muslims are the outcome of religious pluralisation; they are aware of an 
international Islamic world and, at the same time, of an ongoing fragmentation of the 
                                                          
138 Gafenin in bila i jufa kͻnͻ, i ka taaa n’a ye foro la. A kalan kosԑbԑ. A bԑԑ durusi. 
139 I replaced ‘citizen’ by ‘Muslim’. 
140 Marsden and Retsikas elaborate the category of ‘people of Muslim background’ (forthcoming). How do ordinary Muslims differ 
from people of Muslim background? The latter category includes the religious elite and members of specific religious groups; it 
emphasises Islam as a cultural trait. The former focuses more on Islam as religious experience among non elite and unaffiliated 
Muslims. To be curious about religion is an important dimension of Islam I explore among the ordinary Muslims of Bougouni, 
whereas it is not necessarily the case for all people of religious background. In this study, the category of ordinary Muslims comes 
close to what Schulz coined as ‘observant Muslims’ who are both not-affiliated Muslims and practising Muslim (xiv; 6). 
141 Ka fԑn kalan (to study something). 
142 On further explanations of successful life in Bougouni, see chapter 5. 
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contemporary Islamic sphere. The opening up of the world also reveals its divisions. It points to 
rivalries and contradictions between Islamic currents that show the limits of control of 
religious leaders over the realm of religiosity. The opinion of Madou, the local DJ, exemplifies 
well the weakening of religious authority: ‘One Muslim scholar says turn left, and another one 
says turn right. At the end we do not know where to go!’ In similar vein, Oumar, the teacher, 
and her daughter complain about this religious fragmentation that they notice on the religious 
programme called Les Oulémas that is broadcast every Friday on ORTM143 national TV channel: 
‘We do not like this programme because it is only a series of chunks of preaching. Each of them 
is incomplete. Each Muslim scholar would like to say something. Finally they say nothing. They 
just want to appear on TV!’  
 Before such a complex, fragmented and somewhat contradictory Islamic sphere, I 
argue, most Muslims prefer not to be affiliated to any clear-cut Muslim movements. Ordinary 
Muslims do not follow specific religious leader(s) or specific body of doctrines. They just build 
their religiosity by picking what they find relevant for their life in whatever Muslim tendencies 
are at their disposal in the religious market of post-1991 Mali which aroused from the 
reinforced of the laïcité of the Malian state and the liberal policies on religious expression in 
Mali.144 
 For instance, one of my Muslim friends Ali is a sympathizer of Haidara because he likes 
his teaching on correct attitude. He regularly attends public preaching organised by the Ansar 
Dine section of Bougouni. He also listens to Haïdara’s preaching in local radio programmes 
when he is at work. However he is not an Ansar because he does not feel the need to be 
affiliated. For him, living a proper Muslim life and being a member of an Islamic movement are 
two different things. For him, religiosity as an object of individual scrutiny does not necessarily 
involve firm affiliation; his religious experience is inserted into mundane settings that involve 
broader agendas. His Muslim life is primarily conceived through the achievement of success in 
life. Ali also attends public sermons organised by followers of Cheick Bilal in Bougouni. 
Although he does not support wahhabi doctrines, he nevertheless agrees with wahhabi critics 
on the local custom of ostentatious marriages that burdens families with debts. He is simply 
curious about Islam because, among other goals, he wants to live a proper Muslim life.  He 
identifies himself as ‘silamԑ dͻron’ (Muslim only). 
 Although ordinary Muslims do not follow a specific body of doctrines, they relate their 
Muslim identity to a sort of presumed universal Islam I develop in the next section. 
 
                                                          
143 Office de la Radiodiffusion Télévision du Mali. 
144 On further implications of the notion of religious market in anthropology, see Pelkmans (2006, 30–32). 
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The formation of a generic Islam  
 
The events of 1991 promoted democratic process and civil liberties that have increased the 
visibility of Muslim activism in Mali. According to Holder, contemporary Mali is characterised 
by the formation of an ‘espace publique religieux’ (public religious sphere) within which Islamic 
currents are advocating the public practice of piety, and politicians are seeking to seduce a 
Muslim electorate (2009a). By contrast to a logic of rupture with its claim of an Islamic state, 
the contemporary linkages between Islam and politics in Mali follow a ‘logique 
d’accommodement’ (logic of accommodation) (2009b). In this context I would like to focus 
precisely on how ordinary Muslims respond to the ‘moralisation’ of the public sphere 
supported by Muslim scholars, Islamic movements and their followers. 
 Like Soares (2004, 223), my approach to the public sphere in Mali is not related to the 
Habermasian notion of ‘public opinion’; I instead point to the notion of Islamic consensus 
(ijma) and its formation in post 1991 Mali as the common ground upon which the Muslim 
community discuss about piety. I aim to show how and why a fragmented religious sphere in 
Mali, with its preferred discourses of ‘truth and ignorance’, have reduced the Islamic 
consensus to professions of public Islam and avowals of piety in the practice of Islamic 
precepts.  
 The history of Islamic debate in Mali is related to what Brenner terms ‘doctrinal 
politics’ (2001). Muslim scholars have mostly enunciated Islamic disputes around discourses of 
‘truth and ignorance’, as following he puts it, 
 
 ‘Consequently, doctrinal political debate inevitably includes claims and counter-claims about 
what is “true”, and about which scholars are truly knowledgeable and possess a full command of Islamic 
texts, and which are ‘ignorant’ (2001,135). 
 
For Brenner, past and present doctrinal politics between Muslim scholars have been 
characterised by the following equation: - Whoever knows tells the truth; the others are 
ignorant - In this way ‘the expansion of each movement was accompanied by one, or several, 
doctrinal initiatives which simultaneously challenged a pre-existing doctrinal position and 
sought to demonstrate the superior Islamic knowledge of the leader in question’ (Ibid, 137). 
Putting the same point differently, Muslim scholars have always argued about the 
purity/impurity of Muslim practices.145 
                                                          
145 For Brenner, the outcome of such debate ‘depends ultimately on the intellectual capacity of its proponents to propagate and 
defend it, that is, upon their knowledge and control of the basic sources [the Qur’an and the Hadith] (Ibid, 135). Here I disagree 
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Then what can we say about the reception of such discourses among ordinary Muslims within 
the ongoing religious fragmentation of the Islamic sphere in Mali? How is Muslim identity 
assessed when various conceptions of proper Muslim life coexist and compete with each 
other? How do ordinary Muslims apprehend their common religious background and make 
sense of a broader Muslim community? I argue, Muslims still base their unity on Islamic 
consensus, however a ‘generic’ one that is reduced to the assumed universals of Islam 
(Eickelmann 1989).  
 Eickelmann defined the notion of ‘generic Islam’ as the outcome of modern mass 
education and religious policy of the Oman state whose aim was to develop Islamic studies as 
‘scrupulously non-sectarian subject’ (1989). In this context, state authorities promoted generic 
Islam as the means to foster a shared Islamic curriculum and to avoid sectarian divisions 
between Ibadis, Sunnis and Shi’ahs. In Mali, generic Islam is also a sort of shared Islamic 
curriculum, but its development is not similar to the one found in Oman because it is not the 
result of a peculiar religious policy.  
 Given that Mali has an overwhelming Muslim majority, Malian Muslims tend to say 
‘Mali is a Muslim country’. The fact that they say Mali is a laïc and, at the same time, a Muslim 
country is not contradictory. Their statement does not express the wish for an Islamic state; it 
rather stresses the fact that Mali is part of the Muslim world commonly called ‘the global 
Islamic community’ (umma). As such Islam is an important cultural referent for Mali.  In 
parallel, Islam as cultural system has been imagined (Anderson 1983) in modern times as one 
of the ‘world religions’146 of our contemporary epoch (Cook, Laidlaw, and Mair 2009). Both 
these ideas of - umma and world religion - reinforce the perception of Islam as an authentic, 
coherent and encompassing system to ordinary Muslims. However, following the arguments of 
Cook, Laidlaw and Mair, this system does not exist out there, as if it had an existence 
separated from Muslims; ‘the widespread assumption by adherents of self-consciously world 
religions that there must be a coherent whole of which they are part is itself a religious 
commitment’ (Cook, Laidlaw, and Mair 2009, 54). This system therefore needs to be 
continuously produced and explained by Muslims so as to exist and to endure. Thus, I argue, 
the practice of generic Islam systematises Islam as the common cultural background of a 
religious nature for ordinary Muslims in the heterogeneous and contested field of Islamic 
currents in Mali. This situation is foremost the progressive outcome of the relationship 
                                                                                                                                                                          
with Brenner. Knowing and persuading are two different arts. Although both involve intellectual capacity, they do not reduce to it. 
Reformist movements in Mali developed within a ‘rationalistic episteme’ (see Brenner 2001, 7-8) and a literal Islam which 
constituted their main sources of religious authority (on similar reflexions about reformist movements in Egypt, see Schielke 
(2006)). However, reformist movements convinced only a minority of Muslims in Mali. Most Muslims reflect upon Islam not only in 
term of intellectual capacity in Mali. Local conceptions of proper Muslim life are also related to status, ethics and belongings of 
subjective origins. 
146 On an analysis of the category of ‘world religion’ as historical product, see Masuzawa (2005). 
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between the sense of a global Islamic community and the process of the religious 
fragmentation of the Islamic sphere. Following Bowen’s line of inquiry between “universal” 
and “local” Islamic traits (1998), I now ask how generic Islam as putatively element of universal 
Islam has been made and taken up in the specific cultural area of Mali? 
 Muslims in Mali have promoted the standardisation of religious practice since the 
colonial period. At that time Islam was the sole idiom that could bring together people of 
different social status and origins. In parallel the emergence of a public sphere ‘has also 
created pressures for Islamic practices to be more uniform’ so as to gather Muslims into the 
same community (Soares 2005a, 240).147 Such processes accelerated during the postcolonial 
period with the implications of small media and Muslim associations that have helped ‘to 
foster a supralocal sense of shared Muslim identity in Mali’ (Soares 2005a, 238).148 In addition, 
Muslim identity has been associated with the exhibition of outwards signs of Islam (e.g. regular 
daily prayers and fasting); the correct way of being Muslim has tended to be mostly assessed 
with respect to its public signs (see Soares 2004). Paradoxically, I argue, this process of 
standardisation of religious practice has also been accelerated by the recent religious 
fragmentation of the Islamic sphere. What unites Muslims when the Islamic sphere becomes 
divided into multiple minority Islamic currents? My response is that the imagined community 
of Muslims has helped to assemble ordinary Muslims around a sort of generic Islam. This 
generic Islam can be interpreted as the lowest common denominator tolerated by most 
Muslim scholars and their followers. 
 In order to refer to what unites Muslims, most of my Muslim friends simply 
pronounced the first pillar of Islam that is the Islamic creed (Shahada): the Muslim declaration 
of belief in the oneness of God and acceptance of Muhammad as his Prophet. Others also 
uttered the sura Al-Fatiha149 they learnt by heart150 and which is intoned in each prayer and 
during every life-ritual ceremony in Mali. They also said that you should pray and fast when 
asked. Then some added that wealthy Muslims have to help the poor, and to go to the Mecca. 
Most Muslims unite around the five Islamic pillars which are the Islamic creed, the regular 
                                                          
147 On the public sphere in Mali, see Soares (2005a, 222-238). 
148 I disagree with Soares when he wrote: ‘One could even go so far as to say that Islam has come to saturate the sphere of public 
discourse in postcolonial Mali’ (2005a, 222). Islam is an important public discourse in Bougouni, but not the only one. 
Furthermore, Christian discourses are visible in contemporary secular Mali through radio and TV programmes (such as Saturday 
night Catholic and Protestant programmes on ORTM). I also attended public preaching of various evangelic priests in Bougouni. 
For instance, the Mission d’Evangelisation et d’Implantation des Eglisee MEIE-MIN organised 5 evenings of evangelisation, prayer 
and blessing from 24 to 28 February 2009 in the Sakoro Mery Diakité soccer stadium. Theses religious events were guided by an 
American evangelist and a Malian minister. Many local Muslims attended them from curiosity and for entertainment. Others 
wanted to receive blessings from Christian leaders. 
149 The sura Al-Fatiha is the first chapter of the Qur'an. Its seven verses are a prayer for God's guidance and stress the lordship and 
mercy of God.  
150 Most Malian Muslims still learnt Al-Fatiha by heart without knowing its meaning. In Bougouni, Muslim families commonly send 
their teenagers to a family of a Muslim scholar for their religious education. They stay there 1-3 months (during school break) the 
time to learn how to take ablution, how to pray and basic moral guidance.  Some children receive their religious education with an 
elder of their own family.  
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daily prayer, the ritual fasting, the alms-giving and the pilgrimage of the Hajj. The statement 
below that I collected in Bougouni during an informal chat I had with a couple of elders in the 
courtyard of a small mosque, illustrates the state of the Islamic consensus found in town. 
 
‘Muslims throughout Mali agree on the five Islamic pillars.  
The rest is only disagreement (Imam, Bougouni)’. 
 
We can say that ijma has been reduced to profession of the five Muslim pillars, avowals of 
piety about the practice of Islamic precepts, abstention from consumption of alcohol, the 
Friday communal prayers in a mosque, and the Hajj pilgrimage; they constitute the main 
markers of Islamic faith in Mali. For many Muslims, the unity of Islam somehow stops here. 
This sounds rather simplistic, but here Muslims take ijma as a straightforward statement that 
does not need the backing of any religious authority to be verified. Of course Muslims can 
achieve consensus over other points, but such consensus is never immediate; it stems from 
debate the outcome of which is partial, changing and situational. 
 In response to the increasing public expression of piety observed among the followers 
of the many Islamic movements found in post 1991 Mali, ordinary Muslims of Bougouni 
(especially members of the emerging urban middle class and local elite, family heads and 
elders)151 have adopted the display of common outwards signs of piety such as the white robe 
of Arabic style, rounded small white cap called ‘silamԑ fugulan’ (Muslim hat) and white 
Moroccan-style slippers among other items and clothes in the Muslim dress code, or what I 
call “the Muslim look”. As women are traditionally linked to the household (cooking, 
household chores and child rearing), the female outwards signs of piety are less significant 
because they are not necessarily put on public display. However, in her book called Muslims 
and new media in West Africa: pathways to God (Ibid.), Schulz focuses on the female face of 
the post-1991 Islamic renewal in the urban localities of San and Bamako; through the decision 
of “taking the veil” as an act of public self-expression, she illustrates how the public practice of 
piety has become an important element of religious identity among female participants in the 
Islamic renewal movements. Nonetheless, except during prayer, the overwhelming majority of 
ordinary Muslim women in Bougouni do not wear the veil. 
 The moralisation of the public sphere, supported by Islamic movements and their 
followers, gained new momentum following the introduction of new civil liberties in 1991. 
What I would like to add is that the practice of a generic Islam and the display of outwards 
                                                          
151 On the new Muslim elite with similar public and ‘deprivatized Islam’ in Mali, see Soares (2005b). However, when Soares refers 
to new religious intellectuals in Islamic studies, I refer to broader urban elites (civil servants, merchants, teachers, doctors, NGO 
workers (...)). 
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signs of piety in public life in Bougouni, are both encouraged and made possible by the 
longstanding cultivation of ostentatious identities found in Mali. This specifically public Islam 
was enabled by the visual and open character of street life found in urban Mali. 
  
 
 
Public Islam and the visual and open character of street life 
 
In the preface to an edited book called Public Islam and the common good, Eickelman and 
Salvatore broadly state that ‘“Public Islam” refers to the highly diverse invocations of Islam as 
ideas and practices that religious scholars, self-ascribed religious authorities, secular 
intellectuals, Sufi orders, mothers, students, workers, engineers, and many others make to 
civic debate and public life’ (2004, xii). Although fitting their wider theoretical perspective, the 
notion of public Islam I put forward here does not fully correspond to any of those explored in 
the chapters of their edited book.152 Rather than a discursive, mass-mediated and 
transnational public Islam shaping the contemporary public sphere, as in most Muslim 
countries, the public Islam I conceive of here originates from the open character of street life 
found in urban Mali. 
 Daily life is about street life in Mali. Street life mostly unfolds around its three main 
spaces of sociality which are the carré, the street and the grin.153 As these spaces are highly 
visible and open, street life in urban Mali tends to bind the quotidian to a public performance. 
When ‘daily life is spent outdoors under the gaze of neighbours or passers-by’, one ‘lives in a 
quasi-constant state of surveillance, comparable, in some respects with Bentham’s 
panopticon’ (Archambault 2010, 123). Put differently, street life puts someone’s behaviour 
within sight throughout the day. In such open settings, Islam contributes to the moral 
evaluation of life through visual social control. In this way, the practice of generic Islam and the 
display of outwards signs of piety advertise the shaping of moral subjects in public. - To be - is 
also informed by - to appear/look - in Mali.154 Moreover, observers are so attentive to what 
people do in public because this shapes their reputation. Indeed, social order in Mali is rooted 
in respect (bonya) which implies, above all, self-restraint in public, and in honour (danbé) 
which insists on correct behaviour, good manners and ostentatious display in public. The 
                                                          
152 Pinto (2004) and Soares (2004) refer to the public display of individual signs of piety, respectively in Syria and Mali; however, 
they do not specifically explore them in relation to social spaces. 
153 On a detailed description of these three spaces of sociality, see chapter 1. 
154 Here the notion of public space can be analysed as a ‘social arena’ in which the performances of actors are assessed through 
Islamic scripts (among other scripts) (Leclerc-Olive 2009). 
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visible open spaces of street life in Mali reinforce the fact that Islam, as medium of broader 
public identity, contributes to people’s reputation. The relationships between public, power 
and Islam, have tended to transform Islamic identity as resource which is active in the broader 
politics of success in Bougouni and beyond.  
 During the day, prayer times155 unfold as religious duties within carrés, around the 
shops and in the big market. Men and Women look for the colourful plastic pots (selidaga) 
they commonly use to perform their ritual ablution (ka seliji ta). Then, they take or borrow 
someone’s prayer mat. If one is unavailable they might use plastic or jute bag instead. Then 
they pray on it wherever they are: within carrés, in workshops, in shops, in the waysides (...). 
Except for elders, Muslims do not necessarily go to the mosque. They just aim to pray 
wherever they happen to be with little concern for the noise and bustle impinging on their 
prayer space. 
 During my stay in Bougouni, the first Imam of a mosque in Torakabougou was criticised 
because he wore a ‘veston’ (blazer) over his white boubou during communal prayer. His 
detractors did not appreciate his blazer because they thought it was not a proper Islamic cloth. 
They added that the Imam should be an exemplary Muslim. In order to stay in office, the Imam 
had to remove his blazer.  
 Among public religious acts, Soares also noticed that ‘communal Friday prayer has 
become perhaps the most public of all signs of piety in contemporary Mali’ (2004, 220). As 
weekly collective event constituting the core of the holy day of Islam, the communal Friday 
prayer illustrates well the visual, social and ostentatious character of public piety found in 
Mali; indeed most Muslim men and old women go to the mosque for the Friday communal 
prayer. In 2010, among the 33 mosques of Bougouni five were considered as Friday 
mosques.156 Every Friday just before 1 pm, the streets of Bougouni are packed with Muslims 
walking towards the Friday mosques for the communal prayer. At that time one can observe 
processions of finery and ‘Friday’ best. Men hold prayer mat and prayer beads and wear 
immaculate white cloths (big boubou or robe of Arabic style) and small rounded Muslim caps 
(silamԑ fugulan) and turbans. Women wear loose-fitting traditional cloths (boubou) and partial 
veils decorated with colourful and golden embroideries. Although white is the colour of Islam 
due to its symbolising purity, other colours are tolerated except for red because it is linked to 
bamanaya.157 A sharp-eyed observer can notice numerous polished shoes among the crowd as 
                                                          
155 Here I refer especially to the second prayer time (1-1.30pm) and the third prayer time (3.30-4pm) 
156 Usually, a mosque is selected as Friday mosque due to its size, its geographical position and its attendance. However, their 
choice is often subjected to political conflicts and difference of allegiances. 
157 Muslims can wear red colour as long as it is a minor colour such as a red scarf or a red design on a shirt, but I have never seen 
Muslims going to the mosque with red trousers and shirts because such cloths are too bound to Bamanaya practice; red cloths are 
known to be worn for Bamanaya rituals. 
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well. Locals say that those who come first to the Friday communal prayer and manage to find a 
place in the first row receive more ‘baraji’ (divine award) than the others. The Friday mosques 
are so packed that the latecomers have to pray in rows outside the mosque. At that precise 
moment, the streets of the towns (especially in the vicinity of Friday mosques) are half-empty 
and silent. Inhabitants who are not Muslims, and the minority of Muslims who miss the Friday 
communal prayer, remain quiet while the Muslim community is praying together in the Friday 
mosques. When the prayer is over, the processions of finery start again and scatter as Muslims 
go back home, eating and relaxing with family and, later, visiting relatives and friends in town. 
 The visible and open character of street life refers also to public spaces in general, such 
as the markets, the coach stations, and public transportation. The next illustration of public 
Islam illustrates how the Islamic look of a stranger indicates his pious identity which, in turn, 
inspires respect. During a coach trip to Bamako I heard someone calling his unknown 
neighbour ‘karamͻgͻ’ (teacher in Islamic studies).158 This person was a well-groomed young 
man with a sharp-cut beard; he wore a white robe of Arabic style, small rounded cap covered 
with golden embroidery, and white Moroccan slippers (silamԑ sabara). He also had Islamic 
rings of luck (garijԑgԑ)159 on his fingers. He spent most of the time picking up his ostentatious 
mobile and conversing with his interlocutors in a calm voice. He also occasionally listened to a 
reading of the Qur’an in his white earphones.160 His neighbour did not call him karamͻgͻ by 
accident. Owing his Muslim look, he was respectfully called teacher in Islamic studies. 
Furthermore his clean appearance and his extravagant mobile were indices of wealth. One 
should respect an apparently pious and rich stranger.  
 The practice of public Islam in Mali indexes piety; a pious person is thought to attract 
baraji or God’s favours. At the social level, a pious Muslim attracts the respect of the 
community; public expression of piety contributes to someone’s honour in the eyes of 
Muslims. The public significance of values, respect and honour, are encapsulated in the 
following local French expression: ‘Il/elle est quelqu’un de considéré(e)’ (literally, he/she is 
someone considered). In Mali this expression vehicles precisely two constitutive sets of 
meaning: 1. someone who is not just anyone because he/she is known among the community 
to be distinguishable from the masses; 2. someone regarded with regard and esteem (a person 
of standing). The kind of public Islam, which is supported by the visible and open character of 
street life in Bougouni, can be interpreted as the reformulation of an older social process of 
                                                          
158 karamͻgͻ means teacher in general. Someone knowledgeable in Islam is named karamͻgͻ. 
159 Such a ring is easily recognised due to its small box-shaped form. I call it an Islamic ring because it is said a powerful name of 
God is enclosed in it. An esoteric ring brings luck and protection to its wearer. 
160 Public Islam has also been strengthened by new media and technologies. Here I am concerned with mobile phone practices. 
Many young people (and some elders as well) set Islamic ringtones on their mobile and listen to the melodic reading of the Qur’an 
in Arabic. Such reading sounds more like a chant. Muslims listen to them as pious entertainment that brings them baraji. Others 
download series of blessings into their mobile and listen to them for similar purposes.  
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Mande origin: the cultivation of ostentatious identities in public. This process has tended to 
transform the public expression of Muslim identity as a resource which is active in broader 
politics of success in Bougouni and beyond. A good Muslim ‘est quelqu’un de considéré(e)’ 
within the Muslim society of Bougouni. 
 The public character of piety is not, however, devoid of criticism. The twofold nature of 
piety, both public and personal, that I explained through my opening anecdote of the 
madman, reminds ordinary Muslims of the problem of intentionality linked to the practice of 
public piety. Below, I introduce this issue through an ethnography of Islamic prayer in 
Bougouni. 
 
 
 
The Islamic prayer: a practice between faith and mundane status 
 
During my sojourn in Bougouni I became friendly with Yaya. The first time we met each other 
was during a public preaching (wajuli) organised by the Ansars of Bougouni.161 At that time he 
was a newly married man who worked as a carpenter in a workshop in Dialanikoro. As a first 
son, local custom pressed him to stay with his father and his mother and to support them. 
Yaya and his wife then shared the same carré with his parents and younger brothers and 
sisters. From time to time, he invited me for lunch when he knew women were not cooking 
to162 with gan163 sauce because of my dislike for glutinous meal. One day, we ate my favourite 
Malian dish: rice with peanuts sauce (tigadԑgԑ.na). Then we relaxed a bit while waiting for his 
younger brother who was preparing Malian tea. Yaya suddenly waved at me to look at his 
uncle who was visiting that day. He was praying just few meters away. A mobile phone was 
laid in front of him on the right corner of the prayer mat. More amusingly his uncle was 
holding a red hair comb in his hand while intoning sura. Yaya then smiled at me and 
whispered: ‘You see, my uncle is always ready for business and seduction; and this even when 
he is praying!’ Yaya’s remark was more a joke than a critique. I saw many Muslims putting their 
mobile phone on the prayer mat during prayer (but not a hair comb!). Nevertheless, this joke 
indicates that the prayer is animated by numerous intentions, mindsets and focus; either pious 
ones or more mixed ones. 
                                                          
161 Yaya, as many young men, appreciates the rhetoric skills of Haïdara, but he is not an Ansar. 
162 Traditional semolina made of corn or millet. 
163 Lady-finger. 
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For Muslims, the Islamic prayer (sԑli)164 is an important vehicle of the Islamic faith (limaniya).165 
It is the second pillar of Islam that is constituted by five daily prayers performed at precise 
moments during the day. The Islamic prayer concerns the relationship between the 
worshipper and God. My friend Boubacar who sells Chinese-made cloths in the big market of 
Bougouni used to say: ‘Praying is about bringing God within you’ (‘ka sɛli yé ka Ala jigin ɛ kͻnͻ 
yé’). Without entering into the details of each of the five daily prayers,166 I would like to stress 
the fact that Muslims say they communicate with God through prayer. This relationship is 
sacred; it should therefore be, neither distracted, nor interrupted.167 Islamic prayer is a 
ritualistic performance that demands a pious disposition in order to be valid.168 The true 
intention of the worshipper is only known by God, but small signs such as the above hair comb 
indicate that the worshipper can be distracted during his prayer.  
 Many times I entered shops and found someone praying behind the counter. I then 
went outside and waited until the shopkeeper had completed his prayer. Comings and goings, 
and street activities can affect someone’s space of prayer. Such interferences are coped with 
differently. Some remain focused on their prayer whatever happens around them; others 
seem to lose focus; while their body and mouth may be in the correct Islamic posture for 
prayer, their eyes look instead at the movements around them which indicates that their mind 
is dissociated from the prayer. Once I went to a workshop because my bag had a big hole that 
needed to be fixed. There I came across someone praying on a mat between two doors. He 
looked at me when intoning sura. I stopped for a couple of seconds. He kept looking at me 
while intoning, and used a body language (with his eyes and hands) that I interpreted as ‘what 
do you want?’ I did not respond and waited until the end of his prayer. Others are affected by 
more subtle breaches of focus. Worries about daily life arise in the shape of thought during 
prayer. Such breaches of concentration during prayer evoke laughter and mockery among 
Muslims because one should remain focused during prayer. Ahmed the bogolan maker used to 
make fun of such easily distracted Muslims: 
 
 ‘Muslims even forget God during the prayer. For instance, during their prayer they think: 
“Heee, I did not close the door of the shop; shit! What if the robber comes?” What kind of Muslim is 
that?’ 
 
                                                          
164 Ar. Salat. 
165 Ar. Al-iman (etymology). 
166 Each prayer contains from 2 to 4 zakat: a sort of round of prayer that includes bowings and intonations of sura. 
167 On another anthropological analysis over the problem over the cultivation of moral selfhood through Islamic prayer in 
Indonesia, see Simon (2009). 
168 Most Muslims in Mali consider Islam as pure, however, like Indonesian Muslims they differentiate ‘the perfection of Islam’ with 
‘the messiness of the human world’ (Simon 2009, 258). 
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According to local discourses, Muslims face perturbations during prayer because God puts 
their faith to the test. Pious Muslims remain firm and unshakable in their prayer. Their link 
with God is direct and deep. Most of Muslims however struggle to stay on the Islamic path due 
to their somewhat unsure faith; they can then experience breaches of concentration during 
their prayer. A period of recurrent lack of concentration is sometimes understood as harbinger 
of misfortune as well. As such, breach of concentration during prayer illustrates fragile faith 
and reminds Muslim that the Islamic path is demanding. Therefore, people’s alertness and 
attentiveness during prayer connote pious intentions; in this way, the Islamic prayer becomes 
a genuine pious expression. By contrast, breaches of concentration during prayer indicate the 
possibility of ambiguous, even insincere intentions and duplicity of the Islamic prayer. In this 
way, breaches of concentration and lapses during prayer can sometimes give rise to criticism 
that goes beyond the symptoms of a weak faith. 
 Public coaches in Mali stop at each prayer time. Although Islamic orthodoxy allows a 
traveller not to pray, most people get off the coach and pray; why then such religious zeal? As 
a Muslim friend commented ‘we do not let people think we do not pray because this is ill-
regarded’. Before only elders respected Islamic prayers; now young adults try to pray as well 
because regular daily prayer informs someone’s reputation; people think that someone who 
prays also acts morally in life. Many times I heard people voice the opinion that Muslim 
families in Bougouni tend not to let their daughter any longer marry men who do not pray. 
Simply declaring one’s Muslim identity does not necessarily make a person Muslim anymore. 
Such representations of Islam incline Muslims to perform Islamic prayer for the mundane 
status it brings them as well as to avoid being stigmatised as bad Muslims within their Muslim 
society. 
 This ethnography of Islamic prayer in Bougouni illustrates well the tension between 
the relational world (social) and the reflexive domain (personal intention). The fulfilment of 
religious duty in Mali can be motivated by faith, but also by other mundane schemes. 
 Islam is nowadays an important moral authority that shapes public life in Mali. 
However, when public Islam is practised for the social consideration it brings to the Muslim 
and to avoid being stigmatised as a bad Muslim within the Muslim society, it risks undermining 
the practice of public norms of piety by making them a mere mundane ritual emptied of 
genuine faith. Similarly to Minangkabau people of Indonesia, many Muslims of Bougouni 
‘complained that so much of public religious life was hypocritical, a mere show’ (Simon 2009, 
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270). Such Muslims are accused of not praying with the correct disposition.169 Below, I explore 
the issue of hypocrisy related to public Islam in Mali. 
 
 
 
‘Zigzag’ Muslims 
 
Many Muslims question the professions of public Islam and avowals of piety as the practice of 
Islamic precepts because they do not index pious intentions only. The effect of the spread of 
generic Islam and outward religious signs in Mali has been to put the sincerity of public piety 
among ordinary Muslims in question, and to remind them of the twofold nature of piety, both 
public and personal, explained in the introduction of this chapter. Here I argue that when 
moral failings are involved ordinary Muslims respond to the discourses of ‘truth and ignorance’ 
of Muslim scholars and the moralisation of the public sphere supported by their followers 
through the parallel discourses of ‘sincerity-hypocrisy’ I illustrated in the above comments on 
Islamic prayer. Apart from Muslim scholars themselves, such discourses concern particularly 
those who do not follow the twofold nature of piety in their practice of public Islam.  
 The nature of hypocrisy can be manifold because, as deception, it can appear in many 
different situations. As Judith Shklar explains, hypocrisy whether originating from a naive or a 
wicked mind, is a socially learned behaviour which aims at profit through the art of pretence: 
the fact of ‘assuming a false appearance’ with ‘dissimulation of real character or inclination’ as 
means to an end (1979, 3). An accusation of hypocrisy can uncover serious matters: the 
detection of moral insecurity and worst of all the unmasking of evil schemes. In Bougouni, a 
Muslim who did not pray was seen as a bad Muslim. However, the sincere attitude imputed to 
his mind towards Islam protected him from odious accusations. His faith was just deemed 
weak. People were more fearful of ‘zigzag’ Muslims because the fact of praying without faith 
betrayed the presence of a malicious mind. 
 During my fieldwork, discourses of ‘sincerity-hypocrisy’ were particularly directed 
against Muslims of upper status within the community (such as big traders, heads of family, 
civil servants, politicians) and followers of Islamic movements who emphasised outwards signs 
of piety but revealed a lack of sincerity in their practice through moral failings they displayed in 
                                                          
169 For instance, on the 15 July 1995, the Muslim Indonesian politician leader, Haji Harmoko, was accused of having 
mispronounced the opening verse in the Qur’an, al-Fatihah, at the end of a dalang (shadow puppet performance). His ‘slip of the 
tongue’ was the subject of many debates among Indonesian Muslims. Even after his official apology, some of them interpreted his 
gaffe as a proof of ignorance, as if he was, in his heart, more dalang-like than Muslim (Bowen 2000). 
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life. Such Muslims were accused of just wanting to look Muslim for the status Muslim identity 
gave them within the community. Their moral failings indicated that their practice of Islam was 
bound to selfish and political aims rather than a genuine faith. They pretended to be good 
Muslims in public, but they acted in an un-Islamic manner when they were out of sight. They 
did not walk straight on the Islamic path. Sekou the guard of hotel used to say: 
 
  ‘Those married men who bear Muslim names, pray in public and says ‘God is The greatest’170, 
but bring prostitutes to the hotel during the night are not Muslims; they are zigzag Muslims’.  
 
During the evening I used to stop at the coach station where I sat and chatted for a while with 
people I met in one of the numerous restaurants and shops of this busy area. In this way I 
became acquainted with Adama, a young unmarried man in his mid twenties who had 
completed high school three years previously. During the period of my stay, he lived with his 
parents and struggled to make a livelihood through the small activities available in town. Once 
I encountered him late in the evening walking through the coach station. He looked sad and 
angry at the same time. I invited him for a sucreries (soft drinks) so as to cheer him up. We sat 
at a table of a restaurant next to the tarred road. He then told me why he was in bad shape 
this evening. Like many young men he always had comical stories to narrate about flirting in 
Bougouni, but this time he was hurt by one of them. He had been trying to seduce a young 
unmarried lady he had fallen in love with a couple of months ago. He felt this affair was 
different because of his sincere sentiments towards her. He thought also she was a serious 
lady because she displayed educated manners and stayed at home in the evening. However 
what he saw this evening forced him to reassess his opinion. When he was wandering around 
in the evening he encountered two persons standing in the dark of a side street of Bougouni. 
Then they moved quickly to a car parked under a tree and left. Nonetheless Adama identified 
them: the same lady he had been trying to seduce and an elder of a neighbouring family! Such 
furtive meeting between a man and a woman late in the evening usually arouses suspicion of 
an affair of illicit sexual activities. The accusation conveys social consequences whatever the 
truth behind it. He was very upset because he realised that the lady had turned out to be loose 
and the man not the one he pretended to be. He is a successful trader and family head of 
Bougouni, known as a respected Muslim who never misses common Islamic duties. He often 
criticises youths who spend their time in grins instead of farming for their parents as lazy and 
useless; he accuses them of being more interested in women than in their family. However this 
evening Adama had discovered he also was among those who took Islam as mere appearance: 
                                                          
170 Allah akbar (Ar.). 
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‘It makes me laugh when I see them in the big mosque. They pray with the so-called Islamic 
cloths and moralise the youth there. Then during the night they go visiting their young 
mistresses (sunguruw) in secrecy. This is just maquillage (make-up)!’ Adama also lamented 
being in a powerless situation. As a young unmarried man without proper job, he felt he could 
not compete with this guy. ‘He is a wealthy trader and a respected chief of family of Bougouni. 
He is our elder. What can I do? Nothing!’ His account will nonetheless circulate among his 
friends and fuel the discourses of ‘sincerity-hypocrisy’ of public Islam found among ordinary 
Muslims in Bougouni.  
 Near to the end of my fieldwork, Salif the tailor and I often visited our friend the 
entrepreneur Amidou and his wife at their home in the district of Torakabougou during the 
evening. This newly married couple hosted a kind of night grin where regular friends came to 
chat, watch TV and drink tea in the living room and on the terrace. Their home was located off 
the main roads at the dead end of a quiet and small sandy street. They rented half of a 
cemented house. The other half was occupied by another young married couple and their baby 
who had moved there recently. Both families shared the same courtyard. They had a 
seemingly polite relationship. One evening, Salif, Amidou’s wife and I were sitting quietly at 
the threshold of the living room. It was after midnight. Amidou was already in bed and we 
were about to leave. However, low voices and movements coming from the other half of the 
house drew our attention; we then saw a male figure leaving the house and walking out to the 
gate and disappearing into the night. Amidou’s wife was a bit stunned. The husband of the 
woman next door was not at home. He had travelled to Segou for work. Therefore such a late 
visit by a man to a lonely married woman is deemed scandalous. Although nobody recognised 
this ambiguous visitor, his specific look unmasked his identity. We made out a man with a long 
beard wearing white Arabic style robe and shorter white trousers. Salif chuckled and 
commented: ‘These Wahhabis foul the name of God! They hide themselves behind their 
Islamic dress, but this is just a façade (facade)!’ Who was this night visitor? A lover? A 
marabout? Whatever the truth, a night visit in the absence of the husband always nurtures 
gossip about illicit sexual activities. Moral failings betray outwards sign of piety and remind 
ordinary Muslims that being Muslim and looking Muslim are two different things. 
 These two vignettes of zigzag Muslims are related to accusations of illicit sexual 
activities, but stories of zigzag Muslims are also frequently related to charges of corruption and 
embezzlement in Mali. Such accusations are routinely voiced in the grins and carrés of 
Bougouni. 
 These accusations of hypocrisy also reflect tensions between appearance and the 
moral world which question the nature of the real person. Whereas the attention to the visual 
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cultivates mundane success, people conceive what lies behind the appearance as the source of 
people’s intentionality or morality. For Boubacar, the seller of cloth,  
 
  ‘Many Muslims pretend to be Muslim. When they go to the communal Friday prayer they show 
their Islamic masque (mask). However, when they go back to their activities they are capable of un-
Islamic acts so as to obtain what they want’.   
 
Not surprisingly metaphors of sight were privileged in my informants’ speech idioms.  Terms 
like ‘zigzag’, ‘maquillage’, ‘façade’ and ‘masque’ indicate a discrepancy between appearance 
and the moral world and describe the presence of a mask-like identity and the concern about 
“the behindness of thing”. Muslims rarely referred to the notion of ‘soul’ (ni) when they 
wanted to speak about the source of people’s morality. Beyond the practice of public Islam, 
They rather understood that someone’s intentionality lies in his/her ‘conscience’171 or his/her 
‘dusu’ (heart). Often my friends explained to me that Islam is between themselves and God by 
putting their right hand on their chest and looking at the sky. Both terms express where the 
true moral nature of someone lies; an innermost being moved by emotions and sentiments 
which cannot escape from God.172 As social reality, the concern about “the behindness of 
thing” points to issues of trust (danaya) and shifting allegiance among people in Mali. 
 
 ‘A good Muslim is sincere with his heart. If what you say is what is in your heart [dusu kͻnͻ], 
then you are a good Muslim. If you say something that your heart disagrees with it, this is bad’ (Kassim, 
35 years old, labourer in Bougouni). 
 
Sometimes, public life in Mali asks for deceptive politeness or silence (instead of the voicing of 
a painful truth) so as to preserve social harmony. However, people dislike hypocrisy in Islam 
because such behaviour insults Islam, and more dangerously, connotes an inner being which is 
dominated by malicious forces. Zigzag Muslims are harshly criticised because they corrupt 
Islam by practising it without faith and, more importantly, with un-Islamic intentions. For 
them, these zigzag Muslims can serious threaten trust and social harmony between people 
because they live upon ‘treachery’ (janfa), ‘lie’ (nkalon) and shifting allegiance. Someone who 
is able to wear and practise a mask-like religious identity in public is able to ally with occult 
forces when out of sight. 
                                                          
171 French word. 
172 ‘Here people hide themselves to drink alcohol, but your conscience cannot escape from God’ (Sekou, 42 years old, guard of 
hotel in Bougouni); ‘Islam dwells at the bottom of heart. It is not a makeup’ (Kassim, 35 yeas old, labourer in Bougouni). 
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The discourses of ‘sincerity-hypocrisy’ of public Islam I found in Bougouni criticised the 
instrumentalisation of public expressions of Muslim identity for two main goals: to support 
someone’s reputation within the local Muslim community and to cover mundane schemes of 
immoral and occult nature. Accusations of hypocrisy can go so far as to signify that the ‘devil’ 
(sitanԑ) has been unmasked!173 
 
 
 
The Islamic resource 
 
Reflecting on shifting morality of zigzag Muslims, Alou the student at the IFM uttered the 
following Bamanan proverb: 
 
 ‘A savoury pancake has to be repeatedly turned on the grill in order to be well cooked. If the 
savoury pancake is cooked only on one side, this very side will burn’.
174
 
 
 Commenting on this proverb he said that Malians tend to have many activities and 
identities, but only those which are acceptable are made public. He continued by saying one 
should behave like a chameleon if he wants to succeed in life because ‘we do not know what 
tomorrow will be’; someone adapts to the ‘volatility’ of the local economy and broader 
political contexts (for instance, the Ivorian crisis) through the adoption of complex livelihood 
strategies.175 For Alou, such an unstable situation promotes the presence of multiple and 
shifting activities and allegiances in the same person. In turn, such strategies nurture the 
practice of opaque moralities and the belief in occult forces in Mali.  
 The debate between public signs of piety and their intentions in Bougouni 
demonstrates that the practice of religious precepts does not necessarily subject human being 
to its religious path. Both, the recent democratic shifts and the older visual and ostentatious 
characters of sociality of street life found in urban Mali, have transformed Islamic identity into 
a mundane resource which is part of the broader politics of success in the Muslim society of 
Bougouni. Similarly to Masquelier’s findings about Niger, in Bougouni, as in the rest of Mali, 
Islam is now equated with status, power and wealth (2009). Living a proper Muslim life 
contributes to someone’s broader success in life. 
                                                          
173 On the relations between consumption, distinction and the occult, see chapter 5. 
174 Yɛlɛmɛn yɛlɛmɛn yé ŋͻmi ka ni, takula bana o ma. O kɛrɛ kɛlen cici la. 
175 On the notion of volatility applied to African contexts, see Makhulu, Buggenhagen and Jackson (2010). 
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The fact that people’s attitude towards public norms of piety can be ambivalent show how 
Muslims engage with rituals, public signs and moral discourses in complex and reflexive 
manners which deserve to be explored, not only in their personal dimensions, but also in their 
social consequences. 
 The twofold nature of piety indicates that self-discipline is an important realm of 
religious virtuosity. This latter is mostly apprehended by ordinary Muslims through local social 
ethics (hadamadenya) of Mande origin. I will analyse these views through the popular figures 
of the noble Muslim (hͻrͻnya) and the blessed child (dubabu/barika den) in the next chapter. 
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3. Mande identities, the noble Muslim and the blessed child  
 
Islam in Mali is often recounted as a set of rituals, outward signs and moral discourses that 
shape public life; but the previous chapter demonstrates that being Muslim also involves the 
kind of self-discipline that informs someone’s personality, maturity and blessedness in Mali. 
This chapter aims to explore local perceptions of this self-discipline in the two figures of the 
noble Muslim and the blessed child. 
 Many adults and elders176 of Bougouni blame post-1991 liberal and democratic 
changes in Mali for bringing a culture of permissiveness to the town. They bemoan a current 
‘dégradation des moeurs’ (decline in morals) and feel nostalgic for the respect for authority 
that they say characterised the period before 1991. They also think the strength of local forms 
of social ethics has diminished. In a similar vein, others refer to an ideal remote past that was 
defined by displays of virtue, bravery and public respect for authority. This epoch existed 
before the arrival of Islam, Christianity, and also the French in southwest Mali.  It was an epoch 
during which local people lived together in a distinctively Mande society that was divided into 
three main categories of persons: the noble (hͻrͻn), the artisan (ɲamakala) and the slave (jon) 
(Conrad and Frank 1995; Hoffman 2000). 
 After a brief introduction to Mande forms of status hierarchy and a consideration of 
their development in the context of present-day Bougouni, this chapter focuses its attention 
on the code of behaviour of the nobles. They are especially remembered in Bougouni with the 
hero cult of Diakassan Moussa Diakité, a great warrior who, according to the members of the 
local traditional chieftainship, was the representative of the kafo of Bougouni to the king of 
Ségou in pre-colonial times. His tomb is known to be a space blessed by God where the Diakité 
families meet regularly, and the locals ask for divine intervention. This ancestor represents the 
Bamanan hero who acts in line with ‘hͻrͻnya’ (nobility). This attitude still shapes the thought 
and identity of Muslims in the town, yet not in a static way: I explore the complex interactions 
between Bougouni residents’ understandings of Islam and of being Muslims as they are 
informed by a set of sacred virtues, and by local norms and social ethics, which are widely 
interpreted to be of Mande origin.  
 Local forms of social ethics are also captured by local practices of blessing. As social 
acts, giving and receiving blessings are important daily rituals that show good manners and 
education; they also connote pious disposition. At the same time, blessing is the spiritual 
means through which Muslims make requests of God; blessing is about baraka (divine power). 
                                                          
176 35 + year old. 
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Several anthropologists have studied the notion of baraka in relation to the religious elite and 
their lineages (Cruise O’Brien and Coulon 1998; Evers Rosander and Westerlund 1997; Schmitz 
2000). By contrast I explore baraka’s importance to ordinary Muslims through an examination 
of the local figure of the ‘blessed child’ (barika/dubabu den). Local discourses stipulate that the 
blessed child will have a successful life and, by contrast, the ‘damned child’ (danga den) a 
miserable fate on earth. The way blessings circulate between generations in Bougouni roots 
the notion of ‘respect’ (bonya) in the acceptance of traditional authority. While it reinforces 
local ‘traditions’ and ‘customs’ (laada), the notion of a path of the blessed child is increasingly 
contested by youths who blamed their elders for an abuse local social ethics which blighted 
their ‘avenir’ (future). 
 In this chapter my aim is to assess the legacy of the Mande world within contemporary 
conceptions of a proper Muslim life in Bougouni. Islam has been present so long in the Mande 
world that it would be implausible to try to isolate its importance in the local legacy of 
southwest Mali.  Therefore, I explore Islam and Mande culture together as important elements 
of laada.   
 
 
 
Nostalgia and moral decline 
 
In the course of my fieldwork in southwest Mali I regularly listened to public and private 
pronouncements about moral decline and the general state of ‘dégradation des moeurs’ in the 
present epoch. Most such criticisms were made by Malians who grew up under the 
authoritarian regime of Moussa Traoré (1968 – 1991). Although they welcomed the post-1991 
liberal and democratic processes, they rebuked the failure of development and the moral 
drifting177 of Malians in general. For them, the state, as well as the elders, lack moral authority 
in the current context.  
 Abdoulaye was born in a village near the small town of Garalo, 50 km south of 
Bougouni. He moved to Bougouni in the district of Massablacoura in the early 1990s so as to 
find a job. He later became an electrician and got married in town. When I met him in 2009 
Abdoulaye was in his late forties and the head of a large family. I used to stop regularly in his 
workshop where we chatted and drank tea together. Like most of his contemporaries, the 
events of 1991 brought him hope and new expectations. However, twenty years later, his 
                                                          
177 On post-1991 criticism of the climate of permissiveness, lax morals and moral corruption made by Malian Muslim preachers, 
see Soares (2005a). 
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feelings about present-day Mali are mixed. His material and economic situation has not really 
improved. Following Osella and Osella’s analysis of the Izhavas of Kerala (2006, 584), 
modernity among these adult Muslims is ‘about dream and disillusionment, promising 
progress to all while delivering to a few’.178 More precisely here, his feeling of nostalgia mirrors 
a ‘crisis of meaning’ of traditional authority brought by the current transformation of moral 
standards in Mali (see Ferguson 1999, 14). Abdoulaye thinks the authority of elders and heads 
of family has decreased generally. Although he supports the idea of democracy, he believes it 
has not been understood properly by the majority of Malians and especially by the youth: 
 
 ‘Democracy arrived. But many people and the youth have only understood it as -you can do 
what do you like- .’
179
 
 
Abdoulaye’s opinions are similar to those of many Malians who have lived through the 
economic and political changes brought by the events of 1991. They principally upbraid the 
fact that democracy has been perceived by the younger generations only as permitting 
freedom of behaviour, hence they feel nostalgia for the respect for authority they portray as 
characteristic of the pre-1991 period.180 Abdoulaye continued by expressing his dismay at the 
increasing numbers of babies born out of wedlock and the youths smoking cigarettes in front 
of their elders without embarrassment. For him, ‘the strength of social ethics has 
diminished’.181 
 Here I use the expression ‘social ethics’ for the Bamanan noun ‘hadamadenya’.182 This 
term has a very broad meaning that needs to be examined in detail. Primarily hadamadenya is 
composed of two words; adama (Adam) and den (child) which together means ‘the son of 
Adam’ or simply ‘human being’.183 In Bamanankan the suffix ‘ya’ is often added to a noun so as 
to express the state/condition of what is named. Therefore hadamadenya expresses ‘the state 
of human being’ or ‘the human condition’. The Reverend and linguist Charles Bailleul, who 
lived 26 years in the Bamanan countryside,184 translates it variously as ‘solidarity’, ‘politeness’ 
and ‘social relations’ (1996, 146). Thus the term of hadamadenya indicates that the local 
understanding of humanity is primarily conceived as a social ethics.185 As the anthropologist 
                                                          
178 The impact of the failure of economic development on local perceptions of modernity is analysed in chapter 5. 
179 Demokrasi nana. Nka mogow ani dͻgͻw caman yé o faamu dͻrͻn ko “min ka di ɛ yé, ɛ bɛ o dɛ kɛ”. 
180 On similar reference to nostalgia in Mali, see Soares (2010); I develop such common findings one step further below by looking 
at the old social ethics of the Mande world. 
181 Hadamadenya barika bana. 
182 Or adamadenya. 
183 The word den as suffix expresses the idea of filiations (see Bailleul 1996, 81). 
184 See, http://www.africamission-mafr.org/charles_bailleull.htm. 
185 Dorothea Schulz translated ‘hademadenya’ into ‘humanity’ (2010, 81). 
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Micheal Lambek (2010), my Muslim informants consider ethics to be a fundamental feature of 
human social action. 
 Many adult Muslims criticised the advent of a contemporary society characterised by 
the weakening of what they saw as social ethics of Mande origin. How then can we address 
these? Initially, we need to unpack the Bamanan concept of social ethics into a set of 
identifiable moral traits. 
 One of the privileged moments to listen to informal, public criticism of society 
between Malians is during the course of bus journey. The fact of being seated alongside one 
another, shoulder-to-shoulder, heading in the same direction, promotes a sharing of ideas and 
information through ‘companionable’ interaction instead of the more ‘confrontational’ 
interaction of face-to-face settings (see Lee and Ingold 2006, 79–83). Malians frequently travel 
by coach for business and personal purposes. Coaches are mobile spaces in which people of 
different backgrounds, who usually would not know each other, are put together for a couple 
of hours. Passengers frequently start chatting and debating freely on many subjects.186 One 
day, I could not help overhearing a lively discussion between two Malian men sat in front of 
me for a typical bus journey from Bougouni to Bamako. They conversed in French on many 
societal issues. At one point, one of them stated that the 2002 Coupe d’Afrique des Nations 
(Africa Cup of Nations) held in Mali had promoted infidelity in his hometown Sikasso; he based 
his accusation on the fact that all the hotels built for hosting the various national teams there 
had since turned into ‘chambres de passe’ (rooms rented on an hourly basis). His companion 
vehemently criticised corruption within the Malian government and bad sexual behaviour 
among urbanites in general. Their exchanges continued for a couple more minutes and 
sparked off debates among other passengers. Then one of two concluded loudly in 
bamanankan: ‘Nobility does not exist anymore and people do not fear shame. They only sell 
their honour!’187 
 The rhetoric of this last statement resonates with judgements of moral decline and 
sentiments of nostalgia for an older social ethics. It also contains three notions important for 
understanding old social ethics:  honour (danbé), shame (maloya) and nobility (hͻrͻnya).188 
Hͻrͻnya matters more in this chapter because its etymology refers to an old traditional status 
of Mande origin.  
 
 
                                                          
186 On talk as important pastime in Mali, see Schulz (2002, 812-813). 
187 Sisan hͻrͻnya tԑ ani maloya ka ɲie. Mͻgͻw bԑ danbé feere! 
188 Honour and shame are discussed in chapters 1, 2, 6 and 7. 
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The traditional Mande statuses 
 
The term Mande (or Manden, Manding) refers to a vast historical region of West Africa in 
which people shared common cultural features (see introduction). Among them I am 
particularly interested in Mande ideas of status and the forms of practice associated with 
them. Before treating these statuses as dynamic and multidimensional realities of 
contemporary Malian life, I first introduce how French administrators and scholars attempted 
to codify them.189  
 Mande society was structured into multiple groups. This complexity became codified 
during the colonial period under three main groups: the hͻrͻn (free man, noble), the ɲamakala 
(artisan), and the jon (slave).190 The tripartite system has since been known as the ‘Mande 
caste system’ (Conrad and Frank 1995, 7). Wishing to avoid any false parallel and confusion 
with the famous Indian caste system,191 I prefer to speak of groups articulated around distinct 
statuses.192 Each of the three groups was bound to specific activities which conferred upon it 
resources, power, prestige and identity. The unity and continuity of the Mande society was 
based on the complementarity of each group in term of a division of work. Members of these 
three groups did interact in village life, but followed strictly endogamous rules of marriage.193 
In addition to illicit intercourses, a breach of the system was produced when someone 
encroaches on the fundamental activities of another groups; the fact of acting in a way 
inappropriate to someone’s social role was mostly monitored by the feeling of shame. 
 The hͻrͻnw194 were the freemen and nobles of Mande communities. They usually were 
farmers, herders and warriors and were allowed to hold political offices. The ɲamakalaw were 
the artisans of Mande villages: blacksmiths (numu), griots (jԑli), cobblers, potters, 
leatherworkers (...). As the etymology of their name indicates (ɲama.kala), they were known 
to be expert in the manipulation of ɲama, a sort of impersonal energy that inhabits all matter 
and all beings.195 In the Bamanan zone, they were also the guides of initiation societies such as 
                                                          
189 Contemporary historical and anthropological studies criticise the reification of status and hierarchy as fixed structure or 
monolithic cultural code. For instance, Bayly  (1999) and Dirks (2001) explored the Indian caste system as a complex, dynamic and 
changing reality of daily life and politics in India since the pre-colonial times. 
190 On historical and linguistic analysis of caste systems in West Africa, see Tamari (1991). 
191 As explained by the anthropologist Barbara Hoffmann in her study of griots (jeli) of the town of Kita (Mali),‘the Mande caste 
system does not incorporate an opposition of purity and pollution, but rather a spectrum of differential access to various forms of 
social and occult power, with the potential pollution arising from inappropriate contact with the powers of other castes’ (2000, 
247–248). 
192 The notion of caste does not cover a unique system which is not comparable with other ranking systems. For instance, 
comparing ethnographically the Indian caste system with the ranking system of Middle East societies, Lindholm argued that both 
systems are primarily based on ‘oppositional relations’ from which social orders emerge (1985).  
193 Often the ɲamakalw lived in separate districts. On an Indian illustration of how different groups mix and interact together 
during the market in ways that demonstrate and reinforce their social hierarchy, see Gell (1982). 
194 In Arabic, Hurr. 
195 On ɲama, see McNaughton (1988). 
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the komo. The jon was the most mutable status. The slaves were usually former hͻrͻnw 
enslaved through capture in battle. They could regain hͻrͻn status through purchase of 
freedom over years. However, most slaves who gained freedom did so as houseborn slave 
(woloso). Slaves of second generations were usually not sold; therefore they developed special 
ties with their master’s household that eased the accumulation of wealth necessary for the 
purchase of their freedom. Slaves were usually the housemaids, servants and workers of the 
two other groups. 
 
 
 
The Mande statuses in contemporary Bougouni 
 
The first chapter pointed to the regional particularities of southwest Mali. One of them is the 
massive enslavement of the inhabitants of south Mali more generally during the period of 
Samory Touré. However, except for rare elders I specifically interviewed on this subject, I never 
heard, either locals speaking about the past status of slave of local families, or foreigners 
reminding autochthons of such an inglorious past. Referring mostly  to the work of the 
historian Peterson (see 2011, chapter 3), two main reasons explain the absence of reference to 
a past of enslavement in Bougouni: the large scale of enslavement experienced in exile, and 
the limited integration of southwest Mali in the slave trade. 
 The large scale of enslavement in southwest Mali undermined this marker as a 
meaningful distinction for locals because most of their communities were affected by it. Events 
did not divide local communities but united them in suffering. Their period of enslavement had 
been a violent breach of their life that reconstructing their communities urged them to brush 
aside. Indeed as slavery was experienced in exile, either in the coastal countries of West Africa 
or in Northern Mali, this shameful status entered historic oblivion when,  after the wars of 
Samory and the end of legal slavery in 1905, many former slaves returned to southwest Mali 
and rebuilt and repopulated their ancient villages. ‘Because of the exodus, descendants of 
slaves shed the socially embedded dispositions of being a slave, the public deference to 
masters, and the identification of belonging to a low-status group. Slave status, which had 
been experienced in exile, was a temporary marker of identity. Their “social death”, as it were, 
had been a transitory, leaving few traces in the status of their descendants’ (Peterson 2011, 
89). Furthermore, as their enslavement did not last more than a generation, it did not cut 
them off from their past. Reconstruction of their own social identity was based on recollection 
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of their own past, not on the enduring stigmatisation of slavery related to a former slave’s lack 
of personal history.196 Return migration to a region of limited integration with the slave trade 
also eased this historical oblivion by cutting old ties of slavery;197 former masters could not 
remind former slaves of their shameful past because they did not live in southwest Mali. In the 
North of Mali, such as in Tombouctou, the past status of slave still shapes social life because 
the families of former slaves remained next to the households of their former masters. An 
historical particularity has no grasp on the present if it is neither transmitted, nor are people 
reminded of it in one way or another.198 
 Although vocational differences of Mande status are losing their meaning, Malians still 
recognise one another’s Mande status from their surname (jamu). The vocational dimension of 
caste has mostly disappeared in Bougouni. My host family well illustrates these 
transformations. Both parents originating from griot families moved to Bougouni before 1991 
where they started careers within the local administration. Shortly after their arrival in town, 
like most families of Bougouni, they also began farming as a supplementary activity. The head 
of the family comes from the important griot lineage of Kita, but he was never involved in griot 
activities in Bougouni up to his death in 2009. Both parents belonged to the local intellectual 
elite and transmitted the importance of school education to their children who now work in 
different modern professions. None of the children is involved in griot activities. The griot 
status of my host family was sometimes mentioned by visitors, but mostly as a joke. As I 
observed during public events, griots are still used as mediators in conflicts or as spokesmen in 
wedding processes, but so far I know this was not the case for my host family. 
 Marriages between ɲamakala-hͻrͻn remain rare in Mali, but the economic status of 
the groom tends to crack the endogamous rules of the Mande caste system in urban centres. 
Before giving their agreement to a marital match parents used to ask for the surname of the 
candidate in order to know his identity by birth; however, my friends said jokingly that 
nowadays the parents first investigate the profession and wealth of the suitor (see chapter 5). 
The importance of Mande status as marker of identity has been undermined by school 
education, new opportunities for livelihood, and increasing migrations. However, it is difficult 
to assess such transformations because each family reacts differently on the basis of its Mande 
status. This is especially the case if their Mande status still supports their livelihood. My 
immediate host family abandoned their griot activities and worked in modern professions. 
                                                          
196 On the importance of lack of personal history in the continuing inequality between former slaves and their masters, see de 
Bruijn and Pelckmans (2005). 
197 ‘The degree to which slavery idioms were discernible in society depended on the particular ways in which localities were 
incorporated into the slave trade and the social patterning that resulted’ (Peterson 2011, 153). 
198 On a general perspective on slave descent and social status in West Africa, see Klein (2009). 
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However, the oldest brother of my host father was still involved in 2009 in griot activities in 
Kati. His griot activities provided an important share of his livelihood.  
 Mande statuses still shape contemporary Malian life. However, they have been 
diffused in complex ways into broader identities and dynamics of belongings, and debates are 
evoked in varied moral concerns. The realities of status belonging vary according to regional 
particularities and situational circumstances. For instance, Malian decentralisation has brought 
new political offices into communities (communes) by election, such as membership of the 
local councils, and local mayors. In some communities, inhabitants refused to elect a ɲamakala 
as mayor because, for the majority of them, only an hͻrͻn can accede to a political seat. In 
other communes, locals chose a non-hͻrͻn  as their mayor.199 The contemporary 
transformation of Mande statuses is a complex and dynamic subject influenced by factors such 
as competition over strategic resources and positions. 
 In Bougouni, inhabitants know the Mande status of their neighbours, but most of the 
time it does not matter. Following Brubaker‘s book Ethnicity without groups (2002), Mande 
statuses do not define sharp distinctions and groups anymore. Mande statuses are more 
becoming like the raw material of categories of differentiation, such as age-systems, gender or 
ethnic groups, which can be “cooked” (crystallised) and turned to political salience under such 
specific circumstances as communal elections. Otherwise, the status of former slave has no 
social reality, and the nobles and the artisans are engaged in the same political and livelihood 
activities.200 However, the noble occupies a specific position in local heritage with the hero cult 
of Diakassan Moussa Diakité. 
 In the old district of Dougounina at three minutes walk from the house of the chief of 
the village, is a crossroads with no homes. Brick walls enclose an imposing isolated tomb and a 
balanzan tree in the middle of an empty square. The main cemetery of Bougouni is located in 
the district of Medine, but this is the tomb of Diakassan Moussa Diakité, one of the most 
famous ancestors of the founders of Bougouni. 
 According to the members of the traditional chieftainship201, Diakassan Moussa Diakité 
was a noble and a great warrior who left his mark on local history thanks to an epic life. He 
lived in pre-colonial times when the Kafo of Bougouni was a vassal of the kingdom of Ségou.202 
Since childhood he had drawn attention to himself by virtue of his precocious maturity and 
correct behaviour. Consequently he was sent by his elders as the representative of the Kafo of 
                                                          
199 As the Ivorian crisis has demonstrated, access to political offices has become more subjected to the factor of  autochthony (and 
wealth) than traditional status, see Chappatte (2007); on an illustration of the influences of traditional chieftainship and kinship in 
the decentralised communal power in southeast Mali, see Chappatte (2005). 
200 Here my analysis echoes broader arguments in anthropology about the nature of culture as a resource with which people 
interact to produce interactive identities (see Barth 1969). 
201 Interview with Kaka Diakité, Bougouni, January 2009; paper on local history given by Lassina Diakité, March 2009. 
202 On the relations between the Kafo of Bougouni and the Kingdom of Ségou, see Samake (1988). 
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Bougouni in Ségou where he became famous for his military prowess. There he also converted 
to Islam, learnt Arabic language and became a fervent Muslim. Later, accompanied by a 
Muslim scholar, he brought Islam to Bougouni and ruled the kafo with rightness and justice.203 
On his deathbed, he implored God to immortalise his earthly achievements through a noble 
tree. His wish was fulfilled; a majestic balanzan of Abyssinia emerged next to his tomb where it 
endured until recently.204 
 
205 
 
More than a century after the death of Diakassan Moussa Diakité, his grave is well maintained 
in Bougouni.206 The path leading to the carré of the tomb had been repaired in 2009 by the 
Diakité chieftainship, a financial investment which illustrates the contemporary importance of 
this grave which is considered as historical heritage of Bougouni by its founding families. On 
the last Sunday of every month members of Diakité families gather here to praise their 
ancestor. The tomb focuses a kind of hero cult; indeed locals assert that God greatly blessed 
Diakassan Moussa Diakité. They say their ancestor did not lie, speaking truth and words of 
wisdom only. He could also tell the future. His tomb is a place invested with God’s favour 
(barika). When a woman has difficulty giving birth, she can come to the grave to ask for a 
                                                          
203 This narration supports the reputation of the traditional chieftainship. The Diakite are not only the founders of Bougouni but 
also the first Muslims of Bougouni. This historical version of the penetration of Islam in Bougouni was publicised by the local 
government in a ‘symposium’ (conference) called the Première Semaine Régionale des Sociétés Artistiques et Culturelles in Sikasso 
in 1985 (Diakite 1985). Its author, Diakite, was an autochthon and professor of letters in the only Lycée of Bougouni existing in 
1985. I wanted to visit him. Unfortunately he passed away in 2007. I also found another document called Premières Festivités 
Commémoratives de Diakassan Moussa Diakité ‘Le Justicier du Banimonotié’ (1780 – 1830). This paper was written for an official 
commemoration of Diakassan Moussa Diakite. The event took place from the 22-23 of May 1999 (I suppose in Bougouni). The 
document mentions that our hero was also the founder of the oldest Friday Mosque of Bougouni. Its authors are five members of 
the Diakité family including Professor Kassim Diakite. The Diakite’s oral traditions of the past differ in many ways from 
recollections of the past I collected among other local elders and from Peterson’s extensive research on the history of Islam in 
south Mali (2011). Southwest Mali lacks contemporary sources on the past. As oral traditions are often associated with local 
institutions, they are liable to manipulation by traditional power so as to legitimate present interests (see Vansina 1965; 1985). 
204 The balanzan was destroyed by a lighting around twenty years ago. The traditional chieftainship replaced it with the current 
one. 
205 Photograph 8: The Tomb of Diakassan Moussa Diakite; source ASEB (Action Santé et Education pour Bougouni; see 
http://www.ase-bougouni.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=135&Itemid=196). 
206 Usually Muslims do not bury their kinsmen in a gravestone. The so-called ‘Wahhabis’ especially disapprove gravestones 
because they index the act of worship. The Muslim cemetery of Bougouni contains only a few gravestones that are usually related 
to local notables.  
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delivery of a healthy child. If God fulfils the request, the beneficiary has to give an offering207 
(saraka) to God through the intermediary of the chief of the village (the sacrificial officer). If 
the new-born child is a boy, his name will be Moussa. If she is a girl, her name will be 
Diakassan. Locals come to his grave with other requests as well.  
 The hero cult of Diakassan Moussa Diakité supports the reputation of the traditional 
chieftainship by praising their great ancestor for his rightness and his pious character.208 In 
parallel to its political dimension, the narrative of Diakassan Moussa Diakité celebrates the 
notion of hͻrͻnya (the noble attitude), remembered as a Bamanan chivalrous ethic that still 
inspires Muslims in present-day Bougouni. The concept of hͻrͻnya is explored in the next 
section through the figure of the noble Muslim.  
 
 
 
The noble Muslim 
 
Brought up in ‘generic Islam’ most ordinary Malian Muslims learn the rudiments of Islamic 
dogma and rituals during their teenager years (see chapter 2). Then they practise ‘generic 
Islam’ more or less diligently. Nonetheless such ‘generic Islam’ does not indicate how a Muslim 
should act in social life. Learning good manners takes place on a daily basis from a very young 
age within the familial compound, in the neighbourhood, and on the streets of the locality; this 
education is an intrinsic dimension of social life which transmits values proper to the cultural 
backdrop of southwest Mali. In this regard, Bamanaya, as an important element of this cultural 
backdrop (see chapter 1), shapes the good manners associated with the local conceptions of 
proper Muslim life. Here, Bamana.ya does not mean the Bamanan religion; its suffix -ya- 
evokes instead ‘the Bamanan condition’ or what it is ‘to be Bamanan’. Taken as a whole this 
Bamanan condition incorporates a set of ethical dispositions bound to Mande statuses; but in 
this analysis, to be Bamanan means to be hͻrͻn. 
 
 ‘If you ask people to help you catch a lion when you are holding its tail, nobody will help you. 
However, if you get the lion’s head, they will help you’ (on hͻrͻnya, Ahmed, Bogolan maker in 
Bougouni). 
                                                          
207 Cock, goat, cow, amount of money (...). 
208 The anthropologist Mary Jo Arnoldi illustrated how the longstanding tradition of verbal praising of heroic deeds of individuals in 
Mali has recently become expressed in public monuments as well. Between 1995 and 2002 the government of Alpha Oumar 
Konaré built more than forty commemorative monuments in Bamako which promote ‘a shared postcolonial national identity’ as 
well as ‘the political legitimacy of the Third Republic’. Many of them represent the heroes of Mali’s independence struggle and 
student leaders of Mali’s pro-democracy movement (see 2007). 
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As evoked in this quotation and argued by Hoffman (2000, 14), Mande statuses are not just a 
matter of profession and kinship, their boundaries are also based on ‘ranges of behavioural, 
psychological, and philosophical differences’: Hoffman defines hͻrͻnya as ‘the state of being 
noble’ (Ibid, 16); the category of person someone belongs to should be identifiable in the way 
they act. For instance, Hoffman writes that ‘the behaviour of an hͻrͻn, according to the 
Guinean hͻrͻn scholar Sory Camara, is distinguished by its “sense of honour, restraint, respect 
of convention in all daily behaviours”’209 by contrast to the exuberant, energetic and shameless 
behaviour of the griot (for instance) (Ibid, 87).210 In a similar vein to Hoffman, I am interested 
here in Mande statuses as a matter of ethical disposition. Indeed the Bamanankan-French 
dictionary written by Reverend Charles Bailleul translates hͻrͻnya into the ethical terms of 
freedom, independence, nobility, honesty, loyalty and high morality (1996). Most 
anthropologists have focused on the study of ɲamakalaw,211 only sometimes referring to 
hͻrͻn. The category of hͻrͻn has been taken-for-granted rather than investigated, an oversight 
I try to make good through an ethnography of the noble Muslim in southwest Mali. 
 During my stay in Bougouni, I undertook several trips to rural southwest Mali, 
especially to visit my friend Moussa whom I met in the big market of Bougouni. Moussa spent 
his early childhood with an uncle who lived in Côte d’Ivoire. When he was approximately 10 
years old, he was sent to his village of origin in southwest Mali so as to help his parents with 
farming. He nonetheless managed to attend school in the neighbouring small town of Garalo 
until the 9th academic year, when he dropped out without obtaining the Diplôme d’Etudes 
Fondamentales (DEF).212 When I met him in 2009 he was a married man and father in his early 
forties who lived next to his oldest brother and his mother in the village of Siramana. His 
activities were multiple.  Like everyone he was engaged in farming. He also gardened. As the 
most educated person of the village, he became a sort of public writer who helped illiterate 
villagers with bureaucracy and letters. He was also involved in the committees of various local 
associations such as the Association Villageoise (AV) of his locality that represents villagers 
producing cotton. Furthermore he was the representative and informant of the Centre de 
Santé Communautaire (CSCOM) of Kologo in Siramana. His involvement in the area has 
provided him with valuable insights into social life there. Moussa is an autochthon of the area 
who has developed a particular interest in local history and enjoys being engaged in 
                                                          
209 Her own translation; for primary reference, see Camara (1976). 
210 Hoffman also mentions that in quotidian contexts a young hͻrͻn.muso (noble woman) is usually ‘quiet, dignified, soft-spoken, 
gentle, somewhat shy, always genteel, and fiercely loyal to her best friend’ (2000, 246). In another text Hoffmann describes the 
sobriety of a young noblewoman when listening to her praise: ‘she sits still and calm, dignified in cool silence, not even deigning to 
look at “her” griot’ (1995, 38). Gender differences are incorporated into Mande statuses, but due to the impact on my fieldwork of 
gendered division of local society my study refers primarily to hͻrͻn.kԑ (noble man). 
211 The reasons for this academic emphasis on ɲamakalaw are probably numerous. One of them is that ɲamakala appears to be 
the most alien category forming the Mande world for Westerners, see McNaughton (1995). 
212 Diploma of Fundamental Studies. 
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philosophical debates late into the night. He also keeps a small collection of books on various 
subjects in his room, and he sometimes brings one out during discussion so as to reinforce his 
point of view and to share his knowledge.  
 One day, Moussa, his younger brother, his friend Ahmed and I were walking across the 
fields surrounding the village of Siramana. Our destination was the summit of a small hill 
ahead of us where we hoped we would be able to find weak mobile telephone signals coming 
from the antenna in Bougouni. Moussa had to call a friend in town. At some point in our walk, 
Moussa started to chant: 
 
‘If you are Christian, you do not lie’ 
‘If you are Muslim, you do not commit adultery’ 
‘If you are noble, you do not rob’
213
 
 
Intrigued by the relation made by Moussa between social ethics and the category of noble, as 
well as by the juxtaposition between nobility, Islam and Christianity,214 I asked him what he 
meant by hͻrͻn in his song.  Then he replied: 
 
 ‘Hͻrͻn is nobility. It comes from before Islam and Christianity. Our religion was hͻrͻnya. Our 
ancestors did not lie. They did not rob. They were upright.’
215
 
 
Moussa is representative of ordinary Muslims who value the moral legacy of their ancestors. 
Instead of ignoring the past, they tend to build bridges between Islam and Mande culture. 
Some of them even question the contribution of Islam to local ethics. In Bougouni, Fousseini 
the carter (wͻtͻrͻtigi) stated: ‘Islam brought prayer and fasting here, but nothing else. In terms 
of morality, we still live the way our ancestors did.’ Most Muslims would not go as far as 
Fousseini’s view of Islam as practice without moral precept. Most Muslims would also disagree 
with Moussa who equates hͻrͻnya with religion. However their [Moussa and Fousseini] 
interest in old social ethics illustrates a point I noticed among Muslims in southwest Mali: local 
conceptions of proper Muslim life are inspired by social ethics of Mande origin. Besides this 
common anthropological observation I want to stress that, whereas these Muslims cultivate 
the formation of common grounds between Islam and Mande culture, scholars downplay the 
impact of Mande culture in Malian life; some even store it in museums. But people in 
Bougouni think ‘the Muslim and the noble are the same’ (silamԑ yé hͻrͻn yé); this local saying 
                                                          
213 Ni ԑ yé krétien yé, ԑ tԑ  galon tigԑ. Ni ԑ yé silamԑ yé, ԑ tԑ  jԑnԑya kԑ. Ni ԑ yé hͻrͻn yé, ԑ tԑ  sonya kԑ. 
214 It was not the first time I listened to someone making a connection between Islam and nobility, but this time I asked for details 
of the resemblance.  
215 I have translated from French to English, keeping the Bamanan words Moussa used. 
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expresses the figure of the noble Muslim. Loyalty and sincerity are among the most valued 
virtues expressed in this that I detected in the field.   
 One day I visited a Muslim friend who lived in the roadside village of Sido located 30 
km north of Bougouni. In late afternoon we spent some time by the roadside in the workplace 
of his friend Aziz, the laundry worker. On this day Aziz’s grin included six of us: a teacher, an 
Imam, a farmer, Aziz, my friend and I. As usual the men were chatting and drinking tea while 
observing activities around. Then, a well-digger came and complained about the fact that he 
found a plastic bag full of shit in the well he was digging and also in his own well. People were 
outraged by such a story. The debate became heated.  For several speakers such odious acts 
were linked to ‘egoism’ (ɲԑgoya) and ‘evil spells’ (dabali).216 Aziz added vehemently that such 
hidden goings-on demonstrate the un-Islamic identity of their perpetrator and the lack of 
hͻrͻnya in general in Mali! Later, when the grin was appeased and less crowded, I asked Aziz if 
he could tell me more about what the term hͻrͻnya conveyed to him in his previous 
intervention. Then Aziz told me that some ‘old things’ (ko kͻrͻ) still pervade Mali in the shape 
of ‘custom and tradition’ (laada) such as the hͻrͻnya. He continued by saying:  
 ‘Islam found nobility here (…) Nobility has not disappeared, but it has diminished (...). Nobility is 
about commitment. A noble does not lie. He does not betray as well. He does what he says. He keeps his 
word (...) His word is his honour. A good Muslim should behave like a noble.’
217
 
What Aziz deplores the most about the reported event is the fact of the perpetrator remaining 
hidden; this is not a noble act because the noble, although he wages war against someone, is 
transparent in his behaviour. Aziz’s remark shows that how to behave in relationship to the 
domain of secrecy is an important part of human ethics (Bok 1989). Coming back to the zigzag 
Muslims of the chapter 2, people’s ideas of nobility in Bougouni respond to issues of ‘trust’ 
(danaya) and shifting allegiance that threaten social harmony in town. For Aziz, the story of 
the plastic bag full of shit found in the well conceals a betrayal. Later in our conversation Aziz 
developed the reasons for the decrease of hͻrͻnya in Mali: 
 
 ‘Two things have weakened nobility: fear and greed. When you fear or you are selfish, you 
cannot tell the truth, therefore your word is null’ (...) ‘Now modes de vie [lifestyles] change. People do 
not satisfy themselves with a bicycle. We want a Jakarta. Next we want a car. People here think about 
building a big house with étages; this is what we wish to be done. We do not want to leave this earth 
                                                          
216 On occult power, see chapter 5. 
217 Silamԑya sͻrͻra hͻrͻnya yan (…) Hͻrͻnya ma tunun, nka a dͻgͻyara’ (...) ‘Hͻrͻnya o promԑsi dԑ don. Hͻrͻn tԑ galon tigԑ. Ale tԑ 
janfa kԑ fԑnԑ. A bԑ min fo, A bԑ a kԑ (...) A danbé bԑ kuma kͻnͻ. Silamԑ yé hͻrͻn yé. 
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before achieving that [laughing]. We look at rich people. We want to live like them, but we are poor. To 
do so, some take loans. Others steal people. Greed has undermined our hͻrͻnya’.
218
 
 
As Aziz suggests, liberal and democratic processes brought by the events of 1991 have been 
understood by ordinary Malians in term of a change of ‘modes de vie’ (lifestyles). This 
transformation of lifestyles is mostly observed through material consumption. The bicycle has 
become outdated. Malians are nowadays looking for expensive motor vehicles, and for 
cemented houses with storeys.219 However, these material changes have accentuated 
distinctions of wealth, as they have also inflamed sentiments of greed (nata); both have, in 
turn, undermined old social ethics (such as represented by hͻrͻnya) among Malian Muslims. 
 Aziz’s opinion of social changes resonates with previously nostalgic quotes of Malians 
for the past. Moving my analysis one step further, I argue all their comments refer to the 
golden age of Mande culture that has been transmitted from generation to generation through 
anecdotes, bits of recollections, family histories, praise songs and oral epics. This past is 
remembered as a virtuous past in which, like Diakassan Moussa Diakité, heroic figures acted in 
line with hͻrͻnya. For many ordinary Muslims, the noble Muslim is taken as the Mande ideal-
type of a good Muslim which inspires ordinary Muslims in their daily life. In this way, a good 
Muslim should keep his words, face difficulties with bravery and have a strong and transparent 
mind. The integrity of the good Muslim warns him against using un-Islamic occult power (see 
chapter 5). In their public sermons and in their cassette-sermons many Muslim preachers (such 
as Cherif Ousmane Madani Häidara) also use the concept of hͻrͻnya so as to make explicit for 
their Bamanan audience what it means to be a good Muslim. 
 The figure of ‘the noble Muslim’ has also changed the nature of nobility in Mali. As 
explained before, Mande society was structured into three groups: the nobles, the artisans 
and the slaves. With the rare exception of slaves who managed to purchase their freedom, 
Mande status was ascriptive, an endowment of individuals at birth. You were hͻrͻn because of 
your noble birth. As hͻrͻn you were expected to act in line with the hͻrͻnya. A ɲamakala could 
never be hͻrͻn and vice versa. A hͻrͻn could not act as a ɲamakala without bringing shame on 
him and his parents and vice versa. Mande society was divided into three endogamous groups 
in which the blood of their lineages was carefully controlled by the whole society. However, 
the noble Muslim, as it is now, is based on Mande status as a matter of ethical disposition. 
When Moussa and Aziz refer to hͻrͻnya, in this context they do not consider the Mande status 
                                                          
218 Fen fila yé hͻrͻnya cԑn: siran ani nata.Ni ԑ siranna wa nata bԑ i la, ԑ tԑ se ka cԑn fo (...). Sisan, modes de vie yԑlԑmana. Nԑgԑso o 
man ɲi! An bԑ Jakarta fԑ. O kͻfԑ, an bԑ a fԑ ka mobili san.An fԑ, mͻgͻw bԑ a fԑ ka so.ba ani étages jͻ. On veut ça. On ne veut pas 
quitter ce monde sans avoir ces choses (rire). On regarde les riches. On veut être comme eux ! Nka waritigi ani faantan, o tԑ kelen 
yé ! Alors les gens prennent des juruw. D’autres volent ! C’est nata qui a gâté notre hͻrͻnya! 
219 On more details concerning changes in consumption in Mali, see chapter 5. 
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as status by birth. The figure of the noble Muslim has transformed the nature of nobility into a 
performed status; the Mande caste system is transcended by the Islamic precept of equality of 
human beings in front of God.220 My Muslim friends in Sido concluded: ‘Someone can be hͻrͻn 
in his attitude and his conduct even though he is a ɲyamͻgͻden (bastard child). We say it now 
in Mali.’ However, this performative conception of status does not mean the definitive 
collapse of the Mande status at birth. Mande statuses remain a raw material of categories of 
differentiation which can be ‘cooked’ and turned to political salience under specific 
circumstances. The issue of communal elections in Mali, for instance, illustrates that the 
competition over political office can narrow hͻron status into a status ascribed at birth. In 
general, the fact of scarcity of resources is an incentive to develop exclusive claim through 
sharper group boundaries.221 
 
 
 
Blessing and the power of the invisible 
 
Before moving to Bougouni I lived two months in Bamako where I attended intensive 
Bamanan classes. Knowing my interest in Islam, my teacher devoted specific lessons to the 
vocabulary of the religious in Mali. Approaching the end of the training period in Bamanan 
language, he wanted me to learn how ‘to bless someone’ (ka dubabu kԑ mͻgͻ la) in 
Bamanankan; he stated that ‘blessing’ (dubabu) is crucial to the Muslim society of Mali in 
many ways that he wished me to discover in the course of my sojourn in Bougouni. We spent 
an entire morning studying how and when to bless someone in Bamanankan. At that moment I 
was not highly motivated to learn how to bless someone, because I found this practice alien to 
my habits. Shortly after this somewhat boring lesson I moved to Bougouni. However, future 
experiences in the field made me change my mind about the usefulness of this lesson. 
 Six months later I realised that I regularly blessed people in Bamanankan. I did not 
know when I started to do so. I simply became aware of my attitude in the midst of a blessing I 
was uttering when visiting an elder. Why did I not notice it before? Part of the answer lies in 
the fact that in Muslim households the act of blessing belongs to the quotidian in Mali; 
therefore it slips into the unremarked phenomena of social life, as, indeed to ideas about Islam 
and being Muslim themselves. For instance, in the town of Djenné (centre of Mali) 
                                                          
220 Faisal Devji explored how some Muslims thinkers and radical militants have attempted to define Muslim identity in anti-
national and anti-racial ways by associating the categories of Arab and Persian with their chivalric spirits of pre-Islamic origin 
(2008, chapter 4). 
221 In Madagascar, whereas Astuti documents the performative identity of the Vezo fishermen (1995), Brown analyses how the 
Betsileo turned slave descent into a basis of discrimination when land became scarce (2004).  
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Mommersteeg noticed that ‘blessings (...), recur throughout conversations and throughout the 
day’ (2009, 74). Illustrations of blessing in the quotidian of Bougouni are numerous. For 
instance, after breakfast parents give blessings to their children before going to school. They 
ask God to help their children to be successful at school. During a visit, final farewells are 
punctuated by blessings. The host and visitor exchange blessings for health and peace 
between them. When members of the family need to travel, their parents ask God to give 
them a safe journey. Before leaving home and going to the centre of Bougouni, I said goodbye 
to adult members of my family. They then replied ‘May God give us lots of pleasure today’222 
or ‘May God give us a smooth day’223, and I concluded by ‘May God grant your blessing’.224 
Such practices of blessing are commonly uttered during visits, greetings, comings and goings.  
 Some locals were amazed to hear a white man giving blessings in Bamanankan; often 
they exclaimed: ‘You became Bamanan!’225, or ‘You became Malian!’226 In retrospect, I think 
my involvement in daily practices of blessing eased my integration into local Muslim society 
because these practices are constitutive of local social ethics; as Muslim etiquette they shape 
politeness, good manners and pious disposition in Mali.227 Similarly than in my analysis of 
hͻrͻnya, the practices of blessing cover realities that reflect hadamadenya. 
 However, primarily one should know that the domain of blessing, unlike hͻrͻnya, is not 
confined to human virtues. Blessing is the religious act through which Muslims make requests 
of God. In a conversation in Bamanankan when the speaker starts with ‘Ala ka’ (May God) and 
then his/her interlocutor answers ‘amiina’228 (amen) you are in the presence of a blessing. 
Muslims can also pronounce blessings alone in a room, such as in maraboutic practices (see 
further below).229 In both situations, it is a speech act which involves three agents: the giver of 
blessing, the receiver of blessing, and God. The last agent, God, brings blessing its spiritual 
dimension.  
 
‘God is visible and intervenes on earth, but God has no contour’ (Youssouf, 27 years old, hip-
hop singer in Bougouni). 
 
                                                          
222 Ala ka an tile hԑԑrԑ caya. 
223 Ala ka an tile nͻgͻya. 
224 Ala ka dubabu minԑ. 
225 Ɛ kԑra Bamanan yé! 
226 Ɛ kԑra Malian yé! 
227 On similar daily blessings in Djenné, see Mommersteeg (2009, chapter 4). 
228 Or ami (diminutive). 
229 Islamic esoteric practices of Western African tradition (see marabout in the glossary). 
107 
 
According to Islam, God is beyond any representation, and any worldly reproduction of God 
(e.g. image, statue) is prohibited as an act of idolatry. By saying ‘God has no contour’ Youssouf 
agrees with this Islamic dogma. For Youssouf, nonetheless, God is felt on earth. 
 It is through the very act of blessing that Muslims ask for God’s favour on earth. In this 
way, the interventions of God on earth become visible, but the origin of this divine power 
remains mysterious therefore invisible. This is the why, in my analysis, the act of blessing 
refers also to ‘God as the power of the invisible’ that can alter someone’s life. In this regard a 
marabout interviewed by Mommersteeg explained that ‘there are three kinds of events. 
Firstly, there are things that happen to us; we cannot avoid them. Secondly, there are things 
that we can get; however, we need to ask God for them through blessing’ (2009, 80–81).230  
 Especially in life-cycle rituals and during moments of uncertainty and suffering, 
Muslims pronounce blessing so as to summon divine power to their side. For instance, an 
Islamic baptism in Bougouni always concludes with the ritual of blessings. In a typical situation, 
men gather in the carré of the parents of the newborn (7 days old) after the first prayer of the 
day.231 Muslim scholars sit on carpets. Around them, men sit on benches and chairs rented for 
the occasion. They listen to Muslim scholars who recite the appropriate sura in Arabic for the 
religious baptism. At this moment the newborn receives a Muslim name and enters into the 
Muslim community. When Muslim scholars have finished their ceremony, a designated man 
stands up and announces in a loud voice, ‘We are now going to make blessings’.232 Then, 
silence and an ambiance of concentration invest the crowd. Men place their palms in front of 
their face so as to be ready to receive blessings. The leading Muslim scholar then pronounces a 
long series of blessings in Bamanankan punctuated by the ‘amiinas’ of the crowd.233 Some men 
devotionally touch their forehead during the ‘amiinas’. This body language expresses 
concentration and shows where blessings are supposed to enter into the body. The blessings 
are made for the newborn and the attendant congregation of Muslims. They ask God to 
protect the newborn against illness, misfortune and the work of Satan. They also solicit God to 
grant health and prosperity on earth for the Muslims present.  Although the content of the 
blessings varies according to the creativity of the speaker, in general, blessings solicit God’s 
protection and favour on earth. 
 
                                                          
230 My own translation; the same marabout explained that there are other things we request through offerings; the practices of 
offerings (saraka) also exist in Bougouni, but they are not explored in this chapter. 
231In Mali, religious baptism is gendered. The mother of the newborn and the other women living in the carré do not participate 
directly in the religious baptism. They stay behind in the courtyard and prepare tea and mayonnaise bread which are going to be 
distributed when the ceremony is finished. However in the afternoon, women perform the customary baptism. They gather 
together in the same place for a more festive celebration that includes gift-giving, music and dance. 
232 An bԑ dubabu kԑ sisan. 
233 For illustrations of such long series of blessing, see Mommersteeg (2009, 75; 77). 
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  ‘Islam is about blessing; I mean not in the Mosque, but alone during the night between 
you and God when everybody sleeps and nobody disturbs you. Me, I know how to use the wurudi 
[Islamic rosary]. Each evening after the prayer I pronounce blessings so as to find sababu ɲuman [divine 
cause]
234
 (...). All the good things I got in Ivory Coast, I got them thanks to blessings’ (Amidou, 48 years 
old, farmer and carpenter in Bougouni). 
 
Besides his main activities of farming and carpentry, Amidou has not forgotten the six years he 
spent in duguma kalan (traditional Islamic school) in Bamako during his teenagehood. Duguma 
kalan, although in decline due to the setting-up of Islamic médersa (French-Arab modern 
schools) during the postcolonial period, still exist in southwest Mali. Their learning system is an 
initiatic transmission of esoteric knowledge between master and disciple through which 
maraboutic practices can be acquired.235 These practices consist of the manipulation of the 
words of the Qur’an in order to affect the lives of people. From that early period, Amidou 
learnt some maraboutic practices he still performs today. In his view, the cement house he 
built in Bougouni would not have been possible without the well-paid job he had in Ivory Coast 
before the civil war, which he believes he secured thanks to the maraboutic practices that 
gained him God’s favour. 
 Marabouts are the experts in asking favours from God. They do so through the practice 
of various Islamic esoteric sciences or what is called maraboutage in the French colonial 
lexicon. Among these various maraboutic practices, Amidou stressed the importance of long, 
lonely and demanding series of blessings he uttered during the night when his family was 
asleep. Muslims ask for marabouts’ services because they are known to be closer to God than 
ordinary Muslims.236 This closeness to God is based on the knowledge of the ‘esoteric secrets’ 
(Ar., sirr) and piety as barika. 
 The etymology of barika is from the Arabic term baraka (or barakah), a prominent Sufi 
concept that is commonly related to blessing and the gift of grace. This concept has widely 
been studied in social sciences. Most anthropologists have focused on the charismatic and 
institutional characteristics of baraka in order to make explicit the linkages between the 
quality of grace and the worldly privileges (wealth and power) of Sufi religious authorities in 
West Africa (Brenner 1984; Cruise O’Brien and Coulon 1998; Geertz 1968; Soares 2005b). For 
instance, in the edited book called African Islam and Islam in Africa most social scientists 
                                                          
234 Sababu ɲuman is the divine cause that helps Muslim to build a successful life. This complex expression is explored in chapter 4.  
235 According to Brenner, this learning system is based on an ‘esoteric episteme’; it is ‘a hierarchical conceptualization of 
knowledge, the highest “levels” of which are made available to only relatively few specialists. Knowledge is transmitted in an 
initiatic form and is closely related to devotional praxis. The acquisition of knowledge is progressively transformative: one must be 
properly prepared to receive any particular form of knowledge, the acquisition of which can provide the basis for a subsequent 
stage of personal transformation [e.g. the spiritual hierarchies of the Sufi orders]’(see 2001, 18). 
236 On an analysis of maraboutic practices in Nioro-du-Sahel (Mali), see Soares (2005b). 
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define baraka as a beneficial force of divine origin that is the source of power and authority of 
saint lineages in Africa (Evers Rosander and Westerlund 1997). 
 Such analyses of baraka among Muslim elites are relevant, but they do not entirely 
capture the meanings and implications of baraka for ordinary Muslims. Here, I would cite the 
statement of the fieldwork assistant of the anthropologist Geert Mommersteeg in Djenné that: 
‘baraka is for everybody’ (2009, 151). I also take a lead from Mommersteeg who studied 
baraka among ordinary Muslims in Djenné through the Songhay figure of the blessed child (see 
Ibid, 147-148), although his main interest remained the marabouts of Djenné. Combining these 
two approaches, in the next section I explore the meanings and implications of the notion of 
barika for ordinary Muslims through the Bamanan figure of the blessed child. I do so by 
making links with the notion of hadamadenya. 
  
 
 
The blessed child 
 
In Bamanankan the blessed child is called either barika den, or dubabu den. Both terms 
[barika; dubabu] mean blessing. Some local Muslims do not distinguish the terms. Others do so 
in terms of their origins. As my Muslim friends said ‘Dubabu and barika are linked like rice and 
sauce’. Whereas dubabu is conferred by human beings, barika is only given by God. As 
explained by Boubacar the seller of cloths: ‘People give blessings. God may transform their 
blessings into barika’.237 In other words, Muslims said that God turns a deaf ear to blessings 
uttered by someone without barika because only a good Muslim can attracts God’s favour. 
God, as power of the invisible, is named ‘barika’ when divine power acts in human life.  
 In this way a barika den is automatically a dubabu den because God has granted 
people’s blessings upon him. However a dubabu den is not necessarily a barika den because 
people’s blessings may not be fulfilled by God. Only God can put a child on the blessed path.238 
Dubabu expresses the social dimension of blessing and barika its spiritual dimension. Local 
discourses I collected contained inconsistencies because people refer to the social and the 
spiritual in complex and contested ways; but both terms speak about the blessed child. 
 
 ‘If you do not have barika and someone gives you millions of francs, you will not be able to 
build something. You will only waste your money. However, If you have barika and you possess only one 
                                                          
237 Mͻgͻw bԑ dubabu di. Ala bԑ barika kԑ dubabu fԑ. 
238 Boubacar the seller of cloths said ‘Blessing is the path where barika lays’ (Dubabu yé sira min bԑ taa barika yé). 
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pack of cigarettes in your shop, step by step your trade will prosper. Sooner or later, you will be rich’ 
(Lamine, student at the IFM of Bougouni). 
 
In general, a blessed child is someone who enjoys a successful life. All that they undertake in 
life blooms because God has blessed them. How then do Muslims define this blessedness? 
Often Muslims refer to the blessed child when a lucky phenomenon occurs. For instance, once 
Salif the tailor received unexpected mobile credits of 1,000fcfa. The sender of these mobile 
credits probably dialled Salif’s number in error; nonetheless his friend exclaimed ‘You are a 
blessed child!’ In another illustration, when we were sitting on a bench near the tarred road 
and observing activities around we saw policemen systematically checking motorbikes passing 
by. However, one of the riders was not stopped. The policemen seemed to ignore him. He 
simply continued freely on his way. My friend commented, ‘This guy is a blessed child!’ Luck 
(garijԑgԑ) is never a random phenomenon in Mali. Garijԑgԑ is God’s favour that accompanies 
the blessed child throughout his life. God protects the blessed child and eases the building of 
his life: the blessed child avoids misfortune and enjoys success. 
 When I asked my Muslim friends how to become a blessed child, they referred to a set 
of attitudes that together define a peculiar path that originates from within the family and 
proceeds in the community.  
 The blessed child is, above all, a ‘child’ (den); a child is by definition dependent on its 
parents. In this way the expression - blessed child - reminds the listener that any individual 
belongs to a specific line of descent. This lineage is imprinted on the child. The way parents 
and ancestors behaved still shapes their descendants. This legacy is a sort of spiritual 
momentum which is transmitted from generation through generation through kinship; put 
differently, this hereditary principle influences the life of each generation, and in turn, each 
generation shapes it as well.239   According to local discourses, ‘barika den’ as a hereditary 
principle mostly depends on the attitude of a wife towards her husband. It is said that God 
blesses children if their mother respects her husband, is faithful and obeys him. In practice, 
this submission of wife to husband reinforces traditional gender relations and the confinement 
of woman within the home: that is cooking, household chores and child rearing. Locals 
stressed that a dubabu den cannot be a barika den if his/her mother did not respect her 
husband. This point was particularly stressed by most of my Muslim friends.  
                                                          
239 The blessed child as hereditary principle has been put forward by saint lineages in Africa so as to keep barika within the same 
family by transmitting it from father to son (see Evers Rosander and Westerlund 1997). This hereditary principle was questioned 
by Schmitz in his study of the transmission of baraka between Muslim scholars and their disciples in the valley of Senegal. Here 
baraka is primarily explored as spiritual and charismatic kinship between master and disciple. The fluid nature of baraka allows 
the master to transmit his baraka to his spiritual son who may not be his biological son (2000). 
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 ‘Of course God appreciates someone who is hard worker and respectful towards his elders; but 
if the mother of this individual did not respect her husband, sooner or later her child will collect the 
consequences of her bad behaviour’ (Sitafa, entrepreneur in Bougouni). 
 
This peculiar path of blessedness extends beyond the family and reaches the community. The 
blessed child is the one who seeks blessings of people in general and blessings of his parents 
and his elders in particular. It is said that God listens more carefully to the blessings of parents 
on their children and to the blessings of the elders in general. Behind this popular belief lies 
the idea that those of the older generation are closer to God than the younger generation 
because their piety matures. This is why the blessed child obeys his parents and elders. 
Obedience is often expressed by Malians through the term ‘bonya’ that they translate in 
French as respect (respect). In practice this respect towards parents and elders is related to 
politeness, gift-giving and consideration.  
 For instance, I accompanied Lamine to visit his parents, who live in a village near the 
town of Yanfolila in southwest Mali. Since he left his home village Lamine has returned every 
three months. He never visits there without seeking out his elders. Shortly after we arrived in 
the village, he searched for the head of his family (gwa). He greeted him and gave him 
1000fcfa. The old man thanked him with a series of blessings. He then did the same with 
another elder of the family. Finally he greeted his mother and gave her 2,000 fcfa. She blessed 
him at length. As Lamine told me, ‘the strength of a man comes from his source (...). The elders 
will be pleased with me and will bless me.’ This example of consideration towards kin elders by 
a member of the younger generation being expressed through gift-giving is typical in 
southwest Mali. It demonstrates that the path of the blessed child strengthens the Mande 
traditional authority of the elders (the gerontocracy). Moreover, the potential spiritual award 
related to this path reinforces the legitimacy of its social dimension. 
 
 ‘The mother is sacred in Mali. We fear disobeying her because we fear her curse’ (Lamine, 
student at the IFM of Bougouni). 
 
In parallel to seeking the blessings of their parents and their elders, the younger generation 
avoid conflicts with them because they fear their curse.240 The curse (danga) is the opposite of 
the blessing. As blessing, the curse can be pronounced by human beings, but it is only given by 
God. By contrast to the blessed child, the damned child (danga den) is blamed as uneducated, 
                                                          
240 Many Malians state that the curse as well as the blessing of the mother is stronger than that of the father. 
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impolite, lazy and selfish. It is said that such person can only encounters misery and misfortune 
on earth. Narrations of the consequences of such curses are frequently voiced by the 
inhabitants of Bougouni. 
 To illustrate, one day I accompanied my friend Shiaka, a local NGO worker, to the 
burial of the mother of one of his neighbours. As people pointed to the fact that some family 
members could not come to the burial, Shiaka remembered a similar event during the last 
month of his mother’s life. 
 Shiaka stayed at his mother’s bedside in Koutiala. As her health deteriorated, members 
of the families hastened to her side. All the close members of her family were at his mother’s 
bedside except for her first son who lived in Bamako. She asked him to be present. Shiaka 
called him several times and begged him to come because his mother was dying. The days 
passed, but the oldest son still did not come. He eventually took a coach from Bamako and 
arrived in Koutiala after a long journey. However, he came too late, even narrowly missing her 
burial. His mother had passed away a couple of hours previously and, according to custom, 
was buried shortly after her death. People were shocked by his late arrival that was 
interpreted as expressing total disrespect for his mother’s wishes. Elders of the family warned 
him about the possible consequences of his shameful act. 
 A couple of years later, the oldest brother of Shiaka encountered successive 
misfortunes. The cement house he built in Bamako was destroyed by the local authorities. The 
Malian state did not recognise his title deed; apparently his house was not erected on proper 
residential land. At the same time, his wife asked for a divorce. For Shiaka, his oldest brother 
was reaping what he had sown. His mother simply damned him for dishonouring her on her 
deathbed. 
 Whatever the objectivity of Shiaka’s recollection, it emphasises a very important point: 
elders and parents, and above all a person‘s mother should be respected. The path of the 
blessed child is transmitted from generation to generation as a ‘gatekeeper’ of a broad Mande 
kinship system. The ways blessings circulate between generations and gender in Bougouni 
inform how social life is rooted in respect for traditional authority and custom (laada). In 
addition, the spiritual dimension of blessing strengthens its social ramifications.  
 ‘Blessing is the respect by and the acceptance of your parents, your elders. It is a life principle. 
It is a philosophy. It is deep. It is the fact of God. If you follow it, your life will be eased. It is like that 
here. If you refuse to help your parents, they will get irritated. They can even curse you. If you run away 
from them you will only collect misfortune there’ (Lamine, student at the IFM of Bougouni). 
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The changes brought by the events of 1991 have also put in question the path taken by the 
blessed child. The discourses of nostalgia voiced by adult Muslims mirror the ways that new 
economic opportunities in town have undermined the traditional power relations between 
generations in Mali. Whereas elders think their traditional authority has decreased generally, 
the youth aspire to more autonomy and independence. As illustrated in the story below, the 
youths tend to contest the traditional control of elders over their resources, work and general 
lifestyle. 
 During my stay in Bougouni I regularly stopped by a restaurant situated by the side of 
the tarred road towards the exit to Sikasso. I appreciated its warmth and comfortable 
ambiance; there, the clientele could sit on proper chairs and eat at clean tables while watching 
TV. Moreover, this place was among the few indoor restaurants of Bougouni which offered 
local dishes at the same price as the numerous cheap eating outdoor places called gargote.241 
Over the months I became friends with the manager, Ablaye, a young man in his mid twenties 
who had grown up in a village in southwest Mali. After obtaining the DEF he had moved to 
Bougouni to pursue his studies. Although he dropped out of high school, he managed to 
transform the gargote of his older sister Oumou into a successful restaurant. 
 Many clients told me ‘Ablaye, c’est un petit qui se débrouille bien’ (Ablaye, he is a 
young guy who has done well). Indeed, Ablaye convinced her sister to invest more in the food 
business, to turn her gargote into a decent restaurant in order to attract more clients. He 
supervised the purchase of a second-hand refrigerator and the construction of a small cement 
house with a wooden extension. The building was equipped with chairs and tables and 
decorated with colourful paintings. Ablaye also designed a larger menu with fixed prices to 
display his menu outside to potential customers. A couple of chairs and tables were arranged 
on the terrace. The first time I entered this restaurant, I was captivated by its cleanness and its 
friendly atmosphere. Not surprisingly, the new restaurant became quickly popular in 
Bougouni. Ablaye’s business acumen uplifted Oumou’s trade into a success story. 
 The turnover of the restaurant multiplied. As is the custom, Ablaye did not ask his 
older sister for anything; his attitude showed courage, patience and respect. While Oumou 
prepared food at home, Ablaye managed the restaurant every day. Helped by two female 
teenagers, he welcomed the clients, took their orders, served them, cashed their money, and 
cleaned the place. At the end of each day he gave the takings to Oumou. This situation lasted 
for a year. When Oumou was running her gargote, her earnings were just sufficient to handle 
her daily expenses. Thanks to the success of the restaurant, she bought new clothes for her 
                                                          
241 These small eating spots are commonly indicated by a woman standing behind a couple of cooking pots put on a table, and a 
bench where clients sit. 
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children, a building lot in town and a new motorbike (among other items). She also opened a 
bank account and saved money in it. Ablaye respected his older sister with whom he shared 
the same father and the same mother, but he was not happy that he did not receive anything 
from his daily work in the restaurant.242  
 Arguing he was the true ‘promoteur’ (instigator) of its success, he confided to me: 
‘Without my help, her business would still be the same petty gargote!’ He progressively lost 
patience; one day, he broke his silence and dared to ask Oumou to help him buying a second 
hand Jakarta motorbike. She sidestepped his demand. He insisted and they quarrelled over it 
for a month. Their relationship deteriorated. Then, Ablaye left the restaurant, a move he 
considered as a ‘grève’ (strike). The drop in clientele was felt rapidly because Ablaye’s 
charisma was part of the good reputation of the restaurant. The older brothers of Ablaye 
intervened and told him that, as her younger brother, he should not contradict his sister and 
should go back to work for her. His sister asked for an intervention by the oldest uncle of his 
family to settle their conflict. Her brother was sent to the old man who lectured him about the 
importance of birthright between generations in keeping the family united. He also warned 
him that young people should not show the way to their elders. Reflecting upon his situation 
and the traditional control of elders over the youth’s resources, work and lifestyle in general, 
he told me: 
 
 ‘All these rules are linked to our environment. They are inventeries [laugh]. But without these 
inventeries the social life here would be difficult.’
243
 
 
The French-African expression inventeries used here has a negative connotation. One way to 
explain it is to say that invent.eries comes from the French words invention (invention) and 
connerie (crap) that Ablaye uttered shortly after this sentence. He recognised the social 
importance of these rules which serve to prevent dissension within families, but he blamed the 
elders who abused them to the detriment of the emancipation of the youth; in this way, the 
path of the blessed child becomes mere inventeries. Ablaye did not contest the authority of his 
older sister per se; she was the patron because she financed the business. Nevertheless, as 
many young people I met, he just thought each effort must be rewarded. He did not accept 
that free work should be based on one-sided kinship ties any longer. 
                                                          
242 The terms ‘brother’ and ‘sister’ in Mali are not only used between biological siblings. For instance, balimakԑ (brother) and 
balimamuso (sister) are polite expressions used for an acquaintance or a foreigner. In a way Malians cultivate a view of themselves 
as belonging to the same large family; everybody relate to everyone else as brothers and sisters. However, they do so with 
different degrees of closeness. 
243 Toutes ces règles là, elles sont liées à notre environnement. Ce sont des inventeries. Mais sans ces inventeries la vie sociale 
seraient difficile ici. 
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 ‘Someone who is more than 70 years old has no avenir [future]. Someone who is young has an 
avenir which needs the help of people to be built. I have seen so many talented older brothers upon 
whom our elders put pressure. They obeyed and now they are poor (...). These are traditional principles. 
If they hindered you, you should not follow them (...) Often people speak ill of someone who wants to 
move forward in life. But you will see that God will cause a stir; this person will succeed.’ 
 
Finally, Ablaye did not obey to his elders. He did not reconsider his decision because her older 
sister kept refusing his demand. Two month later, he moved to Bamako to work with a friend. 
Changes brought by the events of 1991 have demonstrated that Malians not only aspire to a 
better future, but also they can build a better future. However, many young people 
interpreted the moral framework of hadamadenya put forward by their elders during familial 
dissensions as a brake on the building of their lives. The next chapter explores the experience 
of adventure as an escape from the burden of traditional customs (laada) and as an 
opportunity for greater autonomy in Mali. 
 
 
 
Islam in the Mande world 
 
During the course of his researches on the oral epics of Mande blacksmiths, the art historian 
Patrick McNaughton found many references to Islam in Mande traditions. He wrote ‘this sort 
of eclectic interaction with Near Eastern religions occurs often in Mande traditions of all kinds, 
partly because Islam has been present for so long in the Western Sudan (...) (1995, 47). 
Similarly, the longstanding interaction between the Mande world and Islam is observed in the 
many Arabic linguistic borrowings found in Bamanankan.  For instance, etymologically hͻrͻn 
derives from the Arabic term hurr244 (freeman), and barika originates from the Arabic term 
baraka. However, their meanings have come to differ from their Arabic sources over the 
centuries of contact between Islam and the Mande world.  
To illustrate, the term barika in Bamanankan is linked to two registers, one of which does not 
relate to its Arabic source. In its religious sense, barika means ‘blessing’ and ‘favour’. This 
register reflects its Arabic source. However, in its mundane register barika is not linked to its 
Arabic source.  In this case, barika means ‘physical strength’ and ‘vigour’. In this same register, 
barika.ntan designates the human being who is physically weak. By contrast, barika.tigi means 
                                                          
244 Or hur. 
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the human being who is physically strong. Following McNaughton the driving forces of the 
Mande world are ‘the entangled issues of means and power’ (1995, 51). Mande people 
perceive the state of things to be the result of visible (or mundane) and invisible (or occult) 
powers that men seek in order to succeed on earth. In this way, the double registers of the 
term barika might originate from the twofold nature of power present in the Mande world.  
 The anthropologist Roy F. Ellen rightly argued the difference between adat (custom) 
and Islam in southeast Asia highlights the existence of an unclear and thick boundary made of 
highly complex, intertwined, reinterpreted and reordered integrated elements of adat within 
Islam and vice versa.  What is understood as Islamic practice by some people might be 
understood as the perfection of adat by other people of the same local community (see Ellen 
1983). The same argument is made by Brenner concerning Muslim identities in Mali (1993a) 
and by Doquet concerning Islamic knowledge and non-Islamic knowledge in Mali (2007). 
Furthermore, Tamari showed most Islamic education in Mali is delivered in local languages and 
among individuals still engaged in what is interpreted as Bamanaya practices (1996). Following 
these scholars, my analysis of local social ethics (hadamadenya) embedded in the figures of 
the noble Muslim and the blessed child demonstrates that a sharp distinction between a 
sphere of custom (laada) and one of Islam is dubious. Islam is constitutive to a field of 
experience and not simply an order imposed upon experience. Instead of questioning the 
Islamic nature of a practice, the analyst should investigate the dynamics through which Islam is 
evoked.  
 In 2009 the Malian Assembly voted for a Nouveau Code de la famille. Muslim 
associations and some political parties organised demonstrations against it in most regional 
towns of Mali; they denounced a Nouveau Code de la famille which went against Islamic 
precepts. Eventually, the President refused to give his approval to the Nouveau Code de la 
famille and requested a revision from the Malian Assembly. The modified version of the 
Nouveau Code de la famille was eventually ratified in December 2011. Western media 
criticised the Islamist tone of the modified version of the Nouveau Code de la famille and 
deplored that the Malian Assembly ceded to conservative Muslim forces.245 In parallel, Islamic 
media criticised the Western influences on the first version of the Nouveau Code de la famille 
and praised the ratified version as a victory for Islam.246 
 What I observed in Bougouni, however, differed from these media analyses. Many of 
my friends who demonstrated in Bougouni did so because they thought the Nouveau Code de 
                                                          
245http://www.contrepoints.org/2012/01/27/66452-reforme-du-code-de-la-famille-au-mali-le-parlement-cede-aux-pressions-
religieuses ; http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20111205-mali-moins-droits-femmes-le-nouveau-code-famille (retrieved the 27 March 
2012). 
246 http://islametinfo.com/2011/12/24/mali-femmes-le-nouveau-code-de-la-famille-regi-selon-les-preceptes-islamiques/(retrieved 
the 27 March 2012). 
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la famille was against how they lived within their families. What outraged them was the fact 
that, instead of ‘les femmes doivent obéissance au mari’247, the Nouveau Code de la famille 
framed gender relation in term of ‘mutuel respect’.248 Moreover, the Code extended the rights 
to inheritance to children born out of wedlock. According to a local teacher, Islamic 
associations recuperated this popular discontent, became its standard-bearers, and turned this 
grassroots claim for the legalisation of local customs into an Islamic agenda. Apart from the 
few intellectual Malian women I met, most Malians opposed this reform, but my Muslim 
friends did so with little reference to Islam. They instead told me they wanted to defend their 
‘dignité’ (dignity) as men and heads of family. The inhabitants of Bougouni demonstrated 
massively because they felt this reform scorned one of the bases of their traditions: patriarchal 
authority. With regard to the rights to inheritance for children born out of wedlock a woman 
jokingly pointed out to me: ‘Men are involved in extra-marital relations. Then they are afraid 
that the child is not theirs. They do not want to recognise him. They wonder: “the child of the 
goat comes from which ram?”’. To her mind, what was at stake was to safeguard the 
longstanding local patriarchy, patrilineal society, and its codes of honour. 
 Western as well as Muslim media had islamised this popular claim in Mali, whereas 
most of the inhabitants of Bougouni criticised the first version of the Nouveau Code de la 
famille as irreconcilable with a way of life based on local norms and practices of social ethics, 
which are widely interpreted to be of Mande origin. The next analytical step would be to 
explore the complex processes through which the Mande legacy has tended to be transformed 
into a museum piece and Islam into the sole agent of social ethics in Mali. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
247 Wife must obey her husband. 
248 Mutual respect. 
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4. Adventures 
 
 ‘Ils sont venus en Gold Coast ou en Côte d’Ivoire pour chercher de l’argent sans doute, mais 
aussi pour chercher de l’aventure’ (Rouch 1967).
249
 
  
The towns and roads of West Africa have been thronged since colonial times by migrants of 
rural origins in search of money. However, as the filmmaker and anthropologist Jean Rouch 
commented in Jaguar, these migrants were also seeking adventures. Between 1910 to 1950 
migrant peanut farmers (nawétaans) from the territory of French Sudan moved to the western 
region of Senegal during the rainy season. Some were sent by their families so as to earn 
money to pay colonial taxes250 and bridewealth; others went of their own accord. Often these 
migrants were motivated by a spirit of adventure; they wanted to explore new horizons, to see 
new technologies, and to acquire new consumer objects (such as hats, sunglasses, jewellery, 
umbrellas, clothes) and the status and social distinctions they connoted (see David 1980, 113–
126). ‘The general message was that to prove their manhood, men had to go on adventure in 
Senegal’ (Peterson 2011, 144). After 1950, young men from southern Mali went on adventures 
in Côte d’Ivoire for similar reasons (see Gary-Tounkara 2008). For the making of the 
documentary film Moi un noir (1957), for six months Jean Rouch  followed the daily life of 
young inhabitants of Niger who migrated to the Treichville district of Abidjan in order to seek 
money. Fifty years ago on moving to Abidjan, these young men understood money as the main 
road to having a wife, house, car and successful urban life. But their little song ‘Abidjan when 
we say your name, Abidjan of lagoon, nice sojourn’, turned out to be a fleeting ‘awakened 
dream’ against the gloomy reality of daily struggles, tiredness and sadness (Ibid). 
 What can we say about migratory practices in contemporary Mali? An adventurous 
spirit persists, but the migrant does not need to go as far as the big cities of coastal countries 
anymore. Upper-market neighbourhoods, and hence money, can be found in the much smaller 
towns of landlocked countries, such as Bougouni. This chapter investigates the experience of 
adventure in the town of Bougouni through the Bamanan notion of tunga. Adventure starts on 
leaving home; it is a tortuous quest for a better life which unfolds in both meaningful and 
surprising ways. I explore the motives, stakes and encounters that underpin the broad context 
of adventure through the discourses of migrants of rural origins I met during my stay in 
Bougouni. I then describe what livelihood activities Bougouni offers to them in terms of small 
                                                          
249 They came to Gold Coast or to Côte d’Ivoire to look for money, but also to search for adventure. 
250 The first colonial tax was introduced in 1895. Taxes increased incrementally over the next several years (see Peterson 2011, 67). 
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trades, manual employment activities and schools. Throughout I look at the religious 
dimension of discussion. 
 
 ‘If you give the key of Heaven to Muslims in the Mosque, they will not accept it and will try to 
run away through the windows, doors and roof (laugh). Because they think that in order to accede to 
Heaven, they should die first. They do not want to die (laugh).’  
 
The Importance of earthly ambitions is jokingly suggested above by my friend Ahmed, farmer 
and bogolan maker from rural southwest Mali, who moved to Bougouni a couple of years ago. 
Achieving a successful earthly path is an important element of Muslim life. Heaven is certainly 
a powerful part of their belief systems, but so incommensurable with our present times that 
most human beings would prefer to continue their time on earth rather than taking whatever 
shortcut to Heaven is offered. As stated in the introduction, Malian Muslims think God rewards 
and punishes Muslims already on earth. Moving forward in life, acquiring money, buying a 
motorbike, financing a wedding, building a house (...) are as important as the gates of Paradise 
to Muslim believers in Bougouni. Many rural Malians try to move forward in life through 
migration to urban areas; they respond to earthly ambitions by undertaking adventures. In the 
second part of the chapter, following an actor perspective I focus on the worldview of Muslim 
believers in order to understand where Muslim adventurers think they are heading to, how 
they perceive the unfolding of their life as in accordance with the will of God and, how far they 
believe they can influence the will of almighty God with respect to their life. 
 
 
 
Towards Bougouni 
 
I met Kassim in early 2009 inside the noisy and dusty atmosphere of a petrol-powered 
mechanic mill251 in the Torakabougou district of Bougouni where he was a mill worker. During 
the course of my stay in the town we became friends, and Kassim revealed himself to be an 
alert observer of daily life in Bougouni. Later he opened a shop ‘par-terre’252 in another district 
of Bougouni as a complementary night activity to his day work in the mill.  By the end of my 
stay, Kassim additionally managed to run a cement-built shop selling and servicing mobile 
                                                          
251 Better-off urban households prefer to bring bags of crop to those modern mills which can pound their crop quickly in exchange 
of hundreds of francs. 
252 Shop ‘par terre’ (street vendor) designates all outdoor rudimentary trades where products are displayed either on a table or on 
a plastic tarp/bag laid directly on the floor. 
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phones in Bougouni. By that time, his economic situation was improving, and a wedding 
project had hatched in his mind. The burgeoning success he was achieving by early 2010 had 
been preceded by years of struggle spent in adventures that he narrated to me one evening 
when he was fixing a mobile phone. 
 
 ‘I grew up in a village in northern Côte d’Ivoire (...).  Then, I moved to San Pedro in order seek 
money. I found a job as a docker in San Pedro harbour where I stayed for a couple of years (...).However I 
lost everything in the civil war. I could not return home with empty hands! Then I decided to go on 
adventure to Mali where there is nobody of my family. At that time Côte d’Ivoire was dangerous! From 
Bouaké to Zégoua our bus had to cross more than 30 roadblocks of the rebels. A policeman from the 
same town as me helped me to cross them safely (...).When in Sikasso, nobody helped me except 
someone who previously lived in Côte d’Ivoire. I told him my story. He then replied: ‘You will suffer mate. 
It’s harsh here.’ Indeed I suffered. I slept outdoors for one month and I did not manage to eat properly. 
But the problem was where to store my only bag in a safe place during the day. I lied to touts by saying 
them I was expecting money from my big brother in order to go to Bamako. They kept my bag during 
four days. After that it was too much! I did the same trick with a street vendor sitting next to the coach 
station, but she started to refuse me after a couple of days. Then I moved out of the coach station and 
stayed a couple of days around a Mosque where I stored my bag and prayed regularly. Eventually 
someone noticed my comings and goings and then proposed me to work as gardener for his eldest 
brother. I accepted and lied by saying I had already done such a job in Abidjan (laugh).I was all-found 
and the wage was correct, but the patron did not give us enough food. After three months of watering, 
my co-worker convinced me to go to Bamako where job opportunities are better. Then we moved 
together in Bamako. However, Bamako turned out to be too harsh. The only work I found was as a carter 
(wͻtͻrͻtigi), but I did not accept it. It is too shameful and physical [laugh]. After a couple of weeks in 
Bamako, we moved to Ouéléssébougou to greet the eldest sister of my friend. I did not manage to find a 
job there either. Then we moved to Bougouni to greet a relative of my friend. Fortunately I met my 
Ivorian aunt
253
 there. She helped me a lot. She found me a job as a houseboy and handyman in her 
younger brother’s family in Bougouni’ (Kassim, 35 years old, single). 
 
 As a northern Ivorian, Kassim belongs to the broad Mande world which makes him 
culturally close to southern Malians. Kassim also speaks Dyula, a Mande language very similar 
to Bamanankan.254 When he fled the Ivorian crisis, which badly hit the harbour of San Pedro, 
he went to southern Mali. From then on his story illustrates well how his life away from home 
has been characterised by its discontinuous trajectory, hardships and chance. Among all these 
difficulties, his Muslim devotion, regional identity and contacts helped him to connect with 
                                                          
253 Married older woman coming from the same area as he. 
254 Dyula is an important trade language of West Africa, spoken in Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea by millions of 
people, either as a first or second language. The Dyula spoken in Côte d’Ivoire contains many French idioms. 
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locals, to survive, to find a job and to move forward on what Kassim calls ‘tunga’ (adventure). 
The many settings of the journey he undertook (village – big town 1 – big towns 2 – Capital of 
Mali – big village – medium town) goes beyond strictly rural-urban migration; as he stated: ‘I 
am an adventurer’.255   
 
 
 
Adventures 
 
During a bicycle trip to the village of Kokèlè near Bougouni, I come across a massive building 
erected among the typical rural habitations of mud houses with thatched roofs (see 
photographs 9 and 10 below). 
 
  
 
This impressive house had been built by a local who had migrated to Gabon a couple of years 
ago. Income from farming system would not suffice for a Malian to build such a prestigious 
edifice, a fact which does not pass unnoticed in the village. When villagers see such 
ostentatious outcomes of adventure, the temptation to seek money elsewhere increases. 
Cement houses with several floors continue to provide a ‘symbolic push factor’ (see Riccio 
2001; 2005) to villagers in rural Mali. However, the attractions of elsewhere are insufficient to 
explain the decision to leave home. One should also take into consideration the cultural 
constraints and possibilities of the local context in relation to the more distant context. As 
stressed by Riccio (2001, 2), people’s access to political, social and economic resources in both 
                                                          
255 Je suis un aventurier. 
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regions256 of destination and of origin are crucial to determine their decision to go on 
adventure. 
 The increasing disparity between remittances emanating from West and African 
countries has inclined African migrants to seek to move to the West rather than another 
African country. This migratory tendency toward Europe and the United States has allowed 
numerous Senegalese to invest in their country of origin, a fact that has considerably 
supported the urbanisation of Senegal for instance. In parallel, Schmitz speaks of a ‘crisis of 
African migration’ (2006, 97); political and economic deterioration in former African 
destinations (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon) compelled migrants to head north. However we 
should notice that his study of transnational migration involves Senegal, a coastal country that 
has forged privileged networks with the Western world since the colonial period. By contrast, 
Mali is a landlocked country which suffers from remoteness and extreme poverty. While a 
Senegalese may depict his country as an economic blind alley, a Malian sees Dakar as a 
migratory destination. As illustrated by the nawétaans in Senegal and the economy of 
plantations in Côte d’Ivoire, patterns of migration within West Africa have tended to converge 
to coastal countries. Nonetheless, these patterns are influenced by national stabilities and 
wider environmental issues. In this regard, during the last two decades the desertification and 
demographic pressure hitting northern Mali coupled with the political instability in Côte 
d’Ivoire have transformed southern Mali into an important receiving area for West African 
migration (see chapter 1). I met many migrants of rural origin, like Kassim, who went on tunga 
in Bougouni so as to build a better life.  
 According to the Bamanankan-French dictionary compiled by Charles Bailleul (1996), 
‘tunga’ means ‘foreign country’. However, my informants never used the idiom in this way. 
They often translated tunga into the French word ‘aventure’ because they understood 
migration as a specific field of experience which goes beyond the simple fact of crossing 
boundaries; adventure encapsulates the unknown, uncertainty, novelty and hope of migration. 
For them, tunga starts as soon as you leave your home which is, however, an ambiguous 
concept (see Gugler 2002). In this peculiar case, home represents the familiar sphere, itself 
composed of ties (kin, friends and acquaintances), spaces (village(s) and lands) and traditions 
(custom, norms and roles). In this way, tunga emerges when you leave the village of origin in 
which you grew up and you face the unknown, through the uncertainty, novelty and hope of 
migration. Tunga, as lived experience, became meaningful in many ways for migrants of rural 
                                                          
256 By contrast to country, the term region emphasises the importance of local identities. Someone who moves to another region 
can be considered as foreigner by locals even if he/she is still in his country. In parallel, this person feels a stranger to this new 
social setting. I take the criterion of autochthony instead of citizenship as the meaningful difference that matters in context of 
adventure within West Africa. 
123 
 
origins I met in Bougouni. Their decision to go on adventure follows various motives I outline 
below. 
 The lack of arable land in relation to demographic pressure within rural families can 
provoke the decision to go on adventure, as is illustrated by Issa the shopkeeper. He grew up 
in a village near the town of Koutiala. Family members were numerous and, as a consequence, 
farming opportunities restricted. Feeling more of a ‘bouche à nourrir’ (mouth to feed) than a 
contributor to his family, he decided to move to Bougouni to live next to a member of his 
village who had already settled in town. He started a shop ‘par terre’ there. Rural men also 
move to towns also to help their families during ‘les mois de suture’ (the difficult months 
before the new harvest when granaries are empty) by providing remittances. For Issa, tunga 
responded to village poverty and was lived in solidarity (ɲͻgͻn.dԑmԑ) with his parents. 
 Others leave village life because of the weight of traditional customs (laada) such as 
gerontocracy. Ablaye was farmer in rural southwest Mali where ‘the familial structure is based 
on lineage with pre-eminence of the patriarch ‘gwatigi’ who manages the familial patrimony’ 
(Konate 2003, 535).257 He worked hard for his family. With other young men of his family, he 
was able to harvest promising quantity of cotton in early 2000. However his oldest paternal 
uncle, who is by custom also the family head and the treasurer of the gwa (extended family) 
he belongs to, disappointed him. After the death of his father, Ablaye answered directly to the 
head of the gwa. He had to give him all his harvest, but his uncle never rewarded him for his 
contribution to the family. Instead he kept the money for himself, travelled around south Mali 
and bought prestigious items for his own wife and children. Ablaye could see no future in face 
of such unfairness. After obtaining his DEF in the neighbourhood big village, Ablaye moved to 
Bougouni to pursue his studies at the IFM and to work in a local restaurant. Many young men 
see village life as a brake on building of their lives. Tunga is seen as an escape from the control 
of elders over youths’ labour that allows them to take paid work.  
 
 ‘What you find in your village, you have to give all to your parents. You cannot save money. 
What you find in Bougouni, you can save a bit and then you can start trading.’
258
 
 
Seibou, the laundry worker, decided to leave his family and his village located in south Mali 
near the Ivorian border because he wanted to save money so as to be able to start up trading. 
More precisely, when the grammatical particle indicating insistence ‘yɛrɛ’ follows a personal 
pronoun, such as in Seibou’s sentence ‘ɛ yɛrɛ tɛ se ka yiriwa’ (you cannot save money), it 
                                                          
257 On the ‘lineage logic’ of West African rural societies, see Dozon (1996). 
258 Ɛ bɛ min sͻrͻ village la, ɛ bɛ a di denbaya la. Ɛ yɛrɛ tɛ se ka yiriwa. Ɛ bɛ min sͻrͻ Buguni la, ɛ bɛ se a mara la ka jago kɛ. 
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stresses the idea of individualism. Put differently, Seibou left his village in order to achieve 
more freedom, and autonomy from his family. Collective village life dominated by elders is 
seen as blind alley for realisation of the personal ambitions of the younger generation, many of 
whom opt for tunga in urban areas where customs are supposedly weaker, and money easier 
to be found. The town is judged as the setting par excellence of diversity, innovation, 
opportunity and freedom. 
 According to many Malians there are two ways of learning and becoming mature. The 
first one is by sitting on benches of classic school for years. The second one is by gaining 
experience through tunga. In a general manner, Malians say ‘tunga kalanso dɛ don’ (adventure 
is a school) and add, ‘although you do not get money, you can find many things in it’. In this 
way ‘travel leads to knowledge (...) which is essential to a young man’s education (Ebin 1996, 
98). Adventure widens horizons, connects people to a more sophisticated world, and opens 
their minds. This path to maturity is especially favoured by migrants of rural origin who left 
school prematurely because they had to take care of household chores, farming and their 
ageing parents.  
 Shiaka, the seller of tapes, left school after four years of médersa. He had to farm for 
his elders. Later, as a young man, he went on adventure to Côte d’Ivoire where he learnt basic 
French in the street and started to appreciate world music, such as reggae and rock n’roll. For 
him, those who were born, grew up and stayed in Bougouni, knew nothing and were ignorant. 
‘How can you write songs if you did not travel, if you did not experience things?’ he added. 
Adventure is demanding and calls for maturity. More than concrete innovations, adventurers 
bring home prestigious knowledge and take pride in their past sojourns in the wider world. 
They consider themselves as ‘évolués’ (civilised) compared to those who never travelled. In 
this way adventure is sometimes regarded as a rite de passage (Riccio 2001; Tacoli 2001) to 
maturity and manhood in southern Mali where most elders had travelled and worked in 
plantations in Côte d’Ivoire during their youth. 
 For other migrants, tunga shows them the value of work and the burden of social 
obligations coming from their home community. Sekou comes from a village located next to 
the town of Sikasso. He moved to Bougouni a couple of years ago. When I met him he worked 
as guardian for a local hotel. Back in his village he felt overwhelmed by what Malians call ‘le 
social’; a continuous flux of requests coming from his home community (kin, friends and 
neighbourhood). In his opinion this constant flux undermines the value of work and impinges 
on personal savings. This flux reduced drastically when he moved to Bougouni because he 
knows almost nobody there. He then realised how his home community affected his attitude 
toward work. 
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 ‘If you do not go on adventure, you do not know really what work means. You have to leave 
home in order to know the value of work and to find good causes making you move forward in life (...). If 
you are alone, you must work, you have to make your own way and to acquire experiences.’ 
 
Tunga cuts off constraining social ties and demands the discipline to work. In this regard, 
migrants feel more able to accept degrading jobs to which they would not acquiesce in their 
home communities (see Riccio 2001). People may also move to town for its anonymity, where 
they avoid taxes and become part of what administrators call the ‘population flottante’ 
(floating population).  
 Tunga is not exclusively male in Mali. Many rural young women move to Malian towns, 
either in order to help their groom finance their wedding, or to support their parents to 
acquire their trousseau (or both). Most of them work for upper-class families as housemaids 
(baarakaloden musow). Others simply opt for adventure in towns in order to escape forced 
marriages or to live a disapproved romantic love. Aicha arrived in Bougouni with her ‘husband’ 
a couple of months ago. She worked as a housemaid and, he worked as a labourer. They 
pretended to be married but they were not. They had fled their village near Segou in order to 
live their disapproved romantic love away from social pressures. As a laboratory of gender 
emancipation, the town offers also new opportunities to women away from the moralising 
eyes of their families and home community.  
 Tunga also involves risks and tensions. One of these is the tension between honour 
(danbé) and shame (maloya). The adventurer cannot return home with empty hands, as 
Kassim discusses. 
 
  ‘I cannot come back home with empty hands. This is shameful. My parents, my brothers and my 
friends would be angry about that. If I come home and I see my friends married with kids, living in 
houses, driving cars and motorbikes... and me with nothing; I would be very angry and I would bring 
shame on my family. I need at least to start something here and to get married before returning home.’ 
 
Adventure can transform Africans into ‘heroes of modern times’ as Rouch claimed (1967) in his 
documentary film Jaguar based on the migration of three men from Niger to the Gold Coast 
during the 1950s.259 It is, however, a risky choice as well. The adventurer must achieve 
something.260  He must show his parents and home community that he is able to improve 
                                                          
259 On ambivalent representation ‘heroes or tricksters’ see Riccio (2005). 
260 In contexts of transnational migration among young Soninke men in Kounda (Région of Kaye, Mali), a migrant aspires to 
‘realiser quelque chose’ (achieve something) in the village(see Jonsson 2008, 24). 
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himself by making a successful life and starting his own business. Adventurers should think ‘in 
terms of “Walking on Two Legs” as [they] pursue urban alongside rural interests’ (Gugler 2002, 
31). Failure on the path of adventure is a constant source of anxiety for migrants who prefer to 
stay away for years than to return home with empty hands. One object embodies unsuccessful 
adventure in Mali: the ‘tunga man jan’ bag (adventure did not go far away). It is a cheap, 
rectangular and thin plastic bag, usually decorated with kitsch drawings, found in all the 
markets of Mali. When an adventurer returns home with such bag, people are immediately 
suspicious that the contents of the bag may be worthless. The adventure did not work out for 
him. If he can afford only a cheap bag, then he must surely be poor. Successful adventurers 
should return home with prestigious items carried in ostentatious bags. The unsuccessful 
adventurer who goes back to farming in his village is usually labelled as cursed.  Schmitz 
explains (2006, 109), in this context, the curse involves the migrant’s reverting to a poor life, 
supported by traditional farming activities, as if the adventurer had moved but without moving 
forward in life. 
 Although migrants leave home in search of money and, in this way, momentarily 
escape the frame of village life, tunga does not recreate a custom-freedom dichotomy because 
the adventurer does not disjoin himself from his/her customs. With the prospect of return in 
mind, tunga is perceived as a circulatory movement which always comes back home; those 
who settle abroad never sever their origins completely. On the contrary, a successful migrant 
usually seeks to invest in his village of origin (such as building a cement house for his parents). 
The tension between honour and shame reminds migrants where they come from, and where 
they belong to. People say the ‘advantages’ (nafa) are with adventure. The narrative of 
autonomy coexists with the narrative of solidarity (see Riccio 2005, 115-116) because the 
migrant’s personal success is primarily assessed by his community. In most cases, tunga is 
about gaining prestigious resources (experience, savings and materials) which bring migrants 
respect and esteem from their relatives, their village of origin and beyond. For the luckiest 
among them, adventure can bring them wealth and the status of ‘mͻgͻba’ (big men) in their 
community. However, for many migrants tunga turns out to be a mixed experience; then they 
prefer to stay years abroad rather than undergoing the shame of an empty-handed return. 
Whereas people say ‘advantages’ (nafa) are with adventure, tunga is lived as a risky but 
transformative process which come close to the circulatory journeys (see Markovits, 
Pouchepadass, and Subrahmanyam 2003) and sojournings (see Amrith 2011) studied in a 
recent body of work on South Asia and Southeast Asia. 
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Settling in Bougouni 
 
Making my weekly evening visit to my friend Boubacar (trader of yuguyugu in central market 
of Bougouni), his wife and his two young boys, I met two young men new to me sitting around 
the teapot and meal we typically shared together along with various jokes and discussions. 
One had arrived in Bougouni a couple of weeks earlier and worked now in the neighbouring 
gold mining site of Damanda. The other one’s clothes were covered by reddish dust. He looked 
exhausted. At his feet lay a thin woodcut covered by cheap watches and sun glasses. He had 
walked all the day through the town in search of customers, but he managed to sell only two 
watches. Ibrahim, a teenager, had arrived yesterday from Mopti. He had left traditional 
Qur’anic school and came here to work as street peddler because, he argued, the market of 
Mopti was overcrowded of hawkers already. My friend Boubacar, a former Qur’anic school 
student, is from Mopti as well. Many traders in and around the central market of Bougouni are 
from the region of Mopti, via them, new faces from north Mali come to town.261  
 Most adventurers arrive in Bougouni through networks of friendship and kinship that 
help them to settle. Others, mostly men from rural south Mali, have heard of the growing 
reputation of Bougouni. Some villagers from neighbouring villages need to go to Bougouni 
because of its administrative position as head of Cercle. Others initially entered in the town in 
passing, due to its strategic position along the international tarred road between Bamako and 
Abidjan, but they eventually settled for various reasons.  
 An important minority of adventurers, especially among street peddlers and manual 
workers, are seasonal workers from the Malian countryside.262 These young farmers move to 
town in search of supplementary money at the end of harvest. They try to work in town for six 
months, and then they return home for the farming season which also lasts roughly six 
months. After years of seasonal works, some decide to settle definitively in town. Adventurers 
struggle to make a living in Bougouni and face ‘la conjoncture’ in many creative and 
imaginative ways (Toure 1985) that I classify in two low-income job categories (informal 
economy) and in one schooling category.  
 1. The first category of livelihood activities requires small investment, and covers any 
kind of independent small trade. It can be done either as a shop ‘par terre’ (street-vendors, 
                                                          
261 In West Africa, contacts from Qur’anic school networks have supported migration patterns; on the case of Nigeria see Lubeck 
(1987). 
262 On the importance of labour migration in rural Mali, see Brock and Coulibaly (2000). However, villagers around big towns, such 
as Bamako, do not migrate to find money; they undertake a series of locally based commercial activities linked to the urban 
market (see Wooten 2005). 
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stallholders: see photograph 11 below on the left), or as a street peddler (see photograph 12 
below on the right).  
 
  
 
These shops ‘par terre’ principally specialise in: petrol (essencitigi); medicines; cigarettes, sugar 
and tea bags (cigarɛtitigi); bread, eggs, coffee and Lipton263 (shɛfantigi); sucreries (soft drink), 
traditional Malian dishes, dibiterie (butcher shop) (...). A few others sell shoes, clothes 
(yuguyugu, loincloth), music tapes, and DVDs. Others are specialised in fruits and brochettes or 
shoe shine and cobbling. There are also many street peddlers who offer a set of fantasy 
accessories made in Asia such as hats, bags, belts, sunglasses, cheap watches, cheap jewellery, 
radios, flashlights, scissors, cards, (…), toys (see above picture on the right). Rapid urbanisation 
in Mali during the 1990s coincided with an influx of cheap and mostly Asian made items, 
termed ‘produits chinois’ (Chinese product) or ‘pacotille’ (cheap junk) by Malians themselves. 
Sale of these goods boosted the uptake of small trade as a complement or alternative to 
farming for many Malians moving to urban areas (see chapter 5). Others sell religious items 
and sermon-cassettes; modern medicines and bamanaya medicines (...). 
 Veteran or better off adventurers, those who are able to invest a bit more money in 
business, sell more sophisticated and costly products such as mobile phone items  and mobile 
credits, western-like cloths and modern supermarket products (...). Others offer sessions of 
video games. If successful, then migrants can move on to offer a wider range of similar 
products displayed in cement-built shops (see photographs 13 and 14 next page). 
                                                          
263 Malians differentiate what they call TEA used for the daily tea ritual from LIPTON; which is the black tea sold early in the 
morning and late in the night for keeping someone warm. 
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 2. The second category of livelihood activities concerns all manual employment that 
involves no contract. Terms are oral, and the work agreement can be terminated at any time 
by either side. The fact of working for someone is often called ‘mͻgͻ baara bolo’ which literally 
means ‘working in someone’s hands’. This expression stresses the dependence the worker has 
on an employer; here money and work do not balance.  The status of ‘patron’ (mͻgͻ.ba, big 
man) demands respect and consideration on the part of the worker who is considered like a 
client. Many migrants work for upper-class family as housemaids and house boys. Female 
domestic servants do most household chores and nanny care, and male domestic servants 
help with farming and any other physical work such as fetching wood, carrying luggage and 
labouring. Such a domestic position is called ‘baara.kalo.den’, ‘the child who works on monthly 
basis’. A housemaid is usually underpaid and exploited by her host family.264 Domestic servants 
can be made to work at anytime, and are usually the first to awaken and the last to go to bed. 
Some Malian friends defined the domestic servant as ‘the slave of modern times’ who is 
defenceless and subject to the arbitrary will of a patron. A friend in such situation told me ‘a 
domestic servant works like donkey.’265 The harsh regime imposed upon a donkey show that 
slavery, although ended, is still ‘a powerful explanatory metaphor for describing unequal social 
relations’ in present-day southern Mali (see Peterson 2011, 148-154). 
 Other migrants work as labourers in construction sites across the town. Bougouni 
offers various other urban employment opportunities, such as sales staff in shops, guardian for 
an administrative office or NGO, tout (coxer) in the coach station, worker in modern mill, sand-
                                                          
264 A housemaid is given room and board by the host family, but receives only 5,000 fcfa per month (£6-7). 
265 ‘Baarakaloden bԑ fali ka baara kԑ.‘ 
130 
 
diver extractor,266 petrol pump attendants, barmen in maquis, prostitutes (...). There are also 
those who sell their physical force such as the carters (wͻtͻrͻtigi). They search for potential 
clients in the coach station and in the central market of Bougouni.  
 3. The third category is related to schooling: the minority of students who avoided 
dropout from school and obtained their DEF, can pursue their studies in Bougouni in one of 
the three high schools of the Cercle of Bougouni.267 The town also hosts the IFM and a couple 
of technical schools which attract more than 2,000 students from all over Mali. Young men can 
also learn a craft in the sort of informal apprenticeship found in most workshops of Bougouni. 
Salif learnt the work of tailor by working for three years in the workshop of an established local 
tailor for instance. The positions in workshops found in Bougouni include bicycle mechanic, 
motorbike mechanic, car and truck mechanic, baker, mobile mechanic, tailor, haircutter, 
driver, carpenter, welder, builder and electrician.  
 
 
 
Destiny and the quest for a better life 
 
Many studies have demonstrated the importance of networks in the construction of migrant 
careers, as illustrated by Senegalese (Riccio 2001; 2005; Schmitz 2006) and West African 
people in general (Schmitz 2008) moving to Europe. Well-established Soninke migrant 
networks in France have significantly supported transnational migration as the main path to 
adulthood for young Soninke men from northwest Mali during most part of the postcolonial 
period (see Manchuelle 1989; 1997; Jonsson 2008). Contacts are also crucial to the integration 
of adventurers in Bougouni into this new urban environment. However, in contexts of poor (or 
absent) established networks, adventurers seek contacts through different strategies. 
Following an actor-based approach, I propose to enter into the worldview of Muslim believers 
in order to understand where Muslim adventurers are heading to, how they perceive the 
unfolding of their life as the will of God and, to what extent they can influence the almighty 
will of God upon their life. Although adventure is not a religiously motivated travel (like the 
pilgrimage to Mecca, or migration due to religious segregation (hijra), or visit to shrines, or 
travel in search of knowledge (rihla))268, Muslim believers perceive it as being in the hands of 
God. 
                                                          
266 Mͻgͻ min bԑ ka tchԑn-tchԑn bͻ. 
267 One public high school and two private high schools. 
268 On religiously motivated travel in Islam, see Eickelmann and Piscatori (1990, 5-6). 
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When they leave the village of origin in which they grew up, adventurers face the unknown, 
through hardship, novelty and hope269 of migration. In such contexts of uncertainty, only the 
certainty of God accompanies the believer along the tortuous path of tunga. This certainty 
which guides the believer along the tortuous path of tunga, is not associated only with 
fatalism. On the contrary, certainty about God gives rise to religious sentiments which set the 
adventurer in motion in many ways that I explore below. My analysis then aims to explore 
Muslim adventurers’ quests towards better lives through the study of their cosmologies of 
migration based on local perception of destiny (dakan) and its causes (sababu).270 
 Destiny (dakan) is a common topic of daily life in conversation, and in the local film and 
music industry.271 For Malian Muslims, destiny is not only an idea or a belief; it is an important 
component of Muslim faith. Focusing on the connection between practices and religiosity (see 
Asad 2001, 217–220), I explore how the notion of destiny is embodied in Muslim life in Mali. As 
a preliminary remark, my informants’ practical understanding of destiny was connected to 
three principle themes I discuss below. Muslims perceive the work of destiny in their daily life 
within contexts in which they find themselves. These themes are therefore not exclusive; there 
are just simultaneously available and ready to use in any specific situation for Muslims who 
find them meaningful at any precise moment of their life.  
 The first theme is the almighty will of God that Malian Muslims refer to when they say 
‘Ala ka bon’ (God is The greatest) or ‘Ala ye a latigɛ’ (This is the will of God). It explains the 
inevitability of most sudden misfortunes in Mali, such as car accidents for instance. One day I 
was arguing with touts in the coach station of Sikasso. Because of a system of rotation that 
distributes clients among coach companies, they wanted me to buy a ticket for an old bus that 
was about to leave. I instead wished to take a later one which looked newer. Listening to our 
debate, a passenger then told me: ‘Old or new, a bus is a bus. It does not matter. Engine is 
good. God, and not the bus, decides whether you will reach your destination or not.’ Death is 
the fact of God par excellence. Usually nobody asks for the intervention of justice in lethal car 
accidents because responsibility for such deaths dwells beyond human beings. Malian Muslims 
can also refer to the almighty will of God in public debate as a means to avoid being connected 
with a shameful situation, or to disengage themselves from responsibility for a misfortune (e.g. 
disappearance of money, or livestock). Others simply mention God as a statement of 
ignorance. As Lamine the local entrepreneur argues: ‘When Muslims say “God has decided it”, 
                                                          
269 To gain money and to build a better life. 
270 Inspired by Sahlins’usage of cosmologies, I am interested in how adventurers incorporate the experience of uncertainty and 
indeterminacy into their existence and ideas of religiosity (see 1994, 414-415). 
271 In her song called dakan Nahawa Doumbia explains the omnipresence of destiny in people’s life and the importance of 
searching for God’s protection on earth.  
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here exactly ends personal reflection.’ The almighty will of God reminds them of the limits of 
human being and the presence of God on earth. 
 The second theme is kinship. As formulated by one of my research assistants, ‘wolola 
yé dakan yé’ (birth is destiny) because ‘you do not choose your legacy, your parents, your 
brothers and sisters, your town and your country’. This second theme is linked to a ‘personality 
theory’ based on the impact of parents and ancestors upon individual destiny (see Horton 
1961). It focuses on the fact that, through birth, a Malian Muslim belongs to a specific descent 
group which imprints on its members a peculiar legacy (or life momentum). This aspect of 
destiny is relevant for the exploration of the transmission of barika between generations of 
Muslim marabouts for instance. It also partially explains the figures of the blessed child 
(dubabu/barika den) and the cursed child (danga den), I explored in the previous chapter, 
which frame the traditional sense of Muslim personhood in Bamanan regions of Mali.  
 The third theme, and focus of this sub-chapter, is human responsibility. In this 
dimension, the destiny of human life is in the hand of God, but God lets human beings select 
among various paths. Each path is set in motion by specific causes that a human being has to 
seek, find and perform. This theme involves a conception of the future which is expressed 
through the local notion of sababu.272 This term primarily means ‘cause’, but it also signifies 
origin, reason and secret (see Bailleul 1996). In lay settings, sababu refers to ‘a cause and 
effect way of thinking’ proper to human rationality. In religious settings, sababu becomes 
more complex, concealed and moral. 
 Muslims in Mali often said that ‘tomorrow is in God’s hand’ (Sini bɛ Ala bolo) because 
only God knows the exact unfolding of someone’s future on earth; therefore someone’s 
sababu is secret and hidden to himself. Nevertheless, Muslims can uncover their future by 
discovering its signs. In this regard, Muslims need to find the cause, origin, and reason of paths 
shaping their destiny. Someone’s earthly life develops along a chain of causes and their effects; 
while a human being is responsible for the causes inherent in his life, God is responsible for 
their effects. To simplify, Muslims told me that God has reserved to each person two earthly 
paths: a good one, and a bad one. The first is linked to sababu ɲuman (good cause). The 
second one is linked to sababu juguman (bad cause). Each Muslim can choose which one to 
unfold. This is where human responsibility enters into action through the question of the 
choice of destiny. If you act correctly, God will bless and help you to find your sababu ɲuman, 
allowing you to achieve success within society. On the other hand, if you do not act correctly, 
God will not help you to find your sababu ɲuman. God might even curse you. In this way, you 
                                                          
272 Sabab (Ar.). 
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will find only your sababu juguman made of misery and suffering in your life on earth. Hell will 
probably be your fate after death. For Malian Muslims, God acts upon someone’s life through 
a system of rewards and punishments stemming from that person’s behaviour on earth.273 
 Bougouni has to be understood as a site full of everyday experiences of sababu ɲuman 
and sababu juguman which determine the ups and downs of an adventurer in quest of a better 
life. This notion of destiny stresses that the promise of piety starts tomorrow and not only in 
the ‘Hereafter’ (see Schielke 2009a). Practice of piety is not only motivated by ‘the fear of hell’ 
(Ibid), but also by the attraction of God’s favour on an earthly path. Here destiny involves a 
sort of divine justice related to the way Muslims seek their sababu on earth. Before the 
Hereafter, the stake of a Muslim life is about success in this life. 
The actions taken in seeking sababu depend on how the society defines earthly 
success. The life story of Salif the tailor exemplifies what seeking sababu signifies for most 
Muslim adventurers of rural origins I met in Bougouni. After a typical rural childhood in south 
Mali, Salif’s father sent him to traditional Qur’anic school in Segou where he spent nine years 
of his life. After these difficult years abroad during which his father passed away, he went back 
to his village and settled next to his mother and his big brother. However, unmarried and 
under the close authority of his elders, Salif could not build his life in his own way there.  After 
one season of farming, he left his village in order ‘to seek his sababu’ (nɛ ka sababu ɲini). This 
move was about ‘finding a position within society’ (ka position sͻrͻ). Comparing himself with 
his big brother settled in the village, he argued that his big brother - married, a father, head of 
family and cattle trader - had already found a position within society. But he, as ‘unmarried’ 
(cɛgana) and still dependent of his family, had not yet achieved any respectable position 
within his society. For most men from the countryside, seeking sababu is about finding a 
respectable position within their society. It concretely means ‘getting married’ (ka muso furu), 
‘having children’ (ka denw sͻrͻ), ‘taking care of the family’ (ka nasͻngͻ di), and ‘building a 
house’ (ka so jo).274 Because such plans cannot be realised without money, seeking sababu 
involves seeking ‘money’ (wari). Thus, Salif moved to Bougouni and learnt the profession of 
tailor in order to gain the money necessary for moving forward in his life. According to Salif, 
the fact of moving to Bougouni belongs to the destiny he picked when seeking his own sababu.  
How does someone find his sababu? What do piety and Islamic ethics mean in this 
context? During my stay in Mali, I became curious about the designs painted on big trucks 
                                                          
273 In the system of rewards, a successful life on earth and access to Heaven are connected. In this analysis, I focus on earthly 
achievement. 
274 Despite increasing material consumptions which has brought distinctions into village life, we can say that ‘maidens, meal and 
money’ are still the key elements of success in rural Mali (Meillassoux 1981). 
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passing by Bougouni and the public green vans called sotrama275 or duuru-duuruni276  which 
are mushrooming in Bamako. Several times I saw ‘sababu man nͻgͻ’ painted in white at the 
back of such vehicles in Bamako. Literally, this expression is translated as ‘[finding] the cause is 
not easy’, but it locally signifies that ‘moving forward in life is not easy’. Indeed working in the 
public transport business in overcrowded and polluted Bamako is tiring, dangerous and not 
well paid. When I asked my friends how someone can find his sababu, they all referred to 
hardship and the culture of work. 
For Shiaka the seller of tapes, ‘if you only sit, how can you gain sababu?’ Another 
friend replied by pointing to the big can of water next to him and told me: ‘Sababu is in God’s 
hand. Look at the big can. If you push this heavy can, God will help you. But if do not push it, 
God will not help you’. Referring to lazy people who spend their days in sitting, and gossiping 
while drinking tea in grin, Fousseini the carter said, ‘If you do not sit and you stand up and go 
looking for job, and accept a difficult job, God will give you a hand’. Then he added ‘Ala yé 
mͻgͻ jigin yé. Baara o yé i fa an i ba yé’ (God created human being, and work is his mother and 
his father). For most Malian Muslims, seeking sababu is about standing up, being active and 
‘working’ (baara) by contrast to just sitting, waiting and being passive. However, more than 
working, seeking sababu ɲuman is about working hard. The importance of being a hard worker 
is jokingly suggested below by my friend Ahmed. 
 
 ‘If you hold the tail of the lion and you ask for help, nobody will come. However, if you hold the 
head of the lion and you ask for help, people will come and will help you to bind and immobilise the lion.’ 
 
Muslims believe that sooner or later a hard worker will receive help from God in his life. 
However, the hard worker should not expect anything from God quickly. On the contrary, a 
good Muslim, the one who is seeking sababu ɲuman, should always act with patience and 
acceptance.277 These disciplinary aspects of Islamic ethics are well illustrated below in a 
conversational anecdote collected during one of many evening chats I had with Kassim. 
Kassim was listening to Islamic radio programmes. Sharing the thoughts of Muslims 
who are sceptical about the sincerity of public Islam (see chapter 2), Kassim started 
commenting on the preaching of a famous Malian Islamic scholar broadcast on the local radio 
                                                          
275 SO-TRA-MA: Société de Transport Malienne. 
276 Duuru-duuruni literally means 25 francs which refers to the price of the first public transport in Bamako during early 
postcolonial period. The contemporary duuru-duuruni is the sotrama, the usually worn-out green van with wooden bench at the 
back. It is the cheapest public transport in Bamako (150francs). 
277 On similar understanding of Islamic ethics in terms of ‘the virtue of patience and endurance’ among youth Moroccan in context 
of social inequality and social abandonnement, see the case of Jawad in Pandolfo (2007, 340-341). 
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Bediana: addressing the hypocritical aspect of Muslim life in Mali, Haïdara278 was pointing out 
that a correct attitude in life is more important than regular praying in the making of a good 
Muslim. Kassim agreed and added a couple of sentences which summarise an aspect of the 
Muslim faith based on a work ethos that I noticed among Muslim adventurers in Bougouni. 
 
 ‘Certain people pray and ask God for 100,000fcfa at the end of the month. If they do not obtain 
this amount, they stop - Affaire de Dieu
279
 -. Praying is not that! Look at your bicycle. If you feel confident 
that your bicycle can bring you to Bamako, whatever the cost, you will get it. If you feel already 
discouraged and you do not trust your Chinese bicycle (...), you will never reach it. You should never 
expect something from praying. You should trust God. This is it. Sooner or later, God will help you; God 
will thank you.’ 
 
Putting differently, ‘regular praying is important, but it does not put food on your plate’ argued 
Ablaye. The lazy Muslim who sits all day and just stands up for taking ablution and praying and 
fasting during the holy month of Ramadan will not find sababu ɲuman in his life. By contrast, 
the patient and courageous Muslim who works hard and takes actions in life, this one pleases 
God. Such a way of living destiny shapes perception of Muslim piety as a work ethos, a means 
to salvation which is also observed elsewhere, such as among members of Mouride Sufi 
brotherhood (Ebin 1996) and resonates also with the famous book of Weber on the protestant 
ethic and predestination (2002). Here the certainty of God goes beyond the notion of belief as 
an intellectual reality. It becomes embodied in religious sentiments which give courage, 
patience, and motivation to Muslim adventurers in their quest for a better life. Most Malian 
Muslims stipulate that ‘working is worshipping’ (baara yé bato yé). These ideas of Islamic 
ethics as a practice of work ethos which involves a discipline of patience and courage are not 
new in Mali. They originate from a longstanding conversation between an Islamic dogma of 
God-almighty with local senses of justice and wisdom about hardships found in the journey 
towards sababu, such as expressed in numerous Bamanan proverbs (zana) and thoughts. 
 
‘If you manage to hold your calabash up to your ankle, God will help you to raise it up on your 
head.’
280
 
 
 
 
                                                          
278 On Cherif Ousmane Madane Haïdara, see chapter 2 and 6. 
279 God’s business. 
280 Ni ɛ yé daga ta ka se i senkuru ma, Ala bɛ i dɛmɛ ka a sigi kun ma (Bamanan proverb). 
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The economy of charity 
 
 Another important practical dimension of sababu is networking. Turning points in people’s life 
are often of a social nature: these encounters, when they are deciphered through Muslim 
faith, are not random events. They become divine interventions in people’s life.  
  In August 2009 I travelled with my friend Ahmed to the weekly market of the village of 
Siramana located 30 kilometres south of Bougouni within the Commune Rurale of Kologo. 
After several purchases, we decided to return to a neighbouring village where Ahmed lives. 
But when we were about to leave, it suddenly started to rain heavily. We ran to shelter in a 
nearby mud house. We then realised we were not alone in this refuge that was already 
crowded with people who had come here for the same reason as us. After finding somewhere 
to sit and greeting each other, a dozen or so people started to talk and to exchange ideas, 
advice and contacts. Ahmed was debating with two young men over the meaning of praying in 
the Mosque. While they were arguing for the importance of baraji (God’s award as access to 
Heaven), he was rather inviting them to look at the Mosque as a meeting point where news 
and knowledge circulate, and solidarity is created. In another corner of the room, a Fula was 
giving the recipe for a Bamanan medicine against backache and kidney ache to a farmer who 
complained that his wife was suffering from severe pain. Other people were preparing the 
usual tea that accompanies talk in Mali (...). These fruitful exchanges continued until the end of 
the rain (and even longer for certain). Before departing, the Fula entertained the crowd by 
pointing that: ‘Thanks to God who made us to meet up together today. Rain came. We could 
not go. Each of us took refuge here [laugh of approval from the crowd].’ 
For most people present in the shelter, the fact of coming together here was God’s will 
which manifested itself through sudden heavy rain. Within the worldview of the Muslim 
believer, encounter is not a random product, but a fact of God. In this way, Malians state 
‘sababu is putting people together’ (Sababu yé mͻgͻ ɲͻgon yé) because most Muslims 
understand social encounter as another sphere of intervention of God. 
I want to emphasise here the fact that biographies of adventurers frequently develop 
along social encounters. Members of an established network (kins, friends) can provide shelter 
and food to the newcomer in town, but further networking is crucial for the adventurer 
wanting to move forward in life. Access to livelihood for migrants mostly depends on 
patronage in towns characterised by high unemployment and an informal economy dominated 
by members of local elite who are able to finance workers. Moving forward in life is assisted by 
networking here, as elsewhere in Africa where personal links take precedence over 
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institutional links in most daily affairs (see Chabal and Daloz 1999). More than resources 
themselves, what is crucial is the ‘access’ to them (see Owuor and Foeken 2006). In such 
circumstances, seeking sababu is therefore about searching to be connected with people who 
can help you to move forward in life. It involves integration within a specific moral economy 
characterised by clientelism and patronage. My analysis is deepened below through the 
ethnography of Kassim who managed to start small business in Bougouni thanks to the 
patronage of a local state administrator. 
Kassim settled in Bougouni three years ago thanks to the help of his ‘Ivorian aunt’, a 
married older woman coming from the same area as him, who found him jobs as houseboy, 
lumberjack, farmer and handyman for various better-off families. Although they provided him 
room and board, his monthly wage of 5,000 fcfa did not allow him to save money; he 
remembered this period as harsh and shameful: ‘When I came back home from the field I was 
so dirty. The daughters of my patron looked at me as if I was not a man [laugh]’. After one year 
of work as house boy, Kassim eventually found a job in a petrol-powered mechanical mill in 
Bougouni thanks to a neighbour who put him in contact with the owner of this mill. I met him 
when he had been working there for more than two years. He earned a monthly wage of 
20,000 fcfa. At that time he rented a single room within a familial compound and paid his food 
contribution to the family settled next to him. Although single, the difficulty posed by such a 
wage level is how to cover daily life expenses and still save money towards a small trade 
project. The little amount of money someone manages to save is usually put towards the 
purchase of prestigious items (e.g. mobile phone), health care and what young Malian men 
called ‘l’amour commercial’ (commercial love)281, if it is not already ‘eaten’ by numerous 
requests arising from the neighbourhood (what Malians call ‘le social’). Kassim worked from 
morning to late afternoon in the mill, but his hard labour did not allow him to make any 
considerable savings. He wanted to move forward in life, but how? After reflection, he decided 
to make some extra cash by selling cigarettes, sugar, chewing gum (cigarɛtitigi) and coffee, tea 
and eggs sandwiches (shɛfantigi) in the evening. To do so, he needed roughly 30,000fcfa as 
basic investment (for the required furniture). He therefore embarked upon various strategies 
with the aim of reaching his ambition. 
 Although he was not satisfied by his wage in the mill, he kept working hard and was 
hoping for a generous gesture from his patron. He was a faithful worker who stayed loyal to 
his boss when other workers left; he also trained other co-workers of the mill. In order to 
                                                          
281 Love affairs in Bougouni were important means through which women granted sex to men in exchange of prestigious items 
(e.g. expensive cloths, mobile phone) and money; on love relations in urban Mali, see Schulz (2002, 809-810). 
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counteract the eroding effect of ‘le social’ over his income, he also joined a tontine282 under 
cover of a woman friend. He was investing 5,000 fcfa every month in this tontine hoping his 
round would come soon. Kassim also visited various local experts in occult sciences so as to 
improve his luck (garijɛgɛ), and local saints in order to receive their blessings and to secure 
God’s favour over his fate. However time was passing and his previous strategies had not 
succeeded. Then, he activated what I call “economy of charity” by asking for financial help 
(loan or gift) from wealthy friends such as Yaya, a powerful local state administrator he met in 
his workplace.  
 The key to this strategy is to become the protégé (sort of client) of a patron. Within a 
poor job market and economic scarcity, patrons are the gatekeepers of the informal economy 
who can provide the necessary cash for starting small trades. They can also hire someone for 
various chores, or recommend someone to other patrons. Their precious help take numerous 
forms; one among them belongs to the realm of Islamic charity of the Muslim patron.  
 But in this peculiar case, the patron-protégé relationship is not based on ‘business 
venture’ such as studied by Warms among wahhabi merchants of Sikasso in which ‘protégés 
work for a continual flow of goods and credit which give them the opportunity to make profits 
themselves’ (1994, 118) and in similar ways by Gregoire among Hausa merchants in Niger 
(1992). Although the patronage I investigate is also the outcome of a slow process through 
which someone gains ‘a reputation for seriousness' (mͻgͻ sɛbɛ), it is not primarily based on 
‘successful repayment of small debts and devotion to religion’ (Warms 1994, 109). Here the 
patron-protégé relationship is the result of social bond characterised by asymmetric friendship 
and submissive conduct in which the protégé slowly manages to be considered as a ‘mͻgͻ 
sɛbɛ’. Sɛbɛ signifies reliability in general. In community life, sɛbɛ defines the polite one who 
shows respect to his elders. Given a poor job market and economic scarcity, sɛbɛ can also 
stress the qualities of hardwork, loyalty and submission. Whereas a patron-protégé 
relationship among traders aims at mutual prosperity, here it brings access to a livelihood 
activity for the protégé and reinforces the prestige and status of the ‘patron’ as a good Muslim 
and big man (mͻgͻ.ba) through an economy of charity I develop below. 
 The owner of the mechanised mill in which Kassim worked was a close friend of Yaya. 
Almost every day Yaya spent lunch time and late afternoon on the threshold of the mill where 
its owner hosted a grin. There Yaya met Kassim. Since their first meeting, Kassim had greeted 
him with politeness and respect by shaking hands while looking down. Each time Yaya arrived 
                                                          
282 Tontine is the traditional women’s banking system of Mali. On a regular basis, each member of the group chips in a fixed 
amount of money. The total sum is then given to one woman chosen according to a circulatory process. In this way, each member 
of the association benefits successively from a considerable amount of money at once. This system provides savings to women. It 
helps them to face unexpected or specific expenses. 
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in this grin, Kassim came out of the mill, greeted Yaya, offered him the best seat, and returned 
to work within the mill. Sometimes he sat behind Yaya and prepared the tea for the members 
of the grin. The cup of tea circulated first between the patron and his friends, and then it 
completed the round between the workers. When Yaya engaged Kassim in conversation, 
Kassim never interrupted and listened to him carefully. When Yaya ate at the mill and invited 
Kassim to join him, he always found an excuse to eat after Yaya. If Yaya needed something, 
Kassim went on an errand for him (...). In this way they became acquainted, and developed an 
asymmetric friendship in which Yaya progressively started to perceive Kassim as someone 
reliable. 
 In parallel, Yaya was not just anyone in Bougouni; he was a powerful local state 
administrator who earned a considerable amount of money and had contacts with influential 
members of the local elite.  Although already responsible for his parents and siblings, in one 
year, Yaya managed to build a cement house, to buy a laptop, a new Jakarta motorbike and 
several building plots in Bougouni (among other minor prestigious items). As a Muslim 
believer, Yaya prayed regularly, fasted during the holy month of Ramadan, and listened to 
public Islamic sermons organised in town during the evening.  In addition, as a successful 
Muslim he felt morally affected by what happened around him. Reflecting upon his privileged 
position in town, he once stated: ‘the value of man is to learn a profession, to find a job, to 
earn money and to feel pity for others.’ 
 Owing to his status of patron within the local community, Yaya received a flux of 
requests coming from kin, friends and the neighbourhood within context of increasing 
economic inequality.283 In turn, he had to deal with what Malians called ‘hinɛ’ which means 
‘pity’ and ‘compassion’. Hinɛ is an important element of the local sense of humanism that I 
introduced in the previous chapter (see hadamadenya). It emphasises ‘solidarity’ (ɲͻgͻn.dɛmɛ) 
between the members of the local community. Hinԑ is also regarded as a virtuous sentiment 
that local Muslim scholars relate to the third Islamic pillar (zakat/alms, charity). Therefore, 
hinԑ shapes local conceptions of a good Muslim as well as of ‘mͻgͻba’ in Mali. Yaya needed, 
however, to manage his resources and to be selective whom to support. If Yaya refused all 
demands, people of the local community might label him a ‘selfish’ person (ɲɛgoya) and 
‘cursed child’ (danga den). On the other hand, he could not reply positively to all of them if he 
wanted to consider his own interest as well. As a patron, he needed to balance the pursuit of 
his own interest with those of his kin, friends and the interests of the neighbourhood and local 
community. In a system of clientelism and patronage characterised by the continual search for 
                                                          
283 In this situation ‘le social’ can lead to  an ‘economy of affection’  in which demands arising from a state agent’s ties to society 
generate ‘corruption’ (see Villalón 1995, 91) . 
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mutual help and a ‘win-win’ situation (Bayart 1989; Bayart, Mbembe, and Toulabor 1992), I 
argue, the charity of Muslim patrons is more oriented towards those they consider as ‘reliable 
men’ (mͻgͻ sɛbɛ) than to the community as a whole. Here we can say that ‘pragmatic 
instrumentalism and pious sincerity’ coexist within the same person (Osella and Osella 2009, 
216).  
 Trust based on religious identity works for those in a minority situation as a marker 
and maker of a network. During the nineteenth century Muslim trade networks operated in 
just such way in non-Muslim West Africa (see Amselle 1977; Launay 1992). However, unless 
you belong to a specific Muslim movement characterised by a sharp boundary and group 
solidarity, Muslim identity in the increasingly Muslim society of Mali is not a guarantee of 
reliability anymore.284 In this regard, the wahhabi identity is now an important criterion of 
commercial reliability for those who wish to integrate into the established network of wahhabi 
traders in contemporary Sikasso (see Warms 1992). Nonetheless, to the eyes of ordinary 
Muslims, the facts of praying and fasting publicly connote Muslim identity, but they are not 
sufficient to make you a reliable and trusted person. What then differentiates a ‘reliable 
person’ (mͻgͻ sɛbɛ) from the anonymous masses for ordinary Muslims in Bougouni?   
 Mͻgͻ sɛbɛ signifies the courageous and patient hard worker who shows gratitude, 
etiquette and respect to a patron. All these submissive conducts symbolically determine who is 
the reliable powerless party and who is the prestigious patron; they define who gives and who 
takes in the economy of charity. In terms of this asymmetric friendship, and in resonance with 
local conception of humanism and Islamic charity, a Muslim patron feels obliged to make small 
gifts and gestures of hinɛ to a powerless but reliable person. In turn, the beneficiary of such 
patronage praises (ka mͻgͻ tͻgͻ fo) his benefactor as a big man (mͻgͻba), and might be 
available to serve him further by rendering multiple services in the future. This economy of 
charity not only tends to reproduce an ethos of submissive attitudes embodied in the docile 
migrant searching for livelihood strategies in Bougouni, but also legitimates status, prestige 
and social inequalities in town. Over time, if successful, this economy of charity can develop 
the patron-protégé relationship into a business venture. 
 During one of our numerous meals taken together in his familial compound, Yaya 
expressed how Kassim aroused his hinɛ: ‘Kassim is really courageous! He is a hard worker and 
he respects me too much! I feel pity for him (hinɛ).’  In spite of his constant efforts, Kassim was 
not moving forward in life.  His projects stagnated. In this sense, pity (hinɛ) was not a response 
to human misery, but the fact of being affected by the courage and the respect of the 
                                                          
284 Furthermore, public concern about hypocrisy demonstrated in chapter 2 undermines the credibility of public norms of piety as 
criteria of trust. 
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powerless. Indeed adventurers stressed the fact of facing hardship and economic stagnation 
with a patient and hard working attitude. As Shiaka the seller of tapes explains:  ‘Sababu is the 
fact of meeting people who feel pity for you because, although you work hard and you gain 
your life through the sweat of the brow, you do not move forward in life’. For adventurers in 
Bougouni, networks are not pre-existant established structures; they instead come into being 
because they strategically wait for patronage to turn up in an active way. Eventually, Yaya 
helped Kassim financially who therefore managed to start his small evening trade.  
 In a society characterised by weak institutional and bureaucratic bonds, a scarce job 
market, clientelism and patronage, charity becomes an important means of access to 
livelihood activities for adventurers. Stories of financial help from a better-off person to what 
Malians call mͻgͻ sɛbɛ are numerous in contemporary Mali. They explained most 
advancement of personal ambitions among adventurers I met in Bougouni. In addition, such 
charity participates in the reproduction of social hierarchy through bodily and theatrical 
practices of deference, prestige and respect. Gestures of mercy and Islamic charity pertain to 
the reproduction of praise, status and leadership in Mali and beyond. 
 
 
 
God-almighty, Muslim faith and religious experiences 
 
Riccio’s informant says: ‘the migrant does not have a precise global project; he is an 
adventurer... only the signs of success can be aimed at as a general goal’ (2005, 105). Indeed, 
Muslims who leave home know the social expectations placed on their shoulders, but the rest 
is in the hands of God. They are adventurers. Tunga is therefore apprehended as a path 
towards wealth, as a school, and a rite de passage in which shame and honour are at stake, but 
thereafter lived as a transformative process with unknown consequences. Instead of being the 
product of a ‘prescribed faith’, Muslim faith is questioned and reconstituted along the journey 
and struggle towards a better life (Marsden 2009, 60). In order to move forward on its 
tortuous path, Muslim believers deploy many strategies which aim at attracting God’s favour 
on their fate. 
 By studying Muslim faith in relation to earthly ambitions and destiny, I invite 
investigation of new ways of ‘moving closer to God’ (Schulz 2003, 23) that are motivated by 
the building of a successful life in its mundane sense. In this way, Muslim adventurers 
demonstrated a religious commitment in which ‘working is worshipping’. The meaning of a 
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Muslim life spent on adventures became embodied in a work ethos and in virtuous disciplines 
of patience and courage. In comparison to Schielke’s analysis of the Salafi piety movements in 
Egypt (2009b), the search for sababu among ordinary Muslims in Bougouni does not 
necessarily result in the slogan ‘Islam is the solution’ as an uncritical reality. It instead 
highlights primarily the existence of ‘God-almighty’ as a bottom line for ordinary Muslims in 
Mali. What does it mean? Here, ‘religion as paradigm’ does not reduce to an Islamic scriptural 
solution put into practice in the shape of a project of self-formation. From a phenomenological 
perspective (see Desjarlais and Throop 2011, 91-92), the ‘lifeworld’ of Muslim believers comes 
into being through their relationship to God. In parallel with its orthodoxy, Muslim life is also 
understood as a complex, concealed and moral path that heads towards self-realisation and 
that lies in the hands of God. If we associate piety with ‘relationship to God’ most Muslims 
would certainly acknowledge the importance of having an unmediated relationship to God. 
However in reality, it is an ideal lived by Muslims through the intermediaries of the ups and 
downs of everyday life. Therefore, for most ordinary Muslims, Islamic faith as religious 
experience is lived as much as a tortuous path to explore, as it is the practice of a prescribed 
solution ready to use. 
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5. Consumption, distinction and the occult. 
 
The contemporary infrastructure of Mali has been shaped by various foreign investors who 
have built monuments, roads and bridges throughout the country. The three costly bridges 
crossing the river Niger in the capital Bamako illustrate the history of successive foreign 
influences in Malian soil. 
The first bridge, Le Pont de Badalabougou (in reference to the Badalabougou district of 
Bamako), was opened under French colonial rule in 1957. In the aftermath of the bloody 
events of March 1991, it was renamed Le Pont des Martyrs (Martyrs Bridge) as a tribute to the 
demonstrators who sacrificed their life for the struggle to democracy and freedom in Mali. 
 The second bridge, Le Pont du Roi Fahd (King Fahd Bridge), was erected in 1982 and 
financed by the Saudi Fund for Development. With the independence of Mali in 1960, the 
country became open to new foreign influences. As a socialist, the first President of Mali, 
Modibo Keita (1960-1968), developed ties with countries of the communist bloc primarily. 
Under the rule of its second President, Moussa Traoré (1968-1991), Mali softened its socialist 
economic policies, widened its foreign policy, and initiated privileged links with Muslim 
countries. Le Pont du Roi Fahd symbolises an epoch shaped by the petro-dollars of Arabic 
countries (especially from Saudi Arabia; see Soares and Launay 1999, 515) that had funded the 
construction of mosques, Islamic cultural centres and religious schools in Mali during the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
 The third bridge, Le Pont de l’Amitié Sino-Malienne (Sino-Malian Friendship Bridge), 
was inaugurated on Malian Independence Day the 22 September 2011, as a gift offered by the 
People’s Republic of China to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Independence of Mali 
(1960-2010). Although Western and Arabic influences are still present in Mali, the third bridge 
might symbolise a new era of international economic partnership dominated globally by the 
East and in particular by China.285 Whereas in 2000 children in Mali greeted me with ‘bonjour’, 
in 2010 children I met during a tour in a village next to Bougouni welcomed me with Chinese 
greetings. Not used to the variety of whitish skin, they took me for one of the Chinese workers 
who had been repairing the Bougouni – Sikasso road section for a few months. This anecdote 
illustrates that the post-Cold War era in Mali has been characterised not only by North-South 
aid, but also by the increasing business between Africa and China.286  
                                                          
285 Another growing actor involved in technology transfers and farming business is India which opened an Embassy in Mali in 2009.  
286 In less than 20 years China has become an important actor throughout the African continent (see Kernen 2007). Since 2006, the 
Chinese government has organised regular China-Africa summits that indicate its increasing interest in Africa. 
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Whereas most scholars have studied the increasing presence of China on Malian soil in terms 
of investments, buildings and men,287 I am particularly concerned with opportunities for 
consumption by ordinary Muslims in Bougouni, which have been enlarged by the rise of new 
Asian producers and especially by China (see Nguyen 2009; Gaye 2006),  or what Michel and 
Beuret call the ‘Chinafrique’ (2008).288 This chapter stresses that it is mostly through ‘things’ 
that the East has recently entered into all Malian households. Connections between Mali and 
the East are foremost constituted of ‘made in Asia things’; so globalisation ‘from below’ is 
investigated here as a rapidly accelerating circulation of goods rather than of people and ideas. 
Nevertheless, a ‘thing’, although commodified, when in someone’s hand is never devoid of 
meaning and life. In this chapter ‘things’ are investigated through their consumption, and this 
process is central to the creation of identities and inequalities (see Van Binsbergen 2005).  
 Asian-manufactured products have been present in Mali since the inter-war years289 
(e.g. Japanese bicycles); however, they have had a significant impact on most people’s lives 
only from 2000. During colonial and early postcolonial times, the consumption of foreign 
products ( such as clothes, bicycles, hats, sunglasses) ‘was carried on piecemeal fashion’ in 
southern Mali (Peterson 2011, 193). Locals named these new objects with ‘neologisms’ ( 
‘bicycle’, ‘nɛgɛ.so’, literally ‘iron horse’; ‘plough’, ‘misi.daba’, literally ‘cattle hoe’) because 
their occasional, limited consumption did not really transform people’s ways of life (2011, 
194).290 With the development of road networks and international trade during the 
postcolonial period, the so-called ‘France aurevoir’ products progressively arrived in Malian 
towns. Nonetheless, these products were expensively imported from the West and hence 
affordable exclusively for a tiny urban elite. However, the affordability of manufactured 
products has improved markedly in the last twenty years.  
                                                          
287 Mali and China have had diplomatic relations since the independence of Mali in 1960. Although local elders say ‘Chinese came 
with Modibo’, their presence was limited to a few state experts, and exchanges between the two countries remained of minor 
significance until the end of 1990s (see Bourdarias 2009, 8). However, following the privatisation of the Malian market after 1991, 
and the liberal opening of China under Deng Xiaoping, China boosted its presence in Mali in early 2000 and is now involved in the 
country through gifts, loans, bilateral aid, private companies and men (see Sanogo 2008). Many major constructions sites in 
Bamako (such as the Stadium of 26th March, International Conference Centre, Modibo Keita Memorial) and within the country 
have been built by Chinese state companies and financed by Chinese state funds. In parallel to the state channel, during the 2000s 
a growing number of Chinese have settled in Mali as workers and engineers for private companies or as businessmen in the retail 
and entertainment sectors. For instance, Chinese are famous for running ‘bars-hôtels’ with ‘chambres de passe’ at the back 
(especially in Bamako) that have been criticised by many local Muslim movements as signs of moral decadence (see Bourdarias 
2010, 7).  
Whereas the growing presence of Chinese in Mali is in general appreciated because of the newness of their partnership, their 
concrete investments, their easy loans, and their non-paternalistic way of doing business so far, long term Chinese goals are 
questioned and remain vague. China encourages the influx of Chinese workers to Africa in order to absorb high unemployment in 
its rural provinces (see Michel and Beuret 2008; Sanogo 2008). The recent diversification of migratory processes of Chinese in 
Africa stresses the poverty affecting inland China (see Bredeloup and Bertoncello 2006, 213-216) and the harsh competition of its 
internal national market (Kernen and Vuillet 2008, 76-78). In turn, the growing presence of Chinese merchants on African soil has 
recently questioned the integrative capacity of African societies traditionally marked by emigration: on the case of Senegal, see 
Bredeloup and Bertoncello (2006) and Kernen and Vuillet (2008). 
288 By contrast to the former epoch of Françafrique. 
289 1920s – 1930s. 
290 On changes in material culture during the colonial period in southern Mali, see Peterson (2011, 193-198). 
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In a decade, the 1991 liberal and democratic shift in Mali, in parallel with the rapid 
development of emerging economies, transformed the nature, the provenance and the scale 
of manufactured products found in the country. Rapid urbanisation during the 1990s coincided 
with an influx of cheap and mostly Asian-made items. Thanks to the new opportunities to gain 
business visas offered by emerging economies, and especially by China, the big merchants of 
Bamako have been able to supply the Malian market with cheap Asian-manufactured products 
by making short business trips to the East. These products flood markets, shops and 
households, and have enabled millions of Malians to gain access to a consumer lifestyle.  
 The first part of this chapter documents and analyses the increasing importance of 
ostentatious and fashionable consumption to the conception of an urban way of life (by 
contrast to a rural way of life) and the evaluation of success in life among Bougouni’s Muslims. 
Following an ‘Africa-centered approach to material culture’ (see Hardin and Arnoldi 1996), this 
chapter explores the ways Malian urbanites use made-in-Asia objects to construct identity, 
distinctions291 and ideas of success that shape the world around them. In parallel, it examines 
how changing opportunities for consumption and the evidence of success and failure in 
material well-being are interpreted and argued over in their Muslim environment. 
 Consumerism, however, has increased and made more visible the material distinctions 
in wealth between Malians which, in turn, has fostered jealousy (kɛlɛya) and made egoism 
(ɲɛgoya) a source of public concern to the inhabitants of Bougouni. Similarly to Cameroon (see 
Geschiere 1997; Geschiere and Fisiy 2002), the occult in Mali addresses uncertainty, ambiguity 
and hidden dimensions of human success and failure in general, and is comparable with a 
‘social diagnosis’ of an urban dream that wakes in moral disquiet, unequal rewards and 
aspirations (see Moore and Sanders 2002). Within this broad perspective, I want to investigate 
in the second part of the chapter the occult in relation to the fact that in the Muslim society of 
Mali ‘to be a moral person means to be sociable’ (Schulz 2005, 102). As a complement to 
Schulz’s article on the thriving occult practices in urban Mali resulting from current neo-liberal 
context (Ibid, 108-109), my aim is precisely to study the occult as a way to domesticate social 
inequalities within a post-1991 era, which seems deeply shaped by various forms of 
exploitation, marginalisation and individualism that jeopardise trust and loyalty between 
relatives, friends and neighbours.  
 
 
 
                                                          
291 Similar processes of ‘social stratification’ based on uneven access to material goods operate to some extent in rural Mali (see 
Koenig 2005). 
146 
 
Riches as a sign of blessing 
 
Two key ethnographies have analysed interconnections between wealth and Islam in West 
Africa: Islam and the Prayer Economy (Soares 2005b) and Women and Islamic Revival in a West 
African Town (Masquelier 2009). With regard to Niger, Masquelier (Ibid. xvi) writes that ‘Islam 
is now equated with status, power and arziki (a word evoking notions of wealth, prosperity 
and well-being)’. More importantly, she shows how this equation originated in pre-colonial 
times and strengthened during the postcolonial period. In the immediate aftermath of the 
conquest of West Africa, French colonial officials were debating two views of Islamic influence 
and its spread among Africans: Islam as subversive identity and Islam as raiser of civilisation, 
work, order and economy (by contrast with ‘backward’ pagan religious practices). Although the 
former opinion finally prevailed in the shape of a politique des races defending ethnic 
particularism (ibid, 43-44), the latter prospect illustrates the fact that already in the pre-
colonial period Islam was associated with power, status and wealth in West Africa. 
 This association was especially noticeable in colonial administrative centres such as 
Bougouni that attracted traders and civil servants among its first Muslims (see chapter 1). In 
Mali most civil servants of the colonial administration were Muslims educated in French 
schools, such as the Ecole Normale William Ponty in Senegal. Similarly to Niger, many of these 
‘Westernised’ Muslims joined the political party of the RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique 
Africain) and contributed to the association of Islam with power, status and wealth that can be 
observed in the towns, which are predominantly Muslim. As Masquelier noted ‘Muslim 
identity had become an indispensable ingredient of social and economic success’ (2009, 59) in 
Niger and (I would say) in most parts of West Africa. 
 During the postcolonial period the logics of the market have reinforced the links 
between prosperity and religion. With regard to Mali, such mercantile logics have supported 
the development of a ‘prayer economy’, an economy of religious practice in which people give 
gifts to religious leaders on a large scale in exchange for prayers and blessings (see Soares 
2005b). In the religious centre of Nioro-du-Sahel, Soares demonstrates how ‘religious leaders 
[considered as saints] have become more privatised religious figures – effectively free-floating 
sanctifiers – in a religious economy that has come to be more like a market’ (Ibid,  153) or what 
he also calls ‘a fee-for-service religion’ (Ibid, 246). The sainthood of the two prominent Sufi 
religious leaders of Nioro-du-Sahel is not only based on their descent, secret knowledge and 
barika, but is also publically judged by the number of their followers and, crucially to my study, 
by their wealth. In Bougouni, such coupling of piety and wealth in the shape of processes of 
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commodification of blessings and prayers for gifts is illustrated by the person locals name ‘the 
saint of Kologo’. 
 The locality of Kologo stands 30 kilometres south of Bougouni just off the national road 
between Bougouni and Manankoro. This big village and administrative centre of the Commune 
Rurale de Tiémala Banimonitié is distinguished by couple of shops, a weekly market and an 
impressive brown and turquoise-blue cement Friday Mosque. This imposing religious building 
was financed by one of the most respected maraboutic families of southwest Mali, the Diabaté 
of Kologo. According to local discourses, the founder of this maraboutic lineage settled in the 
village in the early twentieth century. A Muslim scholar, he progressively convinced local 
inhabitants to convert to Islam because his barika defeated the power of local jinn. His exploits 
in overcoming Bamanaya forces spread his reputation as a pious Muslim blessed by God and 
persuaded many local residents to consider him as a saint. He was then chosen as the first 
Imam of Kologo and also opened the first Qur’anic school that contributed to the spread of 
Islam in Kologo and surrounding villages.  
 The Diabaté lineage continues in contemporary Mali. In 2009, after the death of his 
father, the founder’s grandson became Imam, karamͻgͻ (Islamic scholar) and marabout of 
Kologo, the heir to the barika of both father and grandfather. The graves of the founder of this 
saintly lineage and his religious heir are places blessed by God where many Muslims come to 
commune with the Almighty through their sainthood. Malians and even foreigners travel to 
benefit from the power of their barika. Every Friday during the weekly market of Kologo the 
threshold of the compound of karamͻgͻ Diabaté witnesses continuous comings and goings of 
people wishing to greet ‘the saint of Kologo’. Next to the main door, local elders, heads of 
family, and privileged visitors sit on benches and chairs, converse, observe the unfolding of 
Friday and wait to accompany their saintly Imam to the Friday prayers. Approaching the 
Diabatés’ garage, one sees a couple of expensive 4x4 vehicles, and motorbikes. The 
descendants of Diabaté occupy an entire district of Kologo which differs from the rest of the 
village by its evidence of wealth: numerous cement houses and well-conserved mud houses 
reinforced with cement rendering, as well as numerous granaries. Blessings and money are not 
lacking in Diabaté compounds. Here ‘prayer economy’ provides a comfortable living for an 
entire district of Kologo.  
 Most Muslims in Bougouni follow the example of prosperous religious leaders in Mali; 
they treat consumption as a sign of success in life. Therefore wealth is understood as an index 
simultaneously of social status, blessing and pious life in general. 
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The urban way of life: being poor but trendy  
 
In studying the articulations between wealth and religion, I need to take into consideration a 
marked feature of African economies: their growing social inequalities. Geschiere and Fisiy 
(2002), and Nyamnjoh (2002) stressed the importance of this feature in the Cameroonian 
context of the collapse of development as a transparent and egalitarian process. With regard 
to Mali, ‘over the past few decades, the discourse of “development” has been viewed ‘as the 
panacea for many of the country’s problems’ (Soares 2005b, 212). After two decades of single-
party dictatorship led by Moussa Traoré (1968-1991), a period characterised by droughts, lack 
of freedom, and constant economic difficulties (see De Benoist 1998; Couloubaly 2004; 
Elmouloud 2007), discourses of development have been invigorated in the hope of changes in 
terms of freedom and development brought by the democratic and liberal reforms of 1991. 
However, contemporary realities have undermined such promises.  
 Although Mali has benefited from substantial international aid and loans during the 
past two decades (see introduction), by 2010 many adults and elders of Bougouni were 
rebuking the failure of development and the moral drift of Malians in general (see chapter 3). 
The Third Republic of Mali has not countered the effects of the structural adjustments of the 
1980s, insofar as many ‘jeunes diplômés’292 still struggle to find paid employment in a state 
bureaucracy undermined by clientelism. Whereas markers of material success have multiplied 
in the urban landscape of Bougouni, they have mainly accumulated in the hands of a minority. 
Most Malians find themselves excluded from the up-market neighbourhoods characterised by 
cement houses with étages, expensive cars and ostentatious events and ways of life 
manifested by the tiny minority of wealthy urbanites. They struggle to gain access to small jobs 
and to make a living (see chapter 4). Other than some urban collective services, such as public 
lighting, TV provided by the local shopkeepers, tarred roads, crowds, junkets and night-time 
activities, their life might be as mundane as in rural Mali. Only a handful of successful people 
keep urban dreams alive in a society characterised by longstanding mass poverty in a new 
context of increasing social inequalities.293 
 While Malians acknowledged that ‘there is money in Mali’, they blame the fact that 
money tends to concentrate in the hands of a minority. This observation does not mean that 
Malians perceive social inequalities through the Marxist notions of ‘class’ and ‘class 
consciousness’ (see Lukács 1972 [1923], 46-82). For them, Mali is a country in which a tiny 
minority of urbanites are becoming rich (they are called patrons, mͻgͻbaw, or ‘gros 
                                                          
292 See Schulz (2005, footnote 47). 
293 The conclusion of my dissertation will analytically relate economic realities in Mali to the coup d’état of 22 March 2012. 
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bonnets’294), whereas the overwhelming majority of its people remains poor. As Malians used 
to say ‘Mali is a poor country’. In such a context of longstanding mass poverty, do processes of 
distinction exist among the inhabitants of Bougouni? And how they work? 
 The urban way of life is central to perceptions of success in town. Whatever their 
origin most Malians want to ‘go urban’ now. For them, the urban area is an open door towards 
wider trends coming from ‘là où ç’est évolué’ or ‘là où ç’est civilisé’ (where civilisation is) such 
as Bamako, Abidjan, Dakar, (...), France, Europe, the United States and beyond. Seen from this 
perspective, an urban Malian can be poor and ‘évolué’ and ‘civilisé’ at the same time. Both 
French terms express a distinction based on the consumption of trendy products of foreign 
origin which, in turn, give their consumers access to a modern way of life. By contrast, the 
rural area is associated with manners and products which are deemed as ‘arriérées’ (backward 
or outmoded); therefore people who follow a rural way of life in Mali are pejoratively called 
‘broussards’ (bushmen), a French term which means inhabitants of the ‘brousse’ (bush 
country). According to this set of ideas about distinction, Malians do not see themselves as 
divided into various classes. In parallel to the distinction between the few patrons and the 
numerous poor, they perceive Malians as composed of trendy people and backward people. 
Rural and urban lifestyles are articulated into discourses that shape broader conceptions of 
social status in Mali. 
 Urbanites commonly associate the rural world and its village life with negative images 
and mockeries. Some of them, especially urbanites of urban origin, depict villagers as 
‘sauvages’ (savage). During a chat with Aminata, a single woman from Bougouni, I asked her 
whether she would consider marrying a villager.295 After a couple of general comments, she 
replied to me: 
 
 ‘A female friend living in a village asked her husband to marry a second wife. She complained to 
me about the way her husband behaved. After having worked all the day, every evening her husband 
just told her “take off your clothes” and boum (bang). She can’t bear it anymore; she is too tired (…). Her 
husband is a savage!’ 
 
Aminata continued her negative remarks with a story about villagers in general she heard in a 
tontine:296  
                                                          
294 ‘Big hats’; this expression usually refers to senior officers of the Malian state. In a study of Bamako sumu events, ‘gorobinew’ 
are the wealthy and emancipated women who manifest their generosity during ‘rituals of conspicuous consumption of jeli praise’ 
(see Roth 2005).  
295 It is not rare to see male urbanites marrying female villagers because the dowry is cheaper when the bride is a villager. 
Moreover, most female villagers aspire to marry a male urbanite so as to live in town (in this patri-virilocal society). 
296 In Mali most women belong to traditional women’s banking associations called tontine. 
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 ‘A young couple of broussards had difficulties to have a baby. Suspecting they had no clue 
about how to make love, one of their cousins brought them to his house in Bamako. Then he put a porn 
movie on the TV and locked them up in a room. The woman became pregnant not long afterwards 
[laugh]! 
 
Although Aminata’s mobile phone contained a secret file of porn movies,297 her comments 
illustrate how broussards are often represented as ignorant people who know nothing much 
except the traditional occupation of ‘sɛnɛkɛla’ or ‘cultivateur’ (farmer). Moreover, the 
formerly noble activity of farming is increasingly being perceived as unattractive and degrading 
by the younger generations living in town.298 Madou, a young man of rural origin and 
newcomer in town, wanted to change the profession written in his identity card before looking 
for a job in Bougouni. He thought: ‘If I show my identity card I will not be taken seriously 
because the “cultivateur” is not “considéré” (esteemed) here.’ Ideas about the farmer’s lack of 
good manners and familiarity with modern products are stressed in a popular Malian TV series 
called Les Aventures de Sékou Boiré; it shows, in humorous ways, the difficulties encountered 
in Bamako by a naive and simple-minded farmer who left his village on the track of his wife 
after she fled to the capital.299 Paradoxically, whereas NGO workers and local politicians keep 
telling the population in their speeches that ‘Mali is a country of farmers’ and stressing that 
the development of Mali rest on its farming activities, many inhabitants of Bougouni 
(especially the youth) systematically belittle what comes from the countryside while giving 
value to an urban way of life whose manners are based on the consumption of foreign 
products I explore below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
297 Asking to see what kind of music was on my mobile phone, we exchanged our mobile phones for a couple of minutes. While 
she was manipulating my mobile phone, I was doing the same with hers. Opening a file called by an ordinary title, I discovered 
porn movies in it. 
298 The nobles and freemen (hͻrͻn, see chapter 3) were the farmers of the Mande world. 
299 See Sekou Boire in Youtube. 
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A successful life in Bougouni 
 
Malians fancy western clothing styles and the traditional expensive boubou300 made of waxed 
and rich and shiny damasks called ‘bazin’. Previously popular bogolan301and locally hand-
woven thick cotton fabric have almost disappeared from the streets of Bougouni. A bogolan 
maker from a neighbouring village stated that the yuguyugu302 had killed local cotton cloth 
production, so that youths laughed at a bogolan wearer, labelling him ‘celui qui porte la peau 
de vache’ (the one who wears a cow’s skin). The revival of bogolan from the 1980s in the fine 
art market (see Rovine 2008) remains an elite phenomenon linked to tourism and collection. 
Except for the boubou, a robe historically linked to Islam and to noble families, which was 
brought to West Africa by Arab-Berber traders during pre-colonial times, local ways of clothing 
are mainly interpreted as the backward dress of uncivilised rural Mali. 
 It is in the city centre, next to the market, where stand the biggest clothing stores of 
Bougouni, such as ‘The American Shop’ which displays affordable trends and icons of Western 
world made by Asian hands. In there you can find a wide range of jeans from classic blue ones 
to baggy, skinny, crisp-looking and faded ones. The salesmen may also suggest you look at 
their Italian-style shirts, casual jumpers and Dolce&Gabbana underwear. For icon lovers, the 
shop also offers a range of T-shirt with prints of 50 Cent, Bob Marley, Didier Drogba, Samuel 
Eto’o and Barack Obama. ‘The American Shop’ represents what most clothing shops offer in 
Bougouni: cheap Western-style clothes and trendy brand imitations bought by the younger 
Malians who want to be fashionable. To a certain extent, their clients, like the sapeurs of 
Bacongo (Gandoulou 1984; 1989) and Peter’s group in Mombasa (Behrend 2002), position 
themselves ‘in a global arena informed by the interactions between locally specific practices of 
self-creation and the dynamics of global processes’ (Ibid, 50). The success of boutiques such as 
‘The American Shop’ in Bougouni is due to a growing aspiration among ordinary Malians to be 
engaged in competition for status, prestige and power in which the consumption of trendy 
clothing is important. 
 The once-prized bicycle, bought with money earned on the plantations of Côte d’Ivoire 
during the early postcolonial period,303 has become old-fashioned thanks to the arrival of 
cheap Asian-made motorbikes. When countryside men from neighbouring rural areas come to 
Bougouni by bicycle during the weekly market, it is not rare to see motorbike and car drivers 
                                                          
300 Traditional wide sleeved robe. 
301 Bogo (earthly realm); lan (coming from). 
302 On yuguyugu, see introduction p.4.  
303 On the ‘transformative impact’ of bicycle on material culture in southern Mali during the second half of the colonial period, see 
Peterson (2011, 197-198). 
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jeer at the ‘broussards’ on their bicycles because of their alleged ignorance of Highway Code. 
Since 2000 motorbikes have no longer been exclusive to the tiny minority of wealthy Malians. 
The arrival of Asian-made motorbikes from emerging countries in the Malian market cut the 
price of motorbike by 50-75% (compared to Japanese and French motorbikes) in less than a 
decade. The most commonly found of these new motorbikes in urban areas is the Jakarta, a 
colourful and easy-to-drive motorbike with low fuel consumption and automatic gears, which 
is made in China304 by KTM (see photographs 15 and 16 below).305 These motorbikes are 
imported as spare parts put in wooden crates and are assembled in Mali in order to avoid 
customs duties called ‘dédouanement’. 
 
 
 
 This fancy motorbike, a conveyance so popular among urban youth that their elders 
jokingly call them the ‘Génération Jakarta’, is also looked on with suspicion as the perfect gift 
for an extra-conjugal woman partner in Mali. Ostentatious consumption is well illustrated in 
gender relations by the choice of bride, flirting and love affairs.306 Oumou, the spouse of a 
friend settled in Bamako, was a member of a tontine based on regional affinities. On a regular 
basis its membership gathered in one member’s house for their activities. She explained to me 
that the arrival of each of them was commonly subjected to judgements, mockery and jokes. 
When someone arrived in the back of a big 4x4 driven by an old man, her friends exclaimed ‘tu 
es branchée!’ (You are trendy!). However, if she arrived on the back of a worn motorcycle 
ridden by a young man, her friends tossed up ‘tu sors avec un apprenti duuru-duuruni!’ (You 
date with a poor apprentice!).307 In similar vein, youth in Bougouni said that a young man 
                                                          
304 For locals, ‘Chinese have enabled Malians to possess their own motorbike’. 
305 The denomination ‘Jakarta’ comes from the fact that this motorbike was previously imported from Indonesia. 
306 Such ostentatious practices also permeate life stage events and Muslim celebrations. 
307 On duuru-duuruni, see chapter 4.  
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cannot date a woman on foot. He needs at least a Jakarta for practical reasons as well as for 
reasons of prestige. 
 In less than a decade, the mobile phone has also evolved from a luxury product to a 
basic item among Africans. In early 2000 only new and second hand ‘Europe aurevoir’ mobile 
phones were found in Mali. Sim cards and mobile credits were accessible only for rich Malians 
living in a couple of big towns connected to the mobile network. The market was monopolised 
by Malitel, the state company. At that time only ‘big men’ (patrons, mͻgͻbaw) possessed a 
mobile phone. However in only a couple of years this situation changed drastically. The market 
in communication was liberalised in late 2000. Two years later, Ikatel (affiliated with France 
Telecom and renamed Orange Mali in 2006) expanded quickly in Mali helped by ambitious 
marketing strategies that have completely transformed the market in mobile phones there.308 
In a few years, the price of sim card and credits for Orange Mali became affordable to ordinary 
Malians, and the mobile network reached most rural towns and big villages (such as Sido and 
Garalo with regard to southwest Mali).309 Such fast and far-reaching changes were also 
facilitated by the arrival in Mali of cheap Asian-made mobiles. The formerly upper-class market 
for mobile communication turned in less than a decade into one of the most dynamic and 
productive emerging popular markets in Africa (see Hahn and Kibora 2008; Archambault 2010; 
2011). Orange Mali was initially praised for its affordability, but later criticised for its too 
aggressive marketing by Malians themselves. The invention of the ‘pastèque orange’ (zɛrɛ, 
watermelon), a top up credits of 100 francs available in the market since 2008, burdened the 
already limited budget of most Malian households. In July 2008 an article published in Le 
Relais, a local newspaper of Bougouni, illustrated criticism of the excessive affordability of 
mobile phones for the majority of the inhabitants of Mali. 
 
 ‘ (…) More than 70% of Malians live on no more than 1,000 fcfa per day, then imagine what will 
come next in Mali; there are two kinds of watermelon: the sweet one found in the soil and the too salty 
one of Orange Mali which gives high blood pressure to Malians because it burdens the income and the 
food budget (…)’ (Coulibaly 2008). 
 
This watermelon revolution caused the bankruptcy of the market for traditional telephone box 
in Mali and the spread of mobile phone to all Malians. Furthermore most Malians do not want 
a simple mobile such as the Nokia 1110. They instead dream of having a double chip mobile 
phone boosted with memory card and fancy facade and offering Bluetooth, music, video, 
                                                          
308 Due to its un-competitiveness, the Malitel state company was sold in 2010 to a Moroccan mobile company. 
309 In a decade, the price of a sim card tumbled from more than 200,000 fcfa to less than 500 fcfa. 
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photographic and TV services. Usually a mobile phone does not spend long in the hands of any 
one owner. It is an item subject to routine upgrade, display, exchange and bargain. The mobile 
phone is the prestige item for the younger generation which particularly symbolises 
dynamism. It is the technological, clothing-like, item of ostentation par excellence for those 
who want to ‘go urban’, to ‘be civilised’ in contemporary Mali. It is also an instrument of 
unseen self-fashioning identities and ambivalent experiences and pleasures triggered through 
intimate communications and the storage of secret files where Drogba, Obama, Islamic sura 
and pornographic pictures are juxtaposed. It is an important proof of success in life among 
other goods; as Malians say: ‘Chaque mois un nouveau portable; Ça marche bien pour toi!’ 
(Each month a new mobile phone; things are going well for you!). 
 Ten years ago, people had to buy their seat in front of the couple of TV sets found in 
Bougouni. Due to the arrival of made-in-Asia, hence affordable, TV and DVD players, nowadays 
this line of business is finished: the colour TV has become an appliance found in many urban 
familial compounds. My friend Boubacar, seller of yuguyugu in market of Bougouni, rented a 
room in a crumbling mud house in Dougounina district of Bougouni where he lived with his 
wife and his two young boys. His room had no furniture except for a couple of mats and 
cookware. He was a small trader who struggled to make ends meet; his wife and himself, 
however, possessed a mobile phone each and a small TV with a car battery that they attached 
to it when they hosted relatives and friends. In addition, the spread of affordable TV and DVD 
players has put an end to the audience for cinema in Mali.310 Next to the Conseil de Cercle of 
Bougouni to the rear of the level area behind the Siraba Togola Auditorium, stand two empty 
and time-worn buildings. These two previously successful cinemas saw their golden age fading 
away with the arrival of affordable TV and DVD players in early 2000.  
 Housing in Mali is also evolving considerably and, again, Asian building equipment is 
supporting these changes. Cement houses, ‘maisons à étages’ (houses with multiple storeys), 
roofs of sheet metal, modern showers and western toilets have increasingly appeared among 
the traditional furniture, mud houses and mud fences. These modern fixtures are shaping the 
urban dream of Mali. The former President, Amadou Toumani Touré (called ATT), even 
promoted the cement villa as the habitat for ordinary urban families of modern Mali through 
the ambitious national social housing project called ATT-bougou (ATT town/village). The 
Former Malian Presidents Moussa Traoré and Alpha Oumar Konaré had already initiated 
projects of social housing in Bamako; however, none of these previous projects enjoyed the 
success of ATT-bougou. This social project was initiated in Bamako in 2003-2004. It aimed at 
                                                          
310 The only cinema still in operation in 2010 was the Babemba Cinema in Bamako. 
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rendering accessible decent cement villas to urban employees with a limited regular budget, 
such as represented by school teachers, policemen and administrative secretaries. 50% of the 
villa is directly paid for by the Malian state, and the other 50% is paid on a monthly basis by 
the owner of the house. As it was a big success in Bamako, Amadou Toumani Touré extended 
it to all regional towns of Mali. In 2010, more than 3,500 villas had been built thanks to this 
project. However, the social spirit of the ATT-bougou projects started to be criticised in Mali. 
After a promising start in Bamako, the project turned aside from its social aim; many houses 
were allocated to rich families instead. Furthermore, not every house is in cement. Some of 
them are in semi-concrete, and others in mud reinforced with cement rendering. Radio 
Trottoir explained that the economic difficulties of the BHM311 Bank (the financing body of the 
project) were due to the greediness of its administrators. The project attracted what Malians 
call ‘le mangement’, or what Bayart names the politics of the belly (1989). 
 As recurrently highlighted in this section, the urban way of life pursued by Bougouni’s 
inhabitants is largely based on the consumption of foreign products of Asian manufacture. 
Thanks to their being affordable and available, made-in-Asian goods have become ubiquitous 
in urban households and have made what were formerly prestige goods available for purposes 
of self-fashioning by ordinary Malians. Western-style clothes, electronic items and vehicles and 
housing (among other products) are the contemporary signs of ‘material prestige’ (Daloz 1990) 
and ostentatious lifestyle, or what Goodwin calls ‘today’s society of the spectacle’ (see 
Tamagni 2009, introduction) in urban settings of Mali.312 However, these cheap made-in-Asian 
goods Malians call ‘produits chinois’ (Chineses products) are of poor quality. 
 
 
 
Chinese products are cheap junk! 
 
One late afternoon in November 2009 I accompanied my friend Yaya, a local civil servant, for a 
stroll around the ‘big market’ (suguba) of Bougouni. As we were walking along the tarred road, 
a young woman hailed us. Yaya recognised her as his friend Aïcha and waved back to her. We 
stopped by her spot, and chatted for a while. Aïcha, a friend of Yaya’s family, grew up in the 
small border town of Yanfolila which is located 91 kilometres west of Bougouni.  Five years 
ago, she moved to Bougouni to stay with her uncle so as to attend a secretarial school. 
                                                          
311 Banque de l’Habitat du Mali. 
312 Like the Chinese goods found in Dakar and Praia, in Bougouni ‘the very competitive prices of these products (…) allow popular 
clientele to put on a performance’ (Bredeloup and Bertoncello 2006, 208). 
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Afterwards, as she did not find paid employment, she started running a small ‘pharmacie par-
terre’ (street vendor of medicines) in the centre of Bougouni. When we met her she was 
seated on a small wooden stool and was looking after a pile of boxes, tablets, and pills 
displayed on a mat in front of her. While Aïcha and Yaya were taking news from their 
respective relatives, two young men came and asked for four ‘comprimés’ (tablets of 
paracetamol). Aïcha replied ‘Which ones? You want French or Chinese tablets?’ They 
responded ‘how much?’ She informed them that one French tablet cost 25 francs, and two 
Chinese tablets cost 25 francs as well. They finally opted for the Chinese tablets, bought them, 
and continued their way. Aïcha then began to grumble about these French tablets. Although 
they were not expensive compared to others western tablets, she would not take them again 
because of the difficulty of selling them. ‘Although their qualities are not the same, people 
prefer the Chinese ones because they are cheaper!’ she argued. 
 Nowadays, most ordinary Malians take the risk of buying Chinese products because 
this allows them to make further purchases. During the first months of my stay in Bougouni, 
the lock on my next-door neighbour’s door broke. A locksmith came and replaced it with a new 
Chinese lock. However, this one broke after only two weeks! He told me he preferred to buy a 
Chinese lock for 1,250 francs which can break at any moment than to buy a French one for 
7,500 – 10,000 francs, which might last for years, because he wants what little money he has 
to buy other things as well: mobile phone credits, a new T-shirt, and small batteries for his 
flashlight. The locksmith came back and managed to fix the Chinese lock without changing it. 
After having listened to one of our conversations about the lock issue and Chinese goods in 
general, an old woman jokingly told us: 
 
  ‘Chinese are very clever. They adapt themselves to your money. Tell them how much you 
possess and then they fabricate you a product corresponding to your budget. For instance, if you have 
2,000 francs for a lock they will give you one worth 2,000 francs. If you have only 200 francs, they will 
manage to manufacture one worth 200 francs [laugh]’ (Fanta, 52 years old, housewife). 
 
For most Malians the price of a product matters more than its quality (although many admit 
that this strategy might not be the best in the long term). In a local context characterised by 
mass poverty and livelihood instability (see Gunther 2006),313 people are concerned to succeed 
today rather than tomorrow because of the high level of uncertainty about the future. 
Following this way of thinking, Youssoufou, a former local trader of French products who now 
                                                          
313 With regard to broader African contexts, the general disorder and instability of African states (see Chabal and Daloz 1999), and 
the volatility of African economies (see Makhulu, Buggenhagen, and Jackson 2010), are also factors weighing down the human 
perceptions of the life trajectory in Mali. 
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sells only Asian-made products, told me that ‘Chinese products are successful because the one 
who is running after the quotidian is compelled to buy the cheapest products.’ 
 The poor want to gain access to the ‘society of consumption’ so as to take part in 
‘globalisation’ today, not tomorrow (Bredeloup and Bertoncello 2006, 208).314 Asian 
companies have well understood this African niche, so their cheaply manufactured items cover 
most contemporary material demands, such as beauty products, housing equipment, clothes, 
medicines, daily life electronic products (TV, DVD, mobile phone), hardware, bicycle, 
motorbike and spare parts for light engineering. Today a Malian household can be equipped 
entirely with Asian-made goods which offer an affordable alternative to all sectors of the 
economy from everyday household goods to machine-tools, tractors and cars. Most of these 
cheap products originate from China, a country sometimes labelled as ‘the factory of the 
world’ (Sanogo 2008). It is not a surprise that they have been termed ‘produits chinois’ 
(Chinese products) by Malians themselves. These Chinese products are slickly marketed in 
ways that are ‘smart’ and flexible in following world events. Clothes, cups, stickers, and mobile 
phone covers of Barack Obama were readily found in Bougouni market way before his 
election. Street peddlers were selling belts with symbols of Manchester United and Barcelona 
football clubs in the weekly big market of Bougouni just two days before the 2009 European 
Champion League final between these two clubs. 
 ‘France aurevoir’, or ‘Europe aurevoir’, items are still predominantly used for cars, 
trucks, computers and heavy engineering products, but the question is for how long? New 
Asian cars have recently been introduced and used as taxis in Bamako as alternatives to the old 
and thirsty Peugeot 504 and Mercedes-Benz 190D.315 Lavish Asian products are also entering 
Mali, rendering luxury items more affordable for wealthy Malians. For instance, Chinese 
entrepreneurs are using a famous Malian singer’s name to brand their ‘4x4 Oumsang’ (see 
Oumou Sangaré) sold on the Malian market.316 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photographs 17 and 18: shops selling Chinese products in Bougouni) 
                                                          
314 A Malian informant of Bourdarias said ‘thanks to Chinese, the poor can buy motorbikes, clothes and shoes of white people!’ 
(2010, footnote 14, 5). 
315 See http://www.anpe-mali.org/news/operation-1000-taxis-urbain-kenedougou-recoit-ses-taxis-flambants-neufs (retrieved the 
7 April 2011). 
316 See http://www.afrik.com/article10299.html (retrieved the 7 April 2011). 
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 During the rule of Moussa Traoré most traders were selling expensive western-
manufactured products. At that time to be a trader meant to be rich, since only a minority of 
people could save enough money to start a business. Today being a trader does not necessarily 
signify being rich. Start-up costs for trading are much lower than during the epoch of Moussa 
Traoré; sale of cheap Chinese products (e.g. street peddlers of junk and sellers of Western-
style clothes) boosted the uptake of small trade as a complement or alternative to farming for 
many Malians moving to urban areas. 
 In the midst of this growing presence of affordable Chinese products the so-called 
‘France au revoir’ expensive products have not disappeared in Mali; they remain the most 
desirable, hence prestigious items. Although Chinese products have made what were formerly 
prestige goods available for purposes of self-fashioning by ordinary Malians, their short-lived 
usage remind Malians that they are, as Salif the tailor said, ‘bad imitations’ of western 
products; ‘they are of poor quality’ (‘qualité tɛ u la’). Discussing material desire in Mali, Salif 
compared the search for superior food with the search for western branded products: ‘If you 
do not find rice, you eat to. If you do not find to, you eat seri. If you do not find seri, you drink 
water.’ Whereas rice in Mali is considered as an expensive cereal associated with urban life 
and feast days, to (semolina made of corn or millet) and seri (mush made of millet) are 
traditional dishes of rural Mali. In similar ways, he told me that Malians look for western-
quality mobile phones (for instance); if this is not possible, they make do with Chinese mobile 
phones, while others simply cannot afford any mobile phones. Chinese products have not 
replaced ‘France au revoir’ products; they have added an intermediary level in the hierarchy of 
goods in Mali. 
 In the early postcolonial period Malians were divided between a tiny elite, who 
possessed western products, and the overwhelming majority of people who barely had access 
to second-hand western products. In post-1991 Mali, people have remained materially 
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divided, however, into three categories: those who enjoy western-branded products, those 
who are limited to the so-called ‘Chinese products’, and those who cannot buy any products 
because of lack of means. Recent transformations in the local hierarchy of goods mean that 
urban consumers of Chinese products in Bougouni do not participate fully in a modern 
consumer lifestyle. As explained below, they only ‘sniff around’ globalisation. Alou, a local 
teacher who recently bought a Chinese mobile phone, commented: 
 
 ‘We like French or European products, but they are too expensive. If someone offers you a 
Chinese mobile phone for a very low price, what can you do?’  
 
Then he jokingly added: 
 
 ‘Chinese are more capitalist than Europeans because their products are à usage unique (single-
use); they do not last at all! You’ll need to buy a new one soon (…) Chinese are eating our money!’ 
 
For Alou, the consumption of Chinese products drags ordinary Malians into a sort of vicious 
circle which impoverishes them. Such cheap products give people access to trendy products, 
services and technologies, but for a short period of time only. Indeed, Malians often complain 
about their poor quality by saying ‘c’est de la pacotille’ (it is cheap junk) because the purchase 
of Chinese products gives them only short-term access to consumer lifestyles. Soon they will 
need to replace Chinese products with new ones so as to re-establish their lifestyles. 
Therefore, momentary access to a material globalisation does not turn urban Malians into 
modern consumers. Through a discontinuously segmented consumption of low-quality 
products, ordinary Malians just keep running after what they see as an up-to-date lifestyle. 
Only the elite who enjoy western products are fully part of an enduring material globalisation. 
Furthermore, ordinary Malians who buy costly Chinese products, such as motorbikes and 
bicycles, have to cope regularly with the problem of their maintenance. It is not rare to see 
such vehicles stationary for months within a courtyard after they break down. In turn, many 
Chinese vehicle repair shops have opened in Bougouni, and it is common to see people 
borrowing some else’s vehicle for a date, wedding, or any other public events. 
 Cheap Chinese products have impacted on Malian society in at least three major ways: 
(1) providing partial access to a culture of consumption to millions of ordinary Malians, (2) 
widening access to formerly prestigious goods, now made available for purposes of self-
fashioning and distinction by ordinary Malians and (3) strengthening social inequalities based 
on ostentatious consumption, prestigious materials, and life-style by introducing an 
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intermediate level in the local hierarchy of goods. ‘Things’ of the East have provided 
opportunities for consumption for ordinary Malians and supported consumption as signs of 
success in life. Although they have not replaced western products at the top of the local 
hierarchy of goods, success in life does tend to be manifested in a wider range of material 
prestige and ostentatious lifestyle in contemporary urban Mali. 
 Finally, we need to look at money, access to it and distribution of it, because without 
money one cannot participate in the urban way of life in Mali. 
  
 
 
When money matters in Bougouni 
 
 
 
The bogolan illustrated above (photograph 19), manufactured by an artist from a village near 
Bougouni, represents a flag with designs of a symbolic and stylised sawfish of CFA francs within 
the African continent. These two elements were enveloped by the following expression 
‘l’argent la clef du monde’ (money the key to the world). Access to ‘money’ (wari) is seen as 
one of the main keys to making a successful life in Mali.317 Since the neoliberal turn of the 
1990s, longstanding African economic austerity has been coupled in Mali with a general 
polarisation of success in life in terms of wealth and consumption. These changes have 
accentuated the ‘over-monetarization’ of everyday forms of sociability (see De Sardan 1996; 
1999) in Mali, such as illustrated by the increasing centrality of cash in bridewealth transfers in 
a context of capitalist expansion (see Grosz-Nagté 1988; Wooten 2005, 25-26). ‘Wariko’ 
(money troubles) keeps one’s mind busy because money is scarce, volatile but very powerful; 
as ever, it can resolve the main earthly challenges (work, family and material success) and 
                                                          
317 In West Africa ‘money is probably the single most important “thing/good” in ordinary people’s ordinary lives’ (Guyer 1995, 5). 
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allow people to move forward in life. Although money has become a mundane necessity, its 
power is shrouded in ‘mystery’ (see Guyer 1995, 26). Indeed, Malians often say money is 
elusive because ‘it comes as it goes’ (ale bɛ taa ka na) and its source remains mostly hidden 
and associated with secrecy. 
 
 ‘In life you have to be rich and to be a believer. At least you need to get one. If you are neither 
rich nor a believer, you will die soon. If you do not have a nice car and a cement house with floors, how 
you gonna do? You have to be a believer.’ (Sekou, 38 years old, sucreries and cigarettes seller in 
Bougouni). 
 
Although wealth is understood as an index of blessing and piety, Sekou hints at the notion that 
money mostly stems from multiple origins whether Islamic or not. Whereas in the Western 
world people’s financial power is represented by their wage, in Mali the wage does not have 
the same significance. Fousséini, a local state administrator, used to say that ‘my wage 
accounts for less than 50% of my monthly income’. He continued by stating that without ‘les 
affaires‘ he would not be able to run his ‘family’, which includes his parents, siblings, wife and 
children. As is the case in most local families, he is among the rare family members who 
benefit from paid employment; therefore he must support his relatives who are jobless. I 
never knew concretely what he meant by ‘les affaires’ because people do not reveal their total 
income and its sources in Mali. The authority of a head of family and his degree of freedom in 
terms of personal expenses are substantially based on the fact that his financial power is kept 
secret. For him ‘someone who shows his limits [whether financially or not] reveals his 
weaknesses’. Nonetheless ‘les affaires’ in Mali commonly refers to economic takings people 
collect through gift-giving, arrangements, privileges and ‘mangement’ linked to their work and 
previous investments in social ties.318 The same logic of multiple sources applies to local 
traders in an obvious manner: because their income is not related to a wage labour, their sales 
fluctuate constantly. 
 Except for themselves, people do not know exactly who earns what in Mali. Such 
vagueness and secrecy about money starts within the family between spouses, parents and 
generations. A person’s financial means are always subject to speculation, which gives rise to 
rumour and gossip within families and in the neighbourhood. This tendency is accentuated as 
                                                          
318 Emmanuel Ndione shows how the meaning of money among Senegalese living in Grand Yoff district (Dakar) differed from that 
of European members of an NGO dealing with micro-credits (1992). The Europeans did not understand why only an average of 
60% of micro-credits is invested in business. In fact, 40% of micro-credits are given as gift to relatives and friends in difficulty. The 
uncertainty of tomorrow is resolved by circulation of money and goods among members of social networks. The one, who is rich 
today, will probably be poor tomorrow and vice-versa. The gift is not reducible to money and goods. It can be a service, favour, 
privilege, contact, pull etc. Moreover, the African saying ‘the friend’s friend is my friend’ extends potential recipients of services. 
Finally, ‘the system becomes a “generalised exchange” of services, small and big, which takes officially the shape of illegal favour’ 
(De Sardan 1996, 105). In absence of networks (that is to say with a deficit of capital of social ties), the favour becomes a bribe. 
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the distribution of money becomes increasingly unequal. When someone becomes rich 
quickly, such as in the case of the notorious Malian business man Babani Sissoko,319 people 
speak about ‘l’argent du diable’ (the devil’s money). Indeed, religious discourses and texts in 
Africa ‘reflect  the preoccupations of Africans concerning the way in which power is exercised 
in their societies’ (Ellis and Haar ter 1998, 176). Given the increasing economic inequality 
developing in Sub-Saharan societies, local populations tend to raise questions about how paths 
to success are produced through the exercise of occult power. In Bougouni, locals explain 
current social inequalities through sentiments of jealousy, egoism and greed, a situation which 
often connotes the presence of the occult in town.320   
 
 
 
Jealousy, egoism and greed 
 
People’s failures and successes are common themes of everyday conversations in grin, familial 
compounds, markets, and in coach stations and during social events. Three words occur often 
in comments about someone’s path in life: ‘jealousy’ (kɛlɛya), ‘egoism’ (ɲɛgoya) and ‘greed’ 
(nata). 
 During 2009, the construction of a new CSCOM (Centre de Santé Communautaire) in 
Heremakono Nord was delayed due to discord between autochthonous families and the 
communal administration. This logjam animated discussions in grins late into the night. The 
new CSCOM had been financed by an American who had married a local woman a couple of 
years earlier. Unfortunately his wife passed away, and her husband decided to finance a new 
CSCOM in her hometown. After negotiation, the Commune Urbaine de Bougouni allocated land 
for this piece of social infrastructure. However, the traditional chieftainship of Bougouni 
impeded the building. As owner of the land, the traditional chieftainship claimed their share of 
money in this land tenure process. Whether or not the Commune attempted to bypass 
traditional custom and the rights of chieftainship is not important to my analysis. What 
matters in this case is that many inhabitants of Bougouni believed the egoism (ɲɛgoya) of 
                                                          
319 On accusations of ‘voodoo economics’ towards Babani Sissoko in the United States, see articles in the Los Angeles Times at 
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/17/news/mn-13939/2 (retrieved the 28 May 2012). 
320 Through his study of the ‘gift economy’ within new form of Pentecostalism emerging in the 1970s among the young and urban 
middle class in Ghana, Van Dijk (1999) demonstrates how display of social success and upward mobility goes hand in hand with 
the religious fervour of ‘a Man of God’. Moreover, the prestige of a church in Ghana relies also on competitive displays of 
donations and generosity in order to attract public attention. Such findings present many parallels with the wealthy saints and 
religious Muslim leaders of Mali. Van Dijk pointed out, however, during the public gift-giving of a brand new BMW-600 series to ‘a 
Man of God’, members of the congregation were invited to extract all bitterness within their heart and mind that might be 
provoked by so extravagant gift (Ibid, 84-86). Such prestigious gifts are desirable but their redistribution is unequal; therefore they 
heighten jealousy, envy and bitterness among members of the same church. 
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autochthonous families lay behind this blockage. They were disappointed that the traditional 
chiefly family jeopardised the development of Bougouni in order to pursue their own greed 
(nata). This story fuelled debate on selfishness for some time in the town. Other illustrations of 
egoism circulate daily in Bougouni. The success of someone, whether based on moral or 
immoral acts, almost always stirs up criticism, whispers and gossip. 
 This section emphasises how wealthy Muslims manage the jealousy of those not as 
successful as themselves. The following section will balance this perspective ‘from above’ by 
showing how the poor understand and deal with their unsuccessful situation. 
 An impressive house stands next to the tarred road and not so far from the town 
council of Bougouni. In 2010 this three-storey residence was the only building in the whole of 
Bougouni that was round and cement-built with red tiles roof. The villa consisted of two 
towers connected by a bridge, and was among the most lavish houses of Bougouni. Every local 
knows its landlord, the famous politician Mamadou Bakary Sangaré, nicknamed Blaise, founder 
of the powerful regional political party of Convention Démocrate Social (CDS Mogotiguiya)321 
and unsuccessful candidate for the Malian presidency in 2007. Although he was never 
appointed a Minister, he is more respected than former local Ministers due to his generosity, 
gifts and buildings in the Cercle de Bougouni such as his mansion in Bougouni and the first 
public generator at Garalo, a little rural town in his native area. Notwithstanding strong 
suspicions of embezzlement when formerly National Director of Caisse des Retraites du Mali 
(1991-1996) made by local intellectuals of modest status (e.g. teachers, ‘jeunes diplômés’ and 
students), Blaise owes his position among local politicians to the way he has responded to the 
demands of social life following the logics of gift giving, solidarity networks and redistributive 
accumulation.322 Other local former Ministers do not enjoy his fame and fortune. For instance, 
Yoro Diakité, former Minister of Mines and Energy of Mali (1997-2000) and founder of Bloc des 
Alternatives pour le Renouveau Africain (political party BARA), was known in Bougouni for 
being allegedly incorruptible. Nevertheless, he neither built impressive houses nor collective 
buildings in his home town. In 2010 he still lived in Bougouni with his family in a simple urban 
dwelling situation. According to a local ‘jeune diplômé’, over the years the name of Yoro 
Diakité has tended to be associated with ‘the selfish one who did not achieve anything’ and 
therefore his reputation is fading in present day Bougouni. How money is used matters more 
to people in Mali than where it comes from. It is very difficult for a politician to achieve fame 
                                                          
321 CDS Mogotiguiya is a regional political party created in 1996. This party is not influential outside the Région de Sikasso, but it is 
an unavoidable public force of south Mali and especially in southwest Mali and in the Cercle de Bougouni. Between 1997 and 
2002, CDS even won all four seats for deputies allocated to the Cercle de Bougouni. The current Mayor of Bougouni is a member of 
the CDS. 
322 On logics of gift giving, solidarity networks and redistributive accumulation, see De Sardan (1996; 1999). 
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and fortune without making investments in his native region.323 What happens in Bamako does 
not have that much impact on someone’s reputation in his native region. Locals in the 
countryside see Bamako and its high political offices as business opportunities. Someone who 
fails to share the benefits of his privileged positions with his kin, friends and native community 
is commonly labelled a ‘damned child’ (danga den) in Mali.  
 The sense of ‘togetherness’ (hadamadenya) and ‘solidarity’ (ɲͻgͻndɛmɛ) is important 
to understanding the texture of local lives in Malian society.324 Within a context of mass 
poverty and increasing economic inequality, ‘le social’325 (a continuous flux of requests coming 
from the local community) tends to heighten. The rich person who turns a deaf ear to requests 
is criticised for being selfish and behaving in an un-Islamic manner. Despite suspicion of 
embezzlement, can we say that people look at Blaise as a pious Muslim? The response would 
not be straightforward, but Blaise is certainly not considered as a damned child. Overall 
Mamadou Bakary Sangaré, by his wealth and his achievements, gift-giving and solidarity 
network, is someone considered by most locals as a well-rounded Muslim who has reached 
fame and fortune in southwest Mali. Blaise has well understood that, in order to divert popular 
discontent from oneself, a rich person needs to attract communal approval for generosity. In 
turn, such an attitude turns a rich man into a genuine ‘mͻgͻba’ (patron, literally ‘big man’), the 
one who holds power and is respected because he acts in solidarity with his community. 
 Other wealthy Muslims, who hold privileged position that are not as public as 
politicians, can also deploy strategies of economic concealment (modest lifestyle and hidden 
investments) in order to underplay their wealth so as to contain jealousy in their 
neighbourhood and to avoid becoming being labelled a selfish person and damned child. For 
instance, Karim always wears simple, faded and plain working clothes. Although he does not 
appear to be a wealthy man, he is in fact a rich trader who occupies various economic niches in 
south, west and central Mali. He lives in Bougouni with his wife and children in simple urban 
accommodation. He rents a decent villa nevertheless not equipped with fridge, air-conditioner, 
parabolic antenna, modern shower and toilets and other features of most up-to-date houses. 
Moreover his compound stands in a quiet area which is located some distance from shops, 
markets, streetlights and tarred roads. However, he possesses several cars in other regions of 
Mali and constructs expensive cement houses in Bamako for rental and for his coming 
                                                          
323 Nyamnjoh writes that ‘individuals who refuse to work towards enhancing their community are those most likely to be denied 
the public space to articulate their personal desires’ (2002, 31). Indeed, the politician Yoro Diakité never held other political offices 
after his tenure as Minister of Mines and Energy of Mali. His political party has never been successful in local elections. 
324 The French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy states individuals exist because of ‘co-existence’. Following his way of thinking in Mali 
there is no being without ‘being-with’ in how individuals perceive their position in their community (2000). 
325 On le social, see chapter 4. 
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retirement. He told me simply he does not want to attract people’s eyes upon him and his 
family.  
 The hope of changes brought by the democratic and liberal reforms of 1991 is running 
out of steam. In 2010, Mali was characterised by an increasingly unequal distribution and 
access to wealth which, in turn, has fostered jealousy (kɛlɛya) and made egoism (ɲɛgoya) a 
source of public concern to the inhabitants of Bougouni. Whereas successful people need to 
contain the jealousy of their neighbours, the poor need to control occult threats of ‘bad 
persons’ who do not want them to move forward in life.326 The next section explores how 
ordinary Malians elucidate social inequalities and its opacity by the occult.  
 
 
 
Bad persons, sorcery and witchcraft 
 
Before departing early in the morning from a village near Bougouni, I wanted to greet a friend 
who is the Secretary General of a Commune Rurale in Mali. Arriving at his home, I found 
nobody there and decided then to leave, as a gift, a hat and a shirt on the threshold of his 
room. Directly after, I left and took a coach to Bougouni. Late in the afternoon I called him 
because I wished to verify he had noticed what I had left for him. In response he started 
laughing and thanked me for the relief of my call. Indeed he went back home around twelve 
o’clock and saw the hat and the shirt lying in front of his door. However he had no clue what it 
was about. Instead of thinking of a gift, he immediately suspected he was the victim of sorcery. 
He did not touch the clothes, but rather went directly to consult someone knowledgeable in 
such affairs in order to counteract this potentially malicious act towards his person. 
 In Mali people fear becoming the target of a malignant force lurking in the shadows 
that they name ‘mͻgͻ juguman’ or ‘les mauvaises personnes’ (bad persons). As explained by 
Mc Naughton, the semantic field of ‘juguya’ does not necessarily connote a reality in which evil 
and good stand in clear-cut opposition (1995). Following a general remark about the 
anthropology of evil made by David Parkin, I start by arguing that in this analysis ‘evil refers to 
various ideas of imperfection and excess seen as destructive; but that these are contestable 
concepts which, when personified, allow mankind to engage them in dialogue and reflect on 
the boundaries of humanity’(1985, 23). Discourses about bad persons in Bougouni suggest that 
                                                          
326 The nature of tomorrow, Muslims believe, is also determined by invisible forces that need to be solicited through experts in 
occult sciences (see Toure and Konate 1990). 
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people’s suffering and existential predicaments are also related to an ambivalent power - the 
occult - which needs to be controlled through somaya, the Bamanan sorcery.327 
 A soma is a Bamanan sorcerer. Sorcery is stigmatised by Islam as un-Islamic and evil 
knowledge, therefore the sorcerer keeps a discreet identity within the local community. 
Although a soma practises sorcery sheltered from public view, people know who he is by word 
of mouth. In fact, people differentiate between the ‘sorcier’ (sorcerer) as healer and spell 
caster (soma) and the ‘sorcier’ as witch (subaga).328 Whereas the latter is feared, the former is 
tolerated. However, because any sorcerer is allegedly not Muslim, people believe the soma is 
able to harm people through his evil knowledge. Indeed, someone can pay the soma to do 
‘baara juguman’ (bewitchment, literally ‘evil work’) to someone else by means of different 
sorts of ‘dabali’ (spell). In Bougouni people especially fear ‘korotɛ’, a deadly evil work which is 
thrown at people in order to kill them; often people relate korotɛ to sudden death in town.329 
The soma is also known to prepare ‘pudiri’330 (powder) people mix with victims’ meals so as to 
charm them. When someone is suspected to be the victim of such occult threats people say 
‘elle/il a été beaucoup travaillé’.331  
Whereas the soma is a morally ambiguous figure, the very evil character of sorcery is 
expressed in the term subaga. This word is translated as ‘evil sorcerer’ (see Bailleul 1996); I 
translate it by the English word witch. Witchcraft in Bamanankan is therefore subagaya (or 
subaaya). Its etymology is composed of two meaningful words: su (night) and baga (poison). 
Subaga is the poison that devours people from within during the night, which is the time par 
excellence of darkness, fear and betrayal (see chapter 7). The witch is feared, but he/she is not 
uncovered; at most he/she is suspected. Indeed, the witch is usually depicted as a human 
(whether male or female) who is able to change into various evil creatures during the night 
and attack his/her victims from within; nocturnal animals, such as the owl, are among the 
many shapes a witch can take during the night.  
 In Bougouni, the reality covered by bad persons is complex. It can either be malicious 
people who ask the soma to harm someone through baara juguman, or people who are 
                                                          
327 Locals can go to the marabout for similar reasons as well. The marabout (or Karamͻgͻ) is able to employ occult forces, 
however, by invoking God. Whereas a soma is an expert in ‘Bamanan baara’ or ‘somaya’ (Bamanan sorcery), a marabout is an 
expert in Islamic esoteric sciences. Given that a marabout works within the moral universe of Islam, people commonly said that a 
true marabout refuses to harm people; the one who does so is a sorcerer disguised as a marabout. Nevertheless both experts deal 
with occult and destructive forces. On a comparison between somaya and karamͻgͻya, see Schulz (2005, 97-101). 
328 In her analysis of the occult in Mali, Schulz differentiates soma from sorcerer in the same way I differentiate sorcerer as soma 
from sorcerer as witch. I decided to do so in order to respect the fact that my informants used the French word ‘sorcier’ for both 
categories while differentiating them in Bamanankan. Despite our different categorization of the occult in Mali, we both stress the 
moral ambiguity of the soma and the clandestine immorality of the subaga. 
329 On a rare trial against korotɛ accusation attempted during the colonial period, see Meker (1980, 144-145). Such trials never 
happened during the postcolonial period. 
330 Fr. Poudre. 
331 This French expression is the literal translation of its Bamanan idiom in which the verb ‘ka baara’ (travailler, to work) means ‘to 
bewitch’. 
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witches themselves who try to devour someone from within. In both cases, bad persons may 
be suspected but never discovered. Their confusing and shifting identities reinforce the 
atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust pertaining to occult schemes in general and stress the 
abhorrent but clever nature of the evil agent (see Parkin 1985, 1). However, inhabitants of 
Bougouni always link bad persons to egoistic and jealous people who do not want others to 
progress in life. 
 It happens that the poor, who feel overwhelmed by suffering and existential 
predicaments, understands their inability to advance in life to result from bewitchment. In grin 
it is not rare to listen to people who express their disappointments by saying ‘ko ka ca!’ This 
idiom is translated as ‘difficulties are numerous’, or ‘affairs are many and manifold’ (Jansen 
2009, 113). Ko is a dense and polysemous word which can signify ‘affair’, ‘problem’, ‘difficulty’, 
‘need’, ‘envy’, ‘custom,’ ‘action’ and ‘behaviour’ (see Bailleul 1996). However, foremost ko 
means a serious affair and expresses the complexity of everyday life. Ko may be added to 
another word if the speaker wants to specify the issue. For instance, one might say 
musoko/cɛko (problem of woman/man), duminiko (food concern), baarako (work concern), 
wariko (problem of money), (...). ‘Ka ca’ means ‘there are many’. Usually people accentuate 
the ‘ca’ (many). Hence ‘ko ka ca’ conveys the overwhelming roughness of daily life realities, 
expectations and challenges. People refer also to ‘diɲɛnnatigɛ ka gɛlɛn’ which can be 
translated as ‘earthly path is demanding’. Most Malians struggle to make a living or to give a 
new direction to their life. The difficulties of everyday struggle can lead people to feel blocked 
in a world of bad persons. The impression of going nowhere fast, despite their efforts to do so, 
leads them to think that an evil force, originating in the jealousy and egoism of bad persons, 
obstructs their moving forward in life. 
 Many Malians complain about the egoism of others, such as Madou the builder who is 
concerned about the low wage he receives from his patron. He does not eat lunch because his 
daily wage is just enough to cover familial expenses back home. His boss driving a 4x4 Toyota 
and living in cement villa with parabolic antenna is just a selfish man who does not care about 
the living conditions of his employees. Salif spent a couple of years as a tailor in the sewing 
workshop of Yaya, but he did not manage to save money for trading or for his wedding. For 
him, ‘Yaya is not good. He does not like it when people move forward in their life’. Over the 
years Salif became dissatisfied with his job in Yaya’s workshop. He had been doing only basic 
jobs there, with little earning potential, because Yaya did not want to teach him the profitable 
embroidery work; hence, he could not conceive of a prosperous future in Yaya’s workshop. So, 
he quit his job because, as he argues, it was not lucrative due to the egoism of Yaya. Other 
accusations of egoism are more hidden, complex, and insidious such as explained below. 
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Alou, a student in the Institut de Formation des Maîtres (IFM), is in Bougouni ‘malgré lui’ 
(despite himself). He grew up near the town of Koutiala, but was compelled by his father to 
live with his older sister who married a merchant of Bougouni. There he started working in the 
two shops belonging to his sister’s husband. It did not work out. As he achieved the DEF 
(secondary school diploma) in Koutiala, he then started the IFM in Bougouni. Although he 
benefited from a state grant, he was not successful in this enterprise either. At the time, he 
had just finished his exam period and had been anxious about the coming results. He was also 
engaged in a complex love affair. The young woman in question was already married332 and 
had two other suspected lovers in Bougouni. For a couple of years Alou had undergone 
successive failures in building his life.  He tried different things, but most of them turned out 
badly. He then began to visit Bamanan sorcerers regularly in order to assess and contain the 
influence of the occult in his life. The soma told him that he had been bewitched by an old man 
from the neighbourhood who did not want him to succeed in his various enterprises.  
 Despite all his efforts, Salif also felt his projects were not making progress. He wanted 
to move forward in life, but he did not know which strategy to take. So he visited a soma in 
order to realise his longstanding desire to trade and marry.333 The soma explained Salif’s lack 
of progress as the result of bad people; their evil forces were impinging on his person. 
Apparently one old person among his family did not want him to move forward in life. 
Moreover one young woman he sees frequently wanted to harm him. Somaw never name bad 
persons. Their precision stops at gender and approximate age (if possible). Suspicions 
heightened, Salif directly thought about the mobile credits saleswoman sitting next to his daily 
grin as the nasty one willing to hurt him. He thought she does not like him, but doubts 
remained. Who are these bad persons who do not want Salif to succeed in Bougouni?  
 In general, the soma asks for between 100 and 200 fcfa to make ‘an occult diagnosis’ 
of a client. Then the soma needs to perform a ‘sacrifice’ (saraka) on the behalf of a client so as 
to attempt to contain the occult threat upon him/her. Depending on the gravity of this 
clandestine threat, the soma requests a client to bring him a few kola nuts (red or white), a 
chicken, a cock or a goat and money for the most serious cases. Salif told me that ‘soma can 
remove difficulties only; it eases your path.’334 He added that ‘gɛlɛya’ (difficulties) here can be 
associated with ‘mͻgͻ juguman’, ‘subaga’, or ‘sababu juguman’.335 The cycle of ‘occult 
diagnosis’ and sacrifice can continue until the occult threat is completely contained, or a client 
                                                          
332 Her husband had quit Mali two years earlier to pursue adventure in Spain. 
333 Salif had been in touch with sorcerers since his previous village life. 
334 Soma bɛ se gɛlɛya bͻ dͻrͻn. Ale bɛ i ka sira nͻgͻya. 
335 See chapter 4. 
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decides to stop it (usually because of lack of money) or to visit another expert in occult 
sciences. 
 The world of bad persons in Bougouni acts as a reflexive by-product of social 
inequalities. In a general manner, the occult here is ‘one way of interpreting the opening up of 
new horizons and new opportunities’ as a deeply selective process (Ciekawy and Geschiere 
1998, 6).336 In the edited book Postcolonial Subjectivities in Africa, Werbner invites the reader 
to analyse ‘modern subjectivism’ as ‘constituted by artistic self-fashioning, globally driven 
consumption and the struggle for control of identity, autonomy and explicit 
consciousness’(2002, 7). In Mali access to money is seen as the key to someone reaching their 
aspirations. But unequal access to the economic sphere and its volatility highlight the struggle 
over control of identity and autonomy in terms of aspirations. Here, social inequalities are 
domesticated in the shape of accusations of egoism and jealousy towards bad persons acting 
secretly at the heart of Malian society and beyond. As Nyamnjoh writes, ‘in general, if people 
had what they merited, and merited what they had in liberal democratic terms, there would 
be little need for a hidden hand of any kind, real or imagined. But because nothing is what it 
seems, the invisible must be considered to paint a full picture of reality’ (2002, 37). 
 At a community level, the actions of bad persons are often related to jealousy and 
egoism as aspects of the hidden aggression of relatives, friends and neighbours. This 
emphasises how it is delicate but very important to know who are your enemies and allies if 
you want to move forward in life. Trust and mistrust within home and community is explored 
in the last part of this chapter. 
 
 
 
Social harmony, restrained sentiments and trust 
 
In Bougouni, preserving social harmony may involve silence, discretion and even lies, but it is 
often preferable to voicing a painful truth in public which can undermine social bonds and 
bring ‘shame’ (maloya) on and between families. One morning Aïcha, the head of family where 
I lived, informed me that our house had welcomed a new born that day. To my utmost 
surprise, Kadiatou the housemaid gave birth to a little boy late in the night. How disrespectful I 
was in not having been able to notice her pregnancy! For a short moment, I felt ashamed of 
                                                          
336 In her analysis of the occult in Mali, Schulz explains these new opportunities as a source of conflict. ‘New images and goods of 
consumption inspire in women (and men) new ideals of greater individuality and a “modern” life orientation. These wishes are 
diametrically opposed to the scarcity of economic resources; they translate into numerous daily conflicts over material issues 
between husband and wives, among co-wives or between friends’ (2005, 103). 
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my ignorance, but I quickly started to ponder my sentiments when Aïcha explained to me that 
this new born was unfortunately an illegitimate child. As a result, Kadiatou concealed her 
pregnancy from public attention as much as she could. Kadiatou behaved as if nothing 
happened. She never stopped working until the day of his delivery. The silence of those who 
knew, her strong and round proportions and her loose traditional clothing, helped her 
pregnancy to grow unnoticed. In fact, the father of this new born is already married and lives a 
little further down the road with his wife, children and parents. Kadiatou herself is also 
married to a man who lives in the Région of Kaye. She came to work in southern Mali in order 
to finance her wedding trousseau. Such a shameful birth should not be allowed to trouble 
social harmony between neighbours, within families, and between husband and wife. After a 
quick and secret baptism337 conducted without Islamic scholars, crowd or party, the husband 
of Kadiatou’s big sister came to Bougouni and moved her and her child to another locality. We 
have not heard of her and her little boy since. 
 In Mali, many shameful affairs are negotiated behind the scenes of social life because, 
above all, families and their members aim to preserve social harmony between themselves 
and with their neighbours. This focus on social harmony and public conduct involves silence 
and discretion in the construction of the quotidian. Many issues are not openly discussed in 
everyday life because they are deemed shameful. Relatives, friends and neighbours tend to 
restrain public expressions of disagreement, antagonism and even rivalries between them so 
as to preserve social harmony. 
 The imperative of social harmony therefore inclines people to keep negative 
sentiments between themselves and out of public knowledge. In this way dissensions and 
conflicts between relatives, friends and neighbours remain mostly unspoken matters. As is 
customary, the parties to the conflict can send their representatives so as to avoid shameful 
conduct provoked by direct confrontation. However, people are aware that there is a risk that 
such negative sentiments can deteriorate, become destructive and turn into occult aggression. 
When silence and discretion are preferable to truth for the preservation of social harmony, the 
transparency of moral life becomes opaque. In such contexts, social life tends to be 
characterised by a ‘gray zone’ where suspicions of multiple allegiances and shifting loyalty are 
common (see Thiranagama and Kelly 2010). Therefore values of ‘loyalty’ and ‘confidence’ 
(danaya) are crucial social resources in an earthly path bound to social ties, but at the same 
time, undermined by rampant suspicions, accusations and betrayals within same social ties. 
                                                          
337 The father wanted neither to recognise the new born, nor to attend his baptism. But Aïcha threatened to publicise his shameful 
act if he refused to do so. Thanks to the education and responsible patronage of Aïcha, Kadiatou’s baby received a proper birth 
certificate. Many families do not allow an illegitimate child to be born within their compound. Most illegitimate children do not 
have birth certificates in Mali. 
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Approaching the end of my stay in Bougouni, Alou’s behaviour became very ambiguous. Salif 
discovered Alou had been lying to his close friends about his various activities for months. Not 
only did Alou not pass the IFM exams, he had failed them a second time. As a consequence, he 
lost his grant and was expelled from the school; but he never admitted that. Furthermore, 
without money and shaken by his complex love affair, Alou was inventing twisted stories to 
friends, taking on debts and divulging his concerns to the wrong persons. Some accused him of 
finding easy women for truck drivers on their way to Bamako and Abidjan in exchange for 
hundreds of francs. What affected Salif the most was that Alou’s attitude demonstrated that 
his friend never really trusted him as a reliable person. Salif started to feel betrayed by Alou. 
Later, Salif visited me. Looking very preoccupied he warned me about Alou’s shifting 
intentions. He told me ‘ale tɛ a ɲin ni jugu don’ which means ‘he does not know who is his ally 
and who is his enemy’. He advised me not to trust Alou any longer and even to avoid him 
because he realised how Alou was now completely devoured by jealousy. Indeed, he confided 
to me that recently he had tried to warn Alou about the fact that he had been wasting money 
for too long in a love affair that had no future. Alou reacted aggressively: he held a gun to his 
head and accused him of being attracted by the same woman. Alou was not a ‘trustworthy 
man’ (danaya mͻgͻ) anymore. He even became threatening. Some even accused him of being 
a witch. Progressively Alou lost the confidence of people in the grin and disappeared from our 
view. 
 In order to stress the importance of the other in life, my host father used to tell me the 
following Bamanan proverb, ‘someone cannot do things alone; someone comes from 
someone’s arm and goes to someone’s arm’.338 Indeed, social ties are crucial to anyone who 
wants to succeed in life in Bougouni. However, being able to discern enemy from ally is 
particularly difficult in a social context dominated by the imperative of social harmony. 
Betrayal can dwell and grow secretly at the heart of any self through destructive sentiments 
such as jealousy and egoism. In this way sorcery and witchcraft should not be treated as pure 
fantasies because human negative sentiments are real and shape social order. Whereas most 
people let them go (or at least accept them), others nurture them to the point of becoming 
overwhelmed by them. Such people are able to hate and plot silently against someone while at 
the same time being his/her friend. The occult in Mali is rooted in this clandestine world of 
negative sentiments against others in the context of increasing social inequalities. Successful 
persons are those who know people’s loyalty and control people’s greed. 
                                                          
338 Mͻgͻ tɛ se ka fen kɛ mͻgͻ ko; mͻgͻ bɛ bͻ mͻgͻ bolo la, ale bɛ ta mͻgͻ wɛrɛ bolo la. 
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My analysis of the occult in contemporary Mali supplements the one made by Schulz in her 
book chapter called ‘Love potions and money machines: commercial occultism and the 
reworking of social relations in urban Mali’ (2005). As she wrote ‘to be a moral person means 
to be sociable’ in Mali (Ibid, 102) because, whether patron, Muslim saint or ordinary Malian, 
success on earth is bound to social ties. However, increasing material distinctions observed in 
Mali coupled with economic scarcity are bringing about a situation in which competition 
between people is undermining their traditional ‘circuits of exchange and moral obligations’ 
(Ibid, 107) or what Malians refer to ‘le social’. Their ability to ‘attract’ (sara, literally ‘charm’) 
collective solidarity seems to be impaired by growing neo-liberal accumulation (Ibid, 102). In 
this way, people try to ‘rework social relations’ and to transform them as a source of 
redistribution and income through occult interventions. Schulz’s analysis departs from the fact 
that social inequalities in Mali entail various forms of exploitation, marginalisation and 
individualism that jeopardise trust and loyalty between relatives, friends and neighbours. The 
East in Mali and Muslim saints fit into this broad life landscape shaped by an increasing turn 
towards power, status and wealth based on money, material prestige and ostentatious life-
style.  
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6. Youths, elders and the controversy about Zikiri 
 
In the morning I used to stop for a while by shɛfantigiw339 located at the busy exit towards 
Sikasso along the international Bamako-Abidjan tarred road crossing the town of Bougouni. 
There I started the day by drinking a strong Nescafe coffee and chatting with traders and 
passers-by while observing the big trucks, coaches, cars and activities around me. People of 
various economic and social backgrounds were encountered in theses spaces of transit; 
listening to their conversations I could gain an insight into themes and debates shaping the 
public sphere in Mali and beyond. I once sat around a lively table at my favourite shɛfantigi. 
Clients were chatting about many subjects: a serious accident that had happened recently in 
Bougouni, the difficulty of finding ‘monnaiekun’ (basic financing for starting a small trade) in 
Mali, and the controversial zikiri coming out of someone’s mobile phone.340 
 The Bamanan word zikiri comes from the Arab word dhikr (or zikr); it signifies ‘the 
remembrance or recollection of God – a recollection that can be performed either silently or 
aloud’ (Schimmel 1976, 167). According to Sufi tradition, dhikr is a mystical performance, 
typically involving the repetition of the Names of God,341 supplications or formulas taken 
from Hadith texts and verses of the Qur'an in order for the Muslim to come closer to God.342 
The practice of dhikr is usually done individually; in some Sufi orders (such as Qadiriya and 
Tijaniya in Mali) it is also instituted as a group activity. Its practice is flexible because it is 
permitted at anytime and at any place. Nonetheless, dhikr practices in Mali are generally not 
accompanied by musical instruments because, according to most local Muslim scholars, music 
allegedly promotes heedlessness rather than devotional concentration. 
 The clients to whom I was speaking commented on zikiri as a song accompanied with 
guitars and drums; this so-called ‘zikiri’ in Mali is controversial mostly because of its musicality. 
A young teacher in the médersa, who was also street peddler during school break, pointed out 
that many Muslim scholars blame the entertaining character of musical zikiriw for inducing 
forgetfulness therefore being disrespectful towards Islam, the Prophet and God. However, he 
had nothing against such zikiriw as long as their lyrics were in agreement with Islamic sacred 
texts. The owner of the mobile phone, a young wotigi343 in a nearby gold mining site called 
                                                          
339 Shɛfan.tigi literally means the owner (tigi) of chicken’s egg (shɛfan); as a shop it would be “shɛfantigi yͻrͻ la”. To simplify, I use 
shɛfantigi, either as person, or shop depending on the context of the phrase. 
340 Spaces of transit in Mali are also a sort of ‘Radio-Trottoir’ where ‘rumour’ and ‘political derision’ shape information (Nyamnjoh 
2005, 218-220). 
341 On a study of the divine names of God, see Gimaret (1988). 
342 On the practice of dhikr and its mystical dimensions in Sufism, see Schimmel (1976, 167-178). 
343 Wo.tigi literally means the owner (tigi) of a hole (wo) in a gold mining site. Being a wotigi usually connotes experience and 
success in traditional gold washing. Newcomers in gold mining site start to work as ‘creuseur’ (digger). They dig a hole where gold 
is expected to be found. Their work is harsh and risky; the outcome is uncertain. If they find enough gold in the hole, they can 
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Damanda,344 liked such musical zikiri because they mix the pleasant (music) with the useful 
(Knowledge of Islam). The shɛfantigi added that the deceased local religious figure El-Hajj Ladji 
Blen345 used drums to call Muslims for the communal prayer in the Bougouni mosque; he also 
stressed that Christians accompany their prayer (ka Ala deli)346 with music so as to ease the 
learning (ka kalan) of the religious message. A student at the IFM of Bougouni concluded the 
discussion by saying ‘Haïdara agrees to these zikiriw. The extremists347 disagree with them 
because they do not change with the society!’  
 For these young clients, the label ‘extremists’ cast a wide net over  those who did not 
change with the society, in other words Muslim traditionalists, like most of their elders. 
Indeed, many elders criticise the musicality of such zikiriw. For them, this kind of zikiri is a ‘new 
thing’ (ko kura) that has nothing to do with the fact of ‘getting closer to God’ (ka hakili jigin Ala 
la) found in the practice of conventional Sufi dhikr. Listening to zikiri is rather a ‘childish’ 
(denmisԑnw) activity which provokes mockery among the elders in Bougouni. Others accuse 
the entertaining character of zikiri of being un-Islamic and disrespectful towards Islam. 
 ‘Religious singers’ (zikirikԑlaw) in Mali initiated the so-called ‘zikiri’ in the late eighties 
by adapting the remembrance of God to contemporary local music; they started to chant the 
recollection of God, the Prophet and his descendants accompanied by drums, guitars and 
other local instruments. Such musical zikiriw quickly became popular among Malian youth; 
tape cassettes of musical zikiriw were found in most local markets in 2010. One of the religious 
singers, Nouhoum Dembélé, even rose to fame and became a sort of pop star among young 
Muslims in Mali. In this chapter I explore the process of religious pluralisation occurring in 
contemporary Mali (see introduction) in relation to disagreements between generations over 
ideas of modernity through ethnographies of musical zikiri in Bamako and then in Bougouni. I 
do so by investigating the nature of success of the best known promoter of musical zikiri:  
Mali’s most popular religious leader Cherif Ousmane Madani Häidara, the founder and spiritual 
guide of the powerful Ansar Dine Muslim association.348 
                                                                                                                                                                          
become a wotigi (or investor). Then they either provide food and water for the diggers, or buy dynamite to blow up rocks. At the 
end, the diggers and the investors share the total amount of extracted gold in equal parts.  
344 South Mali has been known for its gold and traditional gold washing sites since the colonial period (see Meker 1980, 169-170). 
With the recent development of gold mass-extraction there through the implementation of modern mines (Anglogold and 
Randgold Resources), Mali has become the third largest gold producer in Africa. The sites, where gold was found in insufficient 
quantity for mass extraction, still attracted traditional gold washing in 2009; when new sites are discovered people flock there to 
do traditional gold washing. One of them, the Damanda, was located 8 kilometres from Bougouni in the Commune Rurale of Kola; 
locals perceived these sites as standing outside custom and law; they said there ‘you do what you like’ (ԑ bԑ min fԑ, ԑ bԑ a kԑ). 
However, few people hit ‘the jackpot’. Thousands extracted just enough gold for daily expenses. On the ambivalent ambiances, 
liminality and hardship found in traditional gold washing sites, see the documentary Ceux de la Colline (Goldblat 2009). 
345 On the role of El-Hajj Ladji Blen in the spread of Islam in southwest, see chapter 1. 
346 Bamanan speakers differentiate ‘Islamic prayer’ (ka seli) with ‘Christian prayer’ (Ka Ala deli). The verb ka deli signifies to ask for, 
to beg and to solicit (Bailleul 1996). 
347 ‘Les extremists.’ 
348 In April 2012 people around the world read in the media that an armed rebellion led by the MLNA Tuareg movement and 
various Islamist militias, such as ‘Ansar Dine’, had conquered northern Mali. For Brian Peterson, ‘the other Ansar Dine’ led by ag-
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The success of Haïdara and Ansar Dine in Mali 
 
The anthropologist Dorothea Schulz has argued the success of Haïdara among ‘the urban lower 
middle classes’ is due to his oratorical skills and his sermons recorded in small media which 
focus on ‘ethical self-improvement’ in situations of economic scarcity and ‘moral perplexity’ 
characterising post-1991 Mali (2003).349 In another paper, she explained his success in Mali by 
his ‘disengagement from immoral politics’ and his vague definition of his ‘alternative moral 
community’ in a ‘situation characterized by the failure of the state to capture the allegiance of 
its citizen to the nation’; therefore Malian Muslims can easily identify with Haïdara’s 
‘simultaneously inclusive and exclusive’ rhetoric interventions (2006a, 134; 143). My analysis 
of the success of Haïdara in Mali builds upon but differs in two respects from hers. 
 I would nuance Schulz’s view that ‘at the heart of Haïdara’s appeal to an alternative 
moral community is a void, as he refrains from defining Muslim identity in any substantial 
terms. In this fashion he leaves the line of demarcation between “true Muslims” and other 
Muslims porous at best’ (2006a, 143-144). Most ordinary Muslims conceive of piety as both 
the practice of Islamic precepts and as self-discipline; this twofold nature of piety is the thread 
running through Muslim life in Bougouni and beyond, such as illustrated by ‘zigzag’ Muslims in 
chapter two and the noble Muslim in chapter three for instance. Schulz does not incorporate 
this twofold nature of piety which frames religious experience and its moral evaluation in Mali. 
Ordinary Muslims I met understand Haïdara’s teaching as an Islam rooted in someone’s 
‘conscience’350 because, as he argues, the practice of religious precepts and the display of 
religious signs does not necessarily transform a Muslim into a good Muslim. This chapter 
asserts that Haïdara’s portrayal of Islam as a form of moral guidance more than a dogma about 
practice seduces many Malians by the pragmatic and flexible approach it confers in the 
quotidian. 
 Ansar Dine was still growing in 2009-2010; members of Ansar Dinɛe section of 
Bougouni were busy supervising the opening of new sous-sections in rural southwest Mali.351 
The recent spread of Ansar Dine I observed in rural Mali convinced me not to interpret the 
success of Häidara as solely an urban phenomenon. In this chapter, I argue that the success of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Ghali probably chose the same name as the pacifist Ansar Dine association led by Haïdara so as to ‘highjack the movement’ or to 
‘sow confusion’ in people’s minds knowing that the pacifist Ansar Dine is by far the most popular Muslim association in Mali 
(2012). 
349 According to Soares (2005, 234-235; 252-255), the success of Haïdara is mostly due to the popularity of his recorded sermons in 
‘the country’s lingua franca’ (Bamanankan). In this way, he managed to reach the vast majority of Malian Muslims, to build a 
‘national reputation’ and to become a ‘Muslim media star’. By contrast, preachers in Nioro-du-Sahel did not record sermons as 
much as Haïdara. They also did not record them in Bamanankan. Therefore, their audience is relatively small compared to the one 
of Haïdara. 
350 On the relation between conscience and piety, see chapter 2. 
351 Ansar Dine Mali is organised in a pyramidal structure: bureau national, sections, sous-sections and comités. 
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Haïdara in Mali is mostly due to the support he receives among the younger generations in a 
country where most of the inhabitants are under 30 years old.352 Young people account for an 
increasing proportion of the African population; ‘decreases in infant and child mortality, 
combined with high growth rates, mean that the distribution of the population is heavily 
skewed towards younger people’ (Durham 2000, 114). Post-1991 Mali is characterised by an 
increasing religious pluralisation in which the young people are the most numerous recipients 
of competing religious discourses. Haïdara has many sympathizers among young Muslims 
because, as I develop in the following sections, his marketing of religion connotes an Islam that 
considers the youth as rightful religious actors instead of bad Muslims. His entertaining Muslim 
teaching, such as illustrated by the musical zikiri, speaks directly to their preoccupations 
because it integrates Islam into the mundane world in which they were born and grew up. 
Given the importance of the category of youth in this analysis, we first need to clarify who are 
the youths and elders of contemporary Mali before moving forward in this chapter. 
 
 
 
Youths and elders in contemporary Mali  
 
In Mali, a young person (whether female or male) can be defined as someone single because 
marriage is seen as the main gate to adulthood. One does not however achieve fully adult 
status until becoming a parent as well. Salif the tailor used to joke about his single and 
childless status by naming himself ‘naked single man’ (cԑgana kulukutu). The metaphor of 
nakedness here associates parenthood with the dress of an adult without which adulthood is 
not complete; therefore such a person is still ‘naked’. The eldest brother of my host family told 
me he was called ‘big brother’ (kͻrͻ.kɛ) by unmarried and older co-workers because, unlike 
them, he was already married and father of many children. 
 In parallel, the use of age labels in conversation, such as ‘junior’ (dͻgͻ) and ‘senior’ 
(kͻrͻ), shapes youth and senior as ‘social shifters’ rather than specific age groups353 or cohorts 
(see Durham 2000, 116-117). In this way, youth can also be a situational label that draws 
attention to relations of power, rights, expectations and hierarchy between people. When an 
adolescent called me ‘senior’ or ‘big brother’354 in Mali, he framed our relational configuration 
                                                          
352 Indeed, 47.3 per cent of Mali’ population is under the age of fifteen in 2011 (CIA 2011). 
353 In the Mande world of pre-colonial times, age grades and adulthood were clearly demarcated and marked in associations of 
initiation and through rites of passages. The village of Kola still hosted a cult of komo in 2010, but many young people did not 
attend it; on komo cults, see Dieterlen & Cissé (1972) and McNaughton (1979) ; on Bamanan institutions of initiation, see Colleyn 
(2001). 
354 The same logic applied to women as well: ‘big sister’ is called ‘kͻrͻ.muso.’ 
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by associating my status with the respect attributed to seniority there. When ‘senior’ and 
‘junior’ are uttered between two people of similar age, their usages became contingent, 
strategic and negotiable.355 An elder can be the junior in relationship to another elder, and an 
adolescent can be the senior in relationship to another adolescent. This situation connotes a 
flexible usage of the notion of youth in Mali. Being young can also be associated with 
adulthood in Mali. La Jeune Chambre Internationale of Bougouni defined itself as ‘association 
of young people between the ages of 18 and 40’.356 Many of its members were married 
parents. Indeed numerous associations of youth in Mali are constituted of people Westerners 
would consider as mature adults. 
 Nonetheless, youth and elder are relatively distinct in Mali when people speak about 
the epoch in which they grew up. 
  
 Moussa (75 years old): ‘I have 8 sons. Nobody wants to cultivate my field. They all want to work 
in offices instead’. 
Ablaye (35 years old): ‘It is your fault. You did not educate us correctly as your parents did [smiling 
face]’. 
Moussa: ‘When I was a child, we could do two years without going to Tilé [the village next to Bougouni]. 
We stayed here. We worked hard. We paid one coin for listening to the voice coming out of the music 
box of the commandant Méker. People of Tilé came here so as to listen to this music box as well. When 
we saw the first truck coming here, we ran away because we were afraid of it! [laughing]. At that time it 
took 8 days to go by foot to Bamako, and 3-4 days to Garalo. Now you can go to Kidal in one day. You 
can go eating in Abidjan on taking a flight from Bamako! It is not the same thing anymore. We could not 
educate you the same way our parents did with us.’ 
 
 I collected this dialogue between father and son after a communal Friday prayer when 
families gather in their courtyard for lunch. It highlights how elders and youths in Bougouni 
differentiate in terms of the qualities of the epochs in which they grew up.  By ‘education’, 
Moussa referred to the transformation of the field of possibilities and life trajectories for 
present-day young people compared to the epoch of his youth. The arrival of modern 
technologies and the development of mobility brought significant changes to people’s life in 
town. Youth have easier access to the wider world and all its influences. Nowadays, urban 
youth aspire to jobs other than the traditional farming activities of their elders. These recent 
transformations make elders think of the youth as a distinct ‘generational unit’ (see Mannheim 
                                                          
355 For illustrations of the meanings  of the management of age as shifting and relative criteria in men’s circle at weddings and 
funerals in Botswana, see Durham (2004, 593-594). 
356 See http://www.ase-bougouni.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=154:jeune-chambre-
internationale&catid=148:jeunes-entrepreneurs&Itemid=210 (retrieved the 4 December 2011).  
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1952) shaped by a specific contemporaneity. Urban youth is meaningfully labelled ‘Génération 
Jakarta’ by their elders in Mali (see chapter 5). In addition to material symbols, this 
contemporaneity is often associated with a particular period of changes which emerged after 
the events of 1991. 
  L’AEEM (Association des élèves et des étudiants du Mali ), a student trade union 
founded in 1990, was strongly involved in the demonstrations which triggered the coup d’état 
of 26 March 1991. Many young Malians were among the 200 dead and 1000 wounded people, 
casualties of the violent repression ordered by Moussa Traoré in response to the peaceful 
demonstrations of 21 and 22 January 1991 in Bamako. In its aftermath, and by virtue of their 
sacrifice for democracy and freedom, Malian youth emerged as an important force in civil 
contestation, and intimidating as activists as well. The events of 1991 helped to build a 
generational cohort of youth which differs from earlier ones because it is the first properly 
postcolonial generation to become self-conscious of its weight in Malian society. 
 Although most political offices in Mali are still in the hands of the elders, as power 
holders, they cannot reach national reputation unless they receive support from  younger 
generations, as has recently been illustrated in the power contest between the military junta 
led by Captain Sanogo and ECOWAS357 after the coup d’état of 22 March 2012. ECOWAS had 
difficulty intervening politically in Mali to make Dioncounda Traoré (the head of Mali's national 
assembly) the effective interim President of Mali because of regular demonstrations on the 
streets of Bamako by youths who supported Captain Sanogo and opposed foreign intrusion in 
Malian politics. 
 According to many elders I met in Bougouni, the events of 1991 were a turning point in 
intergenerational relationships in Mali; elders’ authority decreased while the freedom of 
youths increased. As one elder expressed it ‘the youth think they can do whatever they want 
now!’ This youth empowerment is not confined to civil contestation. In this chapter I consider 
the increasing weight of youth cultural practices and ideas of modernity in the shaping of 
conceptions of proper Muslim life in Mali.  
 Malians often identify their generation with the political regimes under which they 
grew up. In 2009 being young meant growing up under the liberal and democratic regime of 
post-1991 Mali. By contrast, many older people relate their epoch to the single party regimes 
of Modibo Keita and Moussa Traoré. In this way, youths and elders tend to be marked by a 
different ‘spirit of times’ (see Durham 2004, 592) and these generational imprints can clash, 
such as the controversy about musical zikiri in Mali illustrates. 
                                                          
357 The Economic Community of West African States. 
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Zikiri performances during Maouloud 2010 in Bamako 
 
From 24 February 2010 to 5 March 2010 I attended the ten day Ansar Dine gathering for the 
celebration of Maouloud 2010 in Bamako.358 For many participants, the climax of this religious 
event was the three mass-gatherings of Muslims that took place in the Modibo Keita Stadium. 
Haïdara gave a first public sermon there for the celebration of the birth of the Prophet during 
the evening; a second nocturnal sermon 7 days later for the baptism of the Prophet; and a final 
mass-blessing the afternoon following the previous public sermon. The annual celebration of 
the Maouloud in Bamako has become the most important Ansar Dine meeting where 
members of all sections come together next to their ‘spiritual guide’ for what they call a 
‘pilgrimage’. Being present three times in ten days in the devotional crowd of 40,000 people 
packed into the Modibo Keita Stadium during Haïdara’s public interventions gave me an 
impressive insight into the power of Haïdara and Ansar Dine in contemporary Mali.359 Moussa, 
a friend critical of Haïdara, nonetheless acknowledged his popularity by saying ‘Haïdara 
manages to fill the Stadium several times in one week when soccer does not!’ The fact that 
Haïdara’s meetings seemed more popular than soccer particularly drew his attention.360 
Haïdara had become a powerful religious actor and a prominent personality in Mali’s public 
life.361 
 In-between these three mass-gatherings many activities happened in the popular 
district of Bankoni around the residence of Haïdara. During the ten days the area hosted 
thousands of Muslims. Streets were transformed into a sort of religious festival articulated 
around communal prayers, general meetings of Ansar Dine,362 and visits to arrays of shops 
selling religious items. Various entertainment activities also happened. The Programme 
Maouloud 2010 distributed at the headquarters of Ansar Dine invited ‘les pélerins’ (the 
pilgrims) to various events such as theatre, Karate and two nights of ‘Animation (Zikri)’. I 
                                                          
358 Thanks to the help of members of the Ansar Dine section of Bougouni, the head office of Ansar Dine in Bamako gave me a pass 
as a member of the Ansar Dine International delegation which facilitated fieldwork on the various sites of this Muslim gathering. 
359 The 9th celebration of Maouloud in the Modibo Keita Stadium unfortunately ended in a dramatic stampede in 2011. 36 people 
were killed and more than 60 injured by being crushed against metal fencing as they waited to leave at the end of the final 
gathering in the Stadium. When Malian newspapers denounced the bad organisation of the security forces (Policemen and Ansar 
volunteers), Haidara’s opponents interpreted this dramatic stampede as a warning from God towards Ansar Dine and Haidara’s 
un-Islamic activities (personal conversations). On Malian newspapers, see websites above: 
http://www.journaldumali.com/article.php?aid=2804,http://www.bamanet.net/index.php/actualite/independant/13252-
maouloud-meurtrier-au-stade-omnisports-de-bamako--letat-les-forces-de-securite-et-lassociation-ancardine-responsables-.html, 
http://www.essor.ml/societe/article/maouloud-2011-bousculade-meurtiere, (retrieved the 24.11.2011). 
360 Some years previously Schulz already wrote: ‘Wherever he [Haïdara] goes in Mali, he draws masses of followers and admirers 
that outnumber by far the crowd that the former president Alpha Konaré attracted during his visits’ (2003, 156). 
361 As a negative illustration of this, Haïdara did not make a public statement about the unpopular Nouveau Code de la Famille (see 
conclusion of chapter 3) that was interpreted as a threat to male authority by many ordinary Muslims. Haïdara’s silence was 
criticised by many friends as tacit support for Le Nouveau Code de la Famille. They expected such a prominent religious and public 
figure to give his opinion when a national debate related to Islam arises. 
362 See Programme Maouloud 2010 in Appendix 2. 
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decided to attend what I refer to as zikiri performances because many young Muslims of 
Bougouni listened to them.  
 
363 
 
Zikiri performances (like the other entertainment events) took place in a vast space which 
stretched right of the end of the main street of Bankoni to the foot of the hills surrounding 
Bamako. During the Maouloud this public square hosted a market of religious paraphernalia, 
parking for the numerous coaches of Ansar Dine’s various national and international 
delegations, and an open space where entertainment events took place. I arrived there early 
at night. Zikiri performances had not started yet, but a crowd of young Muslims and children 
were already standing or sitting in circles on gendered lines; females on one side, males in the 
other side. A space was left empty at the centre of the arena. Two big neon tubes fixed to an 
off-centred post lighted the gathering of Muslims. Next to it, two people sitting at a table were 
operating music through mixing tables and micros. The crowd waited calmly while listening to 
zikiriw coming out of loudspeakers set in strategic sonorous locations. One of the religious 
singers I had met in the afternoon invited me to sit where all religious singers gathered. 
 The whole place quickly became packed. Zikiri performances started. Masters of 
ceremonies invited religious singers one by one by name to perform one of their Zikiriw. Music 
was turned on and, religious singers successively took up a microphone, moved to the centre 
of the arena and performed. The ambiance became animated. The crowd responded to the 
music by clapping hands, moving their body in a dancing mode and by repeating lyrics. The 
                                                          
363 Photograph 20: shop selling Zikiri-cassettes located next to the space where zikiri performances took place.  
181 
 
popularity of each performer and the quality of each performance could be gauged from the 
intensity of the sensual and emotive response of the crowd; the atmosphere was relaxed, 
joyful and warm. 
 When masters of ceremonies announced the arrival of Nouhoum Dembélé on stage, 
the crowd became highly charged. Some listeners behaved like pop star fans at the sight of 
Nouhoum Dembélé. Security volunteers had difficulty keeping the centre of the arena clear 
when many excited fans rushed to dance next to Nouhoum Dembélé. Performing a song called 
‘kira kanu bԑ an na’ (May the love of the Prophet be with us), Nouhoum Dembélé inflamed the 
crowd. Joy, happiness and excitation emanated from young Muslims and children’s faces. 
Everybody participated in the remembrance of the Prophet led by Nouhoum Dembelé in a 
variety of sensual and emotional manners: some repeat lyrics and clap hands while sitting; 
others stand up and dance energetically. After his show, photographers took pictures of 
Nouhoum Dembelé with fans. Zikiri performances continued until late in the night in a 
pleasant and lively atmosphere punctuated by moments of intense emotion brought on by the 
most popular zikiriw. 
 In similar vein to what happened in Egyptian Islamic Mawlids described by Samuli 
Schielke (2001), zikiri performances are about ‘pious fun’. By contrast to Schielke, I do not 
however explain the pious fun generated by zikiri performances in terms of particular 
moments when the sacred and the profane are closely connected; religious singers and their 
audience do not perceive zikiri performances as a melting of paradoxical dimensions; for them, 
the so-called ‘zikiri’ is about living on this mundane world with faith and love of Islam, the 
Prophet and God in their heart. 
 
‘Zikiri today is about cultivating love in people’s heart.’
364
 
‘Zikiri is about bringing out God’s calmness.’
365
 
 
According to religious singers I met there,366 the musical way they perform zikiriw started in 
the eighties shortly after the foundation of Ansar Dine. Ibrahim Diallo and Ablaye Djiré were 
among the first religious singers to follow Haïdara. They paved the way for the current dozens 
of religious singers who now sing the ‘love’ (kanu) and ‘praise’ (tanu) of God, the Prophet and 
his descendants such as Häidara.367 Apart from the Maouloud, they perform zikiriw during 
                                                          
364 Zikiri bi ce n’est ka sԑnԑ kanu mogo dusu kono (Souleymane Diarra, religious singer). 
365 Zikiri yé Ala ko suma de kama (Hamadou Barry, religious singer). 
366 Souleymane Diarra, Hamadou Barry and Sidy Coulibaly Ba. A minority of religious singers are women (e.g. Mama Sangaré).  
367 The patronym Haïdara indicates sharifan descent in this case. Like numerous Muslim scholars of West Africa, Haïdara 
strengthens his religious authority by claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad. 
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baptisms, religious and civil weddings and ‘greetings’368 (ka fͻli kԑ), and produce zikiri-cassettes 
now found in most Malian markets. While most of them work besides being a religious singer, 
a few of them managed to become professional religious singers. In 2010, the Ansar Dine 
association of religious singers was working on setting up their own recording studio. 
 
 ‘Uttering zikiri has existed from the creation of the Word until today. It is an ancient practice 
(...) Playing guitar on it is something new, but it is not forbidden. Its usage is not forbidden. But if you do 
it wrongly, you are responsible for that. If you do it rightly, guitar and song are not forbidden. Music 
does not harm religion. What is important is the way you do it; nothing more (...) Muslim women and 
Muslim men also dance; it does not matter. However if this activity make you forgetful, you should not 
do it.’
369
 
 
For religious singers and their audience, ‘dance’ (dͻn) and ‘music’ (donkili) are accepted in 
Islam. Referring to Haïdara’s teaching on the importance of having a correct attitude in life, 
what matters is not dance and music per se, but the attitude of people involved in these 
activities. 
 
 ‘Zikiri is about calling people to Islam. After performing if you realise people still do not have 
faith in Islam, and their heart is not filled with the desire for Islam, you can say zikiri did not work.’
370
 
 
For members of Ansar Dine, a Muslim with the correct attitude to life does not take zikiri as a 
mere entertainment; listening to zikiri nurtures his or her ‘desire’ (nege) for and ‘faith’ 
(limanyia) in Islam. Music, dance and lyrics of zikiri call people to Islam by filling their ‘heart’ 
(dusu) with the ‘love’ (kanu) of God, the Prophet and his descendants. In this way, the 
sensuality and the musicality of the so-called ‘zikiri’ transformed its ‘recollection with the 
tongue’ into a kind of ‘recollection in the heart’ present in Sufi tradition (Schimmel 1976). The 
aim of zikiri is also about ‘getting closer to God’ (ka hakili jigin Ala la) through pious emotions 
and feelings. By contrast, people who conceive of zikiri as mere forgetful activity do so because 
they lack faith in Islam and the correct attitude towards life. Their religiosity is based on wrong 
intentions. 
                                                          
368 Greetings mean when a religious singer is invited to perform a concert. 
369 Zikiri da tԑ ko kura yé depuis kuma bԑ fͻ bi. Ko kͻrͻ de don (...). Guitariw olu yé ko kura yé.Fԑn dͻ bԑ haramu tԑ.  Haramu tԑ a 
kͻrͻ quoi. Mais ni ԑ yé ka a kԑ ka cԑn, ԑ de bԑ o kԑ ka cԑnba yé. Ni ԑ yé ka kԑ ka ɲie, haramu tԑ guitariw ani fͻli yé a kͻro.  A tԑ diinԑ 
cԑn. Mais ԑ ka a ka cogo don. A bana (…).Silamԑ muso and silamԑ kԑ, olu fԑnԑ bԑ dͻn kԑ. O tԑ baasi yé. Nka a ka a kԑ i ka damunu 
kono dͻrͻn I kana dͻn son. (Sidy Coulibaly Ba, religious singer). 
370 Ni ԑ yé zikiri da ka ban ka sͻrͻ mogow ma se ka limanyia sͻrͻ ka na silamԑya la, walima  ale ma se ka mogow dusu sͻrͻ ka  Ala 
ko nege don mogo la, ԑ bԑ a fo ko zikiri ma mogo ɲia (Hamadou Barry, religious singer). 
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Another important aspect of zikiri mentioned by religious singers is its praising dimension (ka 
mͻgͻ tͻgͻ fͻ). Zikiri lyrics praise ‘God’ (Ala), ‘the Prophet’ (kira) and ‘his descendants’ (kira 
somogow). Apart from God and the Prophet, religious singers of Ansar Dine especially praise 
Muhammad’s descendant Cherif Ousmane Madani Häidara. Sidy Coulibaly Ba is among 
religious singers who closely follow Haïdara. 
  
 ‘I have accompanied Haïdara on his travels for more than 10 years now. All Haïdara’s big 
achievements I witnessed, I put them into cassettes so as to let people know his success in the world 
(...). In Mali, people do not speak about your work until you die. If you die, words said over your grave 
will not point at what you really achieved in life because people have not seen all. If you have achieved 
great works in life, someone has to say it to people’.
371
 
 
Following Haidara’s life, and witnessing and remembrance of his achievements, bring to mind 
the bard tradition (griots) of Mande culture.372 The “praising dimension” (ka mͻgͻ tͻgͻ fͻ)373 of 
zikiri refers to longstanding traditions of praise singers and bards’ families affiliated to nobles 
and kings of pre-colonial Mande society. By following Sharif Haïdara and praising his deeds to 
his followers and beyond, the religious singers behave like griots; they are a sort of Muslim 
bard of the contemporary Mande world. They help build the renown of Haïdara and shape his 
heroic narration as a saint.374 Religious singers constitute one of the means through which 
Haïdara promotes himself and his Muslim association to the youth and beyond. 
 
 
 
The sensual reasoning of Zikiri 
 
I took note of musical zikiriw within the first months of my stay in Bougouni when I was 
searching for contacts outside my host families in grins and shops edging the streets of the 
town. At the very beginning of my fieldwork my Bamanan skills were poor; hence I had 
difficulty in differentiating zikiri from other local music because both sound like contemporary 
                                                          
371 C’est plus de dix ans, an bԑ voyagé. Ni Haïdara bԑ taa voyagé, an bԑ taa ɲͻgͻn fԑ. Ni ԑ yé min yé  min a yé min kԑ ; a yé baara 
bababa mun de kԑ monde kͻnͻ, ԑ yԑrԑ yé min yé min ka di ɲԑna, ԑ bԑ o bla casԑti kͻnͻ ka a fͻ mogow yé (…). An fԑ, farafina mogo 
tԑ fͻ i ka baara la fͻ ni ԑ sara. Ni ԑ sara, kuma min o sͻrͻ kat fari da i kaburu kan, o tԑ foyi ɲԑ.Ni ԑ yé baara kԑ, a kan ka fͻ mogo ka 
dͻ yé min kԑ (Sidy Coulibaly Ba, religious singer). 
372 Sidy Coulibaly Ba does not come from a griot family. 
373 Literally, ‘to say the name of someone.’ 
374 On illustration of zikiri as praise of Haïdara, listen to ‘Cherifou’ of Dembele (2009). 
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Malian music to me. In the course of time I learnt the names of the principal religious singers 
and I became better able to identify the religious register shaping the lyrics of zikiriw. 
 Youths listened to zikiriw through mobile phones and radios in grins, courtyards and 
coaches (...). Housemaids turned on the radio and hummed them to themselves while doing 
household chores within courtyards. Drivers of the Banimonitié coach company regularly put 
zikiri cassettes into the radio-cassette player during the journey from Bougouni to Bamako. 
Numerous youth Muslims I met in Bougouni loaded zikiriw onto their mobile phones and 
stored them next to the songs of Tiken Jah Fakoly, Celine Dion, Nahawa Doumbia and other 
African and Western musicians.375 They listened to them at any time and at any place, but I 
mainly heard zikiriw in grins.  
 Once, I found my friends Ali and Oumar dancing joyfully to zikiriw next to the 
workshop of Salif the tailor. The radio was broadcasting a zikiri the main chorus of which was 
‘If you love God, you quieten down; if we are together, we quieten down’.376 Ali the 
hairdresser and Oumar the carter, both in their mid-twenties, enjoyed listening to zikiriw 
because they taught them about Islam in an entertaining manner. When a zikiri moved them 
particularly, they sometimes express their emotions by dancing on them. When I hailed him 
‘the Imam Haïdara’, Oumar directly corrected me ‘No, Haïdara is a karamͻgͻ!’ For him, Haïdara 
does more than leading the prayer as the Imam does; he is an authentic Muslim scholar 
(karamͻgͻ) who teaches people the right Islamic attitude to adopt in life.377  
 In general, the entertaining and educational character of zikiriw I found among the 
youth of Bougouni resonates with listening to sermon tapes as ‘pious relaxation’ in Cairo 
illustrated in the book The Ethical Soundscape written by the anthropologist Charles Hirchkind 
(2006). Listening to zikiriw as pious relaxation that I observed among young Muslims in 
Bougouni refers more to Ahmad’s conception of sensual and emotional listening than it does 
to Hisham’s conception of ‘listening with attention’ (al-insat);378 when Hisham disagrees with 
listening to sermon tapes for entertainment, Ahmad stated that the entertaining character of 
sermon tapes is acceptable as long as it allows listening to them with ‘a sensitive heart filled 
with humility and faith’ (Hirschkind 2006, 70). The listening to zikiriw I observed in everyday 
                                                          
375 In similar vein, they juxtaposed pictures of Barack Obama, Didier Drogba (for instances) and Qur’anic verses with, as one of my 
friends states, ‘pictures of good weather’ (images du beau temps) that are naked women in their mobile phone memory.   
376 Ni ԑ bԑ Ala fԑ, ԑ bԑ sabali. Ni anw bԑ ɲͻgͻn fԑ, anw bԑ sabali. 
377 It is noteworthy that Haïdara’s sermons convinced most young and ordinary Muslims of the authenticity and the depth of his 
knowledge of Islam, while many Muslim scholars criticised Haïdara for his poor knowledge of Islam; they referred to the fact that 
Haïdara did not receive extensive formal religious training in Mali or in the Arabic world. Haïdara indeed attended médersa in 
Segou until grade six only. He later pursued in his studies in a high school in Abidjan (Ivory Coast), but he never completed it. He 
returned to Mali at the age of 17 and began his ‘preaching career’. Haïdara professes to be a ‘self-taught’ Muslim scholar (see 
Kimberley 2002, 130-132); a book written by a follower of Haïdara mentioned that Haïdara attended two years of duguma kalan in 
the village of Tamani, six years of médersa in Segou and four other years of Islamic learning in the locality of Fasongo (see Traore 
2007, 5). 
378 Ahmad and Hisham are Hirchkind’s informants. 
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life in Bougouni relates religious experience to ‘the anthropology of sensual reason’ put 
forward by Hirschink in the introduction to his book (Ibid, 28-31). Like him, I observed that for 
many young Muslims in Bougouni, the ethical aspects of zikiri are motivated by the affects and 
sensibilities they arouse within them.379 
 Seibou, a young civil servant working in Bougouni, regularly visited a grin after work 
where he listened to zikiriw on his mobile phone while chatting with friends and waiting for 
dinner time to go home. Sometimes a zikiri moved him particularly. He then started rocking a 
bit on his chair in a dancing mode, humming the lyrics of the zikiri to himself and, as I explain 
below, silently reflecting upon his life. Once I dared to interrupt him during such an emotional 
moment to ask him about the experience of listening to zikiri a moment earlier. He explained 
to me that he was simply moved by the zikiri of Mohamed Diaby coming from his mobile 
phone. He got hooked by its main chorus, ‘life is empty’ (dunyia yé fu yé). He then told about 
the thoughts brought to mind by this zikiri. 
 
 ‘“Life is empty” means that running after mobiles, motorbikes, cars and cement houses is not 
the main thing in life. You should rather take care of your conscience and work hard. The rest is nothing. 
The Prophet and Haïdara said that life is nothing unless for practising la bonté (goodness).’  
 
By ‘dunyia’ Seibou referred to desires and worries coming from the mundane world. At that 
precise moment, Seibou was under pressure financially. He had to gather money to finance his 
upcoming wedding and complete construction of the house he would like to move into with 
his future wife. At the same time, as the oldest son of the family, he had to take care of his 
ageing parents and support the studies of his younger brothers. Life circumstances bound him 
to constraints and expectations emerging from the mundane world; the struggle for earthly 
achievements sometimes brought moral lapses in his life and made him forgetful of God. Here, 
listening to zikiriw helped Yaya to stand back from the flow of life thanks to its relaxing 
receptivity which, at the same time, moved his conscience and opened him to self-scrutiny.380 
In this case, listening to zikiriw is about leaving the mundane behind for a while, refocusing on 
the pious desire for God, reminding oneself of the practice of goodness and, at the same time, 
reflecting on his life. As religious singers and their audience illustrated in the previous section, 
the so-called ‘zikiri’ is about living in this mundane world while cultivating the faith and love of 
                                                          
379 For a similar analysis of the power of sound and music as conditions of ethical action among Muslim men in northern Pakistan, 
see Marsden (2007b). 
380 Charles Hirschkind similarly wrote about taxi drivers listening to sermon tapes while driving for hours in Cairo’s maddening 
traffic: ‘The tape produces in those already rightly disposed the sensorially rich experience of inshirah - the Quranic concept 
referring to the opening of the heart that accompanies drawing near to God - and in doing so, allows one to better meet the stress 
and monotony of urban labor’ (2006, 72). 
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God in people’s heart. The ethical aspect of zikiri is motivated by the affects and sensibilities it 
raises within its listeners. For many young Muslims, the musicality of zikiri does not make them 
forgetful of God. On the contrary, listening to zikiri activates their religious sensibilities that, in 
turn, incite them to ethical reasoning upon their life and this mundane world.381  
 From the vibrant performance of Nouhoum Dembelé during Maouloud 2010 in 
Bamako which filled the crowd with the desire of God, to the self-scrutiny of Seibou arising 
when he was listening to a zikiri of Mohamed Diaby on mobile phone, these small 
ethnographies of zikiri demonstrate that sound and music are powerful mediums through 
which faith is cultivated and ethical thinking is conceived by young Muslims in Mali. Among 
them, many are sympathisers of the best-known promoter of musical zikiri, Mali’s most 
popular religious leader, Cherif Ousmane Madani Häidara, the founder and spiritual guide of 
the powerful Ansar Dine Muslim association. 
 
 
 
Being a young Muslim and sympathiser of Haïdara in Bougouni 
 
Like Nigérien youth, young Muslims in Mali conceive of religion as ‘an integral part of their 
cultural identity’ even if they do not practise it fully (Masquelier 2010, 226).382 They also follow 
a kind of ‘pragmatic’ Islam in which ‘ethical behaviour is situational rather than immutable’; as 
when a young Nigérien wore an allegedly un-Islamic baseball cap as ‘protection against the 
sun’(Masquelier 2007, 252); or when Adama, a young Muslim labourer settled in Bougouni, 
sometimes drank a cup of local ‘palm wine’ (banji) after lunchtime because ‘banji is not an 
alcohol; it is a medicine which warms you up and gives you strength’. Many young Muslims 
engage with sectarian distinctions in a similar pragmatic way with regard to the ongoing 
religious pluralisation of Islam in Mali. 
 
 ‘Some Muslim scholars cause us worries concerning Paradise. For instance, some of them said 
that TV, radio and pictures are un-Islamic. Their view of Islam makes life very complicated and this 
especially with the new technologies. Haïdara is not like that’ (Mamadou, 29 years old, engineer in 
Bougouni). 
                                                          
381 The Lyrics of songs promote intellectual life and this is particularly true with illiterate people. The wife of Boubacar, the seller of 
cloth, did not have the opportunity to go to school. Every Friday evening she watched the TV programme Top Etoiles on ORTM in 
which musical clips of Malian artists were broadcast. She especially appreciated when Malian artists spoke about difficulties they 
had encountered in their lives. She could then associate with their lyrics which made her ‘reflect’ (miiri) about her own life. In this 
way, it helped her to create new ‘ideas’ (hakili) in her mind so as to move forward in life. 
382 For a longer version of this chapter, see Masquelier (2007). 
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Like Mamadou, young Muslims in Mali want to use technologies, resources and trends 
available in their own era without facing moral dilemma. Therefore, scholarly attention to 
youth should be related not only to ‘potential forms of resistance and opposition’ to public 
order, but also to their aspiration to live in ‘conformity’ with their epoch (see Amit and Dyck 
2012, 10). In this regard, the youth of Bougouni appreciate Muslim scholars who attempt to 
adapt Islam to novelties characterising their epoch instead of castigate them as un-Islamic.  
 The process of religious pluralisation within Islam in Mali is in itself ancient; in early 
colonial times, Islam was so disparate that Muslims struggled to standardise their religious 
practices so as to gather into the same community (see the formation of a generic Islam, 
chapter 2). Muslims remained divided into multiple Sufi allegiances (e.g. Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya, 
Hamawiyya) during the first half of the twentieth century. In addition, reformist movements of 
Arabic influence became influential in Mali from late colonial times until the 1980s. In the 
1990s new religious movements, such as Ansar Dine Muslim association founded by Cherif 
Ousmane Madani Häidara, emerged and became especially popular among the Malian youth. 
Whereas the process of religious pluralisation has been continuous in Mali, its nature has been 
subject to ever-changing contemporaneous features. In line with Maud and Mayrargue (2011, 
19), I argue that the process of religious pluralisation in Mali partially reflects the variety of the 
majority of ordinary Muslims themselves, the youth, whose way of life is at odds with the 
discourses and practices of their elders. In this regard, the success of these new movements is 
due not only to recent liberalisation, freedom of association and new media of communication 
found in contemporary Mali, but also to the fact that they mirror youth’s aspirations.383 
 The majority of young Muslims I met in Bougouni were sympathisers384 of Cherif 
Ousmane Madani Häidara. They appreciated Haïdara for various reasons, among which his 
emphasis on the ‘correct attitude’ (jogo ɲuman) to have in life (prior to the practice of Islamic 
precepts per se) is one of the most widely shared. Haïdara used to base jogo ɲuman on the 
practice of the six Islamic promises (baya) that I explained in chapter 2. Often people 
translated jogo into the French word ‘intention’ because, according to Haïdara’s teaching, 
there is no correct attitude without correct intention: they are two sides of the same coin. 
How can a prayer be valid, if a Muslim performs it while constantly thinking about un-Islamic 
matters? asked Haïdara. He commonly illustrated jogo ɲuman with everyday life anecdotes 
which connote, above all, a situational precept whose precise reading relies on a given context. 
Therefore, young Muslims perceived Haïdara’s teaching more as a compass which indicates 
                                                          
383 For similar analysis of the insertion of youth culture into a Sufi branch of Cheick Soufi Bilal in Mali, see Soares (2007). 
384 In Mali, enormous numbers of people approve of Haïdara’s teachings without being members of Ansar Dine; they are his 
sympathisers (see Kimberley 2002, 141). 
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the right direction to take in life than a mould applied in people’s life. Criticising the rigorous 
dogmatism of numerous Muslim scholars, Mamadou followed Haïdara’s teaching because it 
allows him to practise his two passions (soccer and internet) freely as well as to relativise 
breaches in the practice of a generic Islam. Indeed, Haïdara invites Muslims to perform the five 
daily prayers and to fast during the holy month of Ramadan. However, at the same time he 
warns them that any prayer done by a Muslim without following the correct attitude in life is 
invalid.  
 
 ‘Haïdara said that being Muslim does not necessarily mean praying. People usually said the fact 
that you go to the mosque and you pray there make you Muslim. Haïdara disagrees with that. For 
Haïdara, what matters first is having a good attitude in life. At the beginning of the life of the Prophet, 
the prayer did not exists’ (Mamadou, 29 years old, engineer in Bougouni). 
 
Haïdara’s sensitisation of Islam as a set of moral guidance prior to any dogmatic practice 
seduces Malian youth due to the pragmatic approach and flexible reading it confers on the 
quotidian; in this way Islam becomes more a personal choice based on someone’s ‘conscience’ 
(or jogo, intention) than, according to a young carpenter, a ‘straitjacket made of obligations’. 
Many young Muslims thought the so-called ‘Wahhabis’ promoted a constraining Islam that 
includes a strict dress code and haircut in public. They preferred Haïdara’s flexible approach to 
outward appearance and often stated one of his famous slogans about the wrongdoings of 
such reformist movements: ‘God does not need people’s beards; God simply needs people.’385 
Following Haïdara’s teaching, my friends would just say that people are free to follow Islamic 
dress code and style, but this does not make them more (or genuine) Muslim. In similar vein, 
young Muslims liked Haïdara’s teaching because it does not linger on doctrinal issue such as 
illustrated in the controversy about the manner of praying which divided Malian Muslims for 
decades. 
 
  ‘When Muslim scholars disputed for years about the correct hand position during prayer, 
Haïdara resolved it in two sentences! Whether you pray with arms crossed or with arms hanging by the 
sides, it does not matter. What matters is the intention you put in your prayer. That is it’ (Kader, 27 
years old, radio host in Bougouni). 
 
As implied in earlier quotation of Mamadou, for Haïdara’s sympathisers, his teaching also is 
rooted in the life of the Prophet, however, in a way different from that proposed in other 
                                                          
385 Ala mago tԑ mͻgͻ si la. Ala mago bԑ mͻgͻ la dͻrͻn. 
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movements. Haïdara disagrees with the sirawo who strive hard to live in the same material 
conditions than the Prophet; Haïdara also disagrees with reformist movements which propose 
scriptural interpretations of the life of the Prophet which consistently seek to encapsulate 
Muslim life into a set of written norms (see the pluralisation of Islam in Bougouni, chapter 2). 
Haïdara reads the life of the Prophet as a religious path with successive stages that the 
Prophet himself underwent. For him, knowing God was prior to worshipping God in the life of 
the Prophet. Muslims should first build their faith in Islam by learning about God instead of 
praying in ignorance. 
 In the increasing religious pluralisation occurring in Mali, Haïdara’s marketing of 
religion puts forward an Islam that considers the youth as ‘being in their own right’ instead of 
‘human becoming’ (Herrera 2010, 129) or ‘not “real” Muslims’ (Masquelier 2010, 226), such as 
stressed by most Muslim scholars who portray youth as immature people who neglect daily 
prayers and fasting. In other words, Haïdara’s teachings apprehend youths as fully-engaged 
religious actors whose preoccupations, worldly aspirations and way of life do not necessarily 
hinder Muslim life. 
 
 ‘Before Islam was only about la toiture (roof) and not les soubassements (basement)! (...) Islam 
was done only for elders. Cherif international [
386
] Madani Häidara brought us the basement of Islam. 
Thanks to him many young people practice Islam now. Most of my knowledge of Islam I got it from his 
cassette-sermons’ (Kader, 27 years old, radio host in Bougouni). 
 
By ‘soubassements’ Kader pointed out that Haïdara’s sermons has rendered Islam accessible to 
all by making Islamic practice less dependent on the Islamic knowledge of Muslim scholars. 
Indeed, Haïdara considerably undermined the power of those who know and teach Arabic 
language by stipulating everyone should be able to pray in his own language (instead of 
Arabic). He also criticised the increasing cost of life-cycle ceremonies in Mali by stressing the 
greed of Muslim scholars involved in baptism and wedding. For him, customs around these 
life-cycle ceremonies should not be hindered by expense if they want to be label as Islamic; he 
advised ordinary Muslims, either to avoid taking ‘credits’ (juruw) and to give Muslim scholars 
only what they can afford, or simply to utter appropriate sura by themselves. These 
interventions potentially undermined the control of the religious elite over life-cycle 
ceremonies; they also gave more authority to ordinary Muslims in the performance of these 
ceremonies. As a young civil servant said ‘Haïdara has opened the envelope’; in similar vein a 
                                                          
386  Ansar Dine was present in 24 countries (mostly in West Africa and the Bamanan-speaking diaspora in the Western world) in 
2010. The international success of Haïdara was regularly stressed by young Muslims as another component of his legitimacy as a 
religious authority. In this increasingly global world, many Haïdara’s sympathisers proudly added ‘international’ to his name. 
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young carpenter stated that ‘Haïdara broke the myth of Islam’ because what Muslim scholars 
have kept secret about Islam for decades, such as the necessary sura for the performing of life-
cycle ceremonies,  is now becoming available to all. 
 Haïdara also managed to gain the sympathy of numerous illiterate Muslims by 
explaining Islam in clear, simple, concrete and ‘humorous’ (tulon) stories in Bamanankan. 
Fousseini, an illiterate Malian from a village near Segou, worked as wͻtͻrͻtigi (carter) and 
fisherman in Bougouni. When he came across a sermon of Haïdara broadcast on local radio, he 
turned up the volume and enjoyed it.387 Once we were fishing on his boat in the river Ba next 
to Bougouni. He was fiddling with his radio. When he found Haidara’s sermon, he turned up 
the volume and listened carefully to it. From time to time, his stillness was punctuated by a 
laugh, a smile and an expression of joy and agreement such as ‘kojugu’, ‘eh Ala!’, ‘Haïdara!’ 
The sermon was about the goodness and swiftness of God: 
 
 A Muslim man was walking on the street and holding a bottle full of alcohol in his hand, when 
he was stopped by a group of angry Muslims armed with staffs. They wanted to check the content of his 
bottle so as to know whether the guy was drinking alcohol or not. The holder of the illicit bottle panicked. 
He silently begged God to change the content of his bottle. He promised God to never drink alcohol again 
if God would intervene in his favour. When the group of angry Muslims opened the bottle they 
discovered vinegar in it! The guy no longer drank alcohol and became a devoted Muslim (summary of 
Haïdara’s sermon). 
 
When the sermon ended, Fousseini laughed loudly and said ‘Ala ka teli kojugu!’ (God is too 
rapid!). As Fousseini suggests, Haïdara’s illustrative teaching style appeals to numerous young 
Muslims because it educates people about Islam in a joyful, humorous and playful manner. 
 Indeed, Haïdara is known as a gifted orator and the most flamboyant Muslim media 
star of Mali who has managed to garner considerable public attention, not only by telling 
entertaining stories, but also by pronouncing provocative public statements towards the elite 
(see Soares 2004, 218). Haïdara’s popularity among the youth is also linked to his defiant 
opposition towards the military dictatorship of Moussa Traoré and the elite in general. He was 
sent to jail three times for his open criticism of the regime of Moussa Traoré. He was also 
known for denouncing the general state of corruption and hypocrisy of the Malian elite. His 
                                                          
387 The four radio stations of Bougouni broadcast 11.5 hours of Islamic programmes every week in 2009-2010. 5.5 hours of 
Haïdara’s sermons and 1 hour of musical zikiriw were broadcast every week. Here Haïdara and his religious singers accounted for 
56.5% of all Islamic radio programmes in Bougouni, whereas all the other Muslim currents accounted for only 43.5% of them. 
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inclination to speak loudly what ordinary Malians thought silently about the drift into venality 
of the elite built his nickname of ‘the one who says the truth’ (cԑnfola).388  
 
 
 
When ‘old things’ meet ‘new things’ 
 
The regular practice of Islam in Mali was originally associated with elders; those whom people 
call ‘old man’ (cԑkͻrͻba) and ‘old woman’ (musokͻrͻba). Their greater devotional practice, 
compared to younger generations, was motivated by acquiring social status and respectability 
in the local community, and by accumulating ‘religious awards’ (baraji) in order to prepare for 
death as the unavoidable gate towards the Day of Judgement.389 In 2003 a young man in the 
village of Dioumaténé in south Mali who ignored prayer times, jokingly argued with me, ‘Islam 
is for those who are tangling with the grave’. While his comment still holds some truth, elders 
in Bougouni pointed out to me that the youth of today practises Islam more intensively than 
during the epoch of Moussa Traoré (1968-1991). 
 The increasing engagement of youth with Islam in Mali is mainly due to: the 
progressive development of médersas390 during the postcolonial period, the post-1991 
formation of a generic Islam in public life (see chapter 2), and, most importantly for this 
chapter, the proliferation of small media (see Eickelmann and Anderson 2003). According to 
Schulz ‘the diffusion of religious knowledge on broadcast media (...) contributes to a process of 
objectivation in the course of which “religion” becomes the object of individual scrutiny and 
identity construction’ (2003, 146). New forms of religious experiences and sociability have 
been brought into being by media technologies (Schulz 2003; 2006b; 2007). In consequence, 
Islam has become more accessible to the illiterate and to women in Mali. Similarly, the 
numerous Zikiri-cassettes found in local markets have enabled the increasing engagement of 
the youth with Islam. 
In the course of my sojourn in Bougouni I noticed elders did not listen to zikiriw; a few among 
them listened to Arabic cassettes of recitations of Qur’an instead. By contrast to local youth, 
most elders did not miss daily prayers in the mosque.391 Knowing I was undertaking a study of 
                                                          
388 However, many regret what they call the ‘embourgeoisement’ of Haïdara they started noticing after 2000. Success, they claim, 
has softened Haïdara’s critical positions towards the state and the elite (see chapter 2). Others simply stated, ‘Haidara became one 
of them’. 
389 On a similar relation between ageing and devotional Islamic practice among the Tuareg in Niger, see Rasmussen (2000).  
390 On the development of médersas in Mali, see Brenner (2001). 
391 Young women in Mali do not pray in the mosque except during the communal prayers for the celebrations of the end of 
Ramadan and the Aïd el Kebir. Old women start praying regularly in the mosque after the menopause. 
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Islam in Bougouni, the President of the local AMUPI392 encouraged me to visit all the local 
mosques of Bougouni shortly after our first meeting. I accepted to do so as part of my 
integration into the Muslim society of Bougouni. After three months in Bougouni I had carried 
out more than 30 open group-interviews with Muslims attending local mosques.393  As these 
meetings were held in the courtyards of mosques right after prayer times on days of the week 
other than Friday, my interlocutors were mostly Muslims who prayed diligently at the mosque: 
the elders of Bougouni. At that time, I was working with a young fieldwork assistant who was 
especially curious to know what elders and Imams of the town thought about the zikiriw he 
listened to with his friends in grins. I therefore encouraged his initiative of asking elders 
questions on zikiriw. 
 
 ‘[Zikiri] it is a means of transmission so as to get it even better. In today’s civilisation, the 
mentality of French people is no longer the same as it was yesterday. Considering what I just said, we 
often need to adapt ourselves to present times’
394
 (Ahmed, 65 years old). 
 
This quotation was among the rare examples we collected that supported zikiri. Ahmed’s 
intervention occurred just after a series of mockeries and criticisms of zikiriw voiced by various 
elders who could think of no ‘benefit’ (nafa) from them. They said the so-called ‘zikiriw’ are 
just ‘noise’ (mankan); ‘they are un-Islamic.’395 I suspected that Ahmed stated his supportive 
opinion in French so as to not upset his Muslim mosque-mates who did not know French. By 
linking people’s mentality with the notion of ‘civilisation’, Ahmed emphasised disagreements 
between generations over ideas of modernity raised by the controversy about zikiri in Mali. 
 
 ‘Zikiri used to be performed with the tongue. Religious retreat used to be performed with the 
tongue (...). In zikiri we utter the name of God many times so as to obtain religious rewards. If you utter 
the name of God many times, you will collect religious rewards. But to do it a bit on balafon
396
 and 
things like that; this did not happen in our epoch! We did not do it. However some people say it is done 
                                                          
392 On AMUPI, see introduction. 
393 While most mosques welcomed my group-interviews, three mosques suspected the nature of my research: the main mosque of 
reformist allegiance missed our first appointment; its Imams accepted a second appointment, but the meeting was apparently not 
open to all as I had wanted. Instead of in the mosque (or in its courtyard), the group-interview surprisingly happened in the house 
of the first Imam of the mosque; it involved only the members of the committee of the mosque. The main Imam of another 
mosque of reformist allegiance refused the group-interview because I was not Muslim. A mosque built by AMA (Agence des 
Musulmans d’Afrique; a Kuwaiti-financed Islamic NGO) missed our first two appointments. Muslims of this mosque turned to be 
openly very suspicious about my work because, as they told me, their Imam is not paid by AMA any more due to American cuts 
and international pressures in the financing of Islamic NGOs. As he told me, the President of the local AMUPI organised these 
group-interviews for me so as show me the openness of most Muslims despite the bad reputation of Islam in the Western world.  
394 ‘C’est une manière de transmettre pour mieux capter encore. Avec la civilisation actuelle, l’esprit d’un français de hier et d’un 
français d’aujourd’hui c’est différent. Tout compte fait chez nous ici, il faut souvent se marier avec le temps, le moment.’ 
395 ‘Zikiri nin tԑ silamԑ yé’. On secular popular musical performances classified as ‘anti-Islamic’ and identified with ‘youth’ among 
Tuareg in Niger, see Rasmussen (2000). By contrast, musical zikiri is labelled as religious popular music by sympathisers of Haïdara 
in Mali. 
396 Traditional xylophone. 
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today and it does not spoil the religion. Others say it is shameful to do it like that’
397
 (Ibrahim, 67 years 
old). 
 
Ibrahim, like most elders, differentiated between ‘their epoch’ (an tile) and ‘today’ (bi) in term 
of the ‘spirit of times’ (see Durham 2004, 592). Sometimes elders referred to their epoch as 
‘the time when we were born’ (an tun bԑ bangin tuma min na). By expressing their own epoch 
as the time of their birth, elders stressed the fact that the period in which they were born and 
grew up still conditioned their life generally. Their ideas of modernity do not result from 
contemporary everyday life. Elders are still marked by a specific period of their life, their 
youth, which continue to guide them years after this meaningful period ended. 
 Elders’ religious education happened in an epoch when the Islamic faith was above all 
built around a body of standardised Islamic practices and the cultivation of ‘the fear of God’ 
(ka Ala siran)398 as the call to Islam; at that time zikiri was associated with ‘the recollection of 
the tongue’ of the longstanding Qadiriya and Tijaniya Sufi traditions in Mali, and the long, 
lonely and demanding sessions of prayer practice during ‘spiritual retreat’ (kaluwa). In 2009 
Ibrahim deplored the fact that ‘now everything is found in zikiri’,399 such as musical 
instruments which bring ‘shame’ (maloya) on the Islam he was familiar with. As an old Imam of 
Qadiriya allegiance we met in Bougouni, many elders there think Islam today ‘has multiplied’ 
(cayara) and ‘changed’ (yԑlԑmana) compared to their epoch. While elders acknowledged Sufi 
dhikr as respectful ‘old thing’ (ko kͻrͻ)400, they did not understand this ‘new thing’ (ko kura)401 
that is also called zikiri. For them, the so-called ‘zikiri’ is just one of the new things coming from 
the breakdown of Islam into ‘numerous tendencies’ (bolo fara) found today. Elders blame the 
current process of religious pluralisation for being made up of new things that have nothing to 
do with what they think Islam is about. They stated that listening to musical zikiriw did not 
bring any ‘understanding’ (faamuya) of Islam. Others go so far as to say that those who listen 
to musical zikiriw just ‘give up their honour and do not walk on the Islamic path anymore.’402 
As explained in chapter 2, many elders criticised the state of moral decline found in post-1991 
Mali. They perceived musical zikiri as another threat to elders’ ‘authority’ (fanga) in favour of 
the youth. When my fieldwork assistant mentioned the fact that Haïdara was behind these 
zikiriw, elders avoided pronouncing their views because they did not want publicly to criticise 
                                                          
397 Zikiri a tun bԑ da. Kaluwa tun bԑ da (...). Zikiri, an bԑ Ala tͻgͻ fͻ ka caya pour an bԑ baraji sͻrͻ. Paseke ni ԑ  yé Ala tͻgͻ fͻ ka caya, 
ԑ bԑ baraji sͻrͻ. Mais ka na a kԑ dͻͻni bala fͻ ni fԑn nin, ninnu kun tԑ an tile la de! An kͻni ma o kԑ. Mais bi a bԑ a kԑ ka o tԑ diinԑ 
cԑn. Dͻ wԑrԑ bԑ a fͻ ko a kԑ malo dͻͻni. 
398 I will develop local conceptions of ‘the fear of God’ in the concluding section of this chapter. 
399 Fԑn bԑԑ bԑ o fͻ a kono. 
400 Or fԑn kͻrͻ. 
401 Or fԑn kura. 
402 ‘Ka ta danbé yԑrԑ bla fͻ Ala sira bla.’ 
194 
 
the powerful Islamic actor who is Haïdara today. As an Imam responded ‘Haïdara has become 
an important person; we respect him.’403 However elders’ tongues loosened during informal 
conversations outside the mosque. 
 As Soares has also noted (2005, 235), ‘the overall effect of the proliferation of 
recorded sermons like those of Haïdara has been the opening-up of debate about Islam and 
how to be Muslim that sometimes seems to impinge on the prerogatives of existing Muslim 
religious leaders (...).’ While youths appreciated Haïdara because he ‘opens the envelope’ of 
Islam by unveiling its ‘soubassements’, many elders criticised him for the ferocious attacks he 
launched on the traditional Muslim establishment of Mali (traditional Sufis and so-called 
‘Wahhabis’) and their followers in his sermons.404 Elders criticised Haïdara for being a ‘vulgar 
man’ who undermines the prevalence of a dogma-oriented traditional Muslim education in the 
construction of Muslim faith in Mali. 
 Haïdara’s opponents also resented his popularity; they interpreted Haïdara’s criticism 
of traditional Islamic education as an incentive to the empowerment of youths and of their 
ideas of modernity. Others pointed to the fact that Haïdara lied about Islam. As Kadari, a 
retired teacher living in Bougouni, expressed it, Haïdara is a ‘philomane’ that is to say ‘a 
misleading philosopher’. 
 
 ‘Haïdara fell into his own trap. Before, he blamed rich people riding lavish cars when their 
neighbours were poor as being not Muslim. Now he himself possesses big Hummers’ (Kadari, 62 years 
old). 
 
Ansar Dine is also involved in projects of social welfare in Mali.405 In March 2009 Haïdara, the 
President, and the Minister of Health of Mali inaugurated the Centre de Santé Chérifla in 
Bankoni, a new hospital entirely financed by Ansar Dine International (see left picture below). 
Nevertheless, many elders suspected Haïdara of using Ansar Dine to sustain the ostentatious 
and comfortable lifestyle of his family. For them, the numerous sections and sous-sections of 
Ansar Dine throughout Mali and beyond simply shape a network of fund-raising that works for 
the wealth of Haïdara.  
 
                                                          
403 ‘Haïdara kԑra mͻgͻba yé, an bԑ a bonya.’ 
404 Schulz wrote‘[Haïdara] never specified whose behaviour was under scrutiny’ in his public interventions (2006a, 143). However, 
most Muslims guessed who were criticized by Haïdara. 
405 ‘Islam’s new visibility in Malian social and political life, seen in the mushrooming infrastructure of Islamic welfare organisations 
financed by sponsors from the Arabic-speaking world , concurred with the breakdown of state-supported domains of social 
infrastructure since the mid-1980s’(Schulz 2012, 13). In response to numerous Mosques and Muslim centres financed by Arabic 
countries in Bamako, Haïdara proudly announced during his first public sermon for the celebration of Maouloud 2010 in Bamako 
that the Centre de Santé Chérifla was financed by Malian money only. For a general analysis of the politics of aid in the Muslim 
world, see Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan (2009). 
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Pictures, video-tapes and DVDs in circulation in local markets showing Haïdara’s convoy of 
Hummers and Mercedes surrounded by bodyguards and wading through the jubilant crowd in 
the Modibo Keita Stadium (see photograph 22 above right) irritated his opponents; they 
accused his followers of considering Haïdara as a ‘Prophet’ or a ‘chief of state’ (see photograph 
21 above left)406 and blamed Haïdara for not discouraging such views.407 For them, devotional 
praises made by his followers, such as found in musical zikiriw, are un-Islamic because they 
represent a dangerous shift into idol worship. 
 Whereas elders accused Haïdara of changing the nature of Muslim education, hence 
Islamic faith, his popularity and the success of Ansar Dine in Mali reflect also the 
empowerment of the majority of Malians (the youths) as political actors and rightful Muslims 
in their own country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
406 Handshaking between Haïdara and the President of Mali during the inauguration of Centre de Santé Chérifla in 2009; Haïdara’s 
conspicuous arrival in the Modibo Keita Stadium of Bamako for the celebration of a late 2000s Maouloud (photograph taken from 
www.bamanet.net). 
407 Others just told me that Haïdara is victim of his own success. He does not fully control the members of Ansar Dine any longer. 
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Islam, ageing and maturity in Mali 
  
By contrast to representatives of the AMUPI, Haïdara did not denounce the reopening of bars 
and night-clubs during Ramadan that was decided by the transitional military regime under 
Colonel Toumani Touré in 1991. In 2009 many of my Muslim friends still remembered 
Haïdara’s public intervention at that time; Haïdara criticised those Muslims promoting the 
closure of bars and night-clubs during Ramadan by claiming this as evidence of weak faith. The 
fact that they demonstrated against the reopening of bars and night-clubs during Ramadan 
only illustrated their own temptations towards alcohol consumption. Once again, Haïdara 
questioned the nature of Islamic faith and invited Muslims to look at the intentions behind 
their religious practices. For him, the one who has faith in Islam has a strong self-discipline; he 
is not tempted by corrupting desires such as alcohol consumption. The true Muslim is simply 
not disturbed by bars and night-clubs. 
 According to the elders, the self-discipline put forward by Haïdara is easier said than 
done. Haïdara does not consider the fact that, for them, the maturity of someone is related to 
his age. 
 
 ‘Young people do not follow traditions anymore. In the past, parents knew the character of 
their children. They chose the bride or the groom in relation to the character of their child. If their 
characters fit together, love grows later. This is sure.  But young people want to choose by themselves 
and they confound desire with love. Later, as characters do not match well together, they divorce. I 
prefer the way our ancestors did it.’ (Aminata, 68 years old, Bougouni) 
 
By contrast to the stereotype of maturing as a process of gaining knowledge, Aminata reflects 
upon her ageing as a process of knowing the difference between desires and sentiments. For 
her, young people are characterised by an immature emotional life that needs to be guided by 
their elders; as they confound sexual desire with true love, their choice of partner usually ends 
up in divorce. In similar vein, many elders do not consider listening to zikiri to be part of 
broader Islamic practices because they suspect young Muslims do not listen to them with 
pious intentions.  Elders agree one can love God, the Prophet and his descendants. However, 
Muslim should foremost feel the ‘fear of God’ (‘Ka siran Ala la’) which elders think is not 
cultivated by youth anymore, as is illustrated by listening to musical zikiri as pious fun. The 
Bamanan expression, although not etymologically linked to the Arabic term taqwā,408 
resonates with this latter.  ‘Ka siran Ala la’ refers to a virtuous fear and denotes reverence in 
                                                          
408 See entries for ‘piety’ and ‘fear’ in Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān (McAuliffe 2001). 
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the service to God rather than a distressing state of anxiety. It encapsulates the submission of 
a Muslim to God. The pious fear of God also reminds Muslims that they will be judged by God 
after death. This pious sentiment also generates a sort of countdown that tends to be felt 
more at the dusk of life than at the dawn of life. 
 Beyond the criterion of experience, associations between ageing and maturity made 
by elders in Mali illustrate their concerns about the weakening of their traditional authority in 
contemporary power relations in which youths, supported by their demographic weight, 
increasingly established themselves as a powerful actor in Malian society.  
 However, beyond disagreements between generations over ideas of modernity, elders 
and youths often associate modernity with two civilising forces: Islam and electricity. I study 
their connections through the night life of Bougouni, an analysis that completes the 
exploration of the metaphor of sight found during daytime in urban street life I developed 
throughout the dissertation. 
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7. Night life 
 
A classic urban/rural dichotomy shapes the religious landscape in Mali.409 The urban is the site 
of Islam as a ‘civilising’ (civilisé) force, whereas, the rural is home to the ‘backward’ (arriéré, 
broussard) forces of Bamanaya. To illustrate, in 2009 I surprised to notice a big ronier palm 
tree standing right in the middle of one of the main streets of the old district of Dougounina. I 
asked why it was there. According to local recollections, when Bougouni was composed of 
three separate districts, locals feared this ronier because it hosted powerful djinns; nobody 
settled next to it, or dared to cut it down because they did not want to provoke the wrath of 
its occult inhabitants. Locals also bypassed the ronier during the night where they believed 
witches410 gathered there and transformed into lions and hyenas that attacked passers-by. 
Over time Bougouni enlarged, becoming a locality of seven contiguous districts. The ronier 
remained, but it stood right in the middle of a street, and locals gradually changed their mind 
about it. By 2009-2010 people in Bougouni were no longer afraid of the ronier which had lost 
its occult character. I even attended an Islamic public sermon (waajuli) at the foot of the tree 
during the night. An elder who lived nearby the ronier told me: ‘The djinns left the ronier due 
to the growth of the town. Djinns do not like industries, urban products and their smell. They 
do not like electrical light as well. Therefore they moved away.’ Bougouni became urban; 
Bamanaya agents moved to the bush country and Islam spread into the town. The once 
notorious tree was cut down shortly after the end of my stay in Bougouni. As my friend told 
me over the phone: ‘It disturbed the traffic too much.’ 
 As the elder indicated, one of the most important markers of urbanisation in Mali is 
electricity. For Malians, whatever its size a locality without electricity411 cannot be considered 
as a town. What I want to highlight here is that electricity has not only helped to keep 
Bamanaya agents at bay, but has also brought new kind of life to the town: night life. Indeed 
my friends used to say that Bougouni is a town because of its night activities. Street lighting 
enables the domestication of the night in Bougouni; by comparison, night life is limited in 
surrounding villages. In this chapter, I want to study night life in the town of Bougouni through 
                                                          
409 For a critic of the rural-urban dichotomy, see Geschiere and Gugler (1998). 
410 See chapter 5. 
411 Better-off villagers are now buying solar panels and car batteries so as to be able to watch TV and to kindle an electrical bulb for 
specific occasions (TV news, soap operas, Champions’ League football games...). Nonetheless, such private sources of electricity 
remain limited. A locality with electricity is a locality linked to powerful public sources of electricity (dams, big generators) mostly 
(if not exclusively) managed by the EDM Company (Energie du Mali). The electricity of the town of Bougouni is produced by two 
big, old generators. Their capacity is insufficient to respond to the increasing demand for electricity by the inhabitants. Power cuts 
are so regular that locals jokingly nickname EDM as ‘Energie du Mal’ (power of evil).  
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the encounter between what locals conceive as being among the main ‘civilising’ forces 
associated with urbanisation in Mali: Islam and electricity.412 
 
 
 
The anthropology of the night and Muslim life in Bougouni 
 
   
 Thinking about the West and Asia, the social scientists Brigitte Steger and Lodewijk Brunt invite 
us to investigate ‘what is going on outside the 7 to 11 rhythm that is often considered the 
framework for our lives’ (2003, 1). I would like to do the same for Mali.  
  The framework of rural life follows daylight, which is roughly from 5.30 am to 7 pm. 
After 8 pm, with no electrical light, night life is mostly for sleeping. Outside Bamanan rituals 
(e.g. spirit cults) and musical events (e.g. local orchestra),413 by 9 pm, except for a few intrepid 
young people, the entire village community rests. In an urban setting, the framework of life is 
extended because of electricity. In Bougouni, most inhabitants awake between 7 am and 9 pm. 
Urbanites usually go to bed around 10 pm. Common night activities (grins, shops and small 
restaurants) however continue at least until midnight on the perimeter of street lighting.414 
The coach station and the international road Bamako - Abidjan (among other spaces) are 
important sources of activity after midnight. Life in town is more varied than in the countryside 
because of the opportunities for night life. How might the anthropology of the night help us to 
understand Muslim life in Bougouni? 
  Bamanankan greetings divide the day into four periods: the morning (a ni sͻgͻma), the 
afternoon (a ni tile), the late afternoon up to the evening (a ni wula)415 and the night (a ni su). 
In this chapter I focus on the last period of the day which starts after dinner time in Mali (7 - 9 
pm). ‘Night’ (su) is a time the social sciences have tended to ignore for various reasons, such as 
considering the night as the continuity of the day (as if the night does not differ from the day 
in term of social significance) and therefore taking ethnography as a daytime activity only. 
However, following Schnepel and Ben-Ari, the quotidian is not only about everyday life; it also 
concerns ‘every-night life’ (2005, 153). The night as time of darkness (by contrast to the day as 
                                                          
412 On electric light as metonym for modernity, development and enlightenment for rural Mongolians during the Soviet-era 
electrification programme, see Sneath (2009). 
413 In the village of Fama in southeast Mali where I did six months fieldwork in 2004-2005, a local orchestra played twice a week 
during the night in a public place. Children and teenagers (mostly) came together there, socialised and danced to the balafon until 
late into the night. Indeed, Balani also means balafon which is a sort of xylophone (wooden keyed percussion idiophone of West 
Africa). 
414 Street lighting is switched on until the next morning. 
415 Wula or le petit soir (4pm – 7pm) is the period of time before dusk. It is usually the best moment for a walk because the sun is 
warm but does not burn. 
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time of daylight) is a specific period of quotidian life which deserves to be approached 
distinctively. How does darkness of the night ‘shed light’ on Muslim life in Mali?416 
  The nascent anthropology of the night pays attention to three main themes: sleep, 
dreams and nightlife (Steger and Brunt 2003; Schnepel and Ben-Ari 2005; Galinier  2010). My 
focus here is on nightlife as a specific period of ‘free-time’ (Steger and Brunt 2003, 5). Most 
Malians are involved in chores and obligations during the daylight; the day is primarily devoted 
to ‘work’ (baara).  However, after dinner Malians generally enjoy a period of ‘free-time’ 
(lafyia)417 before sleeping time. The notion of lafyia refers to leisure, pleasure and hedonistic 
practices in Mali. The particularity of this period of free time is its occurrence during darkness 
which reduces social control based on sight. 
 Inspired by works like Living Islam (see Marsden 2005, 54-55), I argue the interplay 
between ‘the open’ and ‘the hidden’ as the interplay between day life and night life is an 
important component of morality in Mali. Whereas the anthropologist Magnus Marsden 
focuses on the sense of hearing,418 I emphasise the sense of sight. More generally, this chapter 
relates also to an ‘anthropology of senses’ which argues that ‘the senses are shapers of 
culture, but they are also bearers of culture’ (Howes 1991, 17) because, as illustrated with the 
importance of balancing in the development of Anlo-Ewe identity in Ghana, ‘sensory orders’ 
are not a result of human biological features; they vary based on ‘cultural traditions’ (Geurts 
2002, see introduction). However, my emphasis on sight does not indicate the presence of a 
‘modern occularcentric epistemology’ of Western origins (Hirschkind 2006, 18)419 in this 
analysis. It first and foremost originates from the open character of street life found in urban 
Mali which fosters ostentatious practices and moral evaluations based on sight in Bougouni. 
 Indeed, the three main spaces of sociality (carré, grin and street) make life a public 
performance.420 Behaviour can be observed and assessed. ‘Daily life is spent outdoors under 
the gaze of neighbours or passers-by and one lives in a quasi-constant state of surveillance, 
comparable, in some respects with Bentham’s panopticon’ (Archambault 2010, 123). In such 
open settings, Islam contributes to the moral evaluation of life through visual social control. 
Outward signs of piety advertise the shaping of moral subjects for instance. ‘To be’ is also 
informed by ‘to appear/look’. The relationship between public, power and Islam has 
transformed Islamic identity as a resource significant in the broader politics of success in 
                                                          
416 Schnepel and Ben-Ari’s idiom (2005, 156). 
417 In Hausa the same term means ‘well-being’; the term ‘al-afia’ in Arabic means ‘rest’ or ‘time-off’. 
418 In Pakistan’s North-West frontier, Magnus found that ‘keeping purdah, (...), is as much about concealing thoughts and emotions 
as it is about covering heads and bodies’ (2005, 22); on meaningful  illustration of purdah practice (Ibid, 103-104). 
419 ‘The senses are not a stable foundation upon which a singular and unassailable truth can be erected, as an empiricist 
epistemology would claim, but rather a space of indeterminacy, heterogeneity, and possibility’ (Hirschkind 2006, 20). 
420 On spaces of sociality, see chapter 1. 
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Bougouni and beyond.421 However, the open dimension of day life contrasts with the hidden 
dimension of night life. Therefore I want to complete the exploration of the metaphor of sight 
in Muslim life I initiated in chapters 1 (Spaces of sociality), stressed in chapter 2 (Public Islam; 
‘zigzag Muslims’) and deepened in chapter 5 (A successful life; Riches as a sign of blessing) 
through an anthropology of the night in Bougouni. 
  The night has usually been defined and judged in negative terms such as chaos, 
darkness and fear. It has also been associated with wild and evil beings, activities and 
sentiments (see chapter 5 on jealousy, egoism and witchcraft in Bougouni).422 Therefore 
humans have tried to master, to colonise and to domesticate the night in many ways. A 
decisive breakthrough in the pacification of the night was the invention of electricity in the 
nineteenth century.423 However, electrical light is not as efficient as daylight because electricity 
cannot enlighten all the darkness of the night. Popular wisdom advises people not to wander 
at night into an unlighted narrow street for instance. We never know what malevolent 
intentions lurk in the dark street corners. 
  In general Malian towns are characterised by patchy and dim street lighting (see 
photograph 23 below). Only the main streets in the centre of Bougouni, and few bigger streets 
in residential areas, benefit from limited street lighting. Other than light-bulbs, here and there, 
indicating shops and TV spots, the overwhelming majority of inner streets are shrouded in 
darkness. 
 
 
                                                          
421 See conclusion of chapter 2. 
422 On witch-children at night in Kinshasa, see De Boeck (2004). 
423 In our contemporary world the domestication of the night can be supplemented with cameras such as illustrated in the CCTV 
video surveillance system of London. 
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 While some people apprehend the unseen, uncontrollable and malevolent character of the 
night, others welcome the night as a darkness that hides. By contrast to Boubacar’s wife who 
worried about nocturnal threats of witchcraft to her two young boys, Salif the tailor 
appreciated visiting his girlfriend under cover of the night.  As visual perception becomes 
limited, the street ambiance alters; activities seem wrapped around with mystery. In this way, 
night life is simply less bound to control by sight than day life. People who want to ‘obtain 
relief from the structures and strictures of the day’ (Schnepel and Ben-Ari 2005, 154) use 
darkness to transgress public order, to bypass daytime morality, and to accede to alternative 
life.424 
  Furthermore whereas daytime privileges sight, nighttime promotes other types of 
experience. As the ‘thereness’ of the day disappears into the darkness, social contact has to be 
done within ‘hereness’ (Handelman 2005, 253-254).425 Social life in darkness asks for close 
contact; night life encourages intimacy and opens up new dimensions of existence such as the 
search for pleasure and unrealised possibilities. Inspired by Schnepel and Ben-Ari (2005, 160), I 
investigate the night as a sort of ‘counter-hegemonic’ time when alternative activities and un-
Islamic desires are sought away from the moral restrictions of the day and the scrutiny of 
public Islam.426 Day and night are cyclical, thus they both shape the quotidian; more 
importantly, because their transition is progressive, I enter into the darkness of the night from 
the daylight in gradual terms.  
  
  
  
 Every-night life in Bougouni 
 
 There is no clear-cut transition between day and night. Following a movement ‘from day-night 
into night day’ (Handelman 2005, 248), I invite the reader to enter progressively into the night 
by describing how a typical late afternoon in Bougouni unfolds gradually into every-night life. 
 Southwest Mali is close to the Equator, therefore there is little difference in the length of 
daylight between seasons.427 According to an official website on weather,428 sunset in Bamako 
varies between 6.03 pm (November) and 7.02 pm (July): the day-night transition is almost 
                                                          
424 On an anthropological study of the appropriation of the night by young people in Madrid, see Tinat (2005). 
425 On the social phenomenology of night, see Handelman (2005). 
426 In his study of African religions in Brazil, Bastide analyses a situation in which the day belongs to the whites, and the marginal 
group of former slaves appropriates the night as a time for counter-hegemonic display (candomblé brotherhood) (1960); on the 
night as the expression of a dominated culture, see Galinier (2010, 828). 
427 There are also only two seasons in Mali; the dry season and the wet season. 
428 http:// www.weather.com/; the sunrise in Bamako varies from 6.05 am (Mai) to 6.58 am (January). 
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unchanging through the year in Bougouni. The closer you come to the Equator, the quicker 
darkness falls. At the beginning of my stay in Bougouni, I was astonished several times by the 
rapidity with which the darkness of the night invested the town. 
  A typical late afternoon in Bougouni unfolds in the following sequence of events. 
Schools and civil administration close around 5 pm; daily activities in the centre of Bougouni 
decrease drastically approaching the time for the fourth prayer of the day (Maghrib) a quarter 
of an hour before sunset. After dealing with the last clients of the day, most traders tidy their 
shops. Then they perform their ablutions, pray and close their shops. After the fourth prayer, 
the big market and its vicinity empty quickly. Artisans, labourers, merchants and street 
peddlers head home accompanied by the setting sun which refracts through reddish dust in 
suspension in the air. As it darkens and the horizon disappears, so the traffic becomes 
indistinct, not least the many vehicles without lights! At the same time in residential areas, 
children are playing within and around their carré. Wives and housemaids finish preparing the 
dinner. A little later, families will come together in their carré around dinner. Those who spent 
their day in town ask after those who stayed in the neighbourhood. Dinner is usually eaten 
quietly, but at 8.15 pm all gather in front of the TV to watch the popular Brazilian soap 
opera,429 which ends at 8.45 pm. By then the street lighting is on and darkness otherwise 
wraps the town. Babies and small children show signs of tiredness. Sleeping time is coming for 
the youngest. The other members of the family surround their elders and the head of family 
who are watching the national news on ORTM (9 - 9.45pm).430 The end of national news 
coincides with sleeping time for older children and their elders among them, after a long day, 
some are nodding off. Not without difficulty, the rest of children are sent to bed. If they have 
not already done so, Muslims complete their fifth and last regular prayer of the day. The town 
then is ready to sleep. However, a minority of the inhabitants decide to stay awake a bit longer 
so as to enjoy nocturnal free-time and to get involved in the night activities going on in town. 
  I lived with a family whose carré was lighted by a nearby streetlight; our entrance 
overlooked one of the few big sandy streets in residential areas which benefited from street 
lighting. The next carré on the right occupied a busy junction which attracted most the night 
life of the neighbourhood.  Two small cement-built commercial units adjoining the wall of this 
carré hosted a grocery and a clothing workshop which remained open every evening until 
midnight. The shopkeeper of the grocery brought a TV set, a bench and a couple of chairs out 
each evening; there men came together, drank tea and chatted while watching night TV 
                                                          
429 In 2009, A TV set was found in most urban carrés; on the watching of soap operas in Mali, see Schulz (2006c). 
430 Malians usually go to bed a bit later on Friday evening due to the popular music TV programme called ‘Top Etoiles’ (10.15 pm - 
00.05 am). When the overwhelming majority of families has only access to the free public service of ORTM TV channel, only a 
couple of rich families in Bougouni can afford access to the many TV channels provided by CANAL + TV subscriptions. 
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programmes on ORTM (sport, folklore, Indian movies and religious programmes).431 Such 
circles of men constitute one of the numerous night grins found here and there alongside the 
streets of Bougouni.432 At the same time, women popped quickly into the tailor’s shop so as to 
check their most recent order. The mother of the family living in the corner helped by her two 
eldest daughters had installed a sort of small restaurant (gargote) which was open every 
evening between  7 and  10.30 pm. Latecomers who found empty pots at home and passers-by 
who felt peckish could order soft drinks (sucreries), salad, peas, rice and sauce (...) there. 
Motorised vehicles stopped to buy petrol in the essencitigi433sitting in front of the grocery on 
the other side of the street. In another corner of this busy junction, young men spent their 
coins at a video games spot. Lonely students studied for exams under streetlights located 
further down the street. To complete this night life picture, a couple of children defied 
sleeping time by playing a worn table football standing to the right of the small petrol station. 
Such night activities usually stop around midnight. 
  Women involved in the night economy worked on the threshold of their carré, or 
accompanied their husband to his night livelihood activity. However, they were rather rare in 
Bougouni because, according to tradition, their presence in the night is negatively perceived.434 
Night life is also structured by age. ‘Female teenagers’ (sunguruw), ‘male teenagers’ 
(kamalenw), and ‘children’ (denmisɛnw) are expected to remain within carrés after dinner time 
and to go to sleep soon after. Night life is primarily the domain of men.435 
 
 
 
 The nocturnal confinement of women 
 
 In her study of the seclusion of women (kubli) in the town of Dogondoutchi in Niger, the 
anthropologist Adeline Masquelier demonstrates how conservative Islamic movements have 
helped to promote the seclusion of women as an expression of female piety and the 
preservation of a woman’s ‘reputation as a modest and honourable wife’ among ordinary 
Muslims, and even among the opponents of such reformist movements (see 2009, 97-106). In 
Dogondoutchi  Masquelier observed in early 2000 that women stayed home, avoided entering 
                                                          
431 ORTM TV programs end around midnight. 
432 On grin, see chapter 1. 
433 Someone who sells petrol stored in recycled bottles.   
434 On similar gendered perceptions of mobility and spatial access to the night in India, see Patel (2010). 
435 When public events, such as an Islamic public sermon or wedding party, take place at night, women, teenagers and children can 
go out without raising suspicion. On similar nocturnal public sermons happening in the town of Korhogo in the 1980s, however, 
only during funerals, weddings and Muslim celebrations, see Launay (1997, 68; 163-175). Teenagers and children also go out at 
night when a mobile discotheque (balani) is organised in their neighbourhood. 
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public spaces (such as the marketplace), and relied on ‘young female visitors’ for ‘news, 
errands and company’ (2009, 98). Although the generalisation that ‘staying at home and 
attending to domestic chores are the best ways for a woman to earn respect’ (Ibid, 99) also 
applies somewhat to Mali, women’s mobility and autonomy in Bougouni is greater than in 
Dogondoutchi. 
 In a general manner, Malian society is characterised by a gendered division of work.  
Ideally a man’s duty is to provide food (nasͻngͻ or les prix de condiments), shelter, clothing 
and medicine for his wife (or wives) and his children. In complementary fashion, a woman is 
associated with home: that is cooking, household chores and child rearing. In the current 
situation of economic scarcity,436 however, it is common to see women involved in the local 
economy as well; they do so to financially support their husband and to meet their female 
needs.437 It is not rare to see women involved in small trades selling vegetable, clothing and 
jewellery in the big market of Bougouni. Women selling cakes, water, soft drinks and fruits to 
travellers are also numerous in the coach station of Bougouni. Within residential areas, some 
women sit outside their carré and sell dishes and finger food such as ‘salty pea fritters’ (shͻ 
furufuru) and ‘sweet potato chips’ (woso jiranen) with ‘chilli’ (foronto). A small minority of 
successful women have even become entrepreneurs and are involved in bigger businesses in 
Bougouni. To illustrate, Aïcha, a retired teacher living in the district of Torakabougou, as well 
as selling rich ‘bazins’ (brocades) in Bamako, financed a chicken farm at the outskirt of 
Bougouni which produced hundreds of eggs per day. Most of the times I visited her, I found 
her husband watching their house from the terrace and saying ‘she travelled!’ Although Aïcha 
is an exception to the norm in Bougouni, Malian women aspired to be involved in the local 
economy so as to help their husband financially and to become more autonomous. Men 
accepted their economic activities as long as they were not carried on to the detriment of 
household chores. Often women engaged in the local economy were helped by their 
daughters. Others hired housemaids and delegated to them their household chores. 
  Women commonly entered public spaces as clients. For instance, almost every day, 
either the oldest daughter of my host family, or their housemaid went to the centre of 
Bougouni in order to buy food ingredients. Although linked to home, women enjoyed a degree 
of mobility during the daytime in Bougouni and they were important agents of local economy 
in 2009. The significant role women have played in farming in rural Mali since the pre-colonial 
period may have paved the road to women’s contemporary mobility in local economy. 
                                                          
436 In Dogondouchti, the seclusion of women was a sign of upper social status because it required hiring servants to accomplish 
chores linked to the outside world. Thus, economic hardships might forced a husband ‘to grant his wives greater autonomy and 
make use of their labor’ outside the compound Masquelier (2009, 100). 
437 Perfumes, clothing, jewellery and other personal needs shape ‘musoya’ (womanhood) in Mali. 
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 Although Masquelier did not focus on the mobility of women during the night, she observed 
how secluded women in Dogondoutchi took advantage of the darkness of the night to leave 
the walls of their compound (see 2009, 98-99; 101): ‘These secluded wives [were] allowed to 
visit neighbours and kin after nightfall, when obscurity makes them less likely to be noticed by 
potential admirers (Ibid, 98).’ Women in Bougouni, however, were bound to traditional norms 
of nocturnal confinement. Such norms should not be understood as strict rules acting like 
insurmountable obstacles. Rather, they shaped a disposition of female ethos towards good 
manners. Any adult woman of good education (but especially a married woman) is expected to 
stay at home after dinner time. Nevertheless, women occasionally may have to go out after 
dinner time. In this way a woman seen during the night does not raise suspicion automatically. 
For instance, a woman walking under the light, wearing decent dress (traditional wrapper, 
boubou, plain jumper) and heading toward a local shop does not necessarily raise suspicion.438 
Men in the streets might think she has been commissioned by an elder because her presence 
is visible and unambigous. 
  However, if a woman is often observed out at night, her habit invites suspicion. In 
addition, if her presence is furtive and unfathomable, her ‘reputation’ (danbé) will be 
undermined if her identity is discovered. Gossip will take place in the neighbourhood. Women 
should stay at home. She should not ‘walk-around’ (yaala) without good reason. The verb 
yaala can simply mean going out for a walk, however, a walk in the night connotes secret 
activities; in this way, the verb yaala when used of the night signifies flirting. It is only for a 
known and accepted reason that a woman can go out without raising suspicion. A woman 
regularly spotted and identified in the night is likely to be labelled as ‘sunguruba’ (prostitute), 
‘bandite’ (bandit) or ‘vagabonde’ (hellraiser). People think only spouses deceiving their 
husband, and unmarried women involved in casual sex go out under the cover of the darkness. 
Although ‘sunguru.ba’ (see above) and ‘kamalen.ba’ have similar etymological logic, 
kamalenba does not have a strongly negative connotation; it simply means a seducer (and not 
a male prostitute). Here the Bamanan expressions about the fact of having multiple sexual 
partners illustrate men’s control of women’s body (such as found in many other languages). 
The night life as free-time in town is not the domain of woman. 
  At a more pragmatic level, women usually avoid going out at night because they are 
tired from their daily work and need to sleep. They are the first to wake up the next morning in 
order to sweep the courtyard, kindle the hearth and prepare breakfast. Any married woman 
                                                          
438 Women should avoid wearing skin-tight or low-cut tops. They should also avoid wearing blue-jeans because it is judged as sexy 
clothing in Mali. Once, I attended a civil marriage in Bougouni. Most men and women wore lavish boubou with jewellery. In the 
crowd, however, my male friends spotted a woman wearing tight blue-jeans and red blouse. For them, the display of such sexy 
cloths meant a ‘loose woman’. One of my friends approached her and came back with a mobile number; whether hers I do not 
know. 
207 
 
neglecting household chores will soon become the laughing-stock of the local community; such 
behaviour is highly stigmatised in Bougouni, and if repeated it may lead to divorce. 
 
 
 
Night as a time of secrecy 
 
The night is also a time of secrecy. Social scientists have widely written on the realm of 
secrecy. With regard to the Muslim world of West Africa, many anthropologists have explored 
the notion of secrecy in relation to Islamic esoteric sciences, in which respect secret (Ar. sirr) is 
before all an important component of power and religious authority (see Dilley 2004). Inspired 
by Georg Simmel’s pioneering essay on the social significance of secrecy, in this study of every-
night Iife I am instead interested in the fact that ‘the secret produces an immense enlargement 
of life’ (1950, 330).439 The darkness of the night wraps activities into secrecy. The realm of 
possibilities widens as day time morality is altered. In other words, the darkness of the night 
prevents allegedly immoral behaviour from becoming public; in this way ‘shame’ (maloya) as 
regulator of public life is bypassed. I approach the realm of secrecy more as practice than as 
knowledge: night life as a time of concealment is a privileged moment when ‘certain practices 
of secrecy provide their performers with the means to engage with the wider world’ (De Jong 
2007, 11). By ‘wider world’ I mean one going beyond the self-imposed restraint of the day and 
being engaged in allegedly un-Islamic practices such as flirting, casual sex, alcohol 
consumption, marijuana smoking, maraboutage and Bamanan sorcery440 as instances. 
 The social order in Mali is rooted in ‘respect’ (bonya) which implies, above all, self-
restraint. Respect is maintained through control and concealment of visible practices. 
Concealment happens most during the night.441 For instance, I once encountered my friend 
Salif the tailor reprimanding his current girlfriend; he warned her not to dare meeting young 
men in his sight again. He then told me: 
 
 ‘I know and she knows we will not get married. We just do it for pleasure. I know she is with 
other young men as well, but I do not want to see that in front of me. The other day, I observed her 
                                                          
439 George Simmel also wrote ‘the secret offers, so to speak, the possibility of a second world alongside the manifest world’ 
(1950,330); the notion of ‘second world’ is often related to witchcraft and sorcery in Africa (see Geschiere 1997; West 2005).  
440 Bamanaya as force of the bush is still in town because the urban as a domesticated space still contains wild zones. On nocturnal 
conspiracies (e.g. sorcery, witchcraft and bad persons) in Bougouni, see chapter 5.  
441 Mobile phones ease such concealment of practices. Similarly to Mozambique, ‘mobile phone communication provides cover 
similar to the darkness of the night and, as such, brings the possible into everyday life’ (Archambault 2010, 130).  
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speaking suspiciously with a young man on a Jakarta motorbike. She should not do that in front of me. 
She should respect me instead. Here respect is like that.’
442
 
  
Young women delayed their bedtime slightly so as to enjoy a short romantic meeting with 
their boyfriends. Female silhouettes were indeed often spotted in company presumably of 
their lovers just outside the threshold of carrés in the darkness of the street. They stayed in 
range of their carré in case their elders or their parents called them from within the house. 
Hearing their name, they could respond quickly. 
 Others, such as Oumar, a student in 8th school year who lived in the same carré as me, 
waited until the rest of the household fell asleep to go out in town discreetly. Oumar occupied 
a room within the main house that had a different exit from the rest of the house, where the 
head of family, the housemaids and the children slept. In this way, his comings and goings 
could easily go unnoticed during the night.443 We both went out to join our respective night 
grins and to take part in the night life of the town. We were aware of one another’s nocturnal 
life, but we never talked about it because, above all, night activities are unspoken and private 
matters. 
 Most night grins I visited were characterised by the discreet comings and goings of 
men.444 Members of the grin sat, chatted, drank tea and took shorter (or longer) trips in towns. 
They took their own motorbike or borrowed someone else’s, disappeared into the town and 
came back after a while. These short tours were announced by expressions such as ‘I go and I 
come’ (ne bɛ taa ka na) and ‘I go on an errand’ (ne bɛ taa ci la). What struck me the most is 
that people did not ask for further details about these tours. Night life in grins unfolded 
through the comings and goings of people. These unquestioned apparitions and 
disappearances of people into the darkness of the night continued until grins emptied. When I 
dared to question the why of these comings and goings, people just told me ‘each of us has his 
affaires (business)’. Of course, some men knew exactly what was going on out there and just 
                                                          
442 Handling multiple relations at the same time is frequent among unmarried persons in Mali. 
443 I also enjoyed a room located in the annexe of the house. I used to go out by bicycle shortly after dinner time when the rest of 
the household was closing the main entrance of the house. When I came back after midnight, I found the gate of the carré was 
closed. Then, I parked my bicycle in front of the gate and walked along the wall to a pile of wood I used as ladder so as to climb the 
wall discreetly. After landing softly within the carré and away from the goats and chicken (in order to not frightening them!), I 
opened the latch of the gate and put my bicycle in my room. Oumar and myself avoided being noisy because we had to respect 
people’s sleeping time and we had to keep our night life unnoticed in order to respect the reputation (danbé) of our host family. 
444 Françoise Grange Omokaro mentions the existence of women’s grins in Bamako, unfortunately, without developing her point 
further (see 2009, 192). It is important to specify the spatial situation of grins in order to understand how space is gendered in 
Mali. Grins of women overlooking the street did not exist in Bougouni. Women sat and chatted within carrés instead. 
Furthermore, as they do not come together on a daily basis, their visits do not constitute a sort of continuous circle of socialisation 
such as the grins of men do. In this regard, there is no such thing as grins of women in Mali (on women’s gathering in Mali, see 
Schulz (2002, 812)). The rare women who spent time in men’s grins were girlfriends of members of grins. Nonetheless, these 
women avoided visiting men’s grins regularly because such behaviour is ill-regarded and shows a lack of education which 
undermines the reputation (danbé) of the woman’s family in Bougouni. Once, a girlfriend of a member of a grin arrived tearfully in 
the grin. Her parents did not want her to be seen in this grin anymore. She stopped coming thereafter. 
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covered the activities of their friends. In many cases, however, such ‘empty’ idioms simply 
meant that night is before all understood as a time for private and unspoken matters. 
 Others lied by saying ‘I go home’ (Ne bԑ taa so) or ‘I go to sleep’ (Ne bԑ taa da), but in 
reality they just moved away and unobtrusively looked after their own business in town.  This 
kind of ‘lie’ (nkalon) is not motivated by malice and does not aim to harm someone. The lie 
here is more a ‘mode of deception’ (see Barnes 1994, 1-19) which points at covering one’s 
tracks in the night. 
 In this way, such ‘empty’ idioms and lies were just common techniques of 
dissimulation highlighting the night as a time of secrecy. Inspired by Sarró’s analysis of the 
secret in his study of religious change on the Upper Guinea Coast, the sociological dimension 
of secrecy here is, not only about concealing content, but also about ‘creating remoteness’. 
Members of grin know that ‘the real ground [of such “empty” idioms] is elsewhere’, yet they 
do not question that (2009, 8-9). By not discussing these ‘empty’ idioms, members of grins 
understood comings and goings of night life as unspoken and private matters. They expected 
the same sort of silence about their own short tours in town. In a wider perspective, this 
creation of remoteness also demonstrates that ‘control over secrecy and openness’ is about 
managing privacy that is someone’s autonomy and vulnerability (see Bok 1989, 18-25). 
Members of grins can speak about their night activities, but this happens rather rarely. People 
prefer to gossip about other people instead of speaking about themselves. As a friend used to 
say ‘I do not speak about my plans in grin. The grin is about distraction and pleasure instead.’ 
In fact, night grins work as meeting points and bases for preparing ‘serious’ night activities 
such as romantic meetings and going to  night-clubs, maquis and undertaking other nocturnal 
business. 
 I disagree with the anthropologist Dorothea Schulz when she wrote: ‘Perhaps the most 
important social significance of the grin is that it offers men of all ages a space where they can 
address their concerns in a sphere outside of the household among friends and peoples whom 
they trust’ (2002, 811). The grin is an important space of sociality for men in Mali, but 
members of grins are not primarily linked by ‘trust’ (danaya). They come together to joke, chat 
and gossip about others, but they barely speak about what is going on in their intimate sphere 
because the grin is, above all, a meeting point where men have fun and gossip. Men might 
voice private matters in the grin, but not to all members of the grin. In other words, whereas 
the grin is about ‘speaking’ (kuma) and ‘chatting’ (baro, causer) with people, trust concerns 
specific friends. 
 When my friends and I planned to go to a maquis and to the night-club (or any other 
night plan), we nearly always proceeded in the following manner. As usual we first met in a 
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grin. We sat for a while. We chatted, joked and drank tea. When my friend(s)  felt ready, we 
left other members of the grin and disappeared into the darkness of the night; like the others 
we quietly looked after our own ‘affaires’. ‘Feeling ready’ here is a question of discretion. It 
was very rare that my friends were ready before 11 pm. They preferred to move to a maquis 
late into the night when common every-night life became very limited. 
  
 
 
The maquis  
 
 ‘Anybody who says they hate alcohol has not tasted it. If he tastes it, he will say “it is good”’ 
(Souleymane, mechanic engineer in Bougouni, April 2009).’  
 
As this quotation suggests, the ‘maquis’ in Mali are about alcohol consumption. Alcohol has 
been produced in Mali as a stimulant and a medicine for centuries. Members of local spirit 
cults drank alcohol during possession and villagers consumed it during various celebrations. 
People also took alcohol as a medicine to prevent anguish and tiredness. When Islam spread 
into Mali the practice of alcohol consumption did not stop, but it changed.445 According to 
Islamic tradition, alcohol has mostly been interpreted as an intoxicating substance which 
makes one forgetful of God and prayer; during the Prophet’s time ‘wine came to be 
condemned as haram, an unclean substance akin to blood and urine; drinking it became one of 
the greatest sins’ (Tapper 2000, 219).446 Therefore, local Muslim scholars often interpreted 
alcohol as a satanic potion whose consumption is forbidden.  In this way the practice of alcohol 
consumption became something other than a simple pleasure; it became a vice in the eyes of 
most Muslims. Nonetheless, the Malian state does not prohibit the consumption of alcohol 
because it is a secular country which hosts a minority of Christians who consume alcohol 
publicly.447 But most consumers of alcohol in Mali are Muslims. Given that the consumption of 
alcohol is socially stigmatised within the local Muslim society, Muslims who drink alcohol there 
do it during the night out of public sight in hidden spaces called ‘maquis’. 
                                                          
445 Most villages of southwest Mali have families who brew alcohol in the traditional way. They produce ‘millet beer’ (dͻlͻ or 
capalo), ‘palm wine’ (banji) and ‘hydromel’ (diji; di (honey) and ji (water)). Some farmers sell their small productions of alcohol 
during the day of the big market of Bougouni. Three shops in town were known to sell millet beer and palm wine in their backyard. 
Maquis in town sell beers (Castel, Flag and Guiness) brewed under licence in the modern brewery of BRAMALI (Brasserie du Mali). 
They also sell various spirits (whisky, gin, rum) which are mostly produced in West African countries and distributed in small plastic 
bag of 4cl. Only expensive restaurants and night-clubs of the Capital import wine and spirits from Europe. 
446 Tapper interestingly stressed the ambiguity found in Islamic tradition between wine and sherbet (sort of wine of paradise) 
because both ‘are combinations of fruit juice, sugar and water that are respectively sour and intoxicating, and sweet and non-
intoxicating’ (2000, 222). 
447 Alcohol taxes in Mali are set at 50%, see http://www.izf.net/pages/mali/5243/ (retrieved the 9 June 2012). 
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The secret character of these sorts of Malian bars is expressed in its name: maquis. Surprisingly 
I cannot find any scientific articles whatsoever speaking about maquis. Furthermore nobody 
was able to explain the etymology of maquis to me. Therefore the explanation below is to be 
taken with caution. 
 Before knowing Mali, when I thought about maquis I imagined groups of resisters 
hidden in the thick forests of the massif du Vercors in France during the Second World War. 
The French resistance was organised into groups (maquis) of resisters (maquisards) who 
secretly fought against the Nazi German occupation of France and against the 
collaborationist Vichy regime. Historically, the French term ‘maquis’ originates in Corsica. It 
means a type of Mediterranean vegetation made of impenetrable bushes, shrubs and 
brambles. After a vendetta or acts of banditry, Corsicans used to hide themselves in such thick 
forest. Indeed, “Prendre le maquis” was originally a Corsican expression which now signifies 
the act of taking refuge in the wilderness so as to escape state authority. As Mali was colonised 
by France, the etymological link between the maquis of the Second World War and the maquis 
of Mali might be plausible. Perhaps, former West African soldiers who fought in the Second 
World War in France somehow brought the word maquis home to West Africa; the term 
maquis is also used in similar way in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire as well.448 
Although the maquis in Mali might derive from the French maquis, it does not cover the same 
situation, except in relation to concealment. The French maquis were prohibited because they 
were engaged in armed resistance against the German occupation of France. A French 
maquisard had to hide himself because he risked his life for being involved in the resistance. In 
the laïc country of Mali, the maquis are legal trades. The maquis in Mali are hidden because 
alcohol consumption is socially stigmatised in the predominantly Muslim society of Mali. A 
Muslim maquisard hides himself to drink alcohol so as to avoid being stigmatised within his 
neighbourhood and to preserve his ‘reputation’ (danbé). 
 Three small restaurants selling alcohol in Bougouni were visible because they were 
located aside and along the international tarred roads crossing the town. My local friends did 
not go there because these maquis were too exposed to the public. Such restaurant-bars 
attracted essentially Christians of Bougouni and travellers and truck drivers on their way to 
                                                          
448 The term maquis has also been associated with the popular uprisings of Central Africa. The Congolese political scientist 
Wilungula B. Cosma designated the rebellion led by Laurent Désiré Kabila in the area of Fizi (1967-1986) as “maquis” because it 
had consisted of a sort of mini-state structured into a moving network of camps hidden in the forest from which rebels led 
guerrilla warfare against the armed forces of Zaïre (1997, 14; 46-51). The Cameroonian scholar Achille Mbembe wrote a book 
called La naissance du maquis dans le Sud-Cameron (1920-1960) in which he explains how the Union des Populations du Cameroun 
(UPC, independence movement led by Ruben Um Nyobe) turned into an underground uprising shortly after being prohibited by 
the colonial state in 1955; popular memory still remembers this uprising as ‘maquis’  (1996, 7) partially because its formation had 
explicit links with the French maquis of the Second World War. Indeed, since the prohibition of the UPC its executive board 
announced that they decided to counteract the colonial repression by a resistance similar to what happened in France under the 
Occupation (Ibid, 329). On further readings about the maquis in South Cameron, see Previtali (1999) and Sah (2008). 
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Bamako, Sikasso and Abidjan. One of the oldest maquis and brothels of Bougouni, Le Robinet 
(The Tap), also stood in an open site, nonetheless a specific one. Le Robinet overlooked one of 
the busiest areas of the town, the coach station, a space crowded by all sorts of people and 
described as being inhabited by all kinds of activities. As important spaces of transit, coach 
stations in urban Mali are difficult to monitor; so they are often associated with petty crime 
and banditry. Malians generally label them as ‘repaires de voleurs’ (dens of thieves) and 
therefore say that people of good manners do not linger there. The existence of Le Robinet 
was relatively unobserved there because it fitted into the negative depiction of coach stations 
made by Malians themselves. Le Robinet also benefited from a back-door overlooking a hidden 
parking space which, as I will show in the second to last section, might be the reason why a 
maquis endures in Mali. 
 Otherwise, most maquis in Bougouni were located just off the tarred roads and on the 
fringe of residential areas. Maquis were hidden and therefore did not reveal themselves easily 
to the uninitiated.449 During the first three months of my stay in Bougouni I was not interested 
in going to maquis due to the particularity of my anthropological interest: everyday Islam in 
Bougouni. Given that news about the activities of a white man spreads quickly in small African 
towns, I did not want to be associated closely with maquis in Bougouni; even though I knew in 
Mali the white man is known to drink alcohol, I wanted initially to act with a polite precaution 
towards alcohol consumption, so as not to risk my introduction to the local Muslim 
community. Later, when I felt more at home in Bougouni and I had a sense of the night life in 
town, I slowly approached the world of maquis. I met local Muslims who went to maquis, and 
like them, I drank alcohol discreetly. 
 When I started to be interested in maquis, I realised I had passed a maquis every day 
without noticing it for months! This maquis called ‘Chez le Burkinabè’ (‘Burkinabe’s Place’, 
named after its owner’s nationality) was situated not far from the busy Bamako-Abidjan tarred 
road. It occupied one of the first carrés of the residential area found behind the tarred road. 
No placard, no sign whatsoever indicated the presence of a maquis.450 From the tarred road, 
the maquis looked like a typical Malian carré fenced by a mud wall above which big mango 
trees and iron roofs were visible. Its door, overlooking a sandy inner street, was behind two 
tea-coffee-omelette shops (shԑfantigi) and one small restaurant which usually closed late into 
the night. I used to stop and eat there without suspecting a maquis beyond the nearby mud 
wall. It was only when a Muslim friend brought me there at night I realised it was a maquis. 
After passing the entrance and a sort of open vestibule, we entered in a vast courtyard 
                                                          
449 By uninitiated I mean people who do not go to ‘maquis’. 
450 Sometimes a small display advertising of a beer brand can indicate the presence of a maquis in Mali. 
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characterised by a subdued atmosphere. Tables and chairs were scattered in its corners. Some 
sitting spots were enclosed by walls made of straw mats and by vegetal roofs. I noticed human 
silhouettes here and there, but they remained unidentifiable. A single light bulb illuminated 
the whole place from the interior of a dilapidated house standing in the middle of the carré. 
This building sheltered the most expensive element of the maquis: a big refrigerator to keep 
beers cold. The barman sat next to it and was watching DVD movies through a small TV set. 
From time to time, a client hailed him ‘barman!’ or ‘psssssst!’ He then stood up and came to 
take an order. The barman used a flashlight if the client wished to check the change given. 
 Chez le Burkinabè illustrates how a typical Malian maquis does not seek to domesticate 
the darkness of the night.  On the contrary, it constitutes the main feature of the ambiance of 
maquis. Here the night is appreciated for what it is: a darkness that hides. Put differently, the 
maquis integrates ‘the night-scape’ which blends the person in with his surroundings’ (see 
Handelman 2005, 253); this visual effect helps to create a private ambiance away from 
indiscreet and intrusive gazes. 
 Maquis are not only hidden from the outer world, they also welcome clients into a 
sombre atmosphere which blurs their identities. As Handelman would probably add, the 
‘’thereness” of horizon’ is banished, and the “hereness” becomes limited to the table and 
people sitting around it (Ibid, 254). Everything is done not only to render alcohol consumption 
an activity hidden from the outside world, but also to make it happen as an intimate moment 
from within the maquis. The articulation between the darkness of the night and the dim light 
spreading from the single bulb creates an atmosphere of shadows conducive to privacy.451 
Clients who take women out seek maquis with a dark ambiance because they also want to 
appreciate their romantic date without being observed from within the maquis. Indeed, 
maquis are also spaces for extra-marital relations where lovers meet in secret away from 
public scrutiny. A minority of maquis show porn movies and have rooms called ‘chambres de 
passe’ in their backyard. These are rented on an hourly basis mostly to illicit couples. Other 
maquis are brothels.  
 If it happens that a younger brother unfortunately comes across his elder in a maquis 
by accident (or any other two clients previously unaware of their respective secrets), both feel 
embarrassed, they avoid the shame of this unfortunate encounter by simply ignoring each 
other. When they meet the following days, they behave as if their encounter in the maquis 
never happened. 
 
                                                          
451 On the anthropology of luminosity as the study of how variations of darkness and light affect human experience of space, thus 
interpersonal relationships, see Bille and Sorensen (2007). 
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The maquisards 
 
Men who go frequently to maquis are named ‘maquisards’.452 As regular clients of maquis, 
maquisards know each other. They shape a kind of a night community bound by a common 
secret: the un-Islamic consumption of alcohol.453 Apart from the consumption of alcohol, 
maquisards share another common point: their wealth. 
 Being a maquisard is being able to sustain an expensive lifestyle based on alcohol 
consumption in the maquis. Among the most popular alcoholic drinks in Mali, the big Castel 
beer (65cl) and the small plastic bag of 4cl of whisky cost respectively 900fcfa and 400fcfa in 
2009 in Bougouni. Knowing that the daily wage of a builder was roughly 1000-1500fcfa, regular 
consumption of alcohol in maquis is not affordable for most Malians.454 
 Furthermore, the fact that alcohol is perceived as a vice has reinforced its consumption 
for inebriation rather than socialization. Maquisards rarely consume a single beer in an 
evening, but stay around the table in small groups, paying their round(s) of drinks, until they 
begin to feel drunk. 
 I once went alone in a maquis. I ordered a small Castel beer (35cl). I drank it and asked 
the barman for the bill. Looking choked he replied ‘On vous a mal servi Monsieur?’ (We did not 
treat you well sir?). I just needed to refresh myself with one small beer before heading home. I 
narrated this anecdote to a maquisard. He laughed and commented: ‘We in Mali do not go to 
maquis for just one beer. This is a waste of money! We drink several beers so as to be drunk!’ 
It might be worth adding that maquisards do not start drinking by saying ‘cheers’ or ‘santé’. 
They just drink. Such small social rituals, indicating the presence of a culture of alcohol 
consumption in which drinking is not only about getting drunk but also about conviviality and 
warmth, do not exist in Mali. Drinking alcohol in groups around the same table includes an 
obvious social dimension; but more importantly, alcohol makes drinkers drunken.  
 When maquisards are about to go home, their bill can add up to thousands of francs. 
Sometimes, a maquisard invites friends and pays for all the drinks. Others drink in several 
maquis during the same evening. A maquisard who goes to maquis several times every week, 
by the end of the month will have spent more on alcohol than the entire budget of most 
                                                          
452 Women who go frequently to maquis are called ‘maquisardes’. They are much less numerous than maquisards and did not exist 
in Bougouni. In Mali, they are mostly found in the expensive maquis and night-clubs of Bamako. Similarly to what the 
anthropologist Thomas Fouquet observed in Dakar (2007), maquisardes in Bamako approached rich men and engaged them in 
complex relations of an economic, emotional and sexual natures (not perceived as prostitution) in order to get access to 
autonomy, emancipation and distinction. 
453 They are also known as such within their respective families as well. Their frequent absence during the night and the smell of 
alcohol betrayed them. Given that most of them are heads of family, their spouse(s) cover for them so as to preserve their honour 
(danbé). Their family keeps a low profile towards their consumption of alcohol as long as they are financially able to support them.  
454 Consumers of alcohol who cannot afford going to maquis buy local millet beer, palm wine and hydromel sold in the backyard of 
several shops. In 2010, one litre of palm wine cost roughly 200 fcfa in Bougouni. 
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Malian households. So, maquisards in Bougouni were heads of family who held important 
position within the local community, such as NGO workers, entrepreneurs, merchants, civil 
servants, politicians, policemen, doctors and agents of CMDT.455 Maquisards are sometimes 
accompanied with what I call ‘occasional maquisards’: alcohol drinker who cannot afford the 
regular practice of alcohol consumption in maquis. 
 
 ‘If you want to know mouvements (plots) within the town, go to the big market, the mosques 
and the maquis’ (Youssouf, student at the IFM of Bougouni). 
 
Youssouf, like many other occasional maquisards, appreciated drunkenness from alcohol. 
However, he also valued maquis as platforms of contacts and businesses. For him, the maquis 
is among the three most important hubs of the town where information, plots and jobs are 
negotiated. Thanks to networking in maquis, he got acquainted with a local politician and 
participated as an activist in his campaign for les éléctions communales maliennes of la 
Commune Urbaine of Bougouni in April 2009. He gained a substantial amount of money in this 
job. 
 
 ‘In the grin we talk des bobards (fibs). In the maquis we speak seriously around the table’ 
(Ibrahim, graduate and unemployed in Bougouni). 
 
Maquis constitute a sort of hidden sphere where power, wealth and vice are juxtaposed in 
Mali.456 As expressed by Ibrahim, maquis is no longer about the trivial matters discussed in 
grins, it is about discussing serious issues, meeting powerful actors and integrating networks of 
clientelism. Ibrahim continued by saying that while drinking alcohol and networking away from 
public scrutiny, people reveal themselves. Trust can develop. Business opportunities arise. 
Here, ideas and practices of business do not account for the common emphasis on Islamic 
identity as important criterion to the fashioning of trustful relations.457 In this context business 
possibilities among maquisards emerge from an un-Islamic practice: the consumption of 
alcohol in maquis.458 Focusing on trust as a relational concept rather than trust itself (see 
                                                          
455 Compagnie Malienne de Développement du Textile. 
456 In Bamako, when I passed Le Komoguele in the district of Magnabougou, taxi drivers used to comment ‘this is the maquis of 
ATT!’ (The former President of The Third Republic of Mali). 
457 On business based on religious allegiance in West Africa, compare the nineteenth and early twentieth century Muslim trade 
networks operated in the non-Muslim savannah of  southern Mali and northern Ivory Coast (Amselle 1977; Launay 1992), the 
formation of Hausa trade networks of Tijaniyya  allegiance in the 1950s and 1960s in the town of Ibadan (Cohen 1969, 141-161), 
and the networks of wahhabi traders in contemporary Sikasso (Warms 1992). Such links between business, trust and Islamic 
allegiance have been widely demonstrated beyond West Africa; for the example of a study of relationships between businessmen 
and Sufi saints in Lahore, see Ewing (1993).  
458 On trust based on asymmetric friendships (and not Islamic identity) in Bougouni, see chapter 4 (The economy charity). 
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Jiménez 2011),459 the sharing of expensive alcoholic beverages in little groups in maquis away 
from public scrutiny becomes a ‘pre-condition’ of trust (Ibid, 192-193). Alcohol is a stigmatised 
substance in the local Muslim society whose consumption by Muslims has to be done secretly. 
In turn, the hidden consumption of illicit alcoholic beverages in maquis distinguishes their 
consumers from the others and allows them to think of themselves as an exclusive network 
through which business opportunities and trustful relations can be conceived and built 
discreetly in maquis. Maquisards form an influential network in Bougouni. Away from public 
scrutiny and around the table, they debate, chat, joke and exchange crucial information on the 
current state of affairs in town while drinking alcohol. Through the illicit consumption of 
alcohol, they build ‘trust’ (danaya) between themselves and do business together. Like 
Youssouf and Ibrahim, occasional maquisards look for economic opportunities through the 
patronage of influential maquisards. 
 
  ‘Why I continue to go to maquis? Patrons are in the maquis! Jobs are in the maquis!’ (Ibrahim). 
 
However, maquis as spaces of vice can be fatal for weak persons. It is not rare among 
maquisards to hear stories of men who became alcoholics and poured their family fortunes 
into maquis. Others took ‘credit’ (juru) to finance their binges and died consuming cheap 
adulterated alcohol of dubious origins (nicknamed ‘poison’) sold in infamous maquis. 
Souleymane, a mechanical engineer who frequented the world of maquis for years, 
commented: ‘You can drink. You can be drunk. However, you should not overdo it.’460 A 
maquisard, even if he parties and consumes alcohol, should be able to handle his life and to 
fulfil his obligations as brother, father and head of family. The maquis is a space of vice, but it 
is not devoid of ‘honour’ (danbé). Any maquisard who is regularly too drunk and indulges in 
‘wild behaviour’461 risks losing the trust of his peers and becoming an isolated alcoholic.  
 
 ‘The maquis can bring you many things, but you should learn to say “stop” to alcohol’ 
(Souleymane, mechanical engineer in Bougouni). 
 
In the Muslim society of Mali the consumption of alcohol is tolerated as long as it remains out 
of public scrutiny and it does not disturb public order. Owners of maquis are aware of the 
importance of the hidden character of their business. As consequence, it is difficult to know 
the exact number of maquis in a town. In Bougouni I surely did not discover all the maquis of 
                                                          
459 ‘(…) the question today is not what trust is but what kind of work the notion does’ (Jiménez 2011, 178-179). 
460 Tu peux boire. Tu peux être bien pinté même. Mais tu ne dois pas exagérer. 
461 Comportement sauvage. 
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the town, but I found more than 20 of them.462 The demand for alcohol among Malian Muslims 
is obviously difficult to assess. What I observed is that maquis are lucrative and their number 
has tended to increase over the years. As a friend jokingly said ‘There are more maquis than 
mosques now in Bougouni!’ 
 Although maquis and maquisards take advantage of the darkness of the night, night 
life is still bound to the metaphor of sight. From time to time, the success of a maquis slips into 
the street and the neighbourhood. Muslim community then denounces these nocturnal 
driftings and lobbies for the closure of the maquis. 
 In the next two sections, my aim is to describe two successful centres of night life in 
Bougouni and to analyse why and how one of the two lasted less than one year when the 
other has survived two decades there. 
 
 
 
The famous Alcatraz 
 
While booking a hotel in Bamako for my brothers who were coming to visit me in Mali, I 
exchanged a couple of words with its manager. I told him I was based in Bougouni. He replied 
‘The famous Alcatraz is still there?’ I was surprised by his question. Usually nobody knows 
anything in particular about Bougouni apart from its bad reputation. I soon remembered what 
my friend Ali, a radio announcer in Bougouni, told me proudly about night life in his town: ‘We 
in Bougouni have L’Alcatraz, the unique nightclub of the entire south Mali!’ Ali was not entirely 
right because the towns of Sikasso and Koutiala, I heard, had night-clubs as well; however, 
l’Alcatraz is unique. On its dance floor, we could believe we were in the trendy night-club of a 
big African Capital. Through the shoulders of its bouncers, the show of its DJs, the class of its 
dancers and the sophistication of its decoration, its light show and its sound effects I felt I was 
somewhere in busy Bamako, rather than in small and slightly dull Bougouni.  
 L’Alcatraz is not only a nightclub of excellent standing: it consists of three cement 
buildings fenced by a high wall. The entire complex is dedicated to entertainment and 
hedonism. Each Saturday night around midnight trendy youth and better-off people in quest of 
fun and pleasure gathered there. As they said: ‘Boiti bɛ jama sͻrͻ sufɛ!’ (The night club will be 
packed tonight!) When I arrived at its parking lot on my modest Chinese bicycle, I always 
looked a bit out of place among the fine procession of motorbikes, Jakarta and cars which 
                                                          
462 Six hotels also sell alcohol in Bougouni, however at higher prices than maquis.  
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were washed clean and polished to a shine for this ostentatious occasion. In front of the 
entrance of L’Alcatraz, the crowd paraded while slowly entering into the complex. At 
L’Alcatraz the daytime restrictions on clothing styles were suspended. There elegance, charm, 
eroticism and creativity were the norm. 
 Men wore suits, shiny and colourful boubous made of rich brocades, elegant jeans and 
shirt or chic sport clothes. Certain men also displayed expensive mobiles, sunglasses, hats, caps 
and other fancy accessories. Dresses were carefully ironed and shoes polished. All that was 
‘griffé’463 (marked by famous brand) was displayed proudly. Moreover, Saturday was obviously 
a big day for hairdressers of the town. 
 However, what struck me most was the complete shift in the look of women between 
the day and the night. They abandoned their casual pagne, modest T-shirt and plastic sandals 
worn during the daytime and transformed themselves into what Fouquet coined a ‘queen of 
the night’ (2007, 115). Extravagant, embroidered boubous manufactured with finest brocades, 
low-cut skin-tight tops, bluejeans, lavish evening dresses, high-heel shoes, makeup, plaits, 
extensions, golden jewellery, perfume (...), all was permitted on Saturday night at L’Alcatraz as 
long as it combined eroticism with charm. Women were dressed in splendid and sexy manner, 
but rarely in ways Malians would label as ‘vulgaire’ (vulgar) such as with visible y-string or 
thong and mini-skirt.464 Most of them came there accompanied by their lover. L’Alcatraz was 
above all a place of ostentation, entertainment and fun.465 
 Although L’Alcatraz was known for its night-club, its clientele could choose among 
several options. Its complex was divided into three buildings. The night club stood in the 
middle building. As it was soundproofed, its noisy ambiance was inaudible from the outside. 
On the right on the ground floor of another building, people could sit, relax and eat savoury 
dishes and pastries in the quiet ambiance of the bakery-restaurant of L’Alcatraz. On the upper 
floor of the same building was the maquis of L’Alcatraz. There people could drink beer and 
stronger alcohol while chatting and debating together. Those who preferred drinking and 
flirting in a darker atmosphere could go to the back of the vast courtyard of the complex, 
where they sat around the tables found in the garden of L’Alcatraz. The multiple distractions 
found in this complex were one of the keys of its success. But more importantly, people took 
advantage of the fact that L’Alcatraz was only known as a nightclub. 
 
                                                          
463 The French adjective ‘griffé’ refers to its name ‘griffe’ which means signature in popular French. In this way, a famous brand is 
understood as signature that certifies the ostentatious character of a given item (Adidas, Gucci, Chanel ...). 
464The queen of the night in Bougouni wore less daring dresses than the queen of the night of Dakar (see Fouquet 2007, 115). 
465 On ostentatious consumption generally in Bougouni, see chapter 5 (A successful life). 
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 ‘Maquis and night-club are not the same. L’Alcatraz is the only true place of entertainment in 
Bougouni. We go dancing there. Well, some people seize the opportunity to go to the maquis upstairs’ 
(Alou, graduate and unemployed in Bougouni).  
 
Alou pointed to the fact that dancing and music are widely accepted entertainments in Mali; 
these distractions indeed typically accompany most public celebrations in Mali (wedding, 
baptism, end of Ramadan (...)). Going to the night-club on a Saturday night is not considered 
improper in itself. Many of the ‘soirées dansantes’ organised in the night-club of L’Alcatraz on 
Saturday night were sponsored by the rich men and women of Bougouni or by local political 
parties. By renting the dance floor they became the ‘parrain’ (godfather) and ‘marraine’ 
(godmother) of the party. These events were announced by radio, and the sponsors were 
often namechecked by the DJs during the party. Sponsored parties can be understood in some 
respects as a continuation of traditional praise performances of griots.466 During the evening, 
some people went back and forth between the night-club and the maquis and ended up drunk 
by the end of the party. Finally, couples in need of sex could complete their hedonistic journey 
in the hotel of L’Alcatraz which occupies the left hand building within the complex. 
 L’Alcatraz was erected in the years following the coup d’état of 1991; its owner is a 
local Malian who went on adventures to Italy and made a fortune there. He has continuously 
invested in L’Alcatraz, and another extension is currently under way. L’Alcatraz is the most 
successful place of distraction in Bougouni, with a wider renown. This success has lasted over 
two decades because of one crucial point: its strategic location. For good reasons L’Alcatraz 
was built outside the town and away from residential areas. 
  L’Alcatraz is located a kilometre down the exit towards Yanfolila on the right side of 
the tarred road. L’Alcatraz does not have direct neighbours. In front of it stand the school of 
IFM which is empty during the night. On its right stand the empty hangars of a former Swiss 
development project and the previous prison of Bougouni. On its left is nothing but trees and 
high grasses. The closest residential building to L’Alcatraz is the big colonial house of the Préfet 
of the Cercle de Bougouni standing at the top of the hill located behind L’Alcatraz. A large and 
thick forest separates them. 
 L’Alcatraz of Bougouni, echoing the Alcatraz Island of San Francisco Bay, is a remote 
institution from which it is difficult to escape; however, whereas prisoners were kept behind 
bars of the notorious federal prison of Alcatraz Island, clients of the famous Alcatraz of 
Bougouni give in to alcohol, dance and eroticism until the end of the night. Every weekend, 
L’Alcatraz transforms into a sort of lonely fortress of hedonism standing in the midst of the 
                                                          
466 On griots, see chapter 3 and 6. 
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night where trendy youth, better-off people and the local elite party ostentatiously away from 
the public scrutiny of residential areas. 
 
 
 
The rise and fall of Le Vatican 
 
Another place of Bougouni which became a centre of night life was called Le Vatican. As you 
will discover below, its success was rather ephemeral because it disturbed public order.  
 Le Vatican was located along the tarred road bordering the district of Heremakono. 
While still under construction, its original building attracted the curiosity of passers-by. A big 
house with thickly thatched roof, a brick wall to its rear, and an open-work wall made of white 
and blue planks of wood facing the street was taking shape. A large terrace was added in front 
of this kind of half-open house looking like a paillote.467 When I met its promoter, a local 
Muslim who had lived most of his life in Bouaké but came back to Bougouni due to the Ivorian 
crisis, I asked him what his project here was. 
 
 ‘Here in Bougouni there is no proper restaurant. They’ve mostly got petty restaurants where 
people eat off poor plastic plates and sit on worn benches and even on the ground! Me, I know how to 
welcome clients. You need to set a decent table with tablecloth, napkin and nice cutlery. You need to 
have comfortable seats with chair backs as well. You know, I just want to do the same as they rightly do 
in the restaurants of Côte d’Ivoire. You will see. I know my job.’ 
 
The promoter was as good as his word. When the construction work was completed, passers-
by could admire a well-designed restaurant decorated with ‘Le Vatican’ in red characters 
painted on the front wall of the terrace. The promoter worked in a restaurant called Le Vatican 
in the town of Bouaké. Inspired by his former patron who named his restaurant in honour of 
the Vatican City, the promoter of Le Vatican in Bougouni chose a similar name so as to 
distinguish his restaurant from local restaurants by associated it with the ‘civilised’ restaurants 
of Côte d’Ivoire. He inaugurated his restaurant by organising a ‘soirée dansante’ at which he 
offered food and soft drinks to the population. His party was announced by radios, so masses 
of people came.  
                                                          
467 When I looked at this construction site, my first impression was: ‘This hut looks like a paillote found in the tourist areas of 
northern Mali! Unfortunately, there is not tourism in southwest Mali!’ 
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However, after the crowd at the inauguration dispersed, his restaurant remained empty most 
of the time. The tables were delicately set and the food was well cooked and slightly exotic 
(westernised to some degree), but people still preferred to pay less by eating local dishes at 
petty restaurants. The promoter was also reluctant to sell alcohol to locals because he did not 
want his place to become a maquis.468 My local friends were not surprised by the bad start 
made by Le Vatican. For them, there is no market for expensive restaurants in Bougouni 
because most of its inhabitants do not want to waste their already limited budget on what 
they see as useless distinction when they can eat their favourite meals at home. Bougouni is 
simply not Bamako. The promoter of Le Vatican chose the wrong town for such an elite 
business. 
 The poor business done by Le Vatican forced its promoter to sell it after only two 
months in business. According to gossip, the promoter took loans to build Le Vatican. Sensing 
the imminent failure of his business, he discreetly sold Le Vatican for a good price, and left 
Bougouni to elude his creditors. We never saw him again. 
 The two new owners had a totally different idea of what Le Vatican should be. One of 
their younger brothers became the manager of the new Vatican. Within two weeks, he had 
started selling beers and spirits. He also employed a local woman to cook affordable local 
snacks. Le Vatican stopped being a proper restaurant and became a sort of maquis. The clients 
came slowly. 
 A week later, Le Vatican started to rent chambres de passe as well. The manager found 
an empty house connected to the backyard of Le Vatican by a small hidden path which goes 
behind the residential house located on the left of Le Vatican. He investigated who was its 
landlord. He called him and they arranged a deal together. Le Vatican rented this empty house 
and turned it into five chambres de passe. 
 The transformation of Le Vatican did not end there. Shortly afterwards, a big Hi Fi 
system with speakers was installed in the restaurant. Two weeks later five Nigerian 
prostitutes469 arrived at Le Vatican and settled into the chambres de passe. Within five weeks 
Le Vatican has been transformed into a maquis with chambres de passe and a brothel. When 
seeing the prostitutes, members of a grin470 facing Le Vatican exclaimed: ‘Ouh, this is really a 
maquis now!’ From the very moment the prostitutes came, Le Vatican started to be a hit, and 
became crowded every night. Ironically, Le Vatican turned into a space of vice rather than a 
                                                          
468 He sold alcohol only to foreigners such as passing South African engineers working in gold mines found in south Mali, and 
myself. 
469 I suspected these Nigerian women were forced into prostitutions by traffickers who set a network of “Nigerian” brothels in 
most gold mining sites and towns of south Mali. Such brothels are connected to the broader political economy of prostitution in 
West Africa. 
470 Le Vatican was located in front of a night grin I regularly visited in the other side of the tarred road. 
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‘civilised’ restaurant worthy of the morality of Vatican City. The prostitution and the renting of 
chambres de passe were accelerating and beer was frequently out of stock. During the holy 
month of Ramadan activities slowed down, but the crowd was still there. 
 The shԑfantigi and the owner of the small restaurant located just next to Le Vatican 
were practising Muslims and fasted during the day, yet they were happy when the night fall 
because the clients of Le Vatican consumed their food. Business was prospering. 
  
 ‘As an Ivorian song says “one man’s meat is another man’s poison”’ (Yaya, shԑfantigi in 
Bougouni).’ 
 
Yaya agreed alcohol and prostitution are bad; however, these illicit activities brought him 
many clients. Thanks to Le Vatican, his daily turnover multiplied by four! He continued: ‘What 
can I do? I accept them. I need to survive here.’ 
 However the success of Le Vatican quickly started to drift to the street. Initially, the 
prostitutes stayed within the paillote. After a couple of weeks, they started to come out; they 
sat on the terrace and ordered food next door as well. The comings and goings of clients also 
produced noise within the neighbourhood of Le Vatican. Furthermore, access to chambres de 
passe had a weak point: a neighbouring family complained about ‘tapage nocturne’ (nocturnal 
nuisance) of prostitutes and their clients who had to pass near the courtyard of their 
residential house in order to enter the chambres de passe. Given that this courtyard did not 
have a concrete door; families could see prostitutes and clients passing by from within their 
carré. As Le Vatican was close to the street lighting of the tarred road, it also attracted the 
gaze of passers-by during the night.  
 Three weeks after the end of the Ramadan, I heard in town that ‘Le Vatican has fallen!’ 
(Le Vatican binna) The neighbours called the landlord of the house turned into chambres de 
passe. They warned him about what was going on there. He then travelled from Sikasso and 
gave the manager two days notice to leave his house. Meanwhile, a wall of bricks was erected 
across the small path connecting the backyard of Le Vatican to the former chambres de passe. 
As soon as the chambres de passe were closed and the prostitutes left Le Vatican, the clients 
abandoned the place. Soon, its owners removed valuable materials from Le Vatican. So far the 
paillote has remained. Yaya the shԑfantigi, discouraged by the lack clients, left the area as well. 
 In the previous paragraph, by neighbours I do not necessarily mean those who openly 
complained to the manager about the passing of prostitutes and their clients near their 
courtyard. One of the inhabitants of this residential carré ran a business which benefited from 
clients brought by Le Vatican. The so-called ‘Wahhabis’ were also spotted scrutinising Le 
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Vatican from the tarred road after the night prayers of Ramadan. The closest mosque to Le 
Vatican was the main mosque where Muslims of reformist allegiance prayed. Nobody knew 
exactly who put pressure on the landlord of the house turned into chambres de passe. It could 
be someone people did not expect to do so. Any script remains possible. One thing is however 
sure. The landlord was approached secretly. In my view, this was done purposefully. Suspicions 
about responsibility might be entertained, but the conflict could not become open because the 
informers’ identities remained uncertain. The landlord might have publicly kept quiet the fact 
that he knew what was really going on there. As long as the chambres de passe did not disturb 
public order, he was gaining money, and his big cement house was costly, and had been empty 
for months after the departure of his last tenant, an NGO project.  Any client wanting to rent 
the house would, I imagine, have been welcome. Once these chambres de passe started 
disturbing public order, the landlord (living in Sikasso) could protect himself by saying ‘I had no 
clue about what was going on there.’ The deal arranged between the owners of Le Vatican and 
the landlord of their chambres de passe might have integrated this risk. Secret deals and 
hypocrisy are important parts of setting up un-Islamic businesses. 
 Members of the grin facing Le Vatican observed its rise and its fall. It lasted 5 months 
in total; 2 months as a restaurant and 3 months as a maquis-brothel.471 Now they debated the 
reasons for its short-lived existence. For them, Le Vatican was doomed to failure because it 
was not sufficiently hidden from public scrutiny. They said we should not forget that Mali is a 
Muslim country. Such un-Islamic activities endure only if they are kept secret; that is out of 
sight. Le Vatican was an open space which was not enclosed by a wall. The street lighting on 
the tarred road illuminated (although dimly) illicit activities within Le Vatican: prostitution and 
the consumption of alcohol. More significantly, when they compared Le Vatican to other 
longstanding maquis and brothels in town those in the grin observed ‘Le Vatican did not have 
a back-door’. They supported their opinion by referring to the brothel Chez David which 
benefits from a small back-door overlooking a dark inner street of Bougouni. Its main entrance 
next to street lighting was not used during the night. Most of the clients of Chez David opted 
for an unnoticed arrival through its discreet back-door instead.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
471 To be more precise, Le Vatican sold alcohol for three months; it hosted prostitutes for two months. 
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Reflections on Islam and public order in Mali and beyond 
 
The anthropology of the night I have pursued is interested above all in the night as darkness 
that hides. This analysis of night life is complete only when thought about in relation to day 
life; whereas daylight controls and regulates activities, darkness of the night covers and 
enlarges life.472 
 As illustrated in previous chapters, daytime in Mali concerns chores and work (baara), 
street life, the open and its visual dimension (‘thereness’). The everyday life of Muslims is 
mainly framed by a gendered division of work, spaces of sociality (carré, grin and street), visits, 
and life-cycle ceremonies. Social life is about togetherness and ostentation. Muslims display 
public norms of piety and practise ‘generic Islam’; both assert Muslim identity and shape what 
I have called ‘public Islam’ by connoting pious disposition. By respecting elders, customs 
(laada) and Mande social ethics (hadamadenya), Muslims show politeness, good manners and 
cultivate honour (danbé). By seeking ostentatious items (mobiles, motorbikes, cemented 
house) Muslims align with success in life based on materiality and consumption. All these 
examples demonstrate that the metaphor of sight is an important aspect of identity, success 
and social control in the Muslim society of Mali. 
 Night time in Mali concerns free-time (lafyia), the concealed and its intimate 
dimension (‘hereness’). Every-night life is mainly framed by secrecy, remoteness and nocturnal 
escapade (yaala). Away from public scrutiny some Muslims relax and seek pleasure (dance, 
alcohol and sex) in maquis and night-clubs while networking among the patrons. During the 
night electricity becomes an ambivalent ‘civilising’ force. Electricity keeps agents of Bamanaya 
at bay, but it also promotes night life and all its un-Islamic activities in town. In this way Islam 
and electricity do not promote the same civilised life. Then how can we understand Islam as a 
civilising force of urban Mali? Whereas Islam is an important element of public order during 
daytime in contemporary Mali, electricity allows a modernity of un-Islamic nature to flourish 
during the night. 
 Although most inhabitants of Bougouni declare publicly they are Muslim, the 
Islamisation of the society as the framework of life is at stake here. Recently, high schools in 
Bougouni inserted slots for Islamic prayers into their timetable. Should we consider this new 
policy as matter of good sense or as an Islamisation of high school? In this case, I opt for the 
former, because most students are Muslims, and regular daily prayers belong to basic Islamic 
practice and identity. As I demonstrated in Chapter 2 ‘generic Islam’ has become an important 
                                                          
472 On similar day/night approach to life among young women in Dakar, see Fouquet (2007, 117). 
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element of public order in Mali where Muslims represent over 90% of the Malian population. 
Through post 1991 democratic and liberal changes, Muslims gained the right to be politically 
active in Mali. As such Muslims and Muslim associations participate in the construction of 
Malian civil society. 
 However, post-1991 events have also pointed to the fact that Malian laïcité has been 
questioned by a minority of Muslims. For instance, on the night of the 26 September 2011 the 
bar-hotel and night-club Le Flamboyant in the district of Kalabancoura-Sud in Bamako was 
destroyed by a group of followers of a neighbouring mosque. According to Malian websites,473 
followers of a neighbouring mosque complained about the noise nuisance of Le Flamboyant. 
They took the owner of Le Flamboyant to court. Le Flamboyant had, however, legal approval 
and was built before the mosque. Therefore a group of Muslims decided to dispense justice 
themselves. The assailants, armed with stones and clubs, burst into the bar-hotel at 4 am. They 
hit the employees, sacked and burnt the hotel and a car. Then they fled. Six persons were 
injured, one seriously. Many Malian newspapers, such as Les Echos, denounced this ‘acte de 
vandalisme’. The same newspaper mentioned that ‘under the threat of “religious” people’ two 
other bars decided to close in this same area.474 
 This is not the first time a bar has been vandalised by religious activists who decide to 
take justice into their own hands in Mali; but such vandalism on behalf of Islam remains 
comparatively rare in Mali, a country where most ordinary Muslims support the laicité of the 
state. However attacks of spaces of alcohol consumption have increased since 1991. Under the 
military dictatorship of Moussa Traoré, bars and night-clubs had to close during the holy 
month of Ramadan. Shortly after the events of 1991 this decree was cancelled; the Malian 
state reinforced its secular character by allowing the opening of bars and night-clubs during 
the Ramadan. This new policy was perceived as a provocation by a minority of Muslims. They 
demonstrated in vain. With the post-1991 development of tourism in Mali, bars, hotels, 
restaurants selling alcohol and night-clubs have multiplied in Bamako. The Malian state 
supported this niche market through the OMATO (Office Malien du Tourisme et de l’Hôtellerie). 
Malian, Lebanese, French and Chinese (among others) promoters invested in the lucrative 
entertainment business in Bamako. As a consequence, night life has started to drift into the 
streets of the capital. The rampage at Le Flamboyant illustrates the growing discontent of 
                                                          
473 http://www.afribone.com/spip.php?article36322; http://www.lesechos.ml/acte-de-vandalisme-l%E2%80%99hotel-le-
flamboyant-saccage-par-des-integristes.html; http://www.bamanet.net/index.php/actualite/autres-presses/15769-lhotel-le-nid-
du-flamboyant-saccage-par-des-musulmans--5-blesses-graves-une-mercedes-190-calcinee-et-dimportants-degats-materiels.html 
(retrieved the 3rd of October 2011). 
474 My own translation, see http://www.lesechos.ml/acte-de-vandalisme-l%E2%80%99hotel-le-flamboyant-saccage-par-des-
integristes.html. 
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Muslims of reformist allegiance who feel provoked by the increasing visibility of alcohol 
consumption and sexy clothes in Mali since 1991.475  
 Shortly before the end of my stay in Bougouni, I heard a new night-club called ‘Le 
Faro’476 was under construction next to the exit toward Yanfolila. The youth were excited 
about this new project which might offer an alternative to the classic Saturday night out at 
L’Alcatraz. Its promoter, a French man married to a woman from Yanfolila, wanted to build a 
tourism complex to include a hotel, a restaurant, a swimming pool and a night-club. However, 
half-way through its construction the project was compelled to stop. After having issued the 
promoter with all necessary legal approvals, the same local authorities changed their mind 
when Muslims of a neighbourhood mosque477 started to complain about the erection of a bar-
hotel and night club next to their mosque. For them, the un-Islamic activities brought by this 
new entertainment complex would perturb prayers in the mosque and go against its morality. 
Others commented that the local authorities hurried to cash a costly building permit without 
bothering first to consult with the closest neighbours of this estate project: the Muslims of a 
mosque located just across the tarred road. According to latest news, the promoter 
abandoned his plans for a tourism complex and built a residential house instead. I doubt he 
recovered any money from the local authorities. 
 Whereas the abortion of ‘Le Faro’ tourism complex in Bougouni illustrates the greed of 
local authorities which caused them to act inconsistently, the fire attack on Le Flamboyant in 
Bamako questions the existence of the street as space of freedom. By ‘clearing’ the streets, 
such radical Muslims claim to fight against un-Islamic practices. However, bars and night-clubs 
do not disappear; they just go underground. They simply ‘take the maquis’. In relation to the 
issue of the street as space of freedom, both cases highlight ‘the problem of sameness’ (see 
Kelly and Thiranagama 2010, 9) facing a country in which public order is increasingly being 
understood in religious terms. This tendency is partially caused by the fact that local 
authorities have failed to act as reliable agents of public order in the money-making market of 
legal approval that has come with the rapid urbanisation of Mali.   
 In some parts of the Muslim world, there is a process of  homogenisation of street 
expression and identity working  in parallel with the setting up of spaces of exception such as 
the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) in Saudia Arabia. In contrast 
to what is happening in Saudia Arabia, women are allowed to drive within the campus and are 
                                                          
475 In the aftermath of the rampage of Le Flamboyant the Malian state has invited members of civil society, local state, OMATO, 
police as well as representatives of HCI (Haut Conseil Islamique) to check together legal approvals of bars, clubs and hotels of 
Bamako (see, http://www.rue89.com/2011/07/03/au-mali-des-islamistes-font-la-tournee-des-bars-212027, retrieved the 11 June 
2012). 
476 ‘Faro’, from the French word ‘faraud’, is a colloquial term which signifies ‘show-off’. 
477 A reformist-oriented mosque built by AMA (Agence des Musulmans d’Afrique; a Kuwaiti financed Islamic NGO). 
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not required to wear veils in classes that are open to both sexes. These spaces of exception are 
like zones of non-Islam where apparently God closes his eyes. Similarly, when we look at the 
diffusion of bars and night-clubs in the capital Bamako, they mostly concentrate in Rue 
Princesse in Hippodrome district, around the Bla-Bla night-club in Badalabougou district and 
around the Byblos night-club which is located along the Route de Koulikoro. In these three 
locations, bars and night-clubs shape sort of zones of non-Islam where members of the Malian 
upper-class, ‘expatrié(e)s’ (foreign workers) and western tourists drink alcohol, dance and 
party freely away of residential areas and mosques . The hypocrisy of such zones of non-Islam 
should not been treated as a ‘pathology or a distortion of political life’ but as a means through 
which lucrative un-Islamic businesses are domesticated in predominantly Muslim societies (see 
Kelly and Thiranagama 2010, 2). Most other bars of Mali are maquis; they have been able to 
endure in the predominantly Muslim society of Mali because of their hidden and discreet 
insertion into urban landscapes.  
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Conclusion 
My thesis has highlighted the ways the events of March 1991 put Mali on the path of a new 
era of liberal and democratic changes. The Third Republic provided the background to the 
urban street life that has been a key to the interpretation of Muslim life that I have based on 
my 18 months of fieldwork in the town of Bougouni in southwest Mali. As I reached the 
completion of writing this thesis, however, the country entered a crisis that has jeopardised 
the institutions of the Third Republic, disrupted its democratic process,478 and slowed both its 
local economy and the importation of foreign products into the country. In the aftermath of 
the conquest of northern Mali by the Mouvement National de libération de l’Azawad (MLNA) 
allied with several ‘Islamist’ insurgent factions, the Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré 
was overthrown by a coup d’état on 22 March 2012. After a three week power contest 
between the military junta led by Captain Sanogo and the International Community 
(particularly the ECOWAS), Dioncounda Traoré (the head of Mali's national assembly) became 
the interim President of Mali. But in August 2012, while I write this conclusion, the political 
situation in Mali remains highly confused. The country is still cut in two: 479 whereas the north 
is in the hands of several armed factions motivated by heterogeneous and obscure aims, the 
Malian state remains paralysed because its executive authority has suffered from a lack of 
legitimacy since the coup d'état. In addition to exacerbating longstanding economic scarcity, 
how has this period of instability impacted on people’s lives, their general aspiration to be 
successful, moral Muslim in southern Mali? Although I have not yet been able to return to Mali 
since these events occurred, a partial response to these complex and emergent issues can be 
provided by the messages telling me what has become of my main informants since I left the 
country in April 2010.  
 Salif, a former student in the Qur’anic school in Segou, and later a farmer in southern 
rural Mali, left his village to settle in town where he learnt the profession of tailor in order to 
gain the money necessary to become independent and finance his wedding. After years of 
unsuccessful struggle in Bougouni, however, he became progressively disheartened. When a 
recent attempt to make money in a gardening project organised by an NGO failed, Salif took an 
important decision. Still single and without savings, he eventually yielded to what he had 
attempted to avoid since moving to Bougouni: an outdated rural way of life closely associated 
with the authority of elders. Shortly after my departure, Salif settled back in his village of origin 
                                                          
478 The first round of the presidential election planned for 29 April 2012 was cancelled. 
479 More than 100,000 civilians have fled northern Mali since its invasion. Most of them have taken refuge in southern Mali and in 
neighbouring countries, such as Niger and Burkina Faso. Those who stayed have had to cope with many kinds of shortages and a 
sharia-oriented rule imposed by 'Islamist' factions.  
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next to his gwa.480 The head of the family, his big brother, found him a bride. Thanks to his 
cattle trade, he financed Salif's wedding, and give him money so as to settle his household. 
Salif became a married man; however, he henceforth had to accept his position as an adult 
whose life-trajectory was closely bound to the power of his elders who had helped him to 
achieve this status. Besides farming activities, he still earns some extra cash by repairing 
villagers’ clothes thanks to the tailoring skills he learnt in town. 
Kassim, a former docker in San Pedro harbour who fled the Ivorian crisis to Mali, 
thereafter became gardener in Sikasso, houseboy, mill worker and shɛfantigi in Bougouni; near 
the end of my stay in southwest Mali, he was running a cement-built shop selling and servicing 
mobile phones. At that time, his financial situation was improving, so plans for a wedding and 
the purchase of prestigious products, and the prospect of an honourable return to his relatives 
in Côte d’Ivoire, preoccupied him. A couple of months later, however, I heard that Kassim had 
left the town following an unfortunate event: he had entrusted his neighbour with a 
considerable amount of money so as to conclude an important business deal, but the 
neighbour betrayed their friendship by spending most of this money instead on his personal 
needs. The irreparable financial loss seriously undermined the working capital of Kassim’s 
shop. According to a recent call I had with Yaya, Kassim’s former patron, in the aftermath of 
this interpersonal and economic blow Kassim moved on to the town of Yanfolila. There he 
opened a small shop ‘par terre’ where he fixed mobile phones as a livelihood. 
Boubacar, a trader of yuguyugu from a village near Segou who worked in the central 
market of Bougouni, was also hit by a misfortune. One day, the local police arrested him and 
put him in jail with other small traders of Bougouni; they were all accused of selling stolen 
yuguyugu. After taking credits so as to pay a bail of 100,000fcfa for his release, Boubacar and 
his family left Bougouni to Segou because, frightened, he did not want to pay more for 
something he thought that he was wrongly accused of. According to local gossip, the chief of 
the police, an old man from the Région of Koulikoro, had abused of his power by making false 
accusations against tens of small, hence, powerless traders so as to make easy extra cash in 
preparation for his coming retirement. Boubacar, a man who harboured suspicions about the 
‘bad persons’ of Bougouni, was himself eventually caught up in the notorious reputation of the 
town. 
Fousseini, a fisherman from a village near Segou, had undergone months of poor 
fishing by the end of my stay in Bougouni. He explained that his lack of garijԑgԑ (luck)481 caused 
there to be so few fish in his daily catch. Despite the intervention of a marabout and his 
                                                          
480 On gwa, see Chapter 1 and 5. 
481 For more about the Bamanan notion of luck, see Chapter 3. 
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regular utterance of blessings, his luck did not improve. When fishing in the River Ba near to 
Bougouni was no longer sufficiently profitable to provide a decent livelihood for his wife, his 
daughter and himself, he abandoned fishing and retrained as a carter in the centre of 
Bougouni. He hoped this situation would not persist, because the job of carter is physically 
demanding and poorly paid. Six months after my departure, Fousseini and his family moved to 
the little town of Selingue in southwest Mali, soon after he heard from a friend living there 
that fishing in the Selingue Lake was good.  By the beginning of 2012, he had decided to work 
as a digger482 in a traditional gold washing site in Guinea, while his family stayed in Selingue. As 
he told me: ‘I would like to chance it with gold’. In July when I called him, he was preparing for 
the arrival of his family to live with him.   
Apart from Yaya, a powerful state administrator whose situation has flourished in 
Bougouni, and Ahmed, a farmer and bogolan maker involved in many local activities, all my 
friends have left Bougouni so as to pursue their adventures elsewhere because they did not 
find success they craved in this town. Bougouni, like most middle-sized towns in West Africa, is 
a crossroads for migrants in search of a better life.  A tiny minority of them achieve some 
success in town, while most of them struggle to make ends meet. Given the longstanding 
context of hardship and social stagnation, the recent coup d’état has not constituted a major 
shift in their lives (as the conquest of northern Mali by various armed factions must have been 
for Malians living in north Mali); so far, they have perceived this event as one more of the 
political vagaries affecting the capitals of West Africa. As the head of my host family told me 
over the phone: ‘The town of Bougouni is quiet. Nothing has changed here.  We just listened to 
the radio that the situation is tense in the capital.’  
Two elements will be decisive for the final effect of the coup on lives in Mali: the 
length of the period of instability, and the outcome for the sovereignty of Mali over its 
northern territories.  As yet, it is too soon to assess whether the coup d’état of 22 March 2012 
in Mali marks the beginning of a new era in this country, as the coup d’état of 26 March 1991 
did. Nonetheless, I would like to comment upon an element of the current Malian crisis which 
has struck western media in general. Whereas the conquest of northern Mali has been 
interpreted as a side effect of the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, many observers did not foresee 
the possibility of a coup d’état in a country commonly seen as a model of democracy in Africa. 
The fact that many Malians have accepted the coup d’état and tolerated the military junta, 
such as the youths who, through demonstrations in the streets of Bamako, opposed foreign 
intrusion in Malian politics by questioning the legitimacy of the interim President of Mali, 
                                                          
482 On the job of digger, see Chapter 6. 
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illustrate the failure of post-1991 governments to work for ordinary Malians in general; 
‘indeed, in recent years, we have witnessed a transformation of the Malian economy to the 
benefit of foreign capital and private interests, but ultimately to the detriment of Malian 
peasants and workers’ (County and Peterson 2012, 2). In similar vein, Chapter 5 demonstrates 
that, whereas access to a modern urban way of life remains the exclusive preserve of a tiny 
minority of urbanites who are becoming richer (among them numerous big traders, politicians 
and state senior officers), migrants of rural origins make do with cheap Asian products, while 
others simply struggle to make a meagre livelihood in town. In this context of simmering if 
submerged discontent, in its immediate aftermath a coup d’état is more likely to be 
interpreted in terms of a hope for new opportunities than an attack on democratic institutions 
deserving of defence. In their quest for worldly success, Muslim believers I met in Bougouni, 
with whom I have communicated in 2012, interpret this period of instability as a collective 
sababu (cause)483 affecting Malian society, and most particularly its northern territories. On a 
personal level, whether a Malian perceives this sababu as juguman (bad), or ɲuman (good) 
remains relative,484 because, as Kassim told me when he ran a successful shɛfantigi next to the 
maquis-brothel Le Vatican; ‘one man’s meat is another man’s poison’.  
 The political and economic stability of Mali has largely depended on two factors since 
its independence: the resolution of the instability of the north of Mali (particularly the Tuareg 
rebellions), and the opening up of Mali to neighbouring forest zone and coastal countries. The 
first factor has been headline news of scientific and media analyses, but the second remains 
understudied. A first step in this direction would explore how the recent changes affect the 
dynamics of the border zone between the Malian town of Bougouni, the Ivorian town of 
Odienné, and the Guinean town of Kankan. The current crisis has accelerated the general 
southward migration observed within Mali ever since droughts hit northern Mali during the 
1980s. The vast savannah of southern Mali, which had already become an important zone of 
immigration due to the increasing demographic pressure and desiccation affecting northern 
Mali (by contrast with the relative availability of land resources in southern Mali) is 
progressively transforming  into a regional hub where people migrate so as to avoid conflict 
and to gain access to a better life; in parallel, traders and smugglers increase their operations 
there in order to adapt their businesses to changed economic flows. The instability in northern 
Mali coupled with the relative stabilisations of Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea will boost the strategic 
importance of the formerly marginal savannah zone between Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea, 
                                                          
483 On the Bamanan notion of sababu, see Chapter 4. 
484 On sababu juguman and sababu ɲuman, see Chapter 4. 
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and the cross-boundary activities there, a mutation that will have considerable impact in our 
understanding of the Sahel-Savannah-Coastal dynamics and their regulations. 
 My doctoral thesis has been the first monograph-length work to describe and analyse 
contemporary Muslim life in southern Mali. The next logical step would involve an exploration 
of the vast savannah and border zone extending across Mali, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire in order 
to study religious experiences and identity formation that involved cross-boundary exchanges, 
belongings and dynamics. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Buguni 
 
Jamana ka di Banimonité Jamana (four times). 
Buguni ka di Banimonotié, Buguni i fo. Buguni ka di Banimonotié, Buguni. 
 
Mͻgͻ tͻgͻ jugu ma na fo i tͻgͻ ɲuman yé, ɲuman tɛ don tugu, ɲuman tɛ don tugu. 
 
Mun bɛ Buguni? Balimaya bɛ Buguni de. 
Mun bɛ Buguni ? Jigin dugu bɛ Buguni. 
Mun bɛ Buguni ? Dunan bonya bɛ Buguni de (twice). 
Mun bɛ Buguni ? Jigin dugu bɛ Buguni. 
Mun bɛ Buguni ?  Hinɛ ani makari bɛ. 
 
Mͻgͻ tͻgͻ jugu ma na fo i tͻgͻ ɲuman yé, ɲuman tɛ don tugu, ɲuman tɛ don tugu. 
 
Mun bɛ Buguni?  Furu bonya bɛ Buguni de. 
 Mun bɛ Buguni ? Furu dilan bɛ Buguni. 
 
Nɛ bɛ i wele fila  Buguniden u ma,an ka jɛ ka an bolo di ɲͻgͻn an ma, an ka jɛ ka baara kɛ 
Buguni. 
 
 Buguni ka di Banimonité, Buguni i fo, dugu dasiri i fo, dugu dasiri i fo. 
 
Kulubali siw ani waati Buguni kola. 
Tu kͻrͻni ma mudu jaba nɛnɛ 
Mͻgͻ bina kulu kan, kulu bɛ i ma jogin; ni kulu bina mͻgͻ kan, kulu bɛ i ma jogin. 
Fula ɲuman tatati. 
Fula si naani jatara si naani. 
Fula ma na bonya fulaya cɛnna; ko fula ma na fasa fulaya dafara. 
Ko Banimonitié fulaw olu yé barika dunan ni jatigiya la. 
 
Dow u ko ko a kɛra Buguni  «examen» yé, dow u ko ko a kɛra Buguni «examen» yé. Dow u ko 
ko Buguni fatͻ ka ca. 
Fatͻ ma ca Buguni, Buguni yé kunbɛyɛrɛ yé. 
 
Ni ɛ bɛ Buguni ɲini, Buguni bɛ min ni. A sigilen bɛ Côte d’Ivoire ani Mali dancɛ la. A sigilen bɛ la 
Guinée ani Mali dancɛ la. A sigilen bɛ Sikasso ni Bamako cɛ. 
Dugu dasiri fo, Dugu dasiri fo : Buguni ka di  Banimonité, Buguni (twice). 
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